Armenian–Azerbaijani War (1918–1920)

The Armenian–Azerbaijani war (1918–1920) was a conflict that took place in the South Caucasus in regions with a mixed Armenian- Azerbaijani population, broadly encompassing what are now modern-day Azerbaijan and Armenia. It began during the final months of World War I and ended with the establishment of Soviet rule.

The conflict took place against the backdrop of the Russian Civil War and the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Mutual territorial claims, made by the newly formed Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and Republic of Armenia, led to their respective support for Azerbaijani and Armenian militias in the disputed territories. Armenia fought against Azerbaijani militias in the Erivan Governorate of the former Russian Empire, while Azerbaijan fought Armenian claims to the Karabakh region. The war was characterized by outbreaks of massacres and ethnic cleansing (such as the March Days, the September Days, the Shusha massacre, and more broadly, the Massacres of Azerbaijanis in Armenia), which changed the demographics of the region.

Hostilities broadly came to an end when the Soviet's 11th Army invaded and occupied both Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Background and causes

The ethnic conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis has deep historical roots, with mutual territorial claims emerging against the backdrop of religious and cultural differences between the two peoples.

The origins of the conflict date back to the 11th century when the Seljuks conquered the southern and eastern Caucasus, occupying the fertile valleys and plains, while the Christian population was pushed into the mountainous regions. As a result of multiple waves of invasions, the ethnographic map of the region became highly complex: in the mountainous areas, numerous Muslim settlements coexisted with Christian ones, while Christian settlements remained in the valley of the Aras River. A significant demographic shift occurred following the deportation of a substantial portion of the Armenian population to the central territory of the Safavid Empire in the early 17th century. The Turkic military-feudal aristocracy gained control over vast territories, where Armenian populations also remained. At the same time, economic factors contributed to tensions between settled and semi-nomadic or nomadic lifestyles. During the summer months, Muslim pastoralists moved their herds from the lowlands to mountain pastures, leading to conflicts with the local Armenian population.

However, the national, religious, social, and economic differences between Muslims and Armenians only took on antagonistic forms by the late 19th century. In the 18th, and especially the 19th, century, thousands of Armenians freed themselves from the dominance of the Azerbaijani aristocracy, leading to the emergence of an Armenian bourgeoisie that successfully competed with the old (Azerbaijani) elite, thereby threatening the pre-existing socioeconomic order. Armenian magnates even established themselves in Baku, where, due to massive population influxes driven by the oil boom, Azerbaijanis became an ethnic minority.

One of the factors contributing to the hostile attitude towards Armenians in Russian Transcaucasia in the late 19th century was the underrepresentation of the Muslim population in local administrative bodies. Specifically, according to the 1870 reform, non-Christians were allocated no more than one-third of seats in municipal councils (reduced to no more than 20% in 1892). Although these measures were initially aimed at Jews, in Transcaucasia, they primarily affected Muslims. For example, in Baku, where Muslims were the predominant property owners, they constituted about 80% of the electorate.

Following the incorporation of Transcaucasia into the Russian Empire, the central government sought to establish cultural homogeneity in the region. Measures were taken to weaken the influence of the Muslim aristocracy by appointing primarily Christians—mostly Armenians—to administrative positions. However, from the 1880s onward, the imperial government reversed its policy and sought to undermine Armenian dominance in Transcaucasian cities by implementing an anti-Armenian policy reminiscent of antisemitism, encouraging Muslim claims to urban control in the Baku and Elizavetpol Governorates, and in some cases even participating in anti-Armenian pogroms on the side of the Muslims.

This antagonism escalated into mutual ethnic massacres during the revolutionary events of 1905. The state administration did not intervene in the interethnic conflict and, in some cases, even fueled it to divert Transcaucasia from the revolutionary upheavals in Russia.

The Armenian–Tatar massacres of 1905–1906 had severe material and humanitarian consequences. However, this armed ethnic confrontation also contributed to the consolidation and strengthening of national consciousness among both ethnic communities involved. Armenian nationalist leaders considered these events a form of moral victory: the myth of Muslim invincibility was shattered in the minds of Armenians who had taken up arms for their defense. At the same time, increasing distrust towards Armenians, who traditionally dominated middle-class professions, stimulated the development of an Azerbaijani national bourgeoisie. This, in turn, led to the formation of a more progressive education system, the emergence of several Azerbaijani Turkic-language newspapers, and the establishment of cultural and charitable organizations.

As noted by American historian Richard Hovannisian, hostilities flared up again in 1918 against the backdrop of strong pro-Russian orientations among Armenians and pro-Turkish tendencies among Azerbaijanis, who sought to restore Muslim hegemony in the region.

October Revolution and Transcaucasia

The fall of the Provisional Government in Petrograd as a result of the October Revolution triggered intense political struggles in Transcaucasia. Local Mensheviks argued that a socialist revolution was impossible in an agrarian country and that capitalist development had to be completed before transitioning to socialism. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, sought to extend revolutionary transformations throughout the Russian Empire. During this period, national parties became increasingly active in Transcaucasia, including the Azerbaijani "Musavat" and the Armenian " Dashnaktsutyun".

In the struggle for power, a Transcaucasian government (Commissariat) was formed in Tiflis, comprising representatives from Georgian Mensheviks, Azerbaijani Musavatists, Armenian Dashnaks, and two Russian commissars. National organizations such as the Armenian and Georgian National Councils and the Central Transcaucasian Muslim Committee (National Committee) held significant influence, with their representatives participating in the Transcaucasian Commissariat and determining its policies. The commander-in-chief of the Caucasian front, General M. A. Przhevalsky, recognized the Transcaucasian Commissariat and urged military forces to comply with it.

The Transcaucasian Commissariat extended its authority over the entire region except for Baku, where Soviet power had been established peacefully in November 1917. Here, political struggles among Bolsheviks, Musavatists, Dashnaks, Socialist Revolutionaries, and Mensheviks prevented the formation of a unified governing body for several months.

By early 1918, two centers of political power had emerged in Transcaucasia, each rallying friendly or allied forces around them. The Baku industrial region, a stronghold of Soviet power in the region, was opposed by the traditional political center, Tiflis, where the Transcaucasian Commissariat was based. Meanwhile, large parts of the Baku and Elizavetpol governorates were in a state of lawlessness and anarchy. In Elizavetpol, power was effectively in the hands of the Muslim National Committee, while Nagorno-Karabakh was administered by an Armenian-Azerbaijani council. In Sharur-Nakhchivan, both Azerbaijani and Armenian committees were active in governance.

Disintegration of the Caucasian Front and the formation of national armies

Realizing that the troops under its command had disintegrated and completely lost their combat effectiveness, the command of the Caucasus Army decided to immediately begin forming national units on a voluntary basis to salvage the situation at the front. On December 5 (old calendar: 18), 1917, an armistice was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Caucasus Front, ceasing military operations. The next day, the Transcaucasian Commissariat decided to "demobilize the army if possible", create national military units, and establish a "special body to lead the struggle against the Bolsheviks". The process of forming national armies, including the Georgian Army Corps and the Armenian Volunteer Corps, began in parallel with the withdrawal of several Russian units from the front. In December, at the suggestion of the Caucasus Front headquarters, the Muslimization of certain units, primarily the 219th Infantry Reserve Regiment in Yelizavetpol (Ganja), commenced. On December 18 (31), the Transcaucasian Commissariat announced the formation of a new army, which included the Muslim Corps. By order of General Przhevalsky, commander-in-chief of the Caucasus Front, the official creation of the Transcaucasian Muslim Corps began the next day.

News of the armistice with the Ottoman Empire led to a mass departure of soldiers from the front. The Transcaucasian Commissariat decided to disarm the units that had abandoned the front, which provoked an extremely negative reaction among soldiers unwilling to surrender their weapons. The Muslim National Committee was entrusted to arm the Muslim military unit, which required a substantial amount of arms and ammunition. However, most military depots were located in Tiflis and Sarikamish, and Muslims were excluded from the distribution of weapons and military supplies. Consequently, Azerbaijani representatives were among the most consistent advocates for the complete disarmament of Russian soldiers returning from the front. This process began in Yelizavetpol in December 1917. Local influential figures used the First Tatar Regiment, commanded by Georgian officers, to seize the weapons of the 219th Reserve Regiment. A significant portion of this regiment consisted of Armenians and Russians. These actions led the authorities and the local military commander to lose control over the situation in Yelizavetpol.

In January 1918, local armed groups attacked Russian military personnel returning from the front at stations along the Tiflis– Bilajari railway line, including Dellar, Agstafa, Shamkhor, Akhtakala, and others, as well as in Khachmaz (on the Baku–Derbent railway line), in an attempt to seize their weapons. The largest and bloodiest clash occurred at Shamkhor station on January 22–25 (9–12), when Azerbaijani armed groups attacked, resulting in the deaths of nearly 2,000 Russian soldiers. During this clash, 2,000 Russians were killed and several thousand wounded. More than 30 cannons, 100 machine guns, and 12,000 rifles were seized. According to V.M. Mukhanov, the Shamkhor events signified the gradual descent of Transcaucasia into anarchy. Alongside these attacks on military trains, large-scale clashes between Azerbaijanis and Armenians erupted almost daily in the Iravan and Yelizavetpol governorates, with Azerbaijani and Armenian villages being set on fire for the first time.

The Transcaucasian Seim, the supreme legislative body representing the region's regime, convened on February 10 (23) and was forced to acknowledge the increasing interethnic clashes. However, attempts by commissions composed of representatives from various factions to reconcile the parties failed. According to V.M. Mukhanov, the situation in Transcaucasia was exacerbated by the involvement—both direct and indirect—of the main political parties. While the Musavatists sought to cultivate pro- Ottoman sentiments by exploiting ethnic and religious animosities, "Dashnak leaders did not prevent Armenian units from repressing local Muslims, justifying their actions by claiming that the latter obstructed the movement of military echelons, forcing Armenian units to fight along their path."

At that time, three armed factions coexisted in Baku: the Musavatists, the Dashnaks, and the Bolshevik Red Guard. Political confrontation intensified ethnic tensions, pushing the city to the brink of new ethnic violence.

As early as mid-1917, with signs of the revolutionary disintegration of the Russian army emerging, members of the Armenian national committees in Moscow and Petrograd sought to convince A.F. Kerensky of the necessity of maintaining stability on the Caucasus Front. To this end, they requested the transfer of thousands of Armenian military personnel from other fronts to the Caucasus. From the Armenian perspective, this move could be a decisive factor in ensuring that the territories captured in Anatolia remained under Russian control. Permission was granted. Shortly before the fall of the Provisional Government in October, Kerensky ordered the transfer of 35,000 Armenian soldiers to replace Russian units in the Caucasus. However, only a few thousand of them reached the front. The majority instead went to Baku, where, under the leadership of the Armenian Council, they contributed to the establishment of Bolshevik rule in 1918.

Both the Musavatists and the Bolsheviks understood that a military confrontation between them was only a matter of time. In March 1918, the Bolsheviks and Dashnaks in Baku initiated massacres against Azerbaijani Turks. These events, later known as the March Days or March Massacre, resulted in the deaths of over 10,000 Azerbaijanis. Although the Dashnaks initially declared neutrality, they soon joined the massacres against the Musavatists. The anti-Azerbaijani massacres that began in Baku quickly spread to other regions of the Baku Governorate. As a result of these events, the Musavatists' stronghold in Baku was significantly weakened, leading to the establishment of the Baku Commune by the Bolsheviks in alliance with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Ottoman offensive

In January 1918, the Russian army effectively abandoned the front. During this period, resistance against the Ottoman Third Army was carried out by scattered Armenian units in the region. Following the withdrawal of Russian forces, ethnic clashes between Turks (including Azerbaijanis), Kurds, and Armenians continued along the front. On January 30 (February 12), the Ottoman army declared that it had launched military operations to protect Muslims who had been subjected to massacres by Armenians. By March 24, Ottoman forces had reached the borders of 1914, thereby establishing control over the entirety of Eastern Anatolia. A significant number of Armenian civilians fled the region along with the retreating Armenian military units.

Under the terms of the additional Russia–Turkey treaty signed in Brest-Litovsk on March 3, Russian troops were required to immediately withdraw from the regions of Ardahan, and Batumi (the Kars and Batumi oblasts). Russia pledged not to interfere in the reorganization of these territories' political and legal status and to allow their populations to establish a new system in consultation with neighboring states, particularly Turkey. One of the key provisions of the treaty stipulated that all Armenian armed units within the designated area, which was planned to remain under the control of both Turkey and Russia, were to be disarmed by Soviet authorities. The signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty effectively nullified the Soviet Council of People's Commissars' decree on "Turkish Armenia", which had recognized the right of Anatolian Armenians to self-determination.

In accordance with the agreement, Ottoman forces captured Kars and Batumi and restored the borders of 1877. On April 22, under pressure from the Ottoman Empire, the Transcaucasian Sejm declared its independence from Russia. However, negotiations between the newly formed republic and the Ottoman Empire proved inconclusive, and on May 15, the Ottoman army launched a new offensive. The main target of the operation was the territory of the Erivan Governorate, leading to a new three-week-long war with Armenian forces. This crisis, along with the Georgians' agreement with Germany and the Azerbaijanis' alliance with the Ottoman Empire, resulted in the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic and the subsequent emergence of three new nation-states.

Even before the collapse of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, Azerbaijani nationalists had undertaken a secret visit to Istanbul. Their objective was to secure the support of the Young Turk government for the declaration of a second Turkish state. The two sides reached an agreement on cooperation, particularly regarding Turkish military assistance in the formation of Azerbaijan's future armed forces, their financing, and local Turkish support for Ottoman military operations.

On June 4, the Ottoman Empire signed peace treaties in Batumi with each of the Transcaucasian republics. The terms were particularly severe for Armenia, which had been defeated in its war against Turkey. The newly established Republic of Armenia was granted less than half of the former Erivan Governorate, comprising the New Bayazid Uyezd, the eastern part of the Alexandropol Uyezd, and the cities of Erivan and Uchkilisa. Georgia, in turn, agreed to cede the Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki uyezds to the Ottoman Empire. Under the terms of the Ottoman–Azerbaijan agreement, the Ottoman Empire recognized Azerbaijan as a republic consisting of the Baku and Yelizavetpol Governorates, as well as the Ordubad district of Nakhchivan. Additionally, the Ottoman Empire pledged to assist Azerbaijan in establishing its authority over Baku and the mountainous regions of Karabakh.

In June 1918, the Caucasian Islamic Army, composed of Ottoman and Azerbaijani Turks, was established. Its primary objective was to reclaim Baku, where the Baku Commune, led by Bolsheviks, had taken power following the March massacres. Simultaneously, the predominantly Armenian forces of the Baku Commune launched a military offensive westward, aiming to prevent the Caucasian Islamic Army from linking up with local Azerbaijani military units. The conflict culminated in the defeat of the Baku Commune's forces and the subsequent establishment of the Central Caspian Dictatorship following a coup in Baku. Despite the assistance provided by the British Dunsterforce to the defenders of Baku, the Caucasian Islamic Army captured the city in September 1918, exacting revenge for the March massacres.

During the summer and autumn of 1918, an Armenian–Azerbaijani war was already underway in the ethnically mixed regions of Transcaucasia. Meanwhile, Andranik Ozanyan, refusing to recognize the Ottoman–Armenia agreement, continued fighting Azerbaijani military units in Nakhchivan and Zangezur with his forces. At the same time, with the support of the Caucasian Islamic Army, Azerbaijan sought to establish its authority over the mountainous areas of Karabakh.

During this period, territorial disputes arose between the newly established republics. Azerbaijan laid claim not only to the Baku and Yelizavetpol Governorates but also to Muslim-populated areas of the Erivan Governorate, the Zagatala district, and several districts of the Tiflis Governorate, including Tiflis, Sighnaghi, Borchali, Akhalkalaki, and Akhaltsikhe. Armenia, in turn, asserted claims over the Erivan Governorate, the southern part of the Borchali Uyezd, the Akhalkalaki Uyezd of the Tiflis Governorate, the mountainous regions of the Yelizavetpol Governorate, Zangezur, Karabakh, and Gazakh. Additionally, Georgia and Azerbaijan disputed control over the Zagatala district and parts of the Tiflis Governorate, while Armenia and Georgia contested control over Borchali and Akhalkalaki. Following the Ottoman Empire's defeat in World War I and the signing of the Armistice of Mudros, which led to the withdrawal of Ottoman forces from Transcaucasia, all three republics laid claim to Kars and Batumi.

The territorial dispute over the Borchali Uyezd escalated into a war between Georgia and Armenia. While territorial disagreements between Azerbaijan and Georgia did not result in open conflict, they persisted until Soviet rule was established in Transcaucasia.

At the same time, the Armenian population of Karabakh and Zangezur refused to recognize Azerbaijani authority, insisting on joining Armenia. However, the Armenian government was unable to provide significant support to these territories. Conversely, the Muslim-inhabited areas south of Erivan, receiving assistance and arms from the Ottoman Empire and Azerbaijan, refused to acknowledge the authority of the Armenian Republic. The clash of interests ultimately led to violent confrontations in the disputed territories.

Disputed territories and the arguments of the parties

Yelizavetpol Governorate

The Yelizavetpol Governorate was established in 1868 and was situated east of the mountainous regions of the Erivan Governorate and neighbored the Tiflis and Baku governorates. The majority of its population consisted of Azerbaijanis and Armenians. While Armenians constituted the majority in the mountainous areas, Azerbaijanis were predominant elsewhere in the governorate. Additionally, Azerbaijanis engaged in seasonal migrations, moving from the lowlands to the Armenian-populated highlands during certain times of the year.

During this period, the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict spread across the mountainous regions of the Yelizavetpol Governorate. These conflict zones can be categorized into three main areas:
* The southwestern mountainous region of the Kazakh Uyezd along Dilijan;
* The mountainous part of Karabakh, including a significant portion of the Shusha Uyezd, as well as the mountainous areas of the Yelizavetpol, Javad, and Jebrail uezds;
* The Zangezur Uyezd, which was separated from the mountainous part of Karabakh by Azerbaijani and Kurdish villages.

Following the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Federation, the mountainous part of the Kazakh Uyezd was incorporated into Armenia, while the Armenian–Azerbaijani confrontation in Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur persisted for another two years.

The ethnic boundary in Karabakh largely coincided with the physical-geographical division between the lowland and mountains, running along the western edge of the Mil-Karabakh steppe. At the same time, there were several Armenian villages in the Azerbaijani-populated Lowland Karabakh as well as Azerbaijani villages in the Armenian-populated mountainous regions of Karabakh. The largest city in Karabakh, Shusha, had distinct Azerbaijani and Armenian quarters. Due to the seasonal migrations of Azerbaijani nomads during the summer months, the ethnic boundary in the mountainous regions of Karabakh became blurred, forming a wide zone of mixed settlement.

Zangezur served as a strategic corridor connecting Eastern Transcaucasia, the Erivan Governorate, and Nakhchivan. In 1916, the region was home to 120,000 Muslims and 101,000 Armenians, excluding Azerbaijani pastoralists from the lowland areas of Karabakh, who seasonally migrated to Zangezur's mountain pastures. Additionally, Azerbaijanis formed the majority in certain peripheral areas, such as the southeastern slopes near Qubadli. The Armenian side proposed administrative-territorial reforms in Transcaucasia. According to this plan, the peripheral areas of Zangezur, where the majority of the population consisted of Azerbaijani nomads, were to be separated from the main part of the uyezd. Consequently, after the departure of the nomadic population, the demographic composition of the uyezd would consist of 88,000 Armenians, 2,000 other Christians, and 46,000 Muslims.

Richard Hovannisian states that both Azerbaijanis and Armenians were determined in their territorial claims over these regions.

The First Republic of Armenia justified its claims over the mountainous areas of Yelizavetpol based on the Armenian majority population in those regions, as well as religious and cultural unity. Armenians argued that these mountainous areas were distinct from the Azerbaijani-inhabited lowlands. In their view, these territories formed Armenia's natural defense, facilitating the protection of the Aras Valley and the Ararat region. They also contended that the exclusion of Karabakh's mountainous areas from Armenia would compromise its territorial integrity. From a strategic standpoint, the loss of these highland regions would mean the removal of the last barrier between Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as Armenia's isolation from Iran. Even after the region came under Azerbaijani control and its demographic composition changed, Armenians maintained that remnants of Armenian statehood persisted in Karabakh. They justified their claims by referring to the historical Armenian melikdoms of Karabakh, which had retained a degree of autonomy under the Safavid Empire.

The Azerbaijani side based its claims on historical, geographical, and economic arguments. According to Azerbaijan, although the Armenian melikdoms had certain degrees of autonomy, they were nevertheless considered part of the Karabakh Beylerbeylik, which was under Turkic rule. Prior to the Russian occupation, Turkic tribes had dominated the South Caucasus. In the Yelizavetpol Governorate, Azerbaijanis constituted an absolute majority in seven out of eight districts. Even in the mountainous part of Karabakh, where they were a minority, Azerbaijani Turks and Kurds still formed a significant demographic presence. From Azerbaijan's perspective, the unilateral separation of areas with compact Armenian populations and their annexation to Armenia would threaten the geographical, economic, and political unity of the region. Unlike the Armenian side, Azerbaijan did not consider the mountainous and lowland areas as distinct entities but rather as a single, cohesive unit that aligned with the traditional nomadic lifestyle of the Azerbaijani population.

Anatoli Yamskov notes that, according to the 1897 census, Azerbaijanis constituted 54.8% of the rural population in the Shusha and Jabrayil districts (115,800 people). During the summer, only one-third of them remained in the lowlands of Karabakh, while the rest migrated to the mountainous areas, specifically to the Shusha and Zangezur districts. Arsen Saparov further states that the survival of Karabakh's nomadic communities was heavily dependent on access to the high-altitude pastures in the mountainous areas, as they migrated there seasonally, passing through territories inhabited by sedentary populations.

The division of Karabakh into mountainous and lowland areas could have led to the complete collapse of the economic livelihood of nomadic Azerbaijanis. To address this issue, Armenia proposed alternatives such as developing an irrigation system in Azerbaijan's lowland areas, designating new pasturelands in northern Azerbaijan, or signing an interstate agreement permitting continued use of traditional pastures. However, the Azerbaijani side rejected all these proposals.

From a strategic perspective, Nagorno-Karabakh was as crucial for Azerbaijan as it was for Armenia, as losing control over the region would sever Azerbaijan's connection with Turkey, thereby undermining its security. Azerbaijan also presented economic arguments: the Yelizavetpol Governorate was economically integrated with Azerbaijan, as almost all major transportation routes were linked to Baku rather than Erivan. The Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh was dependent on supplies from Baku, and thousands of locals were engaged in permanent or seasonal employment there. The severance of Karabakh's ties with Baku would thus have profound economic consequences.

Erivan Governorate

According to the 1916 statistical data, Armenians constituted the majority in the Erivan Governorate. However, in the Nakhchivan, Sharur- Daralayaz, and Surmali districts, Muslims—primarily Azerbaijanis and a smaller number of Kurds—formed the majority. On the eve of the declaration of the Republic of Armenia, its territory was home to 670,000 Armenians and 375,000 Azerbaijanis.

Until the end of 1918, Azerbaijan laid claims to the areas of the Erivan Governorate that had not been occupied by the Ottoman army under the Treaty of Batum. After the Ottoman withdrawal, Azerbaijan asserted its claims over the Nakhchivan, Sharur-Daralayaz, and Surmali districts, as well as parts of the Echmiadzin and Erivan districts, including the outskirts of Erivan city. Azerbaijan justified its claims on historical and demographic grounds, arguing that these areas had belonged to Muslim khanates before their annexation by Russia. Despite the large-scale resettlement of Armenian migrants to the region following its incorporation into the Russian Empire, the southern districts retained their predominantly Muslim character, with the majority of the Muslim population being Azerbaijani Turks, who were directly connected to the Azerbaijan Republic.

The Armenian position, however, held that although Muslims constituted the majority in certain districts, Armenians still outnumbered them across the entire governorate. Therefore, applying the principle of self-determination to these districts would undermine the territorial integrity of the Armenian Republic. Armenians argued that historically, Armenian states had existed in the region, with their capitals located along the Araz River. They contended that Turkic incursions had disrupted this continuity, leading to significant demographic shifts. From a geographical standpoint, the Armenian side argued that the Araz Valley, situated at an altitude of up to 1,200 meters above sea level, was not topographically connected to the lowlands of Eastern Transcaucasia, which lay at an elevation of approximately 300 meters. Consequently, they sought control over the valley due to its agricultural potential. Moreover, the Araz Valley was of strategic significance to Armenia, as the railway connecting it to Iran ran through this area. The region also provided access to Zangezur and Karabakh. Politically, Armenia viewed the establishment of a direct border between Azerbaijan and Turkey as a threat to its security and sought to prevent such a development.

Foreign involvement

The Armenia–Azerbaijan war took place against the backdrop of clashing interests among several foreign powers, each influencing the regional situation in various ways.

Ottoman Empire

The two Russian revolutions of 1917 and the subsequent collapse of the Caucasian Front gave the Young Turk government hope for the realization of the Ottoman Empire's longstanding ambitions in the Caucasus. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) believed that advances in the Caucasus through Pan-Turkism would compensate for the loss of the Arab provinces. In February 1918, the advancing Ottoman army managed to reclaim the territories of Eastern Anatolia that had previously been seized by the Russians. By April, the Ottoman forces had also captured Batum and the Kars Oblast. The lack of significant resistance and the ease of their advance encouraged War Minister Enver Pasha to push further. The initial plans included the capture of the Baku oilfields and the incorporation of Southern Azerbaijan. Subsequent objectives involved advancing towards Turkestan, seizing control of the Caspian Sea basin, and inciting anti-British uprisings in southern Iran, Afghanistan, and India.

By the end of May, after battles with Armenian volunteer units, the Treaty of Batum was signed. As a result, Transcaucasia was divided into three states, leading to the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (ZDFR). Armenia and Georgia were forced to accept all territorial demands of the Ottoman Empire. In contrast, Azerbaijan not only secured the territories it claimed but also received assurances from the Ottomans regarding assistance in ensuring security within its borders. The Ottoman Empire pledged military support to Azerbaijan in its fight against the Dashnaks and Bolsheviks in the mountainous parts of Karabakh and in Baku. Furthermore, the Ottoman government viewed Azerbaijani territory as part of the emerging Turan Empire, which was envisioned to include Turkestan, Southern Azerbaijan, and the North Caucasus.

However, Enver Pasha's ambitious plans met with opposition from the German Empire, which was in dire need of Baku oil. Facing increasing German pressure—especially after Germany established its protectorate over Georgia—Enver Pasha was compelled to abandon the idea of deploying regular Ottoman troops to Baku. Doing so would have required using the Georgian section of the Transcaucasus Railway, which Germany controlled. Instead, the Ottoman command redirected its main forces to Southern Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, in Ganja, the Caucasus Islamic Army was formed, comprising Ottoman military units and Azerbaijani volunteers, with Nuri Pasha appointed as its commander. The division assigned to this operation avoided Georgian territory by advancing through the Alexandropol–Dilijan–Aghstafa route.

On September 15, after a series of battles, the Caucasus Islamic Army liberated Baku, which was subsequently declared the capital of Azerbaijan. However, just a month and a half later, facing heavy defeats on other fronts, the Ottoman army was forced to withdraw and signed the Armistice of Mudros. Despite this, the Ottoman Empire maintained significant influence in the region and, during its retreat, participated in the establishment of regimes such as the Araz and Kars Republics. It also left behind a considerable number of officers to serve in the armed forces of these newly formed entities. The Ottoman leadership's strategy in Transcaucasia was later continued by Turkish nationalists, who recognized the strategic significance of the Turkey–Nakhchivan–Zangezur–Azerbaijan corridor.

Mustafa Kemal and General Kazım Karabekir, who was appointed commander of the XV Army on May 3, 1919, acknowledged the strategic importance of the Nakhchivan region. In a letter to Major Veysel Bey and the commander of the 11th Division, Cavid Bey, Kazım Karabekir stated:

We are besieged from all sides, but the Nakhchivan window to Azerbaijan remains open. I want to ensure that this window is never closed.

For Karabekir, supporting the defense of Sharur-Nakhchivan was strategically vital for the upcoming military operations against Armenia and for the protection of the local Muslim population. Additionally, preventing Armenia from having a direct border with Iran and stopping Armenian forces from attacking Van were also key concerns. To this end, on July 18, 1919, Karabekir Pasha dispatched Halil Bey, along with four officers and seven soldiers, to the Sharur- Nakhchivan region.

Great Britain

After the October Revolution, Great Britain and France reached an agreement to divide Russian territory into spheres of influence. The northern Black Sea region fell under France's sphere, while the territories to the east of this region—including the North and South Caucasus—came under British influence.

The official objective of the Allied intervention in Southern Russia was to prevent the Central Powers' forces from penetrating the region and to ensure the security of British possessions in the Middle East. Russian historian L.I. Miroshnikov argues that Britain's aim in Transcaucasia and Transcaspia was to establish full dominance in the region and to support the counterrevolution in Russia in order to overthrow Soviet power.

According to British intelligence of the time, the geographical and strategic advantage of the South Caucasus lay in its position as a crossroads for transportation routes leading into the depths of Asia. Britain was interested in gaining access to Baku's oil reserves and using Transcaucasia as a barrier against the revolutionary influence of Bolshevik Russia on British possessions in South Asia.

The first British attempt to intervene in the region dates back to the late summer and early autumn of 1918. Between August 7 and 17, to prevent the Caucasus Islamic Army from capturing Baku, a British force known as "Dunsterforce", under the command of General Lionel Dunsterville, arrived via Iran. On September 14, faced with the attacks of Azerbaijani and Turkish military forces, the British were forced to retreat.

At the end of World War I, the withdrawal of the Central Powers' forces from Transcaucasia created conditions for a new British intervention. The commander of British forces in Mesopotamia assigned General William Montgomery Thomson, stationed in northern Iran, the task of capturing Baku and its oil fields. During negotiations, Thomson demanded that Azerbaijani and Turkish forces withdraw from Baku by November 17. On this date, alongside the British army, forces under the command of Bicherakhov, who had fought against the Caucasus Islamic Army in Dagestan, also arrived in Baku. At the same time, Thomson, who declared himself the acting governor of the Baku Governorate, announced that the rest of Azerbaijan would remain under the control of the Azerbaijani army and that armed Armenian groups would not be allowed to enter the city. Although Azerbaijan was not officially recognized by the Allied powers, Britain, France, and the United States expressed their intent to maintain de facto relations with the existing government.

On November 17, the British army under Thomson's command entered Baku.

On December 28, General Thomson declared that he recognized the government in Baku as the sole legitimate governing authority in Azerbaijani territory. This status was to be maintained until a final decision was reached at the Paris Peace Conference.

On December 11, the British War Department issued orders outlining the tasks of the British military mission in Transcaucasia: ensuring compliance with Turkey's armistice conditions, controlling the Transcaucasus Railway and the Baku–Batumi oil pipeline, and occupying Baku, Batumi, and, if possible, Tiflis. At the same time, the War Cabinet accepted Winston Churchill's view that Russia would inevitably return to Transcaucasia.

In December 1918 and January 1919, the 27th Division, transferred from Thessaloniki, arrived in Batumi. On December 24, the army headquarters was established, and Brigadier General J. Cook-Collis was appointed as the commander. Despite objections from Georgian Prime Minister Noe Jordania, British forces entered Tiflis on December 26. British rule was established in Kars on January 12, and in Nakhchivan on January 26. At this time, the total number of British troops in Transcaucasia reached 20,000, with 5,000 stationed in Baku alone.

According to American conflict expert Arsen Saparov, British policy in Transcaucasia was shaped by two factors: the desire to establish control over the region and the lack of sufficient troops to enforce this control by force. Under these circumstances, the British could not refuse to cooperate with local political forces. Consequently, their decisions and actions, including those related to the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, were often determined by the evolving political environment and local conditions.

As a rule, the British preferred to base their policies on ethnic conflicts in Transcaucasia on the pre-revolutionary administrative-territorial divisions. For this reason, Britain supported Azerbaijan's claims to Karabakh and Zangezur within the Yelizavetpol Governorate, while endorsing Armenia's claims to the Aras Valley within the Erivan Governorate. As a temporary or permanent solution to ethnic conflicts, British representatives proposed the idea of population exchanges in mixed-population areas.

Richard Hovhannisian expressed his perspective on why Great Britain supported Azerbaijan's claims to Karabakh and Zangezur as follows:

According to the British, who ruled over a multi-million Muslim population in their empire, supporting the first Muslim republic in the world could help pacify their own Muslim subjects. Furthermore, achieving political and economic stability in Azerbaijan could mitigate the influence of Turkish Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist agitation. It is also possible that the British intended to transfer the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire to Armenia, in which case assigning Karabakh and Zangezur to Azerbaijan would have been a more logical decision. Additionally, oil, which was a key factor in Britain's Transcaucasia policy, is believed to have played a significant role in this matter; a grateful government in Baku would have facilitated access to Baku's oil resources.

The British military presence in Transcaucasia did not last long. By 1919, the British Empire was facing more pressing issues in strategically important regions such as Ireland, Afghanistan, India, Egypt, and Turkey. Under these circumstances, they deemed it unfeasible to maintain their military presence in Transcaucasia and decided to evacuate their troops from the region on July 3, 1919. The British military garrison was temporarily retained only in Batumi. The withdrawal of British troops from Transcaucasia caused disappointment in both Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Azerbaijani government was concerned about potential issues with the White Army's Volunteer Army, while the Armenian government was troubled by Muslim uprisings in its southern and southeastern regions. During a session of the Armenian Parliament on August 15, 1919, dedicated to discussing the military threat posed by Muslims, many deputies expressed their disillusionment with the Triple Entente and even proposed redirecting their foreign policy towards Russia.

Nevertheless, even after the troop evacuation, Britain continued to play a significant role in Transcaucasia until 1920. This influence persisted until the arrival of the Red Army, which ultimately led to a complete transformation of the region's political structure.

South Russia (White Army Forces)

Finding itself in complete isolation, the Republic of Armenia sought allies among both Soviet and anti-Soviet forces within war-torn Russia. The Armenian government aimed to secure recognition of its independence and establish friendly relations with all political entities in Russia, believing that Russian support could neutralize hostilities from the other Transcaucasian states and threats from Turkey. The Armenian government initiated contacts with the anti-Soviet Kuban regional government and the command of the Armed Forces of South Russia, hoping for assistance in repatriating Armenian prisoners of war and refugees, as well as in securing supplies of bread, other food products, weapons, and ammunition. At the same time, the Armenian authorities understood that the Volunteer Army in southern Russia, much like Soviet Russia, did not recognize the existence of independent states that had seceded from the former Russian Empire.

The British mission actively encouraged relations between Armenia and the Armed Forces of South Russia through all possible means.

In the summer of 1919, as the Armenian army faced significant difficulties due to Muslim uprisings in Kars and Sharur-Nakhchivan, the Chief of the Armenian General Staff wrote to the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of South Russia, M. M. Zinkevich, requesting "moral and, preferably, material support." He justified this request by asserting that Armenians were the "most neutral element" and had historically been important for Russia, both in the past and in the future. According to the memoirs of General A. I. Denikin, commander of the Volunteer Army, the Armed Forces of South Russia sent several million rounds of ammunition to Armenia via Batumi and Ardahan. They placed particular reliance on American Colonel Haskell and the prospect of securing an American mandate over Armenia. However, none of these hopes materialized.

In August 1919, the Armenian government sent Zinkevich to Yekaterinodar to regulate relations with South Russia (SRMF). By the time he returned in early October, he had already acquired the status of the official representative of the Armed Forces of South Russia in Armenia. Unlike Russia, Armenia remained cautious, unwilling to implement the plans devised by the White Movement to restore the Russian Empire.

Unlike Armenia, relations between Azerbaijan and the SRMF were highly strained. The capture of Dagestan by the Volunteer Army caused serious concern within the Azerbaijani government. They feared that the White Guards would continue their advance southward to restore the borders of the Russian Empire. Although Denikin refused to recognize the independence of the Transcaucasian states, he was unable to launch military operations against Azerbaijan, as this would have strained relations with the Entente. However, he also could not forgo Baku oil, opting instead to achieve his goal through diplomacy and intimidation. In September 1919, Denikin sent a note to the Azerbaijani government, demanding not only the supply of oil and petroleum products to Southern Russia but also the provision of facilities for the overhaul of the Volunteer Army's warships at the sole repair yard of the Caspian Fleet. In October, a second, more severe note was sent. Subsequently, the representative of the Volunteer Army's high command was recalled from Baku, signaling the breakdown of relations. Rumors spread in Azerbaijan and Georgia about Denikin's forces preparing military operations against Baku.

At the beginning of November, Azerbaijan launched the Zangezur expedition. The objective of the military campaign was to establish control over Zangezur and reach the border with Turkey. Russian intelligence interpreted this as Azerbaijan acquiring the necessary arms and ammunition to conduct military operations against both Armenia and the SRMF. Seeking to prevent this, on November 9, Denikin issued an order "in connection with the Azerbaijani authorities' hostile attitude toward the Russian army and the treacherous attack of Azerbaijani troops on Armenian territory". The order required Russian officers serving in the Azerbaijani army to resign from their posts. According to Gegam Petrosyan, this decree fueled rumors of a secret military alliance between South Russia and Armenia and an imminent joint attack on Azerbaijan, forcing the Azerbaijani authorities to abandon their plans in Zangezur.

As noted by Russian historians Karmov and Lobanov, the SRMF posed a threat to Azerbaijan before its dissolution, but by January 1920, a new threat had emerged on its northern border—Soviet Russia. On February 7, 1920, the White Guard command recognized the independence of the Transcaucasian states, but soon, Southern Russia came under Bolshevik attack and fell under their control.

Soviet Russia

Until the late spring of 1920, relations between the Armenian Republic and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) remained limited. This was primarily due to the RSFSR's refusal to recognize the independence of the Transcaucasian states. Georgy Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, referred to the Armenian and Azerbaijani states as "puppet republics". The Caucasus Regional Committee and the Caucasus Bureau of the Russian Communist Party advocated for the overthrow of the Armenian government through force, viewing it as an agent of imperialism and a ruthless enemy of workers and peasants. Additionally, Armenia's connections with anti-Bolshevik forces in Southern Russia contributed to the Bolsheviks perceiving it as a hostile entity.

Soviet Russia showed little interest in the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. Diplomatic relations between the RSFSR's People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs began in early 1920. These relations were limited and primarily focused on the joint struggle against Denikin's forces. This interaction also raised the possibility of Soviet Russia recognizing Azerbaijan's independence.

In mid-April 1920, the 11th Red Army defeated Denikin's forces in the North Caucasus and advanced towards Azerbaijan's northern borders. On the night of April 27–28, with the support of the Bolshevik army, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was occupied, and its government was overthrown. The Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee (Azrevkom) declared Soviet power and urgently requested military assistance from the RSFSR's Council of People's Commissars. On April 28, the Council of People's Commissars of the Azerbaijan SSR ordered Azerbaijani troops in Karabakh and Zangezur to cease offensive operations and adopt a defensive posture.

Sergei Ordzhonikidze, head of the Caucasus Regional Committee of the Russian Communist Party, was encouraged by the success in Azerbaijan and decided to extend this process to the rest of the Transcaucasus. However, orders from Moscow instructed him to halt such activities and refrain from intervening in Armenia and Georgia.

Arsen Saparov notes that the absence of clearly defined borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan, along with ongoing conflicts over Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Karabakh, provided the Caucasus Regional Committee and the Caucasus Bureau with opportunities to intervene in the affairs of these two states without violating Moscow's directives. According to Saparov, Azerbaijan's national interests aligned with those of Soviet Russia. Consequently, Azerbaijani Bolsheviks gained support in conflict regions, while favorable conditions were created to realize Moscow's primary objective of establishing a land connection with Turkey.

Clashes in Sharur-Nakhchivan

Initial confrontations in the Nakhchivan region

Shortly after the October Revolution, joint committees were established in Nakhchivan and Julfa to maintain peace and security between the two ethnic groups. During the same period, Azerbaijani and Armenian self-defense units were also organized in these cities. However, the activities of the joint committees did not last long. Gradually, relations between Azerbaijanis and Armenians deteriorated, and it became evident that sustaining peaceful coexistence would not be possible for an extended period. Armenians living in Azerbaijani neighborhoods in the center of Nakhchivan began relocating to Armenian quarters, and the commercial establishments owned by Armenians also shifted to these areas. These actions were perceived by Azerbaijanis as signs of Armenian preparations for war, prompting them to make their own military preparations. On March 15, 1918, clashes erupted between Azerbaijanis and Armenians in the city.

The initial confrontations in Nakhchivan involved the use of small arms but later escalated to include artillery fire. An attempt at mediation by Murtuzaqulu Khan of the Makinski family proved unsuccessful.

In other parts of the district, the situation was more favorable to the Armenians. During the fighting, many Azerbaijani villages were destroyed. According to Turkish historian Ibrahim Ethem Atnur, the Armenians controlled a large military depot in Julfa, which was sufficient to supply an entire army. In contrast, Azerbaijanis lacked such resources and were compelled to purchase ammunition at their own expense. Nevertheless, Azerbaijanis managed to organize and arm themselves effectively. Due to the relatively balanced military strength of both sides, a ceasefire was signed in the second half of April.

According to the terms of the ceasefire, each town and locality was to have one Azerbaijani and one Armenian commissioner appointed. Ibrahim Atnur notes that relations remained relatively stable until the arrival of Andranik in the summer of 1918. The limited skirmishes and confrontations gradually subsided over time.

Andranik's Nakhchivan campaign and the establishment of Ottoman Administration

On June 4, 1918, the Treaty of Batum was signed between the Ottoman Empire and Armenia, officially ending hostilities. However, General Andranik, commander of the Armenian Special Striking Division, refused to recognize the treaty, denouncing its signatories as traitors who had humiliated the nation. He also rejected the legitimacy of the newly established Armenian Republic, which led to his expulsion from the army on June 5.

Andranik, along with his detachment, crossed through the Nakhchivan district into the territory of Iranian Azerbaijan, intending to join British forces and engage in battles against the Ottoman Turks. Upon arriving in Nakhchivan on June 20, he ordered his troops to destroy bridges and tunnels along the railway leading to Julfa to hinder the advance of the Ottoman army.

On June 21, Andranik reached Julfa and crossed the Iranian border, where a small Ottoman unit guarding a bridge over the Araz River was disarmed by his forces. On June 24, Andranik's forces encountered the 12th Infantry Regiment of the Ottoman army near Khoy and suffered a defeat, losing 125 soldiers. Following this setback, Andranik abandoned his initial plans and decided to return to the Nakhchivan district.

After crossing the Araz River, Andranik's forces engaged in combat with a local Azerbaijani volunteer unit near the village of Yayji, located a few kilometers from Julfa. Despite denials from Russian officers under Andranik's command, Azerbaijani and Turkish historians claim that during this period, Andranik's forces committed massacres against the local civilian population. During the clashes in Yayji, Andranik stationed his troops in the Armenian village of Jannab, near Ordubad. While based there, his forces launched attacks on several Azerbaijani villages, causing widespread destruction and perpetrating massacres against the civilian population. However, Andranik's forces also suffered significant losses during skirmishes with local volunteer units.

By June 28, news of the massacres committed by Andranik's forces had spread throughout the Nakhchivan district. In response, Ottoman officer Khalil Bey, stationed in Sharur, called upon the populations of Sharur and Shahtakhti to rise against Andranik. He also appealed to the higher Ottoman command to dispatch additional military forces to the Nakhchivan district.

Upon learning of the imminent arrival of Ottoman reinforcements, Andranik retreated to the Armenian village of Abrakunis, intending to recruit additional troops there. However, his efforts were unsuccessful.

After failing to unite with the British forces in Iran, Andranik sought an ally by looking to Soviet Russia, which had established its authority in Baku a few months earlier. On July 14, Andranik issued a "decree" in his name, declaring the annexation of the Nakhchivan district to Soviet Russia and the establishment of a state of emergency in the district. He ordered the local population to surrender their weapons. On the same day, Andranik sent a letter to Stepan Shaumyan, the Commissar for Caucasian Affairs, stating that he had placed himself under the authority of the central Russian government and proclaimed the Nakhchivan district as part of the RSFSR. Additionally, he declared his intent to act against the advancement of the Ottoman army in the region. In his response, Shaumyan informed Andranik that he had communicated the matter to Moscow and declared that he considered Andranik a "true national hero". Andranik's appeal was positively received in Moscow, with several newspapers publishing articles praising him as a national hero. Andranik justified his decision by emphasizing the bond of honor and conscience between himself, the Armenian people, and the Russian people.

Despite these developments, the Muslim National Committee of Nakhchivan refused to surrender their weapons and began preparing for the anticipated Armenian attacks. On July 16, Andranik advanced his forces from Abrakunis towards Nakhchivan. While en route, on the morning of July 17, Andranik's forces attacked the village of Nehram, but were repelled by the Azerbaijani defenders. Suffering losses, Andranik was forced to retreat to the banks of the Nakhchivanchay River.

There, he established defensive positions on the outskirts of Nakhchivan city. Despite three days of intense fighting, Armenian forces failed to capture the city and were expelled on July 20 by an Ottoman division that arrived in time to reinforce the local militias. Unable to withstand the combined assaults of the Ottoman army and Azerbaijani volunteers, Andranik's forces were compelled to retreat towards Zangezur. His activities in the region later played a significant role in sparking military confrontations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Following the expulsion of Andranik's forces, the Ottoman army established its authority over the Nakhchivan district, extending their control along the Shah Takhti–Julfa railway line of the Transcaucasus Railway. Using this route, they facilitated the deployment of troops towards Tabriz. On August 7, the headquarters of the 1st Caucasian Special Corps, commanded by Kazım Karabekir Pasha, was relocated to Nakhchivan. His army was tasked with repelling potential attacks in the direction of Tabriz and Nakhchivan.

Subsequently, the Ottoman administrative system was also introduced in Nakhchivan, as the Batum Treaty had officially incorporated the Sharur-Nakhchivan region into the Ottoman Empire. According to Mir Hidayat Seyidzade, head of the Ordubad National Committee, the arrival of the Ottoman Turks resulted in a three-month cessation of clashes between the two ethnic groups in the region. Simultaneously, Armenian historian Richard Hovannisian notes that these Ottoman offensives forced approximately 100,000 Armenians residing in the southern parts of the Erivan Governorate to flee the region.

Araz Valley after World War I

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I and the signing of the Armistice of Mudros left the Muslim population in the region vulnerable. According to the terms of the armistice, the Ottoman army had to withdraw from the South Caucasus, raising the threat of the region's annexation by Armenia. To prevent this, the Turkish command violated the terms of the ceasefire by delaying the withdrawal of troops beyond the Arpaçay River (the 1877 Russo-Turkish border) until December 4, while simultaneously organizing local Muslim militias. During this period, several battalions composed of local Muslims from the Aras Valley were formed, facilitating the declaration of the Aras Turkish Republic. Ottoman soldiers remained in the Aras Valley to support the establishment of its administration.

In November–December 1918, inspired by the Ottoman defeat, armed groups of Ottoman Armenians attacked and destroyed numerous Azerbaijani villages in Daralayaz. Around 15,000 Armenians, who had been exiled from Anatolia, were settled in place of the displaced or killed villagers. Simultaneously, Armenian authorities launched propaganda campaigns in Muslim villages, proclaiming their goodwill, peaceful intentions, and the expectation that the territory of the Aras Republic would soon come under Armenian control with the endorsement of the Entente powers.

In early December, the Armenian government sent a delegation to the village of Qamarli to meet with representatives of the Aras Republic. However, the meeting ended unsuccessfully. At the same time, the village of Ulukhanli, located 20 kilometers from Erivan and the center of the Zangibasar region, declared its intention to join the Republic of Armenia. The leader of the Aras Republic, Amir bey Zamanbeyzadeh, and the Minister of War, Ibrahim bey Jahangiroglu, ordered the arrest of Ali Khan Makinski, who facilitated the village's annexation to Armenia. A military detachment dispatched to Ulukhanli found that an Armenian armed group, consisting of 300 cavalry and 400–500 infantry, had already arrived. Consequently, the Azerbaijani detachment was forced to evacuate. Shortly afterward, the Armenian army entered Qamarli with Ali Khan Makinski.

On December 10, an Armenian armed detachment, led by Colonel Dolukhanov, launched an attack on Sharur, located in the southwest of the Sharur-Daralayaz district. On their way, they captured the large village of Davali. However, an Azerbaijani force led by Abbasgulu bey Shadlinski, organized in the Vedibasar region and gathered in Büyük Vedi, compelled the Armenian army to retreat. Avoiding Vedibasar, the Armenian forces continued their offensive towards Sadarak. The leaders of the Aras Republic, Amir bey and Ibrahim bey, organized the defense and requested assistance from Nakhchivan. Although Karim Khan Iravanski, commander of the Nakhchivan volunteers, refused to comply, numerous groups from the Sharur-Nakhchivan region went to support the Aras Türk Republic. Despite numerical superiority and better supplies, the Armenian army defeated the Azerbaijanis at the battle of Arazdayan and captured Sadarak.

On December 14, the Armenians launched another attack on Sharur but were defeated at Bash Norashen. The next battle took place at the Dehne or Qurd Gapisi Pass, where the Azerbaijanis were forced to retreat. After securing the pass, the Armenian forces established control over the villages of Damirchi, Gushchu, and Makhta. The Armenian offensive against Sharur ceased only after the outbreak of the Borchali conflict between Georgia and Armenia. Concurrently, the 8th Armenian Infantry Regiment attacked the Surmali district, capturing Duzluca and Iğdır. However, due to personnel shortages, the Armenians stationed garrisons only at strategic points between the southern border of the Kars region and the Iranian border.

The inability to prevent the Armenian advance and the flight of many government ministers led to the decline of the Aras Republic's influence. The departure of Minister of War Ibrahim Bey Jahangiroglu to Kars effectively marked the end of the Republic's existence. Subsequently, the Nakhchivan local government turned to Iran for military assistance and began preparations for negotiations with the Armenian authorities.

Iran sent a delegation consisting of two Armenians and two Muslims to Nakhchivan to mediate between the Azerbaijanis and Armenians. The delegates arrived in Nakhchivan on December 23 and, according to the memoirs of Ottoman officers Khalil Bey and Veysel Bey, departed for Erivan on December 25. At the same time, the Nakhchivan district (local) government sent a delegation under the leadership of Jafargulu Khan Nakhchivani to Demirchi-Gushchu to propose a ceasefire to Colonel Dolukhanov. However, the delegation was arrested, and Dolukhanov launched new Armenian attacks on the villages of Norashen and Yengija. This time, the Armenians faced well-trained and organized Azerbaijani armed groups commanded by Colonel Kelbali Khan Nakhchivanski and Mashadi Ali Asgar Agha. After two days of fighting, the Armenians were defeated and forced to retreat. They were also expelled from the villages of Sharur and the Qurd Gapisi Pass, which they had initially captured. Armenian forces settled in Davali, while the Azerbaijani group positioned themselves in Arazdayan. On December 28, Kalbali Khan returned to Nakhchivan with his unit. Following the failure in Sharur, Dolukhanov made another attempt to regain control over Vedibasar, but this time the locals managed to repel the attack.

On January 12, 1919, the Iranian and Nakhchivan delegations returned from Erivan, accompanied by representatives from both the government and Andranik's faction as part of the Armenian delegation. On January 14, under the leadership of Haji Mehdi Baghirov, the Nakhchivan government accepted the Armenian side's conditions and signed an agreement to cease military operations.

Shortly after the signing of the armistice agreement, Major William D. Gibbon, the liaison officer of British Governor-General W. Thomson, arrived in Nakhchivan from Baku, demanding the repatriation of 15,000 Armenian refugees, but his request was denied.

On January 18, Captain F. I. Lawton arrived in Nakhchivan from Erivan. Lawton, the deputy commander of the 2nd Cameron Highlanders, was accompanied by Lieutenant F. L. Schwind of the 4th Rifle Brigade. Lawton and the Nakhchivan National Council reached agreements on border demarcation, the restoration of railway and telegraph operations, and the delivery of grain from the American Relief Society. The Nakhchivan National Council also declared the unacceptability of Armenian rule, with the council's leader, Amir Bey Zamanbeyzadeh, stating that the region belonged to Azerbaijan. On January 21, upon returning to Yerevan, Lawton demanded that the Armenian leadership immediately cease all military operations and await further instructions from the British headquarters in Tbilisi. The Armenians accepted these demands as they sought to avoid conflict with the British and recognized the impossibility of capturing Sharur-Nakhchivan, defended by 10,000 Azerbaijani militiamen. Lawton urgently reported to the 27th Division headquarters, recommending the establishment of a military governorate in Sharur-Nakhchivan and the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the southern part of Yerevan district. At the headquarters meeting on January 26, it was decided to create the governorate and appoint Lawton as the temporary military governor of Sharur-Nakhchivan with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

This decision caused discontent among the Armenians. Shortly after Lawton's appointment, Armenian units from Davalu captured the village of Afshar; the village was recaptured with the support of Vedibasar residents, but fighting continued. Upon learning of the clashes, Lawton and Kalbali Khan Nakhchivanski immediately set out for Davalu, which was predominantly inhabited by Armenians. Lawton demanded that General Pirumyan withdraw his troops to the village of Ayyub, leading to tensions between them. Following his headquarters' instructions, Lawton proceeded to Yerevan, where he proposed extending the governorate's authority northward from Qurd Gapisi to the Vedi River. Although the Armenian government protested this decision, the proposal was approved by the British command in Transcaucasia on February 6. Sharur-Nakhchivan maintained a semi-autonomous status under the leadership of the Khan's government, which acted as the local authority. The Armenian administration remained from Qurd Gapisi ('The Gate of Wolf') to the Vedi River, but Armenian forces had to leave the area, maintaining only a 50-man garrison in Davalu.

Establishment of Armenian administration and the uprising in the Aras Valley

From March 1919 onwards, Britain's policy towards Sharur-Nakhchivan began to change. British intelligence grew concerned about the increasing influence of Turkey, and Lieutenant Colonel Lawton complained about the omnipotence of Fathali Khan's government, the aggressiveness of the National Council, and the lack of authority and influence that a governor-general should possess. The British reported pressure against Armenians in the Vedi–Chay– Sadarak region. A British battalion was insufficient to prevent these conflicts. Lawton's attempts to punish the perpetrators and the mediation efforts of Colonel Temperley, the British representative in Erivan, with the Fathali Khan ended in failure. Relations between the British command and the Muslim population deteriorated; Mashadi Ali Asgar Hamzayev wrote to Kalbali Khan, stating that British soldiers had committed several crimes in the village of Khanliglar and had set fires in Bash-Norashen, which was also confirmed by local residents.

The growing strength of Anatolian and Azerbaijani Turks in the South Caucasus alarmed the British. This led to the decision to abolish the Kars Council and the Sharur-Nakhchivan Governor-Generalship; these decisions were made at the Batumi Conference held on April 2–3. Although the local Azerbaijani leadership was outraged by the decision and protested against it, they were ultimately forced to comply. On May 16, Gevorg Varshamyan was appointed governor, and on May 20, the first Armenian military unit entered Nakhchivan. The evacuation of British forces from the region began on May 22, with the last unit leaving on June 7. The British deemed it necessary to leave only a military mission in Nakhchivan, represented by Lieutenant Schwind.

Despite the initial cold reception of the Armenian administration by the Nakhchivan population, relations remained relatively stable due to a tolerant approach. This situation persisted until the arrival of the first Armenian military units. The presence of the Armenian army in the region began to disturb the population, and in addition, the process of confiscating weapons from the Azerbaijani population commenced. This led to increased tension and the outbreak of clashes.

Shortly after the establishment of Armenian administration, Armenians who had fled the region following the arrival of the Ottoman army in the summer of 1918 began to return. Simultaneously, the Muslim population who had been forced to leave Daralayaz also started returning. The Azerbaijani return to Daralayaz was only accepted by the Armenian authorities after pressure from General Thomson. The resettlement process of Armenians was not always peaceful. For example, Azerbaijanis refused to vacate houses in the village of Keshtaz in Sharur, arguing that these were their former homes now occupied by Armenians. To force them out, a 30-member armed Armenian detachment was sent to the village. At that time, four remaining Ottoman officers organized resistance and successfully repelled the Armenian attack, resulting in the death of 15 Armenian soldiers and officers. The next day, Armenians launched another attack with an armored train and artillery. Although they again failed to capture the village, the bombardment turned it into ruins.

Thus, Armenian administration could only be established over railways and main roads. Soviet Azerbaijani historian Madatov states that real power was in the hands of Mashadi Ali Asgar Agha Hamzayev in Sharur, Boyuk Khan Nakhchivanski in the northern part of Nakhchivan county, and Samedbeyov in Ordubad. Turkish historian Atnur notes that after the withdrawal of the British, who were necessary to prevent clashes during the transfer of power to Armenians, Armenians began to establish control over the Aras Valley. On July 1, Ashot Melik-Mosesyants, one of the Dashnak leaders, was appointed head of the Ordubad region. Arriving with an armed detachment, Ashot demanded submission from the local population. After the demand was rejected, another ultimatum was sent the following day, again demanding submission. Subsequently, the Armenian army attacked Ordubad but was defeated by the local population. Immediately after, the people of Ordubad requested assistance from Azerbaijan, and Samed bey Jemilinski was sent there as a political officer.

Meanwhile, in the Aras Valley, antagonism between the Azerbaijani population and the Armenian administration reached its peak. A partisan detachment of 50 men was formed in the village of Karachug, led by Nakhchivan democrats Mammad Ragimov and Mirzali bey Bektashev. Soon after, partisan groups began to emerge in Ordubad, Sharur, Yayci, Bulgan, Vedibasar, and in the northern parts of Nakhchivan, initiating armed resistance against Armenian authority. Karim Khan Erivanski, who established his headquarters in the village of Jahri, captured six Armenian officials, proposing to exchange them for previously arrested Muslims.

Böyük Vedi, a large Azerbaijani village in Vedibasar near Erivan, which had repelled Armenian assaults twice in December 1918, remained largely untouched during the Armenian army's occupation of Sharur-Nakhchivan. As noted by Richard Hovannisian, Böyük Vedi became a rallying point for Muslim partisans. In June, the insurgents launched an attack towards the village of Davalu, and on July 1, they killed nine Armenian soldiers and twelve peasants. Following the advice of Colonel Plowden—the British military representative in Erivan, who was concerned that Böyük Vedi had become a symbol of resistance for other Azerbaijani villages—Armenian authorities dispatched a 400-man unit under Colonel Apresyank to suppress the uprising. However, after unsuccessful negotiations, the insurgents ambushed and defeated the Armenian detachment. The Armenians, suffering heavy losses, began to retreat, leaving behind most of their heavy weaponry and field equipment. The Armenians suffered 26 officers and 200 soldiers killed. According to Richard Hovannisian, this was the largest and most humiliating defeat of the Armenian army for the entire year. Armenian authorities attempted to convince the British mission that Turkish soldiers fighting alongside the insurgents were responsible for the Armenian defeat; however, no Turkish soldiers were found in the village.

The following ten days were marked by unsuccessful attempts by Armenian forces to capture Böyük Vedi. The Azerbaijani ambassador to Armenia, Mahammad Khan Tekinski, reported on July 14 that Armenian forces were determined to seize Vedibasar and that "even Armenian priests are calling for the destruction of Böyük Vedi in the course of a Crusade". Nevertheless, the residents of Böyük Vedi, supported by volunteers from several nearby Azerbaijani villages, repelled the attacks. Another Armenian assault on the village was led by Dro, who involved both regular troops and "Mauserists" (Armenian militia) in the operation. Abbasgulu Shadlinski, who had commanded the defense of Vedi since 1918, decided to resist the Armenian forces on the village's outskirts. The absence of resistance convinced the Armenians that the village had been abandoned by its defenders, prompting them to hasten their advance. However, they encountered heavy gunfire on the village's approaches. Having lost half of their personnel, the Armenians retreated to fortifications in the village of Iova.

The battles around Vedi mobilized the population of Sharur-Nakhchivan against Armenian rule; battalions established in 1918 began to reorganize. Mahammad Khan Tekinski reported to Baku about the situation in the Aras Valley, urging the Azerbaijani government to take decisive measures, such as concentrating troops at the border to inspire the insurgents and intensify Armenian confusion. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan's Prime Minister, Nasib bey Yusifbeyli, refrained from military intervention due to the Denikin threat from the north, limiting support to sending 200,000 cartridges and 300,000 Russian imperial rubles through Iran. On July 20, an additional four million rubles were sent through Tiflis to Tekinski, who then transferred them to Nakhchivan via his deputy, Iskander Khan Nakhchivanski, and a personal courier. Tekinski reported plans to increase the number of soldiers in Nakhchivan from 6,000 to 10,000 within a week.

Meanwhile, the crisis spread throughout the province, with Azerbaijanis from Vedibasar and Aralikh to Nakhchivan ready to revolt. According to British officer Schwind, dispatched to Nakhchivan by General Cory, the reasons for the uprising included the Armenian expedition against Böyük Vedi, external interference, and "the inherent inability of both sides to resolve any issue other than through murder or massacre". Isolated clashes occurred in rural areas, and by July 21, Mahammad Khan Tekinski reported that residents of several Armenian villages in Sharur were fleeing. Turkish General Kazım Karabekir, recognizing the strategic importance of the Aras Valley, dispatched several of his officers led by Captain Khalil-bey—who had commanded the defense of Sharur in 1918 before leaving with the fall of the Araks Republic. Khalil-bey, after crossing the border on the night of July 17–18, took command of the Azerbaijani insurgent cavalry in Sharur.

Amid the escalation of the conflict, Major General George Norton Cory, Deputy British Commander in the South Caucasus, demanded an immediate ceasefire. At the same time, Colonel Plowden insisted that Azerbaijan withdraw its officers collaborating with Turkish instructors, as well as Ambassador Tekinski, who was implicated in organizing the uprising.

The attempt by Colonel Plowden and British officer Schwinde to prevent the escalation of the conflict failed, and on July 20, clashes erupted in Nakhichevan between Azerbaijani residents and the Armenian garrison of General Shelkovnikov. Lieutenant Schwinde, after meeting with Kelbali Khan Nakhichevanski and the Armenian governor, secured a three-day truce, but it did not last long. The second attempt to establish a ceasefire also failed, and on July 22, the insurgents captured the police station and surrounded the Armenian garrison, numbering 500 men, in the northern part of the city, though they were unable to defeat it.

In the north, on July 22, insurgents led by Captain Khalil attacked all Armenian posts in Sharur. At the Shakhtakhti station, they defeated the local Armenian garrison and an Armenian train detachment under the command of Khumbapet Yapon, en route to support the troops in Nakhichevan. Two platoons from Shakhtakhti managed to join the garrison of Colonel Karakeshishyan in the village of Bash-Norashen, but after two days, the garrison was surrounded. On July 25, Karakeshishyan's column managed to break out of the encirclement in Bash-Norashen and, along with Armenians from Bash-Norashen and Ulia-Norashen, retreated along the Arpa River to the highland regions of Erivan and Daralaghez. During battles near the Norashen station, Azerbaijani insurgents defeated a platoon of the 3rd regiment, capturing as trophies 42 machine guns, 4 cannons, an armored train, and a large quantity of shells and cartridges. The Armenian garrison of Khanlyglar village capitulated without a fight: 5 officers and 195 soldiers surrendered. On July 26, the insurgents captured an Armenian armored train between the Qurd Qapisi and Norashen station. Later, a tribunal was held in Armenia concerning the surrender of the armored train without resistance.

The two-day battles at the Qurd Qapisi pass on the border of Erivan Uyezd also ended in the defeat of the Armenians and the capture of the pass by Azerbaijani insurgents. The Armenians retreated from the Qurd Qapisi to the village of Davalu, but were defeated there as well by Azerbaijanis, after which they withdrew to the village of Shirazlu. From there, after devastating several Azerbaijani villages, Armenian detachments launched another attack on Boyuk-Vedi on July 24–25 with artillery support. However, the attacks were repelled. All four Armenian columns suffered heavy losses and then took defensive positions along the Aghdamlar–Masumlu–Yova–Khor Virap line on the Aras River. Simultaneously, insurgents from Aralik struck the Armenian rear along the perimeter of Erivan Uyezd.

The defeat of the Armenians in Shakhtakhti and Norashen placed the Armenian garrison in Nakhichevan in a disadvantageous position, and on July 25, General Shelkovnikov led his soldiers to the mountain citadel of Martiros. They were joined by Armenian residents of Nakhichevan and Aznaburt.

Meanwhile, Armenian border guards and refugees in Julfa fled to the Iranian part of the city, from where they were sent to Tabriz. Lieutenant Schwinde attempted to leave Nakhichevan Uezd via the same route but was detained by Khan Nakhichevanski. Only on July 28 were British officers and representatives of the American charitable organization sent by train to Julfa, where they crossed the border. In the process, two of their vehicles were confiscated.

Overall, the July battles resulted in the complete defeat of the Armenian army. Twenty-five officers from the 2nd and 3rd infantry regiments were killed, with twice as many wounded. A complete list of non-commissioned officer casualties was never published. In addition to a large quantity of military equipment and supplies, the Armenians lost an armored train, 8 locomotives, and over 100 freight cars. By July 25, Armenia had only 100,000 cartridges left. Captain Khalil bey underscored the seriousness of the situation to the Armenians by sending 29 severely wounded Armenian soldiers to the Armenian headquarters on July 25, warning that the continuation of hostilities would determine the fate of a large number of Armenian prisoners in his custody.

The American Project of a Neutral Zone in Sharur-Nakhchivan

Shortly after the anti-Armenian uprising, the issue of establishing a neutral zone in Sharur-Nakhchivan under the leadership of an American governor-general was brought to the agenda by the Allied High Commissioner in Armenia, American Colonel William Haskell. The stated objectives were to prevent further bloodshed and to facilitate the work of the American charitable organization Near East Relief. However, Ibrahim Atnur considers this project an attempt to create an American base in the South Caucasus, which would strengthen U.S. influence in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Iran, as well as towards India, and ensure American proximity to Baku's oil resources.

On August 29, 1919, Haskell reached an agreement with the Azerbaijani side on the establishment of a neutral zone in Sharur-Nakhchivan. As Ibrahim Atnur notes, this 12-point agreement recognized Azerbaijani jurisdiction over Sharur, Nakhchivan, and even a significant part of Dereleyez, which was under Armenian control. However, upon returning to Tiflis, Haskell changed his position, deciding that this arrangement would not be acceptable to the Armenian side. In the new 21-point draft agreement sent on September 1 to Baku and Erivan, he removed the legal status of Azerbaijan over Nakhchivan. Later, considering the arguments of the Armenian side, Haskell made another amendment to the agreement, excluding Dereleyez from the neutral zone project. The Azerbaijani government was deeply concerned about the changes to the agreement and lodged protests with Haskell and the British representative in Tiflis, Oliver Wardrop. It also proposed a compromise to Haskell. Nevertheless, Haskell maintained his position and continued to pressure Azerbaijan. Eventually, on October 4, Haskell succeeded in securing an Armenian–Azerbaijani agreement on the neutral zone.

Satisfied with this agreement, Haskell left the South Caucasus, assigning military engineer Colonel Ray to oversee the establishment of the neutral zone. Ray decided to travel to Nakhchivan accompanied by Azerbaijani and Armenian representatives. However, both in Baku and Erivan, his request for accompaniment was denied—the Azerbaijani side cited Haskell's constantly shifting stance and suggested Ray negotiate directly with Nakhchivan's leaders, while the Armenian side refused due to the absence of an Azerbaijani representative in the delegation.

On October 24, Ray had to proceed to Nakhchivan accompanied only by Governor-General Colonel Delli and five other American officers. In Nakhchivan, the American delegation was received by Samed bey Jamillinsky and Captain Khalil-bey's secretary, with Azerbaijani and Turkish flags raised. During discussions at the house of Böyük Nakhchivani between the American delegation and Nakhchivan representatives—Khalil bey, Kelbali Khan of Nakhchivan, Samed-bey Jamilinsky, and Heydargulu bey Muradasilov—the local leaders refused to recognize the neutral zone project. Khalil bey told the Americans that Muslims had already been deceived by the British, who transferred power to the Armenians, and they had no intention of giving the Americans a chance.

Colonel Ray faced similar failure in negotiations with the representatives of the local council (''shura''). As Ibrahim Atnur points out, the Americans understood the reasons behind this failure. One American document acknowledges that since American charitable organizations supported not only Armenian refugees but also the Armenian army, this led to prejudice against Americans within the governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan and among the Muslim population of the Aras Valley. With Haskell's arrival, support for the Armenians intensified, which concerned Colonel Ray; he suggested providing some assistance to Muslim refugees.

After three days of unsuccessful negotiations, Ray returned to Erivan on October 29. Haskell was furious about the developments and accused Azerbaijan of failing to support Colonel Ray. Azerbaijan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mammad Yusif Jafarov, responded that his government had declared its passive stance. Prime Minister Yusifbeyli instructed Azerbaijan's representative in Erivan, Abdurrahim bey Hagverdiyev, to inform Ray that Azerbaijan agreed to the neutral zone on the condition of the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Zangezur and the cessation of all military activities there. In reality, Armenia had strengthened its presence in the district, prompting Azerbaijan to deny support to Ray. M. Y. Jafarov, through Hagverdiyev, expressed gratitude to the Nakhchivan leaders for their firm stance.

Further events

By the end of July 1919, only the Armenian rural cluster of Goghtn, located near Ordubad with its center in Agulis, continued to resist. Although the majority of villages had submitted to Muslim authority and to the newly appointed Ordubad commissar, Abbasgulu Bey Tahirov, the residents of Agulis took defensive positions in the town center and prepared for resistance. The Agulis population requested assistance from the Armenian government, which in August dispatched a detachment led by Garegin Nzhde from Zangezur to Agulis, followed by a small unit under Kazar Kasparyan in early September. However, as the defensive ring around Agulis tightened, the Armenian government ordered Nzhde and Kasparyan to cease the campaign. Nzhde disregarded this order and attempted to break through to Agulis. In October 1919, Armenian forces from Goghtn, in coordination with Zangezur units, launched an attack on Ordubad but were defeated, leading Goghtn to ultimately recognize the authority of the Nakhchivan government.

From time to time, the Armenian side attempted to regain control over Nakhchivan. For instance, an Armenian regiment of 500 soldiers and four cannons brought from Kars was concentrated north of Beyuk-Vedi. Beyuk-Vedi was subjected to artillery shelling, and minor skirmishes occurred along the front line. Armenian villages surrounding the village of Chiva were neutralized by Khalil Bey. In early November, Armenian forces attacked the northern border of Nakhchivan; however, in retaliation, Khalil Bey's counteroffensive neutralized the Armenian villages of Sultanbek, Martiros, and Sis.

Clashes also occurred between January 6 and 23, 1920.

Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani population in several regions of Armenia, suffering from ethnic cleansing, sought assistance from the Turkish command in Bayazet. The Turkish command decided to establish contact with the local population and provide them with support. In December 1919, the local populations of Aralık, Zangibasar, Iğdır, and certain areas of the Echmiadzin district organized themselves into ''shuras'' (councils) with the assistance of Chingiz Bey, a Turkish officer of Azerbaijani origin from Shahtakhti. Azerbaijani and Turkish officers were involved in the military organization of these regions; for example, the Zangibasar militia was led by Mammad Bey. On February 14, 1920, following the orders of the commander of the 11th Division, Javid Bey, Captain Muhiddin Bey and reserve officer Ihsan Bey were dispatched to Zangibasar. Although the organization of the local Azerbaijani population created a barrier against Armenian attacks, many unprotected groups continued to suffer from massacres.

Confrontation in Karabakh

Karabakh in 1918

As noted by Richard Hovannisian, in the first half of 1918, while many regions with mixed Armenian-Azerbaijani populations had already descended into interethnic conflict, Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Karabakh lived in relative peace. Although the authority of the Transcaucasian Commissariat and the Transcaucasian Sejm was nominally recognized, Nagorno-Karabakh was effectively independent, governed by a binational, multiparty council.

This fragile balance was disrupted with the arrival of Turkish forces, who sought to assist Azerbaijan in establishing control over Karabakh and Zangezur. In early August 1918, the First Congress of Karabakh Armenians elected the People's Government of Karabakh, which rejected Nuri Pasha's demands to recognize Azerbaijani authority and allow Turkish troops to enter Shusha. The Second Congress of Karabakh Armenians (September 20–24) once again rejected Nuri Pasha's demands, advocating for the preservation of the status quo until a conference between the Transcaucasian republics with the participation of the Central Powers in Istanbul.

Meanwhile, the liberation of Baku enabled Nuri Pasha to shift his focus to Shusha. To seize the city, Turkish–Azerbaijani units under the command of Javid Bey were dispatched to Karabakh. By this time, the Azerbaijani army and Muslim militias, after two weeks of fighting, had subdued the village of Karakishlag, severing the connection between the Armenians of Karabakh and Zangezur. Considering the fate of the Armenians in Baku and learning of the passage of 5,000 soldiers from the Army of Islam through the Askeran Pass, the Third Congress of Karabakh Armenians (October 1–5) acquiesced to Nuri Pasha's demands. On October 8, Javid Bey's forces, accompanied by the Azerbaijani representative Ismail Khan Ziyatkhanov, entered Shusha.

However, as Richard Hovannisian points out, rural Karabakh continued to resist submission to Nuri Pasha and Azerbaijan, and the latter ultimately failed to establish control over the region. Partisan leaders sought assistance from Andranik, who by late October had concentrated his forces near villages close to Goris. After receiving assurances of support from Karabakh and Zangezur leaders and waiting an additional ten days at the request of Shusha's mayor, Gerasim Melik-Shakhnazaryan, and the Varanda partisan leader, Sokrat Bey Melik-Shahnazaryan—who attempted, unsuccessfully, to negotiate with Azerbaijani leaders to avoid resistance against Andranik—Andranik advanced toward Shusha. However, despite overcoming the Muslim militia led by Sultan Bey Sultanov, Andranik was halted by the order of General Thomson.

Following the withdrawal of Turkish forces in November 1918, a temporary Armenian administration was established in Karabakh, represented by a council consisting of the mayor of Shusha and one representative each from the Karabakh districts of Khachen, Varanda, Jaraberd, and Dizak.

Mediation of the British mission in Karabakh

On January 15, 1919, General Thomson sanctioned the appointment of Dr. Khosrov bey Sultanov as Governor-General of Karabakh and Zangezur by the Azerbaijani government. This support for Azerbaijan, as well as the selection of the governor-general, shocked the Armenian public. According to Richard Hovannisian, Khosrov bey had incited Azerbaijanis in Karabakh against Armenians in the summer of 1918, was known as a Pan-Turanist and an ally of the Turkish Ittihadist commanders, and played an active role in the capture of Baku. Hovannisian notes that Armenians both feared and hated Sultanov. The governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged angry messages regarding the situation.

The Fourth Congress of Karabakh Armenians (February 10–21) rejected the proposal to send representatives to the Azerbaijani Parliament, protested Azerbaijan's interference in Karabakh's affairs, and declared that "Nagorno-Karabakh, as an integral part of the Republic of Armenia, rejects Azerbaijani authority in any form." In letters to General Thomson, the Armenian government, and the Armenian delegation in Paris, the Congress complained about the violation of Karabakh's "fundamental rights". The Congress also elected a permanent executive body, the National Council of Karabakh, which assumed responsibility for the region's unification with Armenia.

Meanwhile, Khosrov bey Sultanov himself, along with the British military mission led by Major G. N. G. Monck-Mason, arrived in Shusha. Monck-Mason informed the Armenian National Council that Sultanov would have an Armenian assistant and an advisory council consisting of three Armenians, three Muslims, and a representative from the British mission. He also clarified that Sultanov's appointment did not determine Karabakh's permanent status. However, he firmly stated that all orders from the governor-general must be executed without question, and strict measures would be taken against those who disobeyed. Nevertheless, neither the National Council nor the four partisan commanders of Karabakh yielded to Monck-Mason's persuasion.

In response, the Armenian National Council proposed the establishment of a mixed council chaired by the head of the British mission, composed of seven Armenians, three Muslims, and one representative each from Armenia and Azerbaijan, appointed by mutual agreement. Alternative proposals were also put forward, including the incorporation of Karabakh into Armenia; the restoration of the administrative unit that existed before the Turkish offensive; the creation of a British governorate in the Armenian part of Karabakh; or the establishment of a British governorate over the entire Karabakh region. However, neither General Thomson nor Colonel D. I. Shuttleworth, who replaced him in Baku after Thomson's departure to Tiflis, agreed to any of these compromises.

On March 27, two weeks after assuming command of the British headquarters in Tiflis, Thomson paid an official visit to Erivan, where he discussed the Karabakh issue with Prime Minister Hovhannes Kajaznuni. Thomson promised that Sultanov would be subordinate to Major Monck-Mason, that the governor-general's authority would not extend to Zangezur, and that the Azerbaijani garrison would be stationed only in Khankendi. A month later, General J. F. Milne, Commander of the British Forces in the Black Sea, reiterated the same assurances.

In the meantime, to resolve the crisis, Shuttleworth—who had been promoted to brigadier general on April 19—tasked the National Council of Karabakh with convening the Fifth Congress of Karabakh Armenians. During the congress (April 23–29), both Shuttleworth and Khosrov bey Sultanov delivered lengthy speeches, promising to ensure the rights and security of Armenians. Shuttleworth emphasized economic factors, warning of famine if ties with lowland Karabakh were severed and highlighting the importance of the Yevlakh highway, which connected Karabakh to the Baku–Tiflis railway. The delegates' response was uncompromising, prompting Shuttleworth to acknowledge the failure of his mission and to indicate that he could no longer obstruct Azerbaijan from taking further measures. Azerbaijan began to increase its military presence, with Prime Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski justifying this escalation in a notice to Allied representatives and the Georgian government. He cited attacks by Armenians on small Azerbaijani garrisons in Shusha, Askeran, and other parts of Karabakh, claiming that the state was taking preventive measures to restore order.

Meanwhile, in April–May, a conference initiated by Democratic Republic of Georgia, Georgian authorities was held in Tiflis to address territorial and border disputes among the young republics. However, the conference failed due to irreconcilable positions held by Armenians and Azerbaijanis regarding the ownership of contested territories based on ethnic and economic criteria.

Coinciding with the start of the Fifth Congress, Misha Arzumanyan, an unofficial representative of Armenia in Karabakh, arrived from Baku with General Thomson's permission to investigate the situation and report back to the Armenian government. Shuttleworth hoped that Arzumanyan would persuade the National Council to recognize Azerbaijani authority. He also believed that if Armenia officially acknowledged Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, the conflict would be resolved. When it became clear that Arzumanyan remained steadfast in his position, Shuttleworth expelled him back to Baku. Arzumanyan was replaced by Prince Hovsep Argutyan (Argutinsky-Dolgorukov), known for his conciliatory stance on the Karabakh issue, as Armenia's official representative in the region. However, despite Shuttleworth's hopes, Argutyan, during Shuttleworth's second visit to Karabakh on May 10, limited himself to merely calling on the Armenians of Karabakh and Zangezur to cooperate with the British command.

Establishment of Azerbaijani control over Karabakh

Following Shuttleworth's second failure, Azerbaijan increased its military presence in Karabakh. On June 2, Major Monk-Mason convened the leaders of the Karabakh Armenians, handing them a radiogram from Shuttleworth demanding the cessation of all political activities. The leaders were not allowed to leave the British mission building until they signed the radiogram. The next day, Sultanov ordered the Azerbaijani garrison to surround the Armenian part of the city and demanded that the National Council surrender the fortress held by the Armenian militia. After their refusal, an intimidating demonstration of armed Azerbaijani soldiers followed on June 4. A shootout ensued. Armenian barricades and even the British mission building came under heavy Azerbaijani fire; however, khosrov bey Sultanov, Sultanov failed to dislodge the Armenian militia from their positions.

Monk-Mason demanded that both sides cease fire and allow British posts to be established between them. However, Sultanov refused to stop the hostilities until the Karabakh Council was arrested and brought to him. Monk-Mason attempted to expel the Armenian Council from Karabakh by summoning its representatives under the pretext of acquainting them with new instructions from Shuttleworth. The council, anticipating Monk-Mason's deception, sent only three representatives who claimed they were unaware of the whereabouts of the others. Monk-Mason expelled them from Karabakh. By the end of the day, Monk-Mason once again ordered both sides to yield their positions to British soldiers.

Forced to halt military actions, Sultanov decided to enlist the help of his brother, Sultan bey Sultanov, who led a two-thousand-strong Azerbaijani militia. On June 5, Sultanov's militia attacked the village of Khaibalikend. By evening, with the arrival of Azerbaijani regular troops, Khaibalikend's resistance was crushed, and the population was subjected to a massacre. The attackers then devastated Karkijahan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Karkijahan, Pahlul, and Jamilli. The Armenian militia proved incapable of resisting the governor-general's forces, and Dr. Sultanov made it clear that the alternative to submission would be bloodshed.

The massacres were followed by protests from both the Armenian public and American representatives in Transcaucasia, who blamed ineffective British policies for the events. Khosrov bey Sultanov was summoned to Baku, sparking rumors of his arrest; however, he returned to Shusha by the end of June.

By this time, the mood among the leaders of the Karabakh Armenians had grown increasingly pessimistic. The mayor of Shusha, Gerasim Melik-Shakhnazaryan, as well as the merchant class, the intelligentsia, and local populists had already concluded that continued resistance would lead to disaster. The Dashnaks, the National Council (which had fled to rural areas), and partisan leaders still refused to surrender. Recognizing the gradual shift in Armenian sentiment, Khosrov bey Sultanov, through Bishop Vagan and several prominent figures from Shusha, persuaded the Armenian National Council of Karabakh to convene the 6th Congress of Karabakh Armenians. At the Congress, which began on June 29 in Shushakend, Armenians showed a willingness to listen for the first time. The delegates were overwhelmed by a sense of impending catastrophe due to the withdrawal of the British not only from Shusha but from all of Transcaucasia. However, this time Sultanov was unwilling to listen to them and suddenly departed for Baku for consultations.

Confused by this, the 6th Congress sent three delegates to Baku with a proposal to recognize Azerbaijani authority on the condition of administrative and cultural autonomy, as well as commitments not to conduct campaigns against Zangezur, not to appoint a Muslim representative in Karabakh, and not to attempt to disarm the Armenian population. However, the Azerbaijani government put forward stricter conditions, which were rejected by the Armenian Council.

At the 7th Congress of Karabakh Armenians, convened on August 12 in Shushikend, a militant stance reemerged. The murders of Gerasim Khachatryan on his way to Baku and two delegates from Jraberd en route to Shushakend were condemned. The Congress declared its refusal to relocate to Shusha and rejected any conciliatory tone in negotiations with Sultanov. On August 14, Sultanov issued an ultimatum to the Congress, stating that if the Azerbaijani government's proposal was not accepted within 48 hours, Azerbaijan would resort to force. On the same day, a delegate from the Armenian National Council of Karabakh returned from Baku with news from Armenian representative Tigran Bekzadyan that no external assistance would be forthcoming and that Karabakh could rely only on its own resources. Having lost all hope, the Congress on August 15 authorized 15 of its members to sign an agreement with Sultanov. After a week of negotiations, on August 22, an agreement was signed recognizing the Azerbaijani jurisdiction over the highland parts of Karabakh—Dizak, Varanda, Khachen, and Jraberd—until the decision of the Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920), Versailles Conference. According to Richard Hovannisian, this was a national victory for Azerbaijan and a personal triumph for Khosrov bey Sultanov, who subjugated the Karabakh Armenians, and the temporary recognition of Azerbaijani jurisdiction was a significant step toward the final incorporation of Karabakh into Azerbaijan.

Confrontation in Zangezur

Following the February Revolution of 1917, the Zangezur region, particularly Goris, came under the administration of a mixed Armenian-Azerbaijani authority. However, deteriorating intercommunal relations led the Azerbaijani population to withdraw and establish their own administration in the village of Dondarly.

In June 1918, tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Zangezur escalated sharply. At the end of July, Andranik retreated from Nakhchivan to this area. At the time, his armed force consisted of 3,000 to 5,000 fighters and approximately 30,000 refugees brought from Turkey. The local Armenian leadership supported Andranik. Upon his arrival in Zangezur, Andranik captured several Muslim villages, which were strategically important due to their control over key routes across the region. The devastation carried out by Andranik's forces prompted strong protests from Khalil Pasha. However, the Armenian government declared that Zangezur, as well as the entire Elizavetpol Governorate, fell under Azerbaijani jurisdiction and claimed it could do nothing to prevent the actions.

By late October, Andranik had concentrated his forces near Goris and launched operations aimed at Shusha. The route from Goris to Shusha passed through a narrow valley consisting of 20 villages along the Zabukh , Zabukh Gorge and the Hakari River. The militia led by Sultan Bey, composed of Azerbaijanis, Azerbaijani Turks and Kurds, was highly familiar with this terrain. On 29 November 1918, a three-day battle broke out. Despite suffering heavy losses, Andranik’s forces managed to capture a few strategic heights and villages, including Abdallar. Shortly afterward, British Captain Squire and French Captain Gasfield arrived from Shusha. They presented Andranik with a written order signed by General Thomson demanding the immediate cessation of hostilities and his withdrawal to Goris.

In January 1919, the British command approved the appointment of Khosrov Bey by the Azerbaijani government as Governor-General of Zangezur and Karabakh. This decision triggered protests from the Armenian side, to which Azerbaijan responded accordingly. The British, meanwhile, stated that the final determination would be made at the Paris Peace Conference.

Following Andranik’s departure from Zangezur on 22 March, the region's strategic sensitivity to Azerbaijan became increasingly evident. Even prior to the withdrawal of Andranik’s Special Attack Division, the Central National Council of Zangezur—the Armenian governing body—had already requested arms and ammunition from the Erivan government. These demands intensified after Khosrov Bey’s appointment. At the same time, the council urged the Alexander Khatisian government to send a temporary governor and assign officers to regular military units in Zangezur. Too weak to resist or oppose British pressure, the Armenian government merely appointed Lieutenant Colonel Arsen Shahmazyan as a temporary commissioner. Although Shahmazyan was instructed to facilitate Zangezur’s incorporation into Armenia, neither Prime Minister Khatisyan nor his deputy approved the appointment, thereby denying active involvement in the Karabakh conflict.

In early 1919, British officers began exerting pressure on Zangezur, demanding recognition of Azerbaijani authority on a provisional basis. By the end of April, as it became clear that persuading the Zangezur leadership was unlikely, General Shuttleworth personally traveled to Goris to demand recognition of Khosrov bey Sultanov, Khosrov Bey Sultanov as Governor. When his efforts failed, he returned to Baku. Just two weeks later, General Thomson issued orders for two British units to arrest Armenian propagandists. However, threats and bombardments proved ineffective, serving merely as demonstrations of force for Armenian fighters. Shuttleworth accused the Armenian government of duplicity—claiming non-involvement while secretly financing Armenian agents. He made his final departure from the region on 19 May. Further attempts by Monk-Mason also ended in failure.

Ultimately, the British altered their approach, supporting the maintenance of the status quo in Zangezur on the condition that Karabakh remain part of Azerbaijan. On 29 May, General Corey, the new commander of the 27th Division, informed Shuttleworth that he should clearly warn the Azerbaijani government that any attempt to establish administration in Zangezur by force would be considered military aggression. Corey wrote to Armenian Prime Minister Khatisyan, stating that Azerbaijan had been instructed to accept the presence of local authorities in Zangezur. He regarded this as a significant concession to the Armenians.

From mid-April onward, conflict broke out between Armenians and local Azerbaijanis, leading to the expulsion of Muslims from central Zangezur to peripheral areas, the plains, or Iran. The resulting bloodshed provoked protests in Azerbaijan. On 21 June, the newspaper Azerbaijan published a statement by Khosrov Bey Sultanov reporting that Armenians had blocked mountain passes, preventing 10,000 nomadic Azerbaijanis with 150,000 head of livestock from reaching their summer pastures. The report also noted that Sultanov had requested permission from the government to fulfill his "duty before tens of thousands of people."

On 22 August 1919, Karabakh was formally subordinated to Azerbaijan. Following General Thomson’s earlier order halting Andranik’s advance toward Karabakh, Azerbaijan had emerged victorious in this conflict. In the eastern part of Zangezur—where the Muslim population was predominant—Azerbaijan largely retained control. However, other parts of Zangezur, including Sisian, Goris, Meghri, and Kapan, Qafan, remained under local Armenian authority, with the exception of the Bargushad (river), Bargushad and Okhchuchay valleys, where Muslims were the majority. Thus, the struggles over Karabakh, Mughan plain, Mughan, and Sharur- Nakhchivan ended in Azerbaijan’s favor, and preparations to recover the remaining parts of Zangezur were underway. Less than a week after asserting control over Karabakh, Musavat Party leader Mahammad Amin Rasulzade declared that the time had come to liberate Zangezur and open the route to Julfa, following the successes in Karabakh and Lankaran and the Nakhchivani movement to unite with Azerbaijan. In October, to secure full control over Zangezur, the First Infantry Division under the command of Javad bey Shikhlinski and the Second Cavalry Regiment under Davud Bey Yadigarov were formed. In addition, Sultan Bey—brother of Khosrov Bey, a prominent Karabakh noble and military leader—also began preparing his militia for an offensive, despite warnings from Minister of War Mehmandarov regarding the unreliability of his forces.

On 29 October, Javad bey Shikhlinski expressed confidence in his troops and the success of the upcoming operation. He ordered Captain Ibrahimov, commander of the vanguard, to proceed from Abdallar village to Teqe and present an ultimatum to the Armenian unit there demanding the opening of the road to Goris. After the demand was rejected, Azerbaijani forces launched an Zangezur Expedition, offensive on Zangezur in early November. However, by 7 November, they were forced to retreat to their previous positions. This defeat was not solely due to the undisciplined tribal militias that looted deserted Armenian villages and even fired upon regular Azerbaijani units. The lack of discipline and coordination among these forces contributed significantly to the failure, as they retreated in disarray in the face of Armenian counterattacks.

While the Azerbaijani army launched its offensive from the east, Nakhchivani forces attacked Zangezur from the west. Units under the command of Khalil Bey advanced toward Sisian. Simultaneously, another group led by an Ottoman officer launched an attack from Ordubad to defend Azerbaijani villages in Zangezur. Subjected to simultaneous assaults from Ordubad and the Alinja River sector, Armenian forces were expelled from the villages of Vermeziyar and Alekli. Fighting near Sisian centered around the village of Angalavit, where Khalil Bey succeeded in capturing three villages. However, due to the Azerbaijani army’s failure in the east, the Nakhchivani units were also forced to withdraw from Zangezur.

In mid-November, British representative Oliver Wardrop, Sir Oliver Wardrop and American Colonel James Rey demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities. Negotiations commenced in Tiflis on 20 November 1919, and on 23 November, Armenian Prime Minister Alexander Khatisian and Azerbaijani Prime Minister Nasib bey Yusifbeyli signed an agreement. Despite the signing of the agreement, fighting did not cease. Khalil Bey continued to launch attacks toward Daralayaz. Although these assaults were supported with arms and ammunition by the Ottoman XI Army, they ended in failure. Simultaneously, the Armenian military commander in Zangezur, Garegin Nzhdeh, concentrated his forces in the Geghadzor valley and severed the connection between Tatev (village), Tatev and Qafan. From this position, he prepared to launch fresh assaults on Azerbaijani villages that had survived in the region.

On 1 December, Armenian offensives began. Local Azerbaijanis mounted a fierce three-day resistance against the detachments from Derebaz, Tatev, and Genvaz, even nearly encircling the Qafan battalion. However, on the fourth day, Armenian forces managed to break through Azerbaijani defensive positions and, with artillery support, captured the Shaharjik outpost. On 7 December, the last Azerbaijani village in the region, Achibachi, was looted and burned. As the Dashnak leadership continued its policy of ethnic cleansing, the Azerbaijani population either took refuge in the mountains or fled to Nakhchivan or along the Hakari (river), Hakari River. According to archival sources cited by Atnur, only 261 people from the villages of Shabadan, Pirdov, Atgiz, and Okhchu survived and sought refuge in Ordubad.

Such actions by the Armenian side provoked strong protests from Azerbaijan. Khosrov bey Sultanov called on the government to resume military operations and stated that the regular Armenian army had used machine guns in at least one region to destroy 400 houses across nine villages. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mammad Yusif Jafarov included this information in a formal protest to the Allied Command. Prime Minister Yusifbeyli wrote to Allied commissioners Haskell and Wardrop, as well as to Georgian Foreign Minister Gegechkori, declaring that if Armenian heavy weaponry was not confiscated and they were not compelled to adhere to the terms of peace, Azerbaijan would launch a counteroffensive.

On 3 December, Allied High Commissioner William Haskell returned to the Caucasus and accused Colonel Rey of failing to resolve the Zangezur crisis. Haskell also expressed frustration over the abandonment of the proposed American general-governorate for the Sharur- Nakhchivan region, blaming both Azerbaijan and Khalil Bey for obstructing the plan. Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol, Mark Bristol, then stationed in Istanbul, informed Haskell that Rey and other American officials in Tiflis were unable to distinguish between propaganda and fact. According to Bristol, they believed that Azerbaijan was actively trying to establish a Karabakh–Zangezur–Nakhchivan “corridor.” Regardless of whether these remarks influenced Haskell, tensions between him and Rey escalated to the point that Rey resigned one week after Haskell’s return.

Following Azerbaijan’s protests over Zangezur, Haskell pledged to dispatch inspectors to examine the activities of the Armenian regular army. He also advised the Armenian government to recall any personnel or military equipment sent to Zangezur, adding that any confirmation of Armenian interference in the region would have grave consequences for the country’s future. Khatisian, while again denying the presence of regular Armenian troops or ongoing operations in Zangezur, promised to punish any state officials found to be involved if such suspicions were confirmed. At the same time, he admitted that regular military forces had been deployed against local Azerbaijani militias in Daralayaz and accused Azerbaijan of attempting to seize Zangezur.

In an attempt to placate Haskell and Wardrop, the Armenian government recalled Arsen Shahmazyan in December and reassigned his military authority to General Kazarov, while civilian authority was entrusted to Sergey Melik-Yolchuyan. General Kazarov was even instructed to verify the accuracy of Azerbaijani allegations and to punish any individuals found guilty of violations. However, despite Khatisian conveying these directives to the Allied command and continuing to deny the presence of regular troops in Zangezur, an expeditionary force under the command of Armenian officer Drastamat Kanayan, Dro, consisting of 400 infantry, 300 cavalry, two artillery pieces, and 30 machine guns, was dispatched not only to consolidate Armenian control over Zangezur but also to “liberate” Nagorno-Karabakh and incorporate it into Armenia.

Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Conference

Due to rising tensions over Zangezur, Armenian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Alexander Khatisian proposed holding a peace conference in a letter addressed to Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mammad Yusif Jafarov. As a precedent, he cited a similar conference successfully held between Georgia and Armenia and suggested organizing the meeting in one of the border towns—either Qazakh in Azerbaijan or Dilijan or Karakilisa in Armenia. The proposed agenda for the conference included discussions on the refugee crisis, demarcation of temporary borders, transit agreements, and other related issues. On October 26, the Azerbaijani side accepted Khatisian’s proposal on the condition that the main objective of the conference would be the final resolution of territorial disputes, and suggested Baku as a more suitable location. Although the Armenian side had previously rejected Baku, Khatisian promptly informed Jafarov that the Armenian delegation, consisting of Tigran Bekzadyan, Martiros Arutyunyan, and Vahan Papazyan, would arrive in Baku on November 20.

However, due to the escalation of clashes over Zangezur, the conference was postponed to November 26 and could only commence on December 14. The reason for the delay until December 14 was the congress of the Musavat Party, held from December 2 to 11. During the congress, Rasulzadeh put forward the idea of a Caucasian Confederation, asserting that it would not only bring economic and political benefits but also create favorable conditions for the establishment of a larger Azerbaijani Turkic state.

The first plenary session was chaired by Mammad Yusif Jafarov, who expressed satisfaction with the modest progress made in bilateral negotiations, especially the recent truce reached in Tiflis. Parliamentarian Fatali Khan Khoyski added that only close cooperation among the peoples of the Caucasus could save them from destructive ethnic conflicts and internal upheavals. On the Armenian side, Martiros Arutyunyan, along with Tigran Bekzadyan and Argutinsky-Dolgoruki, praised the free Azerbaijani people and declared that their nation desired nothing but peace and freedom. The Armenian delegation further stated that the freedom of one republic was impossible without the freedom of others.

Nevertheless, despite all optimism, the conference produced little more than an incomplete agenda after three closed-door sessions. It became evident in the very first session that neither side had altered its position. Final negotiations on borders and the Caucasian Confederation remained inconclusive, and both parties agreed to hold a second plenary session on December 21. However, this also proved unsuccessful. The Armenian delegation proposed a recess for consultation with their respective governments, followed by a parallel Transcaucasian meeting on the confederation and bilateral talks on more concrete issues to be held in Tiflis. Neither of these proposals was ever realized. The adjournment of the conference effectively marked its end.

Even during the peace conference, armed clashes and ethnic cleansing did not cease. On December 17–18, in the Armenian-inhabited area near Ordubad in Sharur-Nakhchivan, a Muslim crowd—including refugees from Zangezur—attacked the village of Ashaghi Akulis, killed several Armenians, and forced others to flee to Yukhari Akulis. The commandant of Ordubad, Ottoman army captain Adib Bey, had remained in the region since the Ottoman incursion and attempted to pacify the Armenian population. He informed the Armenians that if the situation deteriorated further, he would summon regular Ottoman forces from Beyazid across the border to either assist in evacuating the Armenians to Iran or help defend Akulis. On April 24, an armed Muslim group approached Yukhari Akulis, and the Armenians appealed for help to Commandant Adib Bey and Ordubad’s commissioner Abbasgulu Bey Tahirov. Although Tahirov and the Shiite sheikh went to Akulis to calm the Muslim crowd, their efforts failed. As tensions escalated, Armenians were advised to take refuge in the small Muslim quarter by the stream near Akulis. By midday Tahirov informed the Armenians that they would be escorted to another village, but when the Armenians learned that the escort would be led by Sattar, they began to ask Edib Bey to lead the escort himself. The latter, citing other duties, called on the Armenians to obey orders. The Armenians, refusing to leave their homes and shelters, fell victim to the pogromists, who were joined by the gendarmerie. The Armenians who fled to another village were also attacked en route.

The Akulis events created significant resonance within Armenian society and led to criticism by Armenian journalists of the Azerbaijani government’s policies.

For nearly a month, the Azerbaijani authorities claimed ignorance regarding the attacks. Once the event was confirmed by several sources, Foreign Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski admitted that, despite efforts by local authorities to suppress unrest, such incidents had indeed occurred. On January 21, he promised that an investigation would be conducted and, if the Armenian side’s allegations were substantiated, all guilty officials would be punished and every effort made to return abducted individuals. However, due to the ongoing conflict in Zangezur and the dire political situation in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan was unable to intervene effectively. At the same time, Fatali Khan Khoyski maintained that the root of the problems lay in the atrocities committed by Armenians in Zangezur. According to him, these atrocities had caused a significant influx of Muslim refugees into Nakhchivan.

Meanwhile, the ethnic cleansing of Azerbaijani Turks in Zangezur under the leadership of Garegin Nzhdeh continued. On January 19, Nzhdeh’s forces captured 20 villages. On the same day, General Kazarov’s unit seized the main route between Goris and the Hakari River valley. In response, Fatali Khan Khoyski protested that during the initial days of the Zangezur attacks, nine Azerbaijani villages had been destroyed, and another 40 villages had been devastated after the agreement. He once again claimed that regular Armenian troops had participated in these assaults. In response, the Armenian government stated that they had no such information, requested additional details, and assured that the matter would be investigated and the perpetrators punished.

War in March–April 1920

The Situation in Karabakh After the August Agreement

Even after the establishment of Azerbaijani authority in August 1919, tensions in Karabakh remained high. Armenian forces in the region continued to incite anti-Azerbaijani uprisings. Meanwhile, militarists and nationalists within the Azerbaijani government exerted pressure on Prime Minister Yusifbeyli to allow Khosrov Bey Sultanov and the Azerbaijani army full entry into the region in order to firmly incorporate it into the state. Armenians protested the construction of military fortifications by Azerbaijanis in the area. Simultaneously, Khosrov Bey was involving Armenians in efforts to confiscate weapons from local Armenian populations.

Following the August 1919 agreement, many leaders among the Armenians of Shusha left for abroad, where they established defense committees to prevent the sale of arms to Khosrov Bey's men and to ensure the protection of ammunition supplies. Nevertheless, there was no consensus among Karabakh Armenians regarding relations with Azerbaijan. The disarmed urban population of Shusha—including merchants and intellectuals—viewed the situation differently from their rural compatriots in Dizaq, Varanda, and Khachen, where Azerbaijani authority remained indirect. While Dashnaks, non-Bolshevik Social Democrats, and some Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) favored unification with Armenia, the Bolsheviks, most SRs, Populists, as well as merchants and intellectuals, emphasized the region’s economic ties with eastern Transcaucasia.

Amid the Zangezur crisis, on 23 October, the self-defense committee sent representatives to Erivan to request that several intellectuals and officers be dispatched to Karabakh. One of their demands was six months of financial support in case Azerbaijan violated the August agreement and attempted to establish direct control over the mountainous part of Karabakh. Members of the Dashnaktsutyun party continued to criticize the Armenian government and party bureau for their failure to secure the unification of Karabakh with Armenia. Consequently, the new party bureau sent Arsen Mikaelyan—an American branch member of Karabakhi origin—to cooperate with the Dashnak Aparaj Central Committee in Karabakh. Simultaneously, the Armenian Minister of Defense dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Zakhar Mesyan to accompany Mikaelyan. Both arrived in the region of Javanshir district in December and, on 3 January 1920, met representatives of Dro in the village of Giziloba. This delegate had arrived from Zangezur. However, shortly thereafter, disagreements arose between the Aparaj Committee and Mikaelyan. The central body of the Dashnaktsutyun party intervened to resolve the dispute, subordinating all party structures in Karabakh to Mikaelyan’s leadership.

The former leaders of the now-defunct self-defense committees—Asatur Avetisyan, Khachik Melkumyan, and Aslan Shahnazaryan—agreed to serve as Mikaelyan's representatives in Varanda and Dizaq. Their mission was to establish self-defense units in each village, halt arms sales, safeguard munitions, and expose agents of Khosrov Bey. Mikaelyan and Mesyan also appointed officials to Armenian-populated areas of Karabakh and established courier communication between five localities in Karabakh and Zangezur. Additionally, a special organ was created to punish those considered "traitors."

By the end of January, the Armenian commander Deli Qazar arrived in Karabakh with his militia and became one of the central figures in the preparations for uprising. Throughout February, Deli Qazar, Zakhar Mesyan, and Captain Ter-Martirosyan (dispatched by Dro) recruited Armenian youth, organized military drills, and led exercises. A small amount of weaponry was also transferred from Zangezur to support them.

The Azerbaijani side did not remain passive. In early January, after learning of Mikaelyan and Mesyan’s arrival in Karabakh from Armenian informants, Khosrov Bey demanded that local Armenian leaders prevent conflict. On 19 January, he further insisted that the Armenians acknowledge the inviolability of economic ties between Azerbaijan and Karabakh. The Azerbaijani garrison in Khankendi was reinforced, Azerbaijani army units were deployed in Armenian villages along the Terter River, and three cannons were sent toward Goris. Former Ottoman commander Khalil Pasha participated in preparations, seeking to strengthen Turkish influence in Azerbaijan and to ensure that the Minister of War, Samad Bey Mehmandarov, would eventually be replaced by a more pro-Turkish commander. Khalil Pasha personally oversaw the training of Azerbaijani armed units in the Jabrayil district. Military figures like Khalil Pasha and Teymur bey Novruzov frequently traveled to Shusha. Additionally, on 8 February, information arrived that former commander of the Caucasus Islamic Army, Nuri Pasha, had visited Sultanov in Shusha via Zangezur. This led to another round of protest, accusations, and denials among Azerbaijani and Armenian governments and their representatives in Tiflis.

The mutual preparations for war caused particular anxiety among the Armenian inhabitants of Shusha. They called on both sides to adhere to the August agreement. The head of the Dashnak party’s Shusha branch requested that Mikaelyan remove Deli Qazar and other “madmen” from the region. The inter-party Armenian bureau asked Mikaelyan to leave the area if he intended to initiate an uprising. This bureau included Karabakhi Dashnaks, Bolsheviks, and SRs. The Bolsheviks asserted that Azerbaijan would soon undergo Bolshevization and that an uprising would be futile. Nevertheless, these and other efforts by the Shusha intelligentsia to prevent conflict were ultimately unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the training of Armenian youth continued in Javanshir, Khachen, Dizaq, and Varanda. Armenian envoys maintained constant contact with Commissioner Sergey Melik-Yelchiyan, Dro, and General Kazarov in Zangezur by infiltrating Azerbaijani lines. Melik-Yelchyan and Dro, both of Karabakhi origin, were not opposed to forcibly resisting Azerbaijan’s annexation of the region. However, due to cold weather and weakening supply lines, the Zangezur units were temporarily disbanded, and Dro returned to Erivan. He would remain there until the end of March to monitor the situation in Karabakh. In the Armenian government, War Minister Nazaretyan was a supporter of unifying Karabakh with Armenia. In early March, Prime Minister Khatisian stated that the situation in Karabakh would not go beyond a defensive stance.

Tensions between the two communities in Karabakh continued to escalate. Khosrov Bey increased pressure on the Armenians of Shusha, attempting to demonstrate the futility of resisting Azerbaijan. Armenians were frequently attacked, robbed, and beaten along the Aghdam–Shusha road, with some even killed. During this period, an incident occurred in Khankendi: an Azerbaijani soldier went missing, and shortly afterward, a corpse of unknown identity was found. This led to collective punishment of the Armenian population in the town. In response to a protest note from the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fatali Khan Khoyski replied that the events had been exaggerated:

Regarding your claims that Azerbaijani military units allegedly beat 400 Armenian civilians without cause, destroyed their homes, closed the Aghdam–Shusha road to Armenians, and subjected them to an economic boycott, I find it necessary to state that all of these allegations are false. The reality is as follows: on February 21, the mutilated body of a Muslim was found in a forest near Khankendi. Soldiers of the regiment stationed in Khankendi identified the victim as one of their missing comrades. Based on this, on February 22, minor excesses were committed by the deceased's comrades and Zangezur refugees, resulting in the killing of two Armenians in Khankendi, three in Aghdam, and three in Khojaly. Due to the extraordinary measures taken by the Governor-General, order was immediately restored. Four individuals responsible for the crime were apprehended, are being held in custody, and will receive appropriate punishment through the court system.

Even four days before the incident in Khankendi, Khosrov bey Sultanov addressed the Armenian National Council, urging them to convene their upcoming congress. He proposed that the congress discuss the complete integration of Karabakh into Azerbaijan and allow the Azerbaijani army to be stationed in the villages of Hadrut, Marqushavan, and Kirs to defend against possible intervention from Zangezur and Basarkechar. On 28 February, the Armenians commenced their 8th Congress in Shusha. Simultaneously, concerned about the dominance of Bolsheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) in the congress, Mikaelyan announced that an alternative congress would be held in Shushakend. Representatives from Shusha, Dizak, parts of Khachen, Gulistan, and Javanshir gathered in Shusha for the congress. Consequently, the Armenians of Karabakh found themselves politically divided. Over the following two days, each congress attempted to attract delegates from the other side, but these efforts ultimately failed.

The majority of delegates participated in the Shusha congress, which was predominantly led by the Inter-Party Bureau and the Bolsheviks Alexander Tsaturyan and Dr. Sarkis Ambartsumyan. They clearly stated their readiness to accept Azerbaijan’s conditions under certain terms. Meanwhile, at the Shushakend congress which declared itself the 8th Congress of Karabakh Armenians Azerbaijan was accused of violating the August Agreement, and it was announced that “any Azerbaijani aggression would be met with resistance.”

Following the Shusha and Shushakend congresses, the situation in Karabakh continued to deteriorate. Khosrov bey prohibited Armenians from leaving Shusha without special permission. Azerbaijani officers were stationed in Armenian neighborhoods to supervise movements, and former Armenian officers who had served in the Tsarist Russian army were registered. This measure was intended to prevent their involvement in the uprising preparations underway in rural areas. According to Armenian-Dashnak sources, on 11 and 12 March, ninety wagons of arms, ammunition, and fighters were transported from Baku to Karabakh and Jabrayil. Concurrently, Khalil Pasha continued to provide military training to Azerbaijani forces. The Yekhlakh–Shusha road became increasingly dangerous for Armenians, prompting wealthy Armenians in Shusha to flee to the countryside in search of safer refuge.

The Armenians were also rapidly preparing for an uprising. Encouraged by Deli Kazar and Mesyan, Mikaelyan continued the insurrection plans. To this end, he received three machine guns and 50,000 bullets from Zangezur. The insurrection plan developed by Mikaelyan, Deli Kazar, and Mesyan was later modified by the Armenian officer from Shusha, Hovakim Stepanyan. On 10 and 12 March, Mikaelyan informed Zangezur that the uprising was scheduled to begin on the night of 17 March. However, Melik-Yelchiyan and General Kazarov advised postponement, noting that Dro had not yet arrived in the region and that Nzhdeh’s planned attack on Ordubad coincided with the same date. Consequently, Mikaelyan decided to delay the uprising until 22–23 March, aligning it with the Novruz celebrations observed by Azerbaijanis.

On the night of 19 March, Nzhdeh’s Zangezur forces launched an attack on Ordubad, followed by coordinated offensives by Armenian forces in various directions toward Vedibasar and Nakhchivan. The assault from the Ordubad axis included 800 bayonets, one cannon, and numerous machine guns; the attack from the direction of the village of Cive comprised 300 bayonets, four machine guns, and two cannons; in the Büyük Vedi direction, 600 bayonets, six machine guns, two cannons, and four mountain guns were deployed; while the assault from the village of Ahura involved 150 bayonets. Despite initial success, including the capture of Aza village between Ordubad and Julfa, Armenian forces were eventually defeated by Azerbaijani troops. The fighters from Vedi, under the command of Abbasqulu bey Shadlinski, managed to seize key strategic points in the Büyük Vedi area. Both sides suffered heavy losses in the battles around Ordubad. Armenian casualties included 200 personnel and seven machine guns. Ultimately, the Armenians were also defeated in this region. Garegin Nzhdeh, who commanded the assault on Ordubad, was never able to capture the village of Akulis. During the Armenian offensive, as agreed with Khalil bey, Zangibasar fighters under the command of Captain Muhyiddin bey launched an attack on Iğdır, though this effort did not yield any results.

The Karabakh Uprising

The uprising began with night attacks launched from multiple directions. Benefiting from heavy fog conditions, the insurgents managed to seize key strategic locations stretching from Dizak to Javanshir. Deli Kazar disarmed the Azerbaijani garrison in Askeran and captured many surrounding passes and highlands. He also succeeded in severing communications with Aghdam. Although Captain Ter-Martirosyan easily advanced the Javanshir detachment toward Marqushavan and the Tartar Riverbank, he failed to launch a diversionary assault on Aghdam. On the southeastern front, fighters from Varanda and Dizak secured several heights overlooking the Karabakh plain. At the same time, Stepanyan and Sasuntsi Manuk seized Azerbaijani posts in the Muslimlar village—a village situated between Zangezur and Karabakh that was unmarked on contemporary maps. Here, they captured two cannons, 25,000 various munitions, and military documents including detailed maps of regional headquarters. This operation opened the route to Zangezur via Korindzor.

Despite initial success along the perimeter, the insurgents faced a significant setback in central operations. After Colonel Mesyan besieged Khankendi with 400 men, command of the ongoing assault was transferred to “Uncle Aleksan” Balasyan and Lieutenant Lalayan. According to Dashnaktsutyun party records, Azerbaijani forces in Khankendi were taken by surprise and allegedly prepared to surrender. However, as the garrison was surrendering, Aleksan unexpectedly opened fire on them, prompting the Azerbaijanis to fight back. This critical error cost Aleksan and Lalayan their lives, and the insurgents were forced to retreat. The failure to capture Khankendi, a core objective of the uprising plan, effectively sealed the fate of Shusha. On 22 March, as planned, Varanda police arrived in Shusha under the pretext of offering Novruz greetings and collecting their wages. Simultaneously, a group of 100 armed men, led by Nerse Azbekyan, secretly entered the city with the goal of disarming the Azerbaijani garrison. However, the Varanda contingent spent the night drinking and failed to occupy their assigned positions. Unable to make contact with them, Azbekyan's group mistakenly opened fire on Azerbaijani troops from a distance. Awakened by the gunfire, Azerbaijani soldiers armed themselves. Only afterward did the Varanda Armenians begin capturing Azerbaijani officers residing in Armenian homes. Confusion persisted on both sides until dawn. Around this time, Azerbaijani forces received news of the failed Armenian assault on Khankendi. Encouraged by this, they launched an attack on the Armenian quarters in Shusha. According to General Novruzov in Aghdam, Armenians were bombarding Shusha from the mountains, cutting off all means of communication. The Azerbaijani assault caught Shusha’s Armenians off guard, and reprisals commenced. Among those killed were Bishop Vahan, Police Chief Avetis Ter-Ghukasyan, Bolshevik Alexander Tsaturyan, and numerous Armenian intellectuals.

Although the assaults on Shusha and Khankendi were repelled, both towns remained isolated from the outside world, with no links to the rest of Azerbaijan.

The events in Karabakh also escalated tensions between Erivan and Baku. The Azerbaijani side accused the Armenians of launching a treacherous and unexpected attack during a national holiday. Parliament demanded that the government immediately suppress the uprising. Conversely, the Armenian press and government accused Azerbaijan of violating the August Agreement and submitted formal complaints to the Allied Supreme Command. In his letter of protest, Prime Minister Khatisian accused Azerbaijan of breaching the agreement, committing acts of violence and disarmament against Armenians, collaborating with Young Turk leadership, and attempting to eradicate “Armenian Karabakh.” Concurrent with the outbreak of the uprising, the Armenian government underwent a shift, forming for the first time an administration composed entirely of Dashnaks.

As Arsen Saparov noted, the Armenian uprising was quickly quelled in its initial stages due to poor coordination. Nonetheless, hostilities continued. A memorandum prepared by the Armenian Ministry of War, based on a request by the U.S. Consulate in Tiflis, reported that Azerbaijani forces had launched attacks on three fronts: Askeran (Shusha), Khachen (Vangli village), and Gulistan (via the Garachinar–Upper Erkech–Lower Agjakand line). Minister of War Samad bey Mehmandarov traveled to western Azerbaijan to better coordinate military operations. Full-scale military engagements began across Karabakh..

On 24 March, Armenians launched an assault toward Tartar (Gulistan) but failed to capture it. Azerbaijani forces stationed there, including a battalion of the Ganja Regiment under Commander Kazimbeyov and a cavalry regiment led by Colonel Tongiyev, engaged in night battles and recaptured Maraghaly village. The next battle occurred near Chayli village, 3 km from Marqushavan. On 26 March at 22:00, after artillery and rifle fire, Azerbaijani forces seized and burned the villages of Chayli and Bruc. The Armenian troops retreated westward to the mountainous section of Chayli. On 28 March, Colonel Kazimbeyov informed central command of the capture of Yenikend and Garachinar villages. Following additional battles on 1 April, Azerbaijani forces secured Lower and Upper Agjakand as well. At 2 a.m. on 29 March, the village of Kharkhaput was also captured. On 31 March, partisans were reported to have seized Erkech village and were advancing toward Gulistan. A report from the Armenian Ministry of War dated 27 April noted that all Armenian villages in the Gulistan direction had been destroyed and were now under Azerbaijani control, except for villages west of Chaykend, which Azerbaijani forces failed to capture during the unsuccessful operations of 11–12 April.

The Armenian Ministry of War also reported that Azerbaijan’s attack from Aghdam toward Khachen had ended in failure.

Meanwhile, from 26 March onward, Azerbaijani forces under Habib bey Salimov, Teymur bey Novruzov, and Javad bey Shikhlinski advanced in the Shusha direction to liberate Askeran and surrounding areas. The local Armenian forces were led by Deli Kazar. During the 29 March battles, Azerbaijani forces captured and burned Pirlar village. They also seized Khanabad and repelled an Armenian counterattack. Cavalry under Kazimbeyov’s command drove the Armenians from Meshadiali and Gazanchi villages and captured Farrukh. As a result of these battles, Armenian forces were pushed back by 2 km, and by the end of the day, Azerbaijani troops had taken Askeran, Khanabad, a 3,360-meter-high elevation point, and Dashbashi village. On 30 March, General Mehmandarov wrote to Aliagha Shikhlinski that Salimov was close to capturing Dashbashi. At the same time, Salimov, concerned about problems within the Baku Regiment and the risks of relying on partisans, requested additional reinforcements.

On the Armenian side, strengthening the defense of Askeran became critical. Dro’s continued presence in Erivan and his inability to assist the rebels further exacerbated Armenian difficulties. On 26 March, Lieutenant Colonel Tarverdyan’s small force was dispatched from Zangezur to Karabakh, but due to Azerbaijani advances from Jabrayil, it was soon recalled. Tarverdyan only arrived in Karabakh on 29 March, but his troops and animals were so exhausted that he was able to send only 100 cavalry to assist Deli Kazar. The aid proved inadequate and untimely, and during the large-scale Azerbaijani offensive on 3 April, Askeran was captured and Deli Kazar was killed. At a meeting in Trnavarz with Armenian commanders, Mikaelyan announced that until “General Dro” arrived, command of the Karabakh forces would be handed to Tarverdyan. The Armenian population began fleeing en masse, while commanders attempted to halt the exodus by occupying abandoned villages.

Following the liberation of Askeran, the road to the besieged city of Shusha was opened. On April 4, Azerbaijani troops, seeking retribution for Armenians arrested by Sultanov, entered the city. That night, the villages of Ketük, Aranzemin, and Naxchivanik were also liberated. On April 5, General Səlimov reported that Dashbashi, Yenija, Mehdikend, Qayabashi, Ballıcan, and Khanazakh, all located along the Shusha axis, had been captured. Additionally, Turshsu and Abdallar—sites that had been shelled during the bombardment of Shusha—also came under Azerbaijani control. In the Tartar direction, Tonqiyev’s forces succeeded in capturing Goyarkh village. After several clashes, Colonel Kazımbəyov managed to seize Talish village as well.

In a report dated April 8 addressed to Aliağa Şikhlinski, General Salimov noted that Azerbaijani forces were continuing their offensive in the direction of Shusha, although specific details of the assault were not disclosed. He further stated that Armenian units had been pushed back from the Malibeyli–Dashkend–Shushakend–Manasharkend axis, from where they had previously bombarded Shusha. He also reported that Armenians were retreating from the Abdallar–Zabukh River axis, that Yarma had been seized, and that the road from Turshsu to Abdallar had been entirely cleared.

General Salimov also noted that Armenian villages captured during the operations had been set ablaze by Azerbaijani insurgents following his troops’ advance. However, he emphasized that these villages were not inhabited by civilians but rather by Armenian insurgents.

An operations report from Salimov’s headquarters dated April 8 confirmed that attacks had commenced on Shushakend and Dashkend early that morning. Historian Richard Hovannisian, citing Armenian fighters, states that a counter-offensive was launched under the command of Colonel Tarverdi, and that news of General Dro’s arrival in Goris had spread. His arrival reportedly brought substantial reinforcements and logistical support. Although Azerbaijani troops temporarily retreated in response to the Armenian counter-attack, Salimov indicated that the timely arrival of the Baku regiment led to the repulsion of Armenian forces as far as Keshishkend.

On April 9, Azerbaijani forces launched an operation to capture Keshishkend. It was reported that this location was fortified with defensive installations and artillery. On April 10, under General Salimov’s command, Azerbaijani troops captured the southern and southwestern heights surrounding Keshishkend. Subsequently, the village of Siznik was also seized. After four days of heavy fighting, on April 12, Keshishkend, Dağdağan, and Harov were taken by Azerbaijani forces.

As A. Saparov has written, the Armenian uprising ended in disaster. On April 10, Aslan Shahnazaryan, a representative of the Karabakh National Council, sent a telegram to all factions of the Armenian parliament (including a copy for the government), in which he stated:

On March 23, the entire Armenian section of Shusha, along with its population, was completely annihilated and burned. On April 3, Azerbaijani troops broke through Asgeran. Surrounding areas are ablaze, and bombardments continue along the entire front of Armenian Karabakh. It is entirely inconceivable that local and newly arrived forces can not only defend themselves but even save a single district from annihilation...We urge you to take all possible urgent measures...to prevent the death of the entire Armenian population of Karabakh.

On April 13, Dro arrived in the Karabakh village of Tum together with the Armenian army from Zangezur and assumed command of Armenian forces in the region. His mobilization efforts led to the involvement of forces from Varanda and Dizak. A force of 3,000 infantry and 500 cavalry was assembled, bringing the total Armenian force to 5,000. Additionally, Garegin Nzhdeh arrived in Karabakh with a 300-man detachment from Kapan. From Zangezur, 900,000 bullets, 2,000 artillery shells, numerous machine guns, and hand grenades were delivered. Dro also formed a Directorate for civil affairs, led by Khachik Melkumyan, which requisitioned all necessary resources for the Armenian army.

While Dro was preparing for a decisive strike, Azerbaijani forces continued their offensive. On April 14, General Salimov reported that Martiz Mountain had been captured and that Armenian forces had been pushed almost entirely in the direction of Abdallar along the Zabux River. From April 19 onward, the front expanded toward the Qoçaz axis. However, the position of Azerbaijani forces near Shusha began to deteriorate due to increased Armenian partisan activity.

In Salimov’s April 15 report, Azerbaijani troop deployments in Karabakh and the Jabrail district were listed as follows: 300 soldiers of the Baku regiment, 1,200 from the Cavanshir regiment, 380 from the cavalry regiment, 250 cavalry from the Karabakh regiment, 400 soldiers of the Hanja regiment fighting in Jabrail, and 200 Shaki cavalrymen. The new operational regrouping was organized as follows: Shaki regiment and two cannons on the Tartar front; Cavanshir regiment, four mountain guns, and about 1,000 troops of Sultan Bey’s detachment on the Qoçaz front; Baku regiment, Shirvan detachment, four light guns, and four field cannons held in reserve in Shusha. The Quba battalion and Karabakh regiment, with two cannons, were stationed in Khankendi. In Esgeran, one battalion of the Aghdash regiment and one cannon were deployed. In Jabrail, the Ganjə battalion, a cavalry regiment, two light guns, four mountain guns, and Khalil Pasha’s armed men were stationed.

At this stage, the conflict between the two sides extended across the mountainous parts of the Ganja Governorate, from Qazakh to the Jabrail district.

On March 23, Colonel Prince Qajar reported that Armenians from Zangezur had attacked the Jabrail district and burned three villages. The Armenians in this area were fighting against four infantry battalions under Prince Qajar’s command, one machine gun from the III detachment of the Ganja infantry regiment, four cannons, and a 200-man cavalry detachment. However, according to the deputy of the Governor-General of Karabakh in the Jabrail district, Azerbaijani forces launched a counter-attack on March 27, killing 50 Armenians and capturing four. Fighters from both Jabrail and Zangezur had supported this assault. This forced Garegin Nzhdeh to halt his unsuccessful advance on Ordubad and return to the Kapan front. Within days, Armenian forces were able to repel Azerbaijani attacks from Jabrail toward Zangezur. On April 8, information received at Salimov’s headquarters stated that the Poryaşen position on the Jabrail front had been captured by Azerbaijani forces. Later, Salimov reported to Shikhlinski and Mehmandarov that, on April 23, the Armenian forces in the area had been fully repelled and that the borders of November 23, 1919 had been restored.

Clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan also occurred in the Qazakh district, though they remained limited to a border conflict. Local Azerbaijani authorities feared that Armenians would transfer forces to Kharabakh via Qazakh and thus tightened border control. According to Armenian historian Richard Hovannisian, on April 5, Azerbaijani forces seized several highlands in the direction of the Armenian villages of Tatlı and Paravakare. Avel Makayev, one of the commanders in Ganja, reported to Shikhlinski that Armenian attacks toward Azerbaijani villages had been repelled and that an unnamed village between the Armenian Tatlı village and Azerbaijani territory had been captured. On April 7, Azerbaijani forces seized the Armenian-populated areas of Kalaja and Kotkend and launched further attacks. On the same day, Armenian forces captured and burned the Azerbaijani village of Yaradulli. On April 9, Azerbaijani troops seized and burned Tatlı village. Both KHatisyan and Khoyski accused each other of violating the terms of peace. On April 14, the governor of Qazakh, Amiraslan Khan, informed Khoyski that the Armenian forces had seized and burned the village of Kemerli but had ultimately been repelled by residents of Salahlı and Shikhli. Clashes in the Qazakh district continued until April 18, when a peace agreement was signed with the involvement of a commission established as a result of a conference held in Tiflis.

Efforts Toward Peace

On 1 April, the British, Italian, and French commissioners in the Caucasus demanded that the governments of both Armenia and Azerbaijan resolve their conflict through peaceful means. Fatali Khan Khoyski rejected the Allied representatives’ proposal to send a joint commission to investigate the situation in Karabakh. He argued that any investigation conducted in Karabakh would inevitably favor the Armenian side. Therefore, if such an inquiry were to be carried out, it should encompass the broader Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation that had been ongoing since 1918.

As a result, the issue of conflict resolution was entrusted to a trilateral conference that was planned to be held in Tiflis between Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Prior to this, on 19 January, a bilateral meeting had taken place between Armenia and Azerbaijan, where the idea of convening the conference on 1 April was agreed upon. However, the first plenary session was only held on 9 April. As in previous encounters, it became immediately apparent that there were substantial divergences in the positions of the two parties. These differences extended even to the formulation of the conference agenda. Ultimately, agreement on the agenda was only reached during the fourth session. The finalized agenda consisted of six items: cessation of hostilities, formation of a permanent organ representing the three republics, resolution of territorial claims, coordination in foreign policy, the issue of a Transcaucasian confederation, and economic matters.

Despite the broad scope of the agenda, the conference became almost entirely focused on the first item, namely the cessation of hostilities, around which intense debates unfolded. The only concrete achievement was the decision to establish commissions tasked with halting violence in Karabakh, Gazakh, and Nakhichevan. The conference was never formally concluded but was postponed until the return of these commissions from the field.

Meanwhile, on 22 April, in an effort to legitimize ongoing military operations in the region, General Drastamat Kanayan (Dro) convened the Ninth Congress of the Armenians of Karabakh. The delegates at the congress called for the unification of the mountainous part of Karabakh with the Republic of Armenia and appealed to Dro to "liberate" the region. However, Dro was never able to issue an order for a large-scale offensive, as the political situation in Transcaucasia shifted rapidly. On 27–28 April, the Red Army launched its invasion, leading to the Red Army invasion of Azerbaijan, Bolshevik occupation of Azerbaijan.

The Establishment of Soviet Power in Azerbaijan and Contested Territories

In mid-April 1920, following the defeat of the remaining forces of General Anton Denikin, the 11th Red Army of the Bolsheviks approached the northern border of Azerbaijan.

After the entry of the Bolshevik army into Azerbaijan, power in the capital passed into the hands of their local allies on 27–28 April. The newly formed Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee (AzRevKom) declared the country the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and immediately requested military assistance from the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR. On 28 April, under the leadership of Nariman Narimanov, the Council of People’s Commissars of the Azerbaijan SSR was established. Narimanov ordered Azerbaijani forces fighting in Karabakh and Zangezur to cease offensive operations and adopt a defensive posture. By this time, the 11th Red Army had already entered Baku, encountering little resistance due to the majority of Azerbaijani forces being engaged in combat with Armenian units.

Mirza Davud Huseynov, a senior figure in the Azerbaijani Communist Party, sent a note to the Armenian government demanding the withdrawal of Armenian troops from both Karabakh and Zangezur and an end to interethnic violence. He warned that failure to comply would be considered by the AzRevKom as a declaration of war by Armenia.

Given the deteriorating situation in the Kars region and Nakhichevan, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR issued an appeal on 8 May to the Armenian government and the Armenian people regarding the events in Southwestern Transcaucasia. The appeal proposed that a delegation be sent to Baku by 15 May to initiate negotiations for resolving all outstanding disputes. In his response, Armenian Foreign Minister Alexander Khatisian accused the populations of Nakhichevan and Kars of resisting the Armenian army. On 15 May, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR Lev Karakhan telegraphed M. D. Huseynov, informing him that the Soviet government agreed to act as mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and had decided to "occupy the disputed territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a preliminary measure."

In early May, the 11th Red Army advanced from Yevlakh toward the mountainous regions of Karabakh, as well as in the directions of Ganja and Gazakh. With the arrival of Soviet troops, a significant portion of the Azerbaijani army was reorganized as part of the Red Army and subordinated to the operational planning of the 11th Army. Local officials of the former ADR (Azerbaijan Democratic Republic) were incorporated into the Soviet administrative structure. By mid-May, Soviet power had been established across nearly the entire territory of Azerbaijan. Regional affairs were administered by local Revolutionary Committees.

On 12 May, the first Soviet units arrived in Karabakh. As Arsen Saparov notes, the arrival of Soviet forces was seen by the Armenian population as a restoration of Russian authority and a potential end to ethnic conflict. The failure of the Armenian uprising and the destruction of the Armenian quarter in Shusha had caused resentment among Karabakh Armenians toward emissaries sent from Erivan. Richard Hovannisian also discusses this anti-Dashnak sentiment among Karabakh Armenians. Armenian fighters began to align with the Bolsheviks. Colonel Mesyan, one of the organizers of the 1920 uprising, was expelled from the village of Vank by Armenian Bolsheviks and Red Army units, while Captain Ter-Martirosyan was reportedly killed between Mardakert and Vank, likely by insurgents. Isolated and lacking popular support, General Dro accepted the Bolshevik ultimatum and withdrew from Karabakh after a brief resistance. Thus, Soviet power was established in the region, with only a few isolated groups continuing limited resistance in the mountains. In the city of Shusha, a Muslim Revolutionary Committee represented Soviet authority, while an Armenian Revolutionary Committee operated in the settlement of Taghavard.

The Armenian army also suffered defeats in several engagements in the Gazakh-Shamshaddin region. A difficult situation arose following the rebellion of a unit of the former ADR army in Ganja against Soviet authority. In response to the anti-Soviet uprisings across Azerbaijan, the Red Army began cooperating with Armenian forces. The two armies jointly suppressed the rebellion in Ganja. Meanwhile, negotiations between Soviet Russia and Armenia continued in Moscow. During these talks, the Red Army was busy suppressing uprisings against Soviet rule in Zaqatala, Ganja, and the Aghdam–Shusha region. Simultaneously, Armenia was engaged in quelling Muslim uprisings in Zangibasar, Vedibasar, and Oltu, and suppressing Bolshevik insurrections in Kars, Sarikamish, Alexandropol, Dilijan, and Novo-Bayazet. In mid-June, during negotiations with the Armenian delegation, the tone of Soviet statements changed. Whereas previously the Red Army was unable to secure control over Zangezur and Nakhichevan due to anti-Soviet uprisings in Azerbaijan, the fall of Shusha on 15 June opened the route through Goris to Nakhichevan.

On 25 June, the commander of the 11th Red Army, Levan Levanidze, signed an order to prepare for deployment to the Iranian border. According to this order, the army was to be positioned along the Nakhichevan–Julfa–Ordubad line. At the same time, an Armenian force under General Baghdasarov marched from Erivan toward Nakhichevan. On 2 July, this Armenian force, composed of 9,000 troops, encountered a Turkish army advancing toward Julfa, Nakhichevan, and Ordubad under the command of Javid Bey. The vanguard of the Turkish force, numbering 3,000 men, had already reached Shahbuz and Nakhichevan.

On 5 July, the Soviet army captured Goris. On 7 July, in order to facilitate coordination between Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Russia, representatives of the Turkish Bayazid Division visited the headquarters of the Red Army’s 20th Division, located in Goris. They proposed a joint offensive toward the Nakhichevan–Ordubad axis. Considering the continued presence of Armenian forces in Nakhichevan and Zangezur and the lack of any conciliatory response from the Armenian government, the Soviet leadership resolved to establish Soviet administration in Nakhichevan by military means. On 17 July, the 11th Red Army launched an offensive toward Nakhichevan. Red Army units were ordered to annihilate Dashnak forces mercilessly, even before they could cross into the territory of the Armenian state. The Armenian offensive on Nakhichevan was repelled jointly by Red Army operations and massed Turkish assaults.

Between 28 July and 1 August, Red Army and Kemalist forces jointly took control of Nakhichevan, where the Nakhichevan Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed on 28 July. On 10 August, a ceasefire agreement was signed between Armenia and the RSFSR, which recognized the temporary presence of Soviet forces in the disputed regions of Zangezur, Karabakh, and Nakhichevan (though Shakhtakhti and the entire Sharur district remained under Armenian control). Following the capture of Goris and the establishment of Soviet power in northern Karabakh, Soviet forces attempted to extend their control to the southern part of the region. However, near Kapan, they were defeated by the militias of Garegin Nzhdeh and came under attack from Dro’s troops in Angalavit. After the withdrawal of Soviet units from Karabakh, Dro demanded the evacuation of “all Armenian territories under occupation.” Nevertheless, on 5 August, the Red Army launched a counter-offensive and recaptured Goris two days later. The corridor between Shusha, Goris, and Nakhichevan linking Soviet Azerbaijan and Kemalist Turkey was reopened.

In early September, the 11th Red Army initiated an offensive from the north toward Kapan and Kajaran in Zangezur. Three weeks later, Red Army units advanced from Nakhichevan and Jabrayil, in cooperation with Turkish and Azerbaijani forces, toward Mehri. Armenian militias under Nzhdeh resisted the offensive and by mid-October had recaptured Kapan and Kajaran, forcing the Soviet-Turkish forces to retreat into Nakhichevan. In early November, Zangezur militias repelled another Soviet-Azerbaijani assault launched from Jabrayil and, on 9 November, launched a counterattack toward Goris. On 22 November, with assistance from an expeditionary detachment from Daralayaz, Zangezur Armenians decisively defeated Soviet forces and recaptured Goris, Tatev, Darabas, and Angalavit. The Red Army was forced to retreat to Abdallar, on the old administrative border of Karabakh. Nevertheless, the independent Armenian state was nearing its end. On 28 November 1920, units of the 11th Red Army crossed the Soviet Azerbaijan–Armenia demarcation line southeast of Gazakh. On 30 November, the sovietization of Armenia was proclaimed in Dilijan, and by 4 December, the process was completed.

Disputed territories after the establishment of Soviet power

The issue of disputed territories became one of the most contentious matters following the establishment of Soviet rule in Azerbaijan. The leadership of Soviet Azerbaijan adopted an uncompromising stance on the matter. On June 18, Nariman Narimanov, A. Mikoyan (a member of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party), Mdivani (a member of the RCP Caucasus Bureau), and Nurijanyan (a member of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee) addressed a note to Chicherin, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, in which they stated:

Armenia is effectively in a state of war with Azerbaijan. As for Zangezur and Karabakh, which have already been incorporated into Soviet Azerbaijan yet are falsely labeled as disputed, we unequivocally declare that these lands must remain within Azerbaijan. The Julfa and Nakhchivan districts, inhabited entirely by Muslims, have been partitioned for more than a year, and the local population, with the support of the national government, has defended itself against the Dashnaks. These areas must be seized and annexed to Azerbaijan, both for military purposes and to establish direct communication with Turkey.

A similar position was reiterated in a collective letter dated July 10, 1920, addressed to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and signed by Narimanov, Mdivani, Mikoyan, and members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the XI Army (Vesnik, Levandovsky, and Mikhailov). The letter stressed:

Under the Musavat government, Karabakh was entirely part of Azerbaijan, and the Muslim population would perceive any regression to the former status and the Soviet government’s failure to preserve Azerbaijan within its historical borders as a betrayal, pro-Armenian favoritism, or weakness.

The authors warned that such sentiments among Azerbaijanis could spark an anti-Soviet uprising. They also emphasized that the settlement of Dashnak forces in Karabakh and Zangezur would damage revolutionary momentum in Turkey. The central authorities were cautioned against any hesitation regarding Karabakh and Zangezur, with the letter underscoring their opposition to creating an “artificial, non-national center and source of Eastern class revolution” by carving up Azerbaijan, which was under the protection of the Red Army, and distributing it among Armenians and Georgians. During the Moscow negotiations in June 1920, the Armenian delegation insisted on recognizing Karabakh and Zangezur as disputed territories while simultaneously demanding that Nakhchivan, Ordubad, Julfa, and Sharur-Daralayaz be acknowledged as Armenian lands..

In contrast to the supportive stance taken by the Caucasus Bureau of the Communist Party and the military-political leadership of the XI Army, the Politburo of the Communist Party and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs held a divergent view. Unlike Azerbaijani Bolsheviks, they did not fear revolutionary unrest within Azerbaijan. Chicherin, the head of the Commissariat, advocated for maintaining neutral relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and for declaring the status of Karabakh and Zangezur as disputed. This position provoked objections from the Azerbaijani Bolsheviks. On June 29, Anastas Mikoyan sent a telegram to Orjonikidze expressing their anger at the center’s policy:

We are outraged by the center’s policy toward Karabakh and Zangezur. Please support our position before the center. We are not opposed to peace with Armenia, but not at the expense of Karabakh and Zangezur.

Orjonikidze relayed the Azerbaijani protest to Chicherin:

The population of Baku is deeply angered, and I cannot but agree that we are making concessions the situation does not demand. When speaking with me in Baku, the Armenians were fully prepared to abandon their claims to Karabakh... The issue of Karabakh has become the second Zagatala [a reference to Soviet favoring of Georgia during the Azerbaijan-Georgia dispute over Zaqatala (city), Zagatala]. A major provocation is underway here, driven entirely by Armenians in Moscow.

There were also figures lobbying in favor of Azerbaijan’s position. Sergo Orjonikidze, Secretary of the Caucasus Bureau, believed that recognizing Karabakh and Zangezur as parts of Azerbaijan was crucial for consolidating Soviet power in the republic and safeguarding Baku. Joseph Stalin, in a marginal note on Orjonikidze’s letter to Chicherin, stated that “there should be no maneuvering between the sides,” adding that “a clear choice must be made, and that choice is undoubtedly Azerbaijan and Turkey.”

Following the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia and later in Georgia, the Bolsheviks assumed responsibility for resolving the territorial disputes.

On December 1, 1920, the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee, led by Nariman Narimanov, congratulated Armenia on its sovietization and issued a declaration that Zangezur and Nakhchivan—where sovietization had already begun in July—were considered integral parts of Armenia. It also granted the inhabitants of mountainous Karabakh the right to self-determination. However, as noted by conflict analyst Arsène Saparov, this declaration was made under pressure from Sergo Orjonikidze. It did not reflect sympathy toward either side but rather addressed the political necessity perceived by the Caucasus Bureau, which was concerned about the fragility of the newly established Armenian Revolutionary Committee. Saparov further asserts that Narimanov had no intention of relinquishing any of these territories..

Lenin, while expressing approval of the proposal to transfer Nakhchivan to Armenia, declared that the final word belonged to the working population of Nakhchivan. A referendum held in early 1921 revealed that 90 percent of the population favored joining Azerbaijan as an autonomous republic. At the same time, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey supported Nakhchivan's integration into Azerbaijan, citing the will of its population, its strategic significance, and the need to shield it from Armenian occupation. Wishing to sign a treaty with Turkish nationalists, Lenin ultimately concurred. As a result, Nakhchivan remained part of Azerbaijan under the treaties of Moscow and Kars. Audrey Altstadt notes that only Zangezur was recognized as Armenian territory in the treaty signed between the RSFSR and Armenia in December 1920.

Meanwhile, territorial disputes among the three Transcaucasian republics persisted intensely. After all three had been sovietized, a special demarcation commission led by Sergey Kirov was established on May 2, 1921, to resolve these disputes.

At the plenary session of the Caucasus Bureau on June 3, 1921, while discussing the political situation in the region, it was noted that an anti-Soviet uprising was still ongoing in Zangezur. The Bureau adopted a five-point resolution that included measures to suppress the revolt. Among these points was a proposal to integrate the mountainous part of Karabakh into Armenia. On June 15, the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party issued a declaration proclaiming the incorporation of Karabakh into Soviet Armenia. Altstadt also mentions that the newspaper Soviet Armenia reported that the Azerbaijan SSR had agreed to this transfer. However, internal records of discussions among members of the Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee reveal that they were unaware of any such agreement. Notably, on May 23, 1921, the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party had already appointed a representative to Karabakh. Nevertheless, Arsène Saparov argues that the fifth clause of the June 3 resolution should not be interpreted as a formal annexation of Karabakh to Armenia but rather as a propagandistic maneuver aimed at pacifying the ongoing uprising in Zangezur.

On June 25, 1921, the demarcation commission chaired by Kirov held its first meeting in Tiflis. Delegates included Svanidze and Silvester Todriya from Georgia, Mirza Davud Huseynov, Rasulzade (not to be confused with Mammad Amin Rasulzade), and Mukhtar Hajiyev from Azerbaijan, and Alexander Bekzadyan from Armenia. Although the commission was expected to resolve territorial conflicts among the three republics, it quickly became apparent that no consensus could be reached. The Armenian delegates demanded the transfer of Akhalkalaki from Georgia and Nakhchivan from Azerbaijan, arguing that ethnic Armenians constituted the majority in these areas. However, nationalist opposition within both Georgia and Azerbaijan rendered these claims unviable. Disputes also arose between Georgia and Azerbaijan over the plains of Garayazi. The continued deadlock led Orjonikidze and other members of the Caucasus Bureau to announce a subsequent session. Aware of the unyielding stance of the Azerbaijani delegation, Kirov and Orjonikidze sent a telegram to Narimanov on June 26, advising adherence to the principle that “not a single Muslim village should be given to Armenia, and not a single Armenian village to Azerbaijan.” Nevertheless, Kirov and Orjonikidze were still pressing Azerbaijan to renounce its claim to Nagorno-Karabakh, hoping to settle the border dispute by June 27.

That very day, Aliheydar Garayev brought alarming news to Baku: the Armenian commissioner for Karabakh, Askanaz Mravyan, was preparing to enter the region. The Azerbaijani government understood that the appointment of an Armenian commissioner to Karabakh would significantly bolster Armenia’s position in the dispute.

On 6 June (although the documents and protocol are dated 27 June), the Political Bureau and Executive Body of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party urgently convened after receiving a request from Kirov and Ordzhonikidze urging them to abandon the Karabakh issue, as well as news that an Armenian commissar had been dispatched to Karabakh. The meeting, chaired by Secretary Lozner and attended by Nariman Narimanov, Dadash Bunyadzade, Hamid Sultanov, Levon Mirzoyan, Aliheydar Garayev, Ruhulla Akhundov, Semyon Gutin, and Grigory Kaminsky, decided to disregard the recommendations of Ordzhonikidze and Kirov and voted against the annexation of the mountainous part of Karabakh by Armenia. According to Saparov, Azerbaijani Bolsheviks, in an effort to avoid accusations of nationalism, based their stance on economic and administrative grounds. At the same time, several telegrams were sent to the Caucasian Bureau in Tbilisi and the Armenian government in Yerevan demanding the recall of Mravyan and the annulment of the extraordinary commissioner's authority over Karabakh.

On 4 July 1921, an expanded plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau was held in Tiflis. Stalin was also present at the meeting, although he was not a member of the bureau and thus had no voting rights. The purpose was to reach a final resolution on the Karabakh issue. Two proposals, each with two options, were reviewed. According to the first, Karabakh would be placed under Azerbaijan’s control (supported by Narimanov, Makharadze, and Nazaretyan; opposed by Ordzhonikidze, Myasnikyan, Kirov, and Figatner), and a referendum would be held with the participation of both Christians and Muslims in both the lowland and highland regions of Karabakh. Narimanov and Makharadze also supported this second aspect. The second proposal suggested that Karabakh be incorporated into Armenia (supported by Ordzhonikidze, Myasnikov, Figatner, and Kirov), with a referendum to be held only in areas populated by Armenians. The final vote saw Ordzhonikidze, Myasnikov, Figatner, Kirov, and Nazaretyan supporting the latter.

Thus, the vote was turning against Azerbaijan. Most participants were in favor of a decision benefiting Armenia. Speakers opposed not only transferring Karabakh to Azerbaijan but even holding a referendum there, as Azerbaijanis would likely be the majority. Narimanov, emphasizing the exceptional significance of the issue for Azerbaijan, proposed leaving the final decision to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a motion the Caucasian Bureau accepted. It is believed that Stalin expressed his opinion after the session and influenced the members of the Caucasian Bureau. The following day, Ordzhonikidze and Nazaretyan proposed revisiting the decision and transferring the Karabakh issue to Moscow. A new decision was then adopted:

a) Based on the need for national peace between Muslims and Armenians and the economic ties between Upper and Lower Karabakh, and its permanent connection with Azerbaijan, Mountainous Karabakh should remain within the Azerbaijan SSR, with broad regional autonomy granted to it, with Shusha—located in the mountainous region—as its administrative center.
b) The Central Committee of Azerbaijan is instructed to determine the borders of the autonomous region and submit them to the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party for approval.

According to Saparov, Stalin’s recommendation in favor of Azerbaijan and the sharp reversal of the Caucasian Bureau’s decision within a single day was likely due to the defeat of the anti-Soviet movement in Zangezur. Once the insurgents led by Nzhde ceased to pose a threat to the Soviet system in Armenia, the Bolsheviks no longer had a compelling reason to transfer Karabakh to Armenia. Saparov asserts that, in such a context, the status quo being preserved in favor of Azerbaijan—even if at the cost of granting autonomy—was not surprising given Narimanov’s energetic interventions and persistence, contrasted with the hesitant and passive conduct of the Armenian Bolsheviks.

Another possible reason for Karabakh remaining within Azerbaijan was proposed by S. V. Vostrikov, who links it to the Bolsheviks’ efforts to form an alliance with Kemalist Turkey.

Two weeks later, Kirov was appointed First Secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party. From the time the Caucasian Bureau was established, Kirov had been Ordzhonikidze’s right-hand man, and following his appointment as First Secretary, he acted as the agent of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze in economic and territorial disputes with Narimanov. Narimanov, for his part, opposed the creation of a separate administrative system in the mountainous part of Karabakh, believing it would further weaken Azerbaijan's already fragile position there. Moreover, the borders of the autonomous entity had yet to be defined. As Arsen Saparov also noted, Azerbaijani Bolsheviks did not want the historical Karabakh region to be split into highland and lowland parts, nor did they want a homogenous Armenian administrative unit to be formed within Azerbaijan.

On 26 September 1921, a joint session of the Central Committee and the Organizational Bureau of the Azerbaijani Communist Party was held. Despite votes against from Bunyadzade and Narimanov, the majority voted to revisit the autonomy issue and to maintain the status quo until its organization. Subsequently, on 21 October, at a meeting in which party functionaries from Shusha, Javanshir, Gubadli, and Qaryagin regions, as well as Bunyadzade, Mirzoyan, and Garayev participated, it was decided to take strict measures against banditry in the region. Saparov suggests that with this decision, Azerbaijani Bolsheviks aimed to stabilize the situation in Karabakh and thereby eliminate the perceived need for autonomy.

At the same time, Saparov notes the absence of consensus among Azerbaijani Bolsheviks regarding autonomy. While some party leaders opposed granting autonomy to Armenians in Karabakh, another group—mostly of Russian origin—supported implementing the Caucasian Bureau's decision.

In August 1921, Levon Mirzoyan, a member of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, began working to accelerate the process. During a party meeting held in Shusha, he argued that establishing a separate administrative entity could serve as a safeguard against ethnic oppression. In a telegram sent to the Azerbaijani Communist Party and copied to the Caucasian Bureau, Mirzoyan emphasized the necessity of creating a separate administrative unit to normalize relations. On 6 October, during a meeting of the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, Kirov approved the decision to determine the borders of Karabakh’s autonomy. The American historian Audrey Altstadt interprets this as a form of compensation given to Armenians after the Treaty of Kars. Arsen Saparov, however, notes that this decision did not result in any practical implementation.

The leaders of Soviet Armenia were aware—through Armenian Bolsheviks in Karabakh—that Azerbaijani leadership was unwilling to implement the autonomy decision. Thus, on 5 June 1922, they appealed to the Caucasian Regional Committee to demand enforcement of the decision adopted by the Caucasian Bureau. This request was fulfilled on 27 October 1922.

On 22 February 1922, the Caucasian Bureau transferred its authority to the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, elected at the First Congress of Transcaucasian Communists. On 20 December 1922, under pressure from the Regional Committee, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party adopted a resolution to establish a central commission on Karabakh affairs, composed of Kirov and two Armenian communists who administered the region—Mirzabekyan and Armenak Karagozov. According to Altstadt, this was the outcome of one year of organizational work by Armenian communists in Azerbaijan, whereas Saparov attributes it to pressure from the Regional Committee on Baku. The following day, another commission—comprising five Armenians and two Azerbaijanis and headed by Karagozov—was established with the aim of forming the autonomy. As Audrey Altstadt also notes, the composition of this commission was highly contradictory. She cites Karagozov as an example, noting that although he worked in Karabakh in 1922, he was simultaneously a member of both the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee and the Azerbaijani Communist Party, as well as the Armenian Revolutionary Committee. Furthermore, the party workers brought to Karabakh during his tenure were Armenian, thereby reinforcing the Armenian character of the Communist Party organs in the region.

In June 1923, the commission led by Karagozov proposed to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party the creation of Karabakh as a separate administrative entity. On 1 July, Kirov signed a protocol addressed to the Presidium, recommending the establishment of Armenian autonomy in Karabakh with its administrative center in Khankendi. An executive committee led by Karagyozov and a regional party committee led by Manutsyan were formed. At the same time, a special demarcation commission was created to determine the borders of the autonomous region.

According to the 1926 All-Union census, Armenians constituted 89.24 percent of the population in the autonomous region. Anatoli Yamskov reports that in the early 1920s, 94 percent of the region's permanent residents were Armenians. However, it must be noted that the census was conducted during the winter months, when the region’s traditional Azerbaijani population had moved to the lowlands for winter pastures. During the summer, they would migrate to highland pastures with their herds. Consequently, demographic figures in the region fluctuated seasonally, and the 1926 census did not account for much of the region’s Azerbaijani population. Yamskov notes that the view that nomadic groups who seasonally used an area do not have full rights of residency is prevalent among most authors, both from post-Soviet countries and the "distant West." He emphasizes that this view appears in both pro-Armenian and pro-Azerbaijani literature, rooted in the idea that, in 19th-century Russian Transcaucasia, ownership of land was attributed only to permanently settled populations.

While the final stage of resolving the Karabakh issue was underway, the question of granting autonomous status to Nakhchivan—part of Azerbaijan within the TSFSR—was resolved at the Communist Party and the Third All-Nakhchivan Soviet Congress. The issue was fully settled at the Nakhchivan level in February 1923 and at the Azerbaijan SSR level in June of the same year. As possible compensation, the head of the Council of People's Commissars of Azerbaijan, Musabayov, demanded not only administrative but also political autonomy for Nakhchivan. In March 1924, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established.

In conclusion, Moscow achieved a certain balance in the Karabakh, Nakhchivan, and Zangezur issues. Zangezur was handed over to Armenia as a barrier between Nakhchivan and mainland Azerbaijan. The loss of Zangezur was a painful blow for Azerbaijan. The Karabakh and Nakhchivan processes were resolved in parallel and planned to compensate for each other. While Azerbaijan asserted nominal sovereignty over Karabakh and Nakhchivan, it simultaneously lost effective control over the western part of Karabakh. Armenia renounced all nominal claims over both Nakhchivan and Karabakh but gained significant cultural rights and political leverage over Armenians in Azerbaijan. However, similar rights were not granted to Azerbaijanis in Armenia, leading to widespread dissatisfaction among them. The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region was promoted as a "brilliant example of Leninist national policy." The settlement and mechanisms of territorial disputes reflected the supremacy of Moscow and the Communist Party. Neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia were guaranteed genuine sovereignty, nor were they shielded from external interference in internal affairs. Tensions in all disputed territories persisted.

Sixty-five years after the "final resolution of the Karabakh issue," the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh flared up once again, culminating in the bloody First Karabakh War. Following twenty-six years of unsuccessful negotiations, the conflict escalated once more into a full-scale war in 2020.

The Humanitarian Consequences of the War

Both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides carried out acts of ethnic cleansing during the war, leaving deep scars in the region.

As a result of the ethnic cleansings between 1918 and 1920, the ethnographic map of the South Caucasus was significantly altered. Armenian-populated areas in Azerbaijan were either depopulated or resettled with Azerbaijanis. In the Shamakhi uezd, 17,000 Armenians were killed across 24 villages, and in the Nukha uezd, 20,000 Armenians were killed in 20 villages. Similar events occurred in Aghdam and Ganja. Armenians survived only in regions that the Musavatists had not penetrated—such as the Kazakh, Elisavetpol, and Javanshir uezds. In Armenia, Azerbaijani-populated regions were also depopulated. Dashnak forces “cleansed” the Novobayazet, Erivan, Echmiadzin, and Sharur-Daralaghez uezds of Azerbaijanis.

The scale of the demographic transformation is evident in the example of the Zangezur uezd (which also included the western territories of modern Lachin, Zangilan, and Gubadly districts of Azerbaijan). In 1897, of the 137,900 inhabitants, 63,600 were Armenians (46.2%), 71,200 were Azerbaijanis (51.7%), and 1,800 were Kurds (1.3%). According to the 1922 agricultural census, the part of Zangezur that had been transferred to Armenia had a population of 63,500, of which 56,900 were Armenians (89.5%), 6,500 Azerbaijanis (10.2%), and 200 Russians (0.3%).

Shusha never recovered from the anti-Armenian pogrom. In 1897, the city had a population of 25,881 (14,436 Armenians and 10,785 Azerbaijanis). By 1926, it had declined to 5,104 inhabitants, of whom only 91 were Armenians. Even by 1959, the population of the city was only 6,117.

Justin McCarthy, comparing the 1914 data from the Russian Statistical Yearbook with the 1926 All-Union census, concluded that as a result of ethnic cleansing, 180,000 people—two-thirds of the Muslim population of the Erivan Governorate—were either massacred or expelled.

The war led to a large number of Muslim refugees. According to McCarthy’s estimates, by 1922 there were 272,704 refugees from the South Caucasus in the Ottoman Empire. Taking into account those who died before 1922, the number of refugees could reach up to 400,000.

Azerbaijani nomadic populations were also severely affected by the war. According to a report by Gazanfar Musabeyov at the Second Congress of Soviets of the Azerbaijan SSR on 29 April 1922, nomads had been unable to access mountain pastures for four consecutive years due to the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict, resulting in significant loss of human life and livestock from malaria.

War proper

On 30 March 1918, the Soviets, based on the unfounded report that the Azerbaijanis, Muslim crew of the ship ''Evelina'' was armed and ready to revolt against the Soviets, disarmed the crew, which tried to resist. This led to three days fighting, resulting in the death of up to 12,000 Azerbaijanis.

Fight for Baku and Karabakh, 1918–19

At the same time, the Baku Commune was involved in heavy fighting with the advancing Caucasian Ottoman Army in and around Ganja. The Ottoman Empire's Enver Pasha began to move forward with the newly established Islamic Army of the Caucasus, Army of Islam. Major battles occurred in Yevlakh and Agdash District, Agdash.

British General Lionel Dunsterville ordered the evacuation of the city on 14 September, after six weeks of occupation, and withdrew to Iran; most of the Armenian population escaped with British forces. The Ottoman Army of Islam and its Azerbaijani allies, led by Nuri Pasha, Battle of Baku, entered Baku on 15 September and killed between 10,000 and 20,000 Armenians in retaliation for the March massacre of Muslims. The capital of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was finally moved from Ganja to Baku. However, after the Armistice of Mudros between the United Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire on 30 October, Turkish troops were substituted by the Triple Entente. Headed by British General William Montgomery Thomson, W. Thomson, who had declared himself the military governor of Baku, 1,000 Commonwealth soldiers arrived in Baku on 17 November 1918. By Thomson's order, martial law was implemented in Baku.

The Armenian government tried several times to seize Shusha militarily. In 1918, the Karabakh Council was declared in the region. However, throughout the summer of 1918, Armenians in the mountainous Karabag region, under the leadership of Andranik, Andranik Ozanian, resisted the Ottoman 3rd Army. After the Armistice, the Ottoman Empire began to withdraw its forces and Armenian forces under Andranik seized Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armistice of Mudros brought Andranik a chance to create a base for further expansion eastward and form a strategic corridor extending into Nakhichevan.

In January 1919, Armenian troops advanced towards Shusha. They captured nine Azerbaijani villages on their way. Just before the Armistice of Mudros was signed, Andranik, Andranik Ozanian was on the way from Zangezur to Shusha to take control of the main city of Karabakh. In January 1919, with Armenian troops advancing, the British military command asked Andranik to return to Zangezur with the assurances that this conflict could be solved with the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Paris Peace Conference. Andranik pulled back his units, and the British command at Baku gave control to Khosrov bey Sultanov, a native of Karabakh and "ardent pan-Turkist", who was appointed the general-governor of Karabakh and ordered by the British to "squash any unrest in the region". Sultanov ordered attacks on Armenian villages the next day, increased the sizes of Azerbaijani garrisons in Shusha and Khankendi, and drew up plans to destroy several Armenian villages to sever the link between Armenians in Karabakh and the region of Zangezur.

Fight for Nakhichevan, 1919–20

In response to a British border proposal that would have assigned Nakhichevan to Armenia, Azerbaijanis of Nakhichevan revolted under the leadership of local landowner Jafargulu Khan Nakhchivanski, Jafargulu Khan Nakhichevanski in December 1918 and declared the independent Republic of Aras, with its capital in Nakhchivan (city), Nakhichevan. The republic, which was essentially subordinate to Azerbaijan, continued to exist until mid-June 1919, when Armenian troops led by Drastamat Kanayan advanced into it to gain control over the region. They managed to capture the city of Nakhichevan in June 1919 and destroy the Republic of Aras, but afterwards fought combined regular Azerbaijani and Ottoman troops, who Muslim uprisings in Kars and Sharur–Nakhichevan, reinstated Azerbaijani control over the city in July. On 10 August 1919, a ceasefire was signed.Armenian-Azerbaijani Military Conflicts in 1919–20

An American Commission to Negotiate Peace telegram, speaking on the conflict, stated:

Fighting resumed in March 1920 and continued until the Sovietization of Nakhichevan in 1920 by the 11th Army (Soviet Union), 11th Red Army, now including former Azerbaijan Democratic Republic troops.

Fight for Zangezur / Syunik, November 1919

Following the controversial withdrawal of British forces from the Transcaucasus in mid-1919 and the subjugation of the Karabakh Council to Azerbaijan in August 1919, Dr. Khosrov bey Sultanov beseeched his government to help him "overcome 'the Armenian bandits' blocking the routes to the summer grazing lands and to convert his titular position as governor-general of Karabagh and Zangezur / Syunik into reality". His call for assistance was also prompted by the antagonizing reports of Muslim villages in Zangezur / Syunik being pillaged by irregular Armenian forces and its inhabitants fleeing into Azerbaijan as refugees. Accordingly, the Azerbaijani army began to plan its invasion of Zangezur with the strategic objective of reaching the rebelling Nakhichevan Uyezd, Nakhichevan and Sharur-Daralagez Uyezd, Sharur-Daralagez uyezds and incorporating them into Azerbaijan.

On 3 November 1919, the Azerbaijani army, supplemented by auxiliary Kurdish cavalry, launched a full-scale attack into the Armenian-controlled section of Zangezur / Syunik, successful in briefly occupying some bordering Armenian villages before being decisively defeated and forced out by the local Armenians, led by partisan commanders Colonel Shahmazian and Garegin Nzhdeh. A notable historian on the topic, Hovannisian, describes the conflict:

Preliminary skirmishes involving the Kurdo-Tatar partisans of Haji-Samlu were followed by a general Azerbaijani offensive at dawn on November 4. Under cover of a dense fog, the advancing regiments flanked the Armenian forward trenches and captured the first line of defense. By the next afternoon Vaghatur, Bayandur, Khnatsakh, Khnadsakh, Kornidzor, Korindzor, and Tegh had fallen, Khoznavar was in flames, and Azerbaijani artillery was bombarding the heights (Kechel-dagh) overlooking Goris. At nightfall Azerbaijani crescent-shaped fires burned on these heights. Elsewhere, Muslim bands from Sharur-Nakhichevan Siege, invested Nors-Mazra and other villages near Sisian, and two Turkish-officered platoons cut across the rugged Zangezur mountains from Ordubad into the Muslim stronghold of Okhchichai. Throughout Zangezur the imperiled Muslim population took heart in anticipation of liberation by the Azerbaijani army.

Such hopes were cut short, however, by the counterattack Shahmazian mounted on November 6 after concentrating all available units on the Goris front. Artillerymen ... made direct hits on the Azerbaijani positions on Kechel-dagh, which was recaptured by Armenian companies ... The Kurdish irregulars were the first to break ranks and scatter into the mountains around Minkend, while the Azerbaijani regulars withdrew toward Tegh and the vale of Zabukh. Having gained the initiative, the Armenians charged the Azerbaijani lines, decimating Edigarov's cavalry regiment in cross fire, reportedly inflicting several hundred casualties on the infantry, capturing 100,000 rounds of ammunition and six machine guns near Khoznavar, and putting two cannons and more than twenty machine guns out of commission. By November 9 the Azerbaijani army was retreating in disarray toward Zabux, Zabukh and the northern mountainous bypaths to Karabagh. Within a week after the invasion began, the Armenians of Zangezur were celebrating an impressive victory.

Fight for Karabakh, early 1920

The largest escalation of the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict occurred in mid-March 1920 during the botched Karabakh uprising culminating in the Shusha massacre, massacre and expulsion of Shusha, Shushi's majority Armenian population. Through 1918–1919, the area of Nagorno-Karabakh, mountainous Karabakh was under the de facto administration of the local Armenian Karabakh Council, which was supported by the region's overwhelmingly Armenian population. During this period, Azerbaijan several times attempted to assert its authority over the region, backed by the British governor of Baku, William Montgomerie Thomson, Lieutenant General Thomson, who appointed Khosrov bey Sultanov, Dr. Khosrov bey Sultanov as governor-general of Karabakh and Zangezur with the intention of annexing the Karabakh Council into Azerbaijan. In 1919, under threat of extermination (demonstrated by the Khaibalikend massacre, Khaibalikend Massacre), the Karabakh Council was forced to sign an agreement to provisionally recognize and submit to Azerbaijani jurisdiction until its status was decided at the Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920), Paris Peace Conference.

Ending early 1920, the Paris Peace Conference was inconclusive in the resolution of the Transcaucasian territorial disputes. Armenia, by this time in a much stronger position to assert itself, therefore took action to emancipate the Armenians of Karabakh from their Azerbaijani governor. Subversive preparations began for a staged uprising in the region of the Karabakh Council, timed to coincide with Azerbaijani Nowruz, Novruz celebrations. Due to poor coordination, the uprising did not successfully oust the Azerbaijani garrisons from Shushi and neighboring Stepanakert, Khankend. A pogrom in Shusha was carried out in retaliation, in which Azerbaijani soldiers and residents burned and looted half of the city, murdering, raping, and expelling its erstwhile majority Armenian inhabitants.

After the occurrence of the uprising, the forces of Garegin Nzhdeh and Drastamat Kanayan, Dro Kanayan were ordered by the Armenian government to assist the Karabakh rebels. At the same time, Azerbaijan moved most of its army westward to crush the Armenian resistance and cut off any reinforcements, despite the threat of the approaching 11th Army (RSFSR), 11th Red Army of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, Bolshevik Russia from the north. By the time of Red Army invasion of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan's Sovietization barely a month after the uprising began, Azerbaijani forces were able to maintain control over the central cities of Karabakh, Shusha, and Khankend, whilst its immediate surroundings were in the control of local partisans supplemented by Armenian army reinforcements. Since Dro had been explicitly ordered by the Armenian Government not to engage the Red Army, he was unable to execute the attack to capture Shusha, whose Azerbaijani defenders had been supplanted by the Red Army. The situation persisted until the overwhelming Bolshevik army drove out the Armenian army detachments from the region, after which the fears of the Armenians of Karabakh were alleviated by virtue of returning to the stability of Russian control.

Fight for Kazakh, early 1920

On 5 April 1920, skirmishes began along the Armenian–Azerbaijani border as the governor and commander of Kazakh (Qazax) increased security forces in the region, expecting that the Armenian army would create a diversion to relieve pressure on Karabakh. Azerbaijani forces occupied the heights above the villages of Tatlu (Tatlı, Agstafa, Tatlı) and Paravakar, prompting Armenian residents to dislodge the Azerbaijanis and sparking the 2-week border battles that saw Azerbaijan capture Kalacha (Berdavan, Armenia, Berdavan) and Kotkend (Koti, Armenia, Koti) while attacking Tasalu, Dvegh (Dovegh), Koshkotan (Voskevan), and Barana (Noyemberyan) on 7 April. While a cease-fire was negotiated on 9 April, the Azerbaijani army subsequently invaded Tatlu and Lalakend, burning the Armenian villages of Badakend (Ələsgərli, Shamkir, Ələsgərli) and Chardakhlu (Çardaqlı, Shamkir, Çardaqlı) on the Azerbaijani side of the border. Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani Prime Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski accused Armenia of violating the truce by attacking the Azerbaijani settlements of Yukhari Askipara, Upper Askipara and Aşağı Əskipara, Lower Askipara, Daş Salahlı, Salakhli, and six other Azerbaijani settlements on April 12. Tensions along the border were ultimately relieved on 18 April when officials from Dilijan and Kazakh agreed on an 11-point ceasefire agreement that included the repatriation of all displaced residents and the restoration of the former boundary.

Aftermath

Sovietization of Azerbaijan, April 1920

In early April 1920, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was in a very troubled condition. In the west, Armenia still controlled large parts of territory claimed by Azerbaijan; in the east, local Azerbaijani communists were rebelling against the government; and to the north the Russian Red Army was steadily moving southward, having defeated Denikin's White Russian forces.

On 27 April 1920, the Azerbaijan government received notice that the Soviet Army was about to invade across the northern border. Faced with the difficult situation, the government officially surrendered to the Soviets. However, many generals and local Azerbaijani militias kept resisting the Soviet troops' advance, and it took a while for the Soviets to stabilize the newly proclaimed Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, headed by leading Azerbaijani Bolshevik Nariman Narimanov.

While the Azerbaijani government and army were in chaos, the Armenian army and local Armenian militias used the opportunity to assert their control over parts of Azerbaijani territory, invading Shusha, Khankendi, and other important cities. By the end of April, Armenian forces were controlling most of western Azerbaijan, including all of Karabakh and surrounding areas. Other occupied areas included all of Nakhichevan and much of the Kazakh-Shamshadin district. In the meantime, Armenian communists attempted a coup in Armenia, but ultimately failed.

Soviet takeover, May 1920

In 1920–21, the only solution to this dispute could come either by military victory—as basically happened in Anatolia, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan—or by the imposition from above of a new structure by an imperial power. After the British failed to impose a settlement, the imperial arbiters turned out to be the Bolsheviks, whose 11th Army (Soviet Union), 11th Army conquered Karabakh in May 1920. On 5 July 1921, the Bolsheviks' Caucasian Committee, the Kavbiuro, under the chairmanship of Joseph Stalin, decided that the mountainous part of Karabakh would remain under the jurisdiction and sovereignty of Azerbaijan. In July 1923, the Nagorny (or Mountainous) Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO) was established within Azerbaijan, with borders that gave it an overwhelming Armenian majority of 94% of the total inhabitants.

End of hostilities, September–November 1920

In late November, there was yet another Soviet-backed communist uprising in Armenia. On 28 November, blaming Armenia for the invasions of Şərur on 20 November 1920 and Karabakh the following day, the 11th Red Army under the command of General Anatoliy Gekker crossed the demarcation line between First Republic of Armenia and Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, Soviet Azerbaijan. The second Soviet–Armenian war lasted only a week.

Sovietization of Armenia, December 1920

On 4 December 1920, when the Red Army entered Yerevan, the government of the First Republic of Armenia effectively surrendered. On 5 December, the Armenian Revolutionary Committee (Revkom), made up of mostly Armenians from Azerbaijan, also entered the city. Finally, on 6 December, Felix Dzerzhinsky's dreaded secret police, the Cheka, entered Yerevan, thus effectively ending all existence of the First Republic of Armenia.

The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic was then proclaimed, under the leadership of Gevork Atarbekyan. On 18 February 1921, a national revolt against Bolsheviks started. General Garegin Nzhdeh, commander Garo Sasouni, and the last Prime Minister of independent Armenia, Simon Vratsyan, took the lead of the anti-Bolshevik rebellion and forced out the Bolsheviks from Yerevan and other places. By April, the Red Army reconquered most part of Armenia. However, Atarbekyan was dismissed and Aleksandr Miasnikyan, an Armenian high-ranking Red Army commander, replaced him. Garegin Nzhdeh left the Zangezur mountains after the Sovietization of Armenia was finalized in July 1921, leaving Azerbaijani-populated villages cleansed of their population. Persuaded by Soviet leadership, Zangezur had already been ceded by Azerbaijan to Armenia in November 1920 as a "symbol of friendship".

Treaty of Kars, 23 October 1921

The violence in Transcaucasia was finally settled in a friendship treaty between Government of the Grand National Assembly, Turkey and the Soviet Union. The peace Treaty of Kars was signed in Kars by representatives of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, Russian SFSR, Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, Azerbaijan SSR, Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, Armenian SSR, Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, Georgian SSR, and Turkey. Turkey had another agreement, the "Treaty on Friendship and Brotherhood", also called the Treaty of Moscow (1921), Treaty of Moscow, signed on 16 March 1921 with Soviet Russia.

By this treaty, Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, Nakhichevan was granted the status of an autonomous region under Azerbaijan's protectorate, on the condition that the rights for protectorate would never be transferred to a third state. Turkey and Russia became guarantors of Nakhichevan's status. Turkey agreed to return Alexandropol to Armenia and Batumi to Georgia.

Notes

References

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External links

Soviet-Armenian War and the Collapse of the First Republic: November–December, 1920

GENERAL

{{DEFAULTSORT:Armenian-Azerbaijani war (1918-1920)
Armenian–Azerbaijani war (1918–1920),
1918 in Armenia
1919 in Armenia
1920 in Armenia
1918 in Azerbaijan
1919 in Azerbaijan
1920 in Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic
Military operations of the Russian Civil War in 1918
Military operations of the Russian Civil War in 1919
Military operations of the Russian Civil War in 1920
First Republic of Armenia
History of Nagorno-Karabakh
Wars involving the Ottoman Empire
British involvement in the Russian Civil War
Turkish involvement in the Russian Civil War
Armenia–Azerbaijan military relations