Sudanese Civil War (2023–present)

A civil war began on 15 April 2023 between two rival factions of the military government of Sudan. The conflict involves the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (commonly known as Hemedti), who also leads the broader Janjaweed coalition. Several smaller armed groups have also taken part. Fighting has been concentrated in the capital, Khartoum, where the conflict began with large-scale battles, and in the Darfur region. Many civilians in Darfur have been reported dead as part of the Masalit massacres, which have been described as ethnic cleansing or genocide. Sudan has been described as facing the world’s worst humanitarian crisis; nearly 25 million people are experiencing extreme hunger. On 7 January 2025, the United States said it had determined that the RSF and allied militias committed genocide.

Since gaining independence in 1956, Sudan has endured chronic instability marked by 20 coup attempts, prolonged military rule, two devastating civil wars, and the Darfur genocide. The war erupted amid tensions over the integration of the RSF into the army following the 2021 coup, starting with RSF attacks on government sites in Khartoum and other cities. The capital region was soon divided between the two factions, and al-Burhan relocated his government to Port Sudan. International efforts, including the May 2023 Jeddah Declaration, failed to stop the fighting, while various rebel groups entered the war: the SPLM–North (al-Hilu faction) attacked the SAF in the south; the Tamazuj movement joined the RSF; and the SAF gained support from factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement. By late 2023, the RSF controlled most of Darfur and advanced in Khartoum, Kordofan, and Gezira. The SAF regained momentum in early 2024, making gains in Omdurman and eventually retaking Khartoum, including the Presidential Palace and airport, by March 2025. Despite renewed negotiations, no lasting ceasefire has been reached, and the war continues with severe humanitarian consequences and regional implications.

Famine alone has killed an estimated 522,000 children, while the overall death toll of the war, including fatalities from violence, starvation, and disease, is even higher; thousands more remain missing or have been killed in targeted massacres, primarily attributed to the RSF and allied militias. At least 61,000 people have died in Khartoum State alone, of which 26,000 were a direct result of the violence. As of 5 February 2025, over 8.8 million were internally displaced and more than 3.5 million others had fled the country as refugees. In August 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Famine Review Committee (FRC) confirmed famine conditions in parts of North Darfur.

Foreign involvement in Sudan’s conflict has included arms shipments from China, Russia and Turkey, with UAE and Chad support for the RSF and Egypt support for the SAF, amid regional tensions. The war has triggered a massive humanitarian crisis marked by extreme shortages of food, water, medicine, and aid access, widespread hospital closures, disease outbreaks, mass displacement, looting of humanitarian supplies, and the near-collapse of education and infrastructure, leaving over half the population in urgent need of assistance. There have been calls for more aid, legal protections for humanitarian workers, refugee support, and an end to arms supplies to the RSF, particularly by the UAE. Both the SAF and RSF have waged sophisticated disinformation campaigns using social media, fake footage, and AI-generated content to manipulate public perception, discredit opponents, and influence international opinion. In response to the conflict, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Union imposed sanctions on individuals, companies, and entities linked to the SAF and RSF for ceasefire violations, human rights abuses, and destabilizing activities.

Background

Since gaining independence in 1956, Sudan has experienced 20 military coup attempts, the most of any African nation. Sudan has usually been ruled by the military, interspersed with short periods of democratic parliamentary rule.

Two civil wars the first from 1955 to 1972 and the second, 1983 to 2005between the central government and the southern regions, which led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011, killed 1.5 million people, and a conflict in the western region of Darfur displaced two million people and killed more than 200,000 others.

War in Darfur and the formation of the RSF

By the turn of the 21st century, Sudan's western Darfur region had endured prolonged instability and social strife due to racial and ethnic tensions and disputes over land and water. In 2003, this situation erupted into a full-scale rebellion against government rule, against which president and military strongman Omar al-Bashir vowed to use forceful action. The resulting War in Darfur was marked by widespread state-sponsored acts of violence, leading to charges of war crimes and genocide against al-Bashir. The initial phase of the conflict left approximately 300,000 dead and 2.7 million forcibly displaced; even though the intensity of the violence later declined, the situation in the region remained far from peaceful.

To crush uprisings by non-Arab tribes in the Nuba Mountains, al-Bashir relied upon the Janjaweed, a collection of Arab militias that were drawn from camel-trading tribes which were active in Darfur and portions of Chad. In 2013, al-Bashir announced that the Janjaweed would be reorganised as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and he also announced that the RSF would be placed under the command of the Janjaweed's commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, more commonly known as Hemedti.Harriet Barber
'Men with no mercy': The vicious history of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces
, ''Telegraph'' (25 April 2023).Michael Georgy
How Sudan's Hemedti carved his route to power
, Reuters (15 April 2023) The RSF perpetrated mass killings, mass rapes, pillage, torture, and destruction of villages. They were accused of committing ethnic cleansing against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa peoples. Leaders of the RSF have been indicted for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC),Factbox: Who are Sudan's Rapid Support Forces?
, Reuters (15 April 2023). but Hemedti was not personally implicated in the 2003–2004 atrocities.

In 2017, a new law gave the RSF the status of an "independent security force". Hemedti received several gold mines in Darfur as patronage from al-Bashir, and his personal wealth grew substantially. Bashir sent RSF forces to quash a 2013 uprising in South Darfur and deployed RSF units to fight in Yemen and Libya. During this time, the RSF developed a working relationship with the Russian private military outfit Wagner Group. These developments ensured that RSF forces grew into the tens of thousands and came to possess thousands of armed pickup trucks which regularly patrolled the streets of Khartoum. The Bashir regime allowed the RSF and other armed groups to proliferate to prevent threats to its security from within the armed forces, a practice known as " coup-proofing".

Political transition

In December 2018, protests against al-Bashir's regime began, starting the first phase of the Sudanese Revolution. Eight months of sustained civil disobedience were met with violent repression.Sudan timeline: From the fall of Bashir to street-fighting in Khartoum
, ''Middle East Eye'' (18 April 2023). In April 2019, the military (including the RSF) ousted al-Bashir in a coup d'état, ending his three decades of rule; the army established the Transitional Military Council, a junta. Bashir was imprisoned in Khartoum; he was not turned over to the ICC, which had issued warrants for his arrest on charges of war crimes.Jack Jeffrey & Samy Magdt
Deal to restore democratic transition in Sudan delayed again
, Associated Press (7 April 2023). Protests calling for civilian rule continued; in June 2019, the TMC's security forces, which included both the RSF and the SAF, perpetrated the Khartoum massacre, in which more than a hundred demonstrators were killed and dozens were raped. Hemedti denied orchestrating the attack.

In August 2019, in response to international pressure and mediation by the African Union and Ethiopia, the military agreed to share power in an interim joint civilian-military unity government (the Transitional Sovereignty Council), headed by a civilian Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, with elections to be held in 2023. In October 2021, the military seized power in a coup led by Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Hemedti. The Transitional Sovereignty Council was reconstituted as a new military junta led by al-Burhan, monopolizing power and halting Sudan's transition to democracy.

Origins of the SPLM-N and the SLM

The Sudan Liberation Movement (or Army; SLM, SLA, or SLM/A) is a rebel group active in Darfur, primarily composed of members of non-Arab ethnic groups and established in response to their marginalization by the Bashir regime. Since 2006, the movement has split into several factions due to disagreements over the Darfur Peace Agreement, with some factions joining the government in Khartoum. By 2023 the three most prominent factions were the SLM-Minnawi under Minni Minnawi, the SLM-al-Nur under Abdul Wahid al-Nur, and the SLM-Tambour under Mustafa Tambour. The SLM-Minnawi and SLM-Tambour signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, ceasing hostilities and receiving political appointments, but the SLM-al-Nur refused to sign and kept fighting.

The SPLM-N was founded by units of the predominantly South Sudanese Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army stationed in areas that remained in Sudan following the South Sudanese vote for independence in 2011. These forces then led a rebellion in the southern states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile a few months later. In 2017, the SPLM-N split between a faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu and one led by Malik Agar, with al-Hilu demanding secularism as a condition for peace while Agar did not agree with this. During the Sudanese Revolution, al-Hilu's faction declared an indefinite unilateral ceasefire. In 2020, a peace agreement was signed between the Sudanese government and Agar's faction, with Agar later joining the Transitional Sovereignty Council in Khartoum. Al-Hilu held out until he agreed to sign a separate peace agreement with the Sudanese government a few months later. Further steps to consolidate the agreement stalled following the 2021 coup, and the al-Hilu faction instead signed an agreement with the SLM-al-Nur and the Sudanese Communist Party, agreeing to co-operate to draft a 'revolutionary charter' and remove the military from power.

Prelude

In the months after the 2021 coup the already weak Sudanese economy steeply declined, fueling wide protests demanding that the junta return power to civilian authorities. Tensions arose between al-Burhan and Hemedti over al-Burhan's restoration to the office of old-guard Islamist officials who had dominated the Omar al-Bashir government. Hemedti saw the appointment of these officials as a signal that al-Burhan was attempting to maintain the dominance of Khartoum's traditional elite over Sudanese politics. This was a danger to the RSF's political position, as said elites were hostile to Hemedti due to his ethnic background as a Darfuri Arab. Hemedti's expression of regret over the October 2021 coup signalled a widening divide between him and al-Burhan.

Tensions between the RSF and the SAF began to escalate in February 2023, as the RSF began to recruit members across Sudan. Throughout February and early March the RSF built up in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum, until a deal was brokered on 11 March and the RSF withdrew. As part of this deal negotiations were conducted between the SAF, RSF, and civilian leaders, but these negotiations were delayed and halted by political disagreements. Chief among the disputes was the integration of the RSF into the military: the RSF insisted on a 10-year timetable for its integration into the regular army, while the army demanded integration within two years. Other contested issues included the status given to RSF officers in the future hierarchy, and whether RSF forces should be under the command of the army chief rather than Sudan's commander-in-chief, al-Burhan.

On 11 April 2023, RSF forces deployed near the city of Merowe as well as in Khartoum.Sudan: clashes around the presidential palace, there are fears of a coup attempt in Khartoum – video
, 15 April 2023. Government forces ordered them to leave and were refused. This led to clashes when RSF forces took control of the Soba military base south of Khartoum. On 13 April, RSF forces began their mobilization, raising fears of a potential rebellion against the junta. The SAF declared the mobilization illegal.

Course of the war

April–May 2023

Battle of Khartoum

On 15 April 2023, the RSF attacked SAF bases across Sudan, including Khartoum and its airport. There were clashes at the headquarters of the state broadcaster, Sudan TV, which was later captured by RSF forces. Bridges and roads in Khartoum and its hinterland were closed by RSF command. The next day saw a SAF counteroffensive, with the army retaking Merowe Airport alongside the headquarters of Sudan TV and the state radio.

The Sudan Civil Aviation Authority closed the country's airspace as fighting began. Telecommunications provider MTN shut down Internet services, and by 23 April there was a near-total Internet outage attributed to attacks on the electricity grid. Sudanese international trade began to break down, with Maersk, one of the largest shipping companies in the world, announcing a pause on new shipments to the country.

Hemedti directed his forces to capture or kill al-Burhan, and RSF units engaged in pitched and bloody combat with the Republican Guard. Ultimately al-Burhan managed to evade capture or assassination, but his base at the Sudanese Armed Forces Headquarters was placed under RSF siege, rendering him unable to leave Khartoum. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Hemedti accused al-Burhan and his commanders of forcing the RSF to start the war by scheming to bring deposed leader Omar al-Bashir back to power. He called for the international community to intervene against al-Burhan, claiming that the RSF was fighting against radical Islamic militants.

Following the first few days of war the SAF brought in reinforcements from the Ethiopian border. Although a ceasefire was announced for Eid al-Fitr, fighting continued across the country. Combat was described as particularly intense along the highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan and in the industrial zone of al-Bagair. Intercommunal clashes were reported in Blue Nile State and in Geneina.

By the beginning of May the SAF claimed to have weakened the RSF's combat capabilities and repelled its advances in multiple regions. The Sudanese police deployed its Central Reserve Forces in the streets of Khartoum in support of the SAF, claiming to have arrested several hundred RSF fighters. The SAF announced it was launching an all-out attack on RSF in Khartoum using air strikes and artillery. Air strikes and ground offensives against the RSF over the next few days caused significant damage to infrastructure, but failed to dislodge RSF forces from their positions.

Following further threats to his life from Hemedti, al-Burhan gave a public video address from his besieged base at the Army Headquarters, vowing to continue fighting. On 19 May, al-Burhan officially removed Hemedti as his deputy in the Transitional Sovereignty Council and replaced him with former rebel leader and council member Malik Agar. With al-Burhan trapped in Khartoum, Agar became ''de facto'' leader of the Sudanese government, assuming responsibility for peace negotiations, international visits and the day-to-day running of the country.

Treaty of Jeddah

International attention to the conflict resulted in the United Nations Human Rights Council calling a special session to address the violence, voting to increase monitoring of human rights abuses. On 6 May, delegates from the SAF and the RSF met directly for the first time in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for what was described by Saudi Arabia and the United States as "pre-negotiation talks". After diplomatic lobbying from the Saudis and Americans the warring sides signed the Treaty of Jeddah on 20 May, vowing to ensure the safe passage of civilians, protect relief workers, and prohibit the use of civilians as human shields. The agreement did not include a ceasefire, and clashes resumed in Geneina, causing more casualties. The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Martin Griffiths expressed frustration at the lack of commitment from both sides to end the fighting.

The situation remained volatile, with both sides trading blame for attacks on churches, hospitals, and embassies. Casualties mounted, particularly in Geneina, where Arab militias loyal to the RSF were accused of atrocities against non-Arab residents. A temporary ceasefire was signed and faced challenges as fighting persisted in Khartoum, and the agreed-upon ceasefire time saw further violence. Between 28 and 97 people were reportedly killed by the RSF and Arab militias when they attacked the predominantly Masalit town of Misterei in West Darfur on 28 May.

June–September 2023

Continued fighting in Khartoum

As June began, Khartoum witnessed tank battles resulting in casualties. The RSF took control of several important cultural and government buildings, including the National Museum of Sudan and the Yarmouk Military Industrial Complex. Acute food insecurity affected a significant portion of Sudan's population.

By July, al-Burhan was still trapped at the Army Headquarters and unable to leave, and to break him out the SAF elected to send a column of troops to lift the siege of the base. This force was ambushed by the RSF and defeated, with the paramilitary claiming it had killed hundreds of soldiers and captured 90 vehicles, along with the column's commander.

In response to the escalating violence in Khartoum, the SAF increased the intensity of their airstrikes and artillery bombardment, leading to heightened civilian casualties often numbering in the dozens per strike. Shelling by the RSF also increased in intensity, leading to many civilian casualties in turn.

Heavy fighting continued in Khartoum throughout August, with clashes breaking out across the city. The RSF laid siege to the SAF's Armoured Corps base, breaching its defences and taking control of surrounding neighbourhoods. The SAF also made offensives, with the RSF-controlled Republican Palace and Yarmouk Complex coming under SAF air bombardment. An offensive was launched against Yarmouk, but this was beaten back after the RSF shipped in reinforcements. One of the few remaining bridges between Khartoum and Khartoum North was also destroyed by the SAF, in an attempt to deny the RSF freedom of movement.

On 24 August an SAF operation successfully rescued al-Burhan from his besieged base at the Army Headquarters, allowing him to head to Port Sudan and hold a cabinet meeting there.

Diplomatic efforts

Ceasefires between the warring parties were announced but often violated, leading to further clashes. The SAF and RSF engaged in mutual blame for incidents, while the Sudanese government took action against international envoys. The Saudi embassy in Khartoum was attacked and evacuations from an orphanage were carried out amid the chaos. Amidst the turmoil, Sudan faced diplomatic strains with Egypt, leading to challenges for Sudanese refugees seeking entry.

With al-Burhan out of Khartoum for the first time since the start of the war, he was able to fly to Egypt and hold a meeting with the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Following this visit al-Burhan went on a tour of numerous countries, heading to South Sudan, Qatar, Eritrea, Turkey, and Uganda. He then proceeded to New York City as head of the Sudanese delegation to the 78th United Nations General Assembly, where he urged the international community to declare the RSF a terrorist organization.

SPLM-N (Al-Hilu) involvement

The Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) broke a long-standing ceasefire agreement in June, attacking SAF units in Kadugli, Kurmuk and Dalang, the latter coinciding with an attack by the RSF. The SAF claimed to have repelled the attacks, while the rebels claimed to have attacked in retaliation for the death of one of their soldiers at the hands of the SAF and vowed to free the region from "military occupation". More than 35,000 were displaced by the fighting. Speculation arose as to whether the attacks were part of an unofficial alliance between al-Hilu and the RSF or an attempt by al-Hilu to strengthen his position in future negotiations concerning his group. Civil society organizations supporting the SPLM-N claimed its operations sought to protect civilians from possible attacks by the RSF.

Al-Hilu's faction launched further offensives in July, moving into South Kordofan and gaining control of several SAF bases. In response the SAF brought in artillery and heavily bombarded SPLM-N positions. Further attacks by the group largely petered out after this, with an assault on Kadugli in September being pushed back by the SAF.

In February 2025, the SPLM-N (Al-Hilu) signed the ''Sudan Founding Charter'' drafted by the RSF-led Government of Peace and Unity, officially allying itself with the RSF.

Darfur front

In Darfur, fighting and bloodshed were particularly fierce around the city of Geneina, where hundreds died and extensive destruction occurred. RSF forces engaged in frequent acts of violence against the Masalit population of Geneina, leading to accusations of ethnic cleansing. On 4 August the RSF claimed that it had taken full control over all of Central Darfur.

A United Nations investigation discovered numerous mass graves in Darfur that contained Masalit civilians. The RSF and Arab militias were additionally accused of having killed lawyers, human rights monitors, doctors and non-Arab tribal leaders. The governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abakar, was abducted and killed by armed men in June, hours after accusing the RSF of genocide and calling for international intervention in a TV interview. The SAF, for their part, conducted indiscriminate airstrikes against Darfur that killed many civilians, especially in Nyala.

Tribal and rebel groups in Darfur began to declare allegiance to one or the other of the warring parties. A faction of the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Movement led by Mustafa Tambour (SLM-T) joined the conflict in support of the SAF. In contrast the controversial Tamazuj rebel group formally declared its alliance with the RSF, joined by the leaders of seven Arab tribes, including that of Hemedti's.

As September arrived both sides made offensives in Darfur. The RSF took control of several towns in West Darfur and also attacked the market of Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur. SAF offensives saw success in Central Darfur, with the army retaking parts of Zalingei from the RSF. Fighting in Darfur also began to increasingly spill over into North Kordofan, with the SAF attacking RSF positions in the state capital of El-Obeid and clashes over the town of Um Rawaba. Both sides made withdrawals to end the month, with the RSF retreating from Um Rawaba while the SAF withdrew from Tawila.

October–December 2023

SAF collapse in Darfur

By October 2023, the SAF in Darfur was experiencing acute shortages in supplies due to RSF-imposed sieges and had failed to utilize its air superiority to stem RSF advances. On 26 October, the RSF captured Nyala, Sudan's fourth-largest city, after seizing control of the SAF's 16th Infantry Division headquarters. The fall of Nyala, a strategic city with an international airport and border connections to Central Africa, allowed the RSF to receive international supplies more easily and concentrate its forces on other Sudanese cities. After Nyala's fall, RSF fighters turned their focus to Zalingei, the capital of Central Darfur. The SAF's 21st Infantry Division, stationed in Zalingei, fled the city without a fight and allowed the RSF to take it over.

In Geneina, reports emerged that tribal elders were attempting to broker the surrender of the SAF garrison in the city to prevent bloodshed. The army rejected the proposal, raising fears of an imminent RSF assault on the city and causing civilians to flee across the border into Chad. The RSF besieged the headquarters of the SAF's 15th Infantry Division in Geneina, giving the garrison a six-hour ultimatum to surrender. The base was captured two days later when the 15th withdrew from the area before fleeing to Chad. Those left behind, numbering in the hundreds, were taken prisoner and paraded in RSF media with signs of abuse. Witnesses later reported mass atrocities perpetrated by the RSF in the city shortly after its seizure, with a local rebel group claiming up to 2,000 people were massacred in Geneina's satellite town of Ardamata. With Geneina's fall, Ed Daein and Al-Fashir were the last remaining capitals in Darfur under government control, with both cities under heavy RSF pressure.

The RSF stormed and plundered the town of Umm Keddada, east of Al-Fashir, after the SAF garrison withdrew. SAF troops in Al-Fashir itself were reported to be running low on food, water, and medicine due to the city being under siege, and external forces noted the SAF seemed incapable of stopping the RSF advance. Ed Daein fell in the early hours of 21 November, with RSF forces taking control of the city after seizing the headquarters of the SAF's 20th Infantry Division. SAF garrisons in East Darfur subsequently abandoned their positions and withdrew, allowing the RSF to occupy the area. In response to RSF gains in Darfur and subsequent abuses, the Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Minnawi), and other smaller rebel factions renounced their neutrality and declared war on the RSF.

Peace negotiations stall

Attempts by other nations and international organisations to negotiate peace had largely been dormant since the failure of the Treaty of Jeddah, but in late October the RSF and SAF met once more in Jeddah to attempt to negotiate peace. This new round of talks was a failure, with neither side willing to commit to a ceasefire. Instead, the warring factions agreed to open channels for humanitarian aid. On 3 December negotiations were indefinitely suspended due to the failure of both the SAF and the RSF to open up aid channels.

With the failure of the talks in Jeddah, the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) hosted a peace summit in early December. Earlier attempts by IGAD to open negotiations had floundered after the SAF had accused Kenyan President William Ruto of supporting the RSF. IGAD's talks appeared to make more progress than the Jeddah negotiations, with Hemedti and al-Burhan agreeing to meet in person at some point in the future.

RSF crossing of the Nile

The RSF attacked the town of Wad Ashana in North Kordofan on 1 October along a key commercial route. In West Kordofan, an uptick in fighting was reported, with the RSF assaulting a "vital" oil field in Baleela, south of Al-Fulah. Geolocated footage showed RSF fighters celebrating around Baleela Airport after allegedly capturing it. The Battle of Khartoum continued with the RSF seizing the town of al-Aylafoun, southeast of the capital, on 6 October. In the process, the paramilitary gained control of key oil infrastructure. By late October the RSF controlled most of Khartoum but had failed to seize key military bases, while al-Burhan's government had largely relocated to Port Sudan.

The RSF sought to capitalize on its gains by stepping up attacks on SAF positions in Khartoum and Omdurman. Days of fighting culminated in the destruction of the Shambat Bridge, which connected Khartoum North to Omdurman over the Nile; the bridge's destruction severed a critical RSF supply chain. This effectively cut the RSF off from its forces in Omdurman, giving the SAF a strategic advantage. In an attempt to gain a new crossing over the Nile and supply its forces in Omdurman, the RSF launched an assault on the Jebel Aulia Dam in the village of Jabal Awliya. As Jebel Aulia could not be destroyed without flooding Khartoum, its capture would give the RSF a path over the Nile the SAF could not easily remove. A week-long battle commenced over the dam and its surrounding village, which ended in an RSF victory. The force captured the dam on 20 November, and all SAF resistance ceased in the village the following day.

On 5 December, local militias along with RSF soldiers attacked SPLM-N (al-Hilu) forces in the village of Tukma, southeast of Dalang in South Kordofan, resulting in the deaths of 4 people and the destruction of the village. The RSF leadership, not wanting hostilities with the then-neutral al-Hilu faction to escalate, issued a statement condemning this attack and denouncing it as "tribal violence". On 8 December, the RSF entered Gedaref State for the first time.

Pushing south from their gains around Jebel Aulia and Khartoum, RSF forces began to move into Gezira State on 15 December, advancing toward its capital Wad Madani. Elsewhere in Gezira the RSF made major gains, taking control of the city of Rufaa in the state's east and entering the Butana region. After several days of fighting the RSF seized the Hantoob Bridge on Wad Madani's eastern outskirts, crossing the Blue Nile and entering the city. The army put up little resistance in Wad Madani itself, the 1st Division withdrawing from the city as the RSF took over.

The fall of Wad Madani was viewed as a major blow to the SAF, as it dramatically widened the frontline and opened up large parts of the country to potential RSF offensives. The city's fall allowed the RSF to capture most of Gezira and to make inroads in White Nile State, capturing the town of El Geteina. Within a few days RSF fighters had advanced to within 25 km of Sennar, the largest city in Sennar State. Over the next few weeks RSF forces ventured into rural areas of Al Qadarif State and River Nile State, without establishing a significant presence. In Sennar State the RSF made some further minor advances but had not attacked Sennar City by the year's end.

Amid the deteriorating situation, the SAF was reported to be arming civilians while government officials in the east called on the population to mobilize. Al-Burhan gave a widely promoted public speech to soldiers in Red Sea State, promising to arm civilian militias to fight the RSF and to fight against 'colonialism', which was viewed by observers as a reference to the United Arab Emirates support of the RSF.

January–April 2024

Hemedti travels abroad

Following the fall of Wad Madani efforts by IGAD to negotiate a ceasefire made progress, as the SAF's weakened position made them more eager to enter talks. Whereas previously opposition from Islamist political groups to negotiation had prevented al-Burhan from committing to a specific date, now both he and Hemedti agreed to meet on 28 December. A day before the meeting was due, it was cancelled as Hemedti recanted his desire to attend.

Instead the RSF leader went on a diplomatic tour, travelling on a chartered Emirati jet and meeting with several African national leaders. One visit that was particularly promoted was his visit to Rwanda, where he met with Rwandan President Paul Kagame and visited the Kigali Genocide Memorial. On the tour Hemedti also met with former Prime Minister Hamdok and his Taqaddum organisation in Addis Ababa, with the RSF agreeing in a declaration negotiated with the Taqaddum to release political prisoners, open up humanitarian aid corridors and negotiate further with the SAF. This tour was regarded by observers as an attempt by Hemedti to portray himself as the leader of Sudan and improve his international image, as his reputation had been severely damaged since the fall of Wad Madani due to large-scale looting by RSF fighters.

On 5 January, al-Burhan vowed to continue the war against the RSF and rejected the latest peace efforts, declaring that war crimes committed by the RSF precluded negotiation. On 14 January, both Hemedti and Burhan received official invitations from IGAD to attend its upcoming summit on 18 January. Hemedti agreed to attend, but Burhan refused to do so. On 16 January, the Sudanese government suspended its ties with IGAD, accusing the body of violating Sudanese sovereignty.This effectively marked the end of IGAD's attempts to mediate peace talks.

Fighting in Kordofan and Gezira

As 2024 began the RSF made attacks into South Kordofan, defeating SAF forces in the town of Habila in the Nuba Mountains and pushing toward Dalang. On 7 January the RSF attacked SAF positions in Dalang, meeting fierce resistance from the army and civilian militias. During the fighting the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) entered the city, taking control of several neighbourhoods. SPLM-N forces proceeded to attack the RSF, and the paramilitary retreated from the city. RSF fighters withdrawing from Dalang entered the city of Muglad in West Kordofan, easily taking control as the city had no organised SAF presence. West Kordofan had been relatively free of fighting for several months due to a local truce brokered by leaders of the Messiria tribe, but as tensions escalated rumours spread that the RSF was planning an attack on the encircled city of Babanusa and the SAF 22nd Infantry Division garrisoning it.

In January 2024, the RSF focused on consolidating its gains in Gezira State. Fighting was reported on 17 January east of El Manaqil, the last major town not under RSF control. The SAF delivered weapons to the city by helicopter, including selectively distributing them among civilians in the town, attempting to bolster its defences. Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) selectively recruited and armed civilians based on perceived loyalty. On 24 January 2024, the RSF launched an attack on Babanusa after encircling the city for months. By 25 January, the RSF gained control of the city centre and entered the headquarters of the 22nd infantry division.

Until March 2024, the RSF maintained its position in Gezira State but was unable to break through. The RSF is recruiting in Gezira State to try to capture territory in El-Gadarif from the SAF. The JEM, which has allied with the SAF, helped the SAF build up its forces in El-Gadarif for a counteroffensive to try to retake Wad Madani. In April 2024, the SAF and its allies began the counteroffensive, attacking from the east and west of Wad Madani in an attempt to retake it. Clashes were reported in Al-Madina Arab on 15 April.

In December 2024, the SAF launched an offensive in southern Gezira. The SAF was able to make small progress, which involved recapturing the town of Wad el-Haddad, a town on the border of Sennar State. It also was able to recapture Um al-Qura, but the RSF reoccupied the village.

In January 2025, the SAF made the first major military operation of 2025. The army was able to make large gains in Gezira and some gains in North Kordofan. On 8 January, the SAF had recaptured Haj-Abdallah after a tense battle that inflicted losses on the RSF. The SAF stated that seven RSF vehicles were destroyed. A day later, the SAF attacked RSF positions in Al-Shabarga in the southeastern part of the state, led by field commander Bassam Abu Satour, leading to the RSF's withdrawal and the SAF recapturing the city, while in the western part of the state, the SAF took control of the villages Mahla, Tahla, and Al-Kumar Al-Jaaliyeen. On 10 January, the SAF recaptured Um al-Qura while the Sudan Shield Forces took Wad al-Abyad. These successful offensives led to the SAF retaking control of Wad Madani on 11 January from three fronts.

After advancing in Gezira and Khartoum, the SAF launched a military operation in North Kordofan for the first time, after being on the defensive in Darfur and Kordofan from the start of the war. The SAF's "Sayyad Force", captured the entirety of the Umm Ruwaba district.

By the start of February, the SAF had recaptured Al-Hasaheisa, Tambul, and Rufa'a. This left the RSF in control of only northwestern Gezira.

The SAF then liberated the town of Er Rahad on 19 February, and by 23 February, the SAF lifted the almost two-year siege of El Obeid.

SAF gains in Omdurman

The SAF gained ground in Omdurman in February 2024, linking up their forces in the northern part of the city and relieving a 10-month siege of their forces in the city centre. The SAF also took control of the Al-Hilal Stadium. As of February 2024, the Omdurman front is the only area in Sudan where the SAF has carried out a sustained offensive operation and represents the first breakthrough for the SAF.

On 12 March, the SAF defeated an attempted RSF counteroffensive in Omdurman and took control of the headquarters of the Sudan National Broadcasting Corporation. The RSF maintains its control of Khartoum and continues to threaten Khartoum North.

As of April 2024, fighting in Khartoum State is ongoing, with the RSF in control of the southern and western parts of Omdurman and the SAF in control of the northern and eastern parts of Omdurman, with the RSF controlling the majority of Khartoum and Khartoum North. The SAF continued to prepare an offensive to relieve its surrounded bases in Khartoum North.

As of March 2025, SAF controls majority of the city. On 29 March, SAF forces announced the control of the Libya Market in Omdurman and seized weapons and equipment left behind by the RSF. On the same day, SAF launched new offensives into the city of Ombada, west of Omdurman.

April 2024–present

Fighting in Darfur

On 15 April, during the Battle of El Fasher, at least nine civilians were killed in a renewed offensive by the RSF on the city of Al-Fashir in North Darfur. The Joint Darfur Force declared war on the RSF and allied with the SAF.

The fighting in El Fasher has diverted SAF resources from other areas, hampering planned counter-offensives to retake Khartoum and Wad Madani. In particular, the SAF has been using its limited aviation resources to carry out airstrikes in North Darfur and resupply El Fasher using airdrops.

Since April 2024, the conflict had been escalating in El Fasher, while the civilians remained trapped with no safety or food. In a June 2024 report, the International Crisis Group said the intensifying battle could lead to mass slaughter, and that there was a need for all sides to de-escalate. The report said the UN and the US should broker the de-escalation and must put pressure on the RSF and its main supporters, including the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Crisis Group said the UAE should push the RSF to stand down, and urged all parties to allow the civilians to flee, open the region for aid delivery and resume national peace talks.

On 14 June 2024, the SAF announced that it had killed Ali Yaqoub Gibril, a top RSF commander, in El Fasher. The United States had sanctioned Yagoub in May 2024 for endangering civilians in Darfur. In June 2024, ''The New York Times'' reported that more than 40 villages had been burned in El Fasher since April 2024.

Fighting is ongoing in El Fasher, which remains the SAF's last holdout in Darfur. As of September 2024, the RSF has advanced into central areas of El Fasher, with the SAF's territorial control at its lowest point since intense fighting began in May 2024.

Fighting in Kordofan

As of May 2024, fighting is ongoing in Babanusa, West Kordofan. The RSF is conducting an offensive to attempt to take control of West Kordofan. Fighting was also reported in North Kordofan.

On 20 June 2024, the RSF captured Al-Fulah, the capital of West Kordofan, after the SAF withdrew from the city after several hours of fighting. The SAF retreated to Babanusa, its one remaining base in Kordofan.

Fighting along the Nile

In May 2024, the RSF launched attacks against the SAF between Khartoum State and River Nile State, as well as in White Nile State near the border with Gezira State. The SAF prepared its forces in River Nile State, ahead of a potential invasion of Khartoum Bahri. In June 2024, the RSF was still in control of Khartoum and Khartoum North, though the SAF controlled one enclave in each that it supplies by airdrop.

In late June 2024, the RSF began an assault in the areas surrounding the city of Sennar. RSF forces struck out to the west of the city, causing the SAF to bring in reinforcements in anticipation of an attack on Sennar itself. Instead RSF forces avoided Sennar and attacked south towards Singa, the capital of Sennar State, capturing the lightly defended town on 29 June. This prevented the SAF from reinforcing Sennar from the south, placing the city under increased pressure.

Following the fall of Singa, SAF resistance collapsed across much of southern Sennar, which led to the RSF occupying the towns of Dinder, Mazmoun and Wad an-Nail with minimal SAF resistance. A united force consisting of the Gedaref-based 2nd SAF Infantry Division and a battalion of the JEM assaulted and retook Dinder on 1 July, but were driven out again by the RSF over the next few days.

On 20 July, the RSF announced the death of Brigadier General Abdel Rahman Al-Bishi, its head of operations in Sennar and Blue Nile States, with Sudanese media reporting that he had been killed in a SAF airstrike.

On 3 August, the RSF launched its first attack on Blue Nile State since the beginning of the war, with the group and the SAF contesting control over Al-Tadamun. On 15 August 2024, the Galgani massacre was carried out by the RSF, which killed at least 108 people, including at least 24 women and children.

SAF offensives

As September 2024 came, for the first time since the start of the war the balance of power seemed to be tipping towards the SAF. On 26 September, the SAF launched a major offensive against RSF positions in Khartoum. The attack on the city came from three fronts striking from the south, east and west of the capital. SAF airstrikes, which killed four and wounded 14, began at dawn followed by clashes within the city. The SAF reportedly captured three key bridges connecting Khartoum to other nearby cities, including the Omdurman Bridge which had previously acted as a line of separation between government and RSF control. Faced with an elusive enemy, the SAF became bogged down in urban fighting, with RSF snipers routinely paralyzing infantry advances.

October 2024 was the deadliest month for Sudanese civilians since the war began. In Khartoum, the RSF have relentlessly shelled areas controlled by the SAF, which has amounted to daily indiscriminate bombardments of civilian areas. Escalating SAF airstrikes on RSF positions have caused dozens of civilian deaths. In October 2024, the SAF also launched counteroffensives in the states of Sennar and Gezira, which were successfully recaptured from the RSF. Starting on 20 October 2024, the RSF carried out the 2024 eastern Gezira State massacres, which killed at least 300 people and wounded at least 200 more.

According to a report by the French newspaper ''Le Monde'', as of November 2024 the war in Sudan has possibly entered its most dangerous phase since it began in April 2023. Both the SAF and RSF have officially ruled out settling the civil war through negotiations, with the only option on the table being total war. During the recent rainy season which brought a lull in the fighting, each side rearmed and restructured their forces. Many ordinary Sudanese, extending to the most serious critics of the SAF, have increasingly supported the SAF in response to RSF war crimes and atrocities. The SAF has become increasingly dependent on Islamist networks, as these movements have mobilized many civilians from popular resistance brigades. The Al-Bara' ibn Malik Battalion in particular is presently fighting on the Khartoum front lines against the RSF and has consequently gained popularity. On 23 November, the SAF retook Singa following an offensive.

The SAF retook Wad Madani, the capital of Gezira State on 11 January 2025. On 8 February 2025, the SAF regained control of nearly all of Khartoum North as it intensified its offensive, and was preparing to retake the capital of Khartoum itself.

On 24 February 2025, the RSF claimed responsibility for downing a Russian-made Ilyushin aircraft in Nyala. Meanwhile, the RSF declared a rival government in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, which the SAF-aligned administration refused to recognize.

On 20 March 2025, the SAF announced it was within 500 metres of the Presidential Palace and captured it on the next day. On 22 March, the SAF also recaptured the headquarters of the Central Bank of Sudan and the General Intelligence Service in Khartoum. It also retook Tuti Island, situated at the confluence of the Blue Nile and the White Nile, after advancing through the Tuti Bridge. On 26 March, they retook Khartoum International Airport and Jebel Aulia, regarded as the RSF's last stronghold in the capital, with al-Burhan proclaiming the liberation of Khartoum later in the day. On 20 May, the SAF announced the clearing of Khartoum State from the RSF.

April 2025 offensive in Darfur

In April 2025, the RSF launched a major offensive in North Darfur, aiming to capture El Fasher, the last state capital in the region under SAF control. Beginning on 11 April, RSF ground and aerial assaults struck El Fasher and surrounding displacement camps, including Zamzam and Abu Shouk. By 13 April, the RSF claimed control of Zamzam camp after intense fighting that left over 200 civilians dead, including children and aid workers. The SAF denied RSF accusations of militarizing the camp, while rights groups documented widespread abuses by RSF fighters, including targeted killings and sexual violence.

May 2025 offensives in Kordofan

On 1 May 2025, the RSF announced that they had taken control of En Nahud, a strategic city in West Kordofan that was previously used by the SAF to send forces to Darfur. On 5 May, the RSF attacked Port Sudan for the first time using drones.

Despite initial setbacks, Al-Khiwai in West Kordofan was retaken by the SAF on 11 May, and on 13 May, the town of Al-Hamadi in South Kordofan, an administrative hub for the Hawazma tribe, was also retaken by the SAF, alongside some strongholds in southern Omdurman previously held by the RSF, such as the Al-Jami’a neighbourhood and all of the Al-Shaqla neighbourhood.

On 19 May, the SAF took Wadi al-Atrun in Al-Malha, located on a strategic road linking Northern State and North Darfur. As of 20 May, the SAF claimed it had fully expelled the RSF from Khartoum state. On 21 May, the SAF said it had cleared White Nile State of the RSF. On 23 May, the SAF announced the capture of the strategic city of Dibebad in South Kordofan.

June 2025 eastern offensives

On 10 June, part of the border triangle linking Sudan, Libya, and Egypt at Gabal El Uweinat was attacked by the RSF and the Libyan National Army, led by Khalifa Haftar, which allegedly struck directly into Sudanese territory against the SAF. On 11 June, the RSF announced that they had entirely occupied the area, and the SAF announced their retreat and their condemnation of the LNA for striking them.

Casualties and war crimes

The Preparatory Committee of the Sudanese Doctors Union reported that over 522,000 infants have died from malnutrition since the outbreak of the war, with 286,000 additional cases of malnutrition recorded.

According to a report published by ''Le Monde'' in November 2024, the war may have killed over 150,000 civilians through the combined tolls of bombardments, massacres, starvation and disease. Total deaths are likely significantly more than 150,000. A November 2024 report from the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine estimated more than 61,000 deaths in Khartoum State alone, for the period between April 2023 and June 2024.

Early in the conflict, doctors on the ground warned that reported figures did not include all casualties as people could not reach hospitals due to difficulties in movement. Soon after the war broke out, a spokesperson for the Sudanese Red Crescent was quoted as saying that the number of casualties "was not small". The Sultanate of Dar Masalit claimed on 20 June 2023 that more than 5,000 people were killed and about 8,000 were wounded in fighting in West Darfur alone, while a Masalit tribal leader told the Sudanese news outlet Ayin Network on 22 July 2023 that more than 10,000 people had been killed in the state. Sudanese prosecutors recorded over 500 missing persons cases across the country, some of which were enforced disappearances, and were mostly blamed on the RSF. On 2 May 2024, a US Senate hearing on the war estimated that between 15,000 and 30,000 people had died, but considered that to be an underestimation by a factor of 10 to 15 times, saying the real death toll could be as high as 150,000.

As of 27 May 2024, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project data reported 17,044 fatalities.

On 29 March 2025, the Sudanese Group for Defending Rights and Freedoms said that it had recorded 50,000 missing persons cases since the beginning of the war.

Darfur

In Geneina, West Darfur, ethnic clashes that began in the last week of April 2023 had killed at least 1,100 people, while the Sultanate of Dar Masalit claimed that more than 5,000 people were killed and about 8,000 were wounded in the city. In July 2023, a Masalit tribal leader claimed that more than 10,000 people had been killed in West Darfur alone, and that 80% of Geneina's residents had fled.

Massacres were recorded in towns such as Tawila and Misterei, while a mass grave was discovered in Geneina containing the bodies of 87 people killed in clashes. Several intellectuals, politicians, professionals and nobility were assassinated. Most of these atrocities were blamed on the RSF and allied Arab militias. The UK government, witnesses and other observers described the violence in the region as tantamount to ethnic cleansing or even genocide, with non-Arab groups such as the Masalit being the primary victims. Mujeebelrahman Yagoub, Assistant Commissioner for Refugees in West Darfur called the violence worse than the War in Darfur in 2003 and the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

Foreign casualties

Civilians, including 15 Syrians, 15 Ethiopians and nine Eritreans have been killed across the country. An Indian national working in Khartoum died after being hit by a stray bullet on 15 April. Two Americans were killed, including a professor working in the University of Khartoum who was stabbed to death while evacuating. A two-year-old girl from Turkey was killed while her parents were injured after their house was struck by a rocket on 18 April. Ten students from the Democratic Republic of the Congo were killed in an SAF airstrike on the International University of Africa in Khartoum on 4 June. The SAF claimed that the Egyptian assistant military attaché was killed by RSF fire while driving his car in Khartoum, which was denied by the Egyptian ambassador.

Two Greek nationals trapped in a church on 15 April sustained leg injuries when caught in crossfire while trying to leave. A Filipino migrant worker and an Indonesian student at a school in Khartoum were injured by stray bullets. On 17 April, the European Union Ambassador to Sudan, Aidan O'Hara of Ireland, was assaulted by unidentified "armed men wearing military fatigues" in his home, he suffered minor injuries and was able to resume working on 19 April. On 23 April, a French evacuation convoy was shot at, injuring one person. The French government later confirmed the casualty to be a French soldier. An employee of the Egyptian embassy was shot and injured during an evacuation mission.

Evacuation of foreign nationals

The outbreak of violence has led foreign governments to monitor the situation in Sudan and move toward the evacuation and repatriation of their nationals. Among some countries with several expatriates in Sudan are Egypt, which has more than 10,000 citizens in the country, and the United States, which has more than 16,000 citizens, most of whom are dual nationals. Efforts at extraction were hampered by the fighting within the capital Khartoum, particularly in and around the airport. This has forced evacuations to be undertaken by road via Port Sudan on the Red Sea, which lies about 650 km (400 miles) northeast of Khartoum. from where they were airlifted or ferried directly to their home countries or third ones. Other evacuations were undertaken through overland border crossings or airlifts from diplomatic missions and other designated locations with direct involvement of the militaries of some home countries. Some transit hubs used during the evacuation include the port of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia and Djibouti, which hosts military bases of the United States, China, Japan, France, and other European countries.

War crimes

Foreign involvement

In July 2024 Amnesty International reported that large numbers of recently manufactured weapons and ammunition were being transported into Sudan from China, Russia, Turkey, Yemen, the UAE and Serbia.

Chad

On 7 June 2023, Hissein Alamine Tchaw-tchaw, a Chadian dissident who belongs to the same ethnic group as Hemedti and claims to be the leader of the Movement for the Fight of the Oppressed in Chad (MFOC), which is fighting the government of President Mahamat Déby, posted a video showing his participation in an RSF attack on the Yarmouk munitions factory in Khartoum.

On 17 November 2023, the SLM-Minnawi and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) accused the Chadian government of supporting the RSF, and "supplying it with military equipment and mercenaries by opening its territory and airspace". A report from ''Africa Analyst'' alleged that Chadian soldiers belonging to a joint Chadian-Sudanese command under Osman Bahr intercepted a shipment of military equipment intended for the RSF on its way from N'Djamena and gave it instead to the JEM, which the latter denied. ''The Economist'' linked Chad's junta receiving financial support from the UAE in exchange for allowing it to support the RSF through Amdjarass airport.

Following accusations by SAF deputy commander Yasser al-Atta of Chadian government support for the RSF, the Chadian government unsuccessfully demanded an apology from the Sudanese ambassador and expelled four Sudanese diplomats from the country on 17 December.

On 5 November 2024, the government of Sudan filed a complaint with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights demanding reparations from Chad for their support of the RSF, accusing Chad of violating international law.

China

Amnesty International's 2024 report highlighted China as a supplier of weapons fueling the conflict, breaching the Darfur arms embargo. Recently manufactured Chinese arms have been traced to both the SAF and the RSF, although China's official stance avoids acknowledging direct support to either faction. China initially adhered to non-interference, evacuating citizens and calling for peace without taking sides. This mirrored its approach in past conflicts, prioritizing stability to protect economic interests. China's Sudan strategy ties into the Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to secure Red Sea trade routes and infrastructure links. The civil war delayed these ambitions, reinforcing China's preference for a stable, cooperative government in Khartoum. Unlike Russia, which has militarily backed the RSF, or the US, which pursues sanctions and mediation, China prioritizes economic continuity over ideological alignment. On 9 January 2025 China donated emergency food aid (1,250 tonnes) to be allocated to all states.

Egypt

On 15 April, RSF forces claimed, via Twitter, to have taken Egyptian troops prisoner near Merowe, and a military plane carrying markings of the Egyptian Air Force. Initially, no official explanation was given for the Egyptian soldiers' presence, while Egypt and Sudan have had military cooperation due to diplomatic tensions with Ethiopia. Later on, the Egyptian Armed Forces stated that around 200 of its soldiers were in Sudan to conduct exercises with the Sudanese military. Around that time, the SAF reportedly encircled RSF forces in Merowe airbase. As a result, the Egyptian Armed Forces announced that it was following the situation as a precaution for the safety of its personnel. The RSF later stated that it would cooperate in repatriating the soldiers to Egypt. On 19 April, the RSF stated that it had moved the soldiers to Khartoum and would hand them over when the "appropriate opportunity" arose. Of the captured Egyptian troops, 177 were released and flown back to Egypt aboard three Egyptian military planes that took off from Khartoum airport later in the day. The remaining 27 soldiers, who were from the Egyptian Air Force, were sheltered at the Egyptian embassy and later evacuated.

On 16 April 2023, the RSF claimed that its troops in Port Sudan were attacked by foreign aircraft and issued a warning against any foreign interference. According to former CIA analyst Cameron Hudson, Egyptian fighter jets were a part of these bombing campaigns against the RSF, and Egyptian special forces units have been deployed and are providing intelligence and tactical support to the SAF. ''The Wall Street Journal'' said that Egypt had sent fighter jets and pilots to support the Sudanese military. On 17 April, satellite imagery obtained by ''The War Zone'' revealed that one Egyptian Air Force MiG-29M2 fighter jet had been destroyed and two others had been damaged or destroyed at Merowe Airbase. A Sudanese Air Force Guizhou JL-9 was among the destroyed aircraft. After initial confusion, the RSF accepted the explanation that Egyptian combat and support personnel were conducting exercises with the Sudanese military before the outbreak of hostilities.

Eritrea

Eritrea is seen as an ally of the SAF, providing military support in Sudan's eastern borders. During a state visit to Asmara in November 2024, al-Burhan thanked President Isaias Afwerki for Eritrea's support to the SAF. Eritrea's support is seen as a counterbalance to Eritrean opposition groups and their possibility of growing in influence under the advance of the RSF in Sudan's eastern border. President Afwerki has implied Eritrea's military readiness to respond in the case of an RSF advance to its borders.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia initially supported the RSF, which was seen as an ally who helped Ethiopia fight against the Tigray People's Liberation Front in the Tigray War. Ethiopia was also supportive of the RSF to counter Egyptian influence in Sudan. However, in July 2024, Primer Minister Abiy Ahmed visited Port Sudan and met with al-Burhan, signaling a shifting position on the conflict. RSF's Hemedti had previously paid a visit to Ethiopia in December 2023 to push for talks with the SAF.

Iran

A June 2024 BBC investigation revealed that Iran violated the UN arms embargo by supplying drones to both sides. Analysts see this move as part of Iran's strategy to counter UAE influence in Sudan and secure access to the Red Sea. Although Sudanese officials denied receiving Iranian aid, multiple sources—including Reuters—confirmed its impact on the battlefield.

Kenya

The SAF rejected Kenya's mediation role in July 2023, accusing President William Ruto of having ties to RSF leader Hemedti and offering refuge to RSF members. SAF Lt. Gen. Yasir Alatta escalated tensions by calling Ruto a mercenary and challenging him to deploy troops. Sudan later threatened to quit IGAD unless Ruto was removed as head of its mediation committee. Kenya denied the accusations, calling them baseless and reaffirming its neutrality. In retaliation, ''Anonymous Sudan'' attacked Kenyan websites in late July.

Tensions deepened in February 2025 when Kenya hosted a meeting in Nairobi where the RSF and its allies signed a charter to form a parallel Sudanese government without the SAF's participation. Sudan condemned the move, accusing Kenya of undermining its sovereignty. Analysts noted a shift in Kenya's stance following Ruto's January 2025 UAE visit and economic agreement, suggesting a possible Emirati influence behind Kenya's actions.

Libyan National Army

The Egypt-backed Libyan National Army, under the command of Khalifa Haftar, dispatched aircraft to fly military supplies to the RSF before the outbreak of hostilities. Haftar and the LNA collaborated with the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, to conduct these flights.

Haftar's support for a different faction in Sudan than the Egyptian government was commented on by ''The New Arab'', which viewed it as a sign of Egyptian weakness due to economic malaise and reliance on Haftar to police Eastern Libya, which constitutes a security concern for the Egyptian government. ''The New Arab'' also viewed the LNA's role in the conflict as signifying a shift in its diplomatic orientation, from being primarily backed by Egypt to being primarily backed by the United Arab Emirates.

Russia

For much of the Sudanese civil war Russia has sent weapons to both the RSF and SAF. This began to shift during mid-2024, with the Russian government beginning to favour the SAF, concurrent with Russia–SAF discussions around the construction of a Russian naval base north of Port Sudan.

Wagner Group

According to CNN, Wagner supplied surface-to-air missiles to the RSF, picking up the items from Syria and delivering some of them by plane to Haftar-controlled bases in Libya to be then delivered to the RSF, while dropping other items directly to RSF positions in northwestern Sudan. American officials said that Wagner was offering to supply additional weapons to the RSF from its existing stocks in the Central African Republic. On 6 September, Wagner reportedly deployed a convoy of more than 100 vehicles carrying weapons to the RSF garrison in al-Zurug from Chad. SAF Lieutenant General Yasser al-Atta also accused the Wagner Group of bringing in mercenaries from several African nations to fight alongside the RSF.

The head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and the RSF denied the allegations.

As relations between the Russian government and the SAF improved during mid-2024, the latter publicly claimed that the Wagner Group was no longer operating in Sudan. This claim was contradicted by a diplomatic source and eyewitnesses speaking to Middle East Eye.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has provided military support and financial aid (though it officially denies it) to the SAF, as it seeks to counterbalance the UAE's influence in Sudan, which supports the RSF. In response, Sudan has provided military support for the Saudi coalition in Yemen. In March 2025, al-Burhan visited Saudi Arabia in his first trip outside Sudan since the SAF retook Khartoum. There, he thanked Saudi support for Sudanese unity and the fight against the RSF.

South Sudan

Since the outbreak of renewed violence in Sudan in 2023, South Sudan has adopted a mediatory role, urging peace and engaging with IGAD and the AU, though with limited success due to the conflict's complexity and multiple factions. South Sudan is deeply concerned about spillover effects—such as refugee flows and economic instability—and recognizes that its own fragile stability is tied to Sudan's fate. Tensions escalated further with a February 2025 alliance between Sudan's RSF and the SPLM-N, a rebel group near the South Sudanese border. Experts warn this could pull South Sudan into the conflict, especially if the Sudanese army supports rival South Sudanese militias in response. With shared borders, historical ties, and existing political tensions between South Sudan's leaders (President Salva Kiir Mayardit and Vice President Riek Machar), the risk of both wars merging is high. The strategic location of the RSF-SPLM-N alliance also boosts smuggling and military operations, weakening Sudan's army and increasing regional instability. If unchecked, experts fear the two conflicts could become indistinguishable, worsening humanitarian crises in both countries.

Turkey

Turkey appears to be engaging with both sides, notably through Baykar, owned by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's son-in-law, selling $120 million worth of weapons, 6 TB2 UCAV's, 3 ground control stations, 600 warheads to the SAF in 2023, violating US and EU sanctions. Meanwhile, Arca Defense, another Turkish company, had extensive contact with RSF's procurement officer, though it denies selling weapons, adding complexity to Turkey's role. Turkey's interests include expanding military and diplomatic ties in the Horn of Africa, offering to mediate between Sudan and the UAE in December 2024.

In January 2025, the Somali government agreed to host SAF troops at Camp TURKSOM for training, as part of a Turkish-led effort to bolster military support to the SAF.

Ukraine

On 19 September 2023, CNN reported that it was "likely" that Ukrainian special forces were behind a series of drone strikes and a ground operation directed against the Wagner Group-backed RSF near Khartoum on 8 September. Kyrylo Budanov, the chief of the Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence, stated in an interview on 22 September that he could neither confirm or deny Ukraine's involvement in the conflict, but said that Ukraine "will be seeking and hunting down Russian military criminals... sooner or later".

On 6 November 2023, the ''Kyiv Post'' released drone footage of what it claimed was Ukrainian special forces attacking Wagner Group personnel in an unidentified urban area in Sudan with an explosive projectile, which was believed to have been taken about two weeks before its publication. Two months later on 30 January 2024, the ''Kyiv Post'' reported that Ukrainian special forces had launched three drone strikes targeting the Wagner Group and other Russian organisations in Sudan as well as their Sudanese partners in the preceding weeks. The ''Kyiv Post'' released a report on 5 February 2024 with a video showing the aftermath of an attack allegedly by Ukrainian special forces on a Wagner Group unit which had purportedly suffered several deaths and the capture of at least one member of the unit who was seen being interrogated on camera.

United Arab Emirates

The UAE has faced mounting accusations of providing military support to RSF, including covert arms transfers, drone supply, and logistics routed through Chad, Libya, CAR, and South Sudan. Reports by major outlets like the ''Wall Street Journal'', ''New York Times'', and ''BBC'', along with diplomatic sources and satellite evidence, suggest Emirati cargo planes delivered weapons disguised as aid, with operations coordinated through Amdjarass airport in Chad. UAE denied the accusations.

Sudan expelled Emirati diplomats, accused the UAE at the UN of aiding genocide, and submitted complaints to the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. The UAE ambassador to Sudan residence in Khartoum was also attacked on September 29, 2024. The UAE is accused of using humanitarian cover such as Red Crescent hospitals for military purposes, including drone operations and weapon bunkers near the border. Sudan claims these actions aim to maintain Emirati influence and gold interests in Sudan, backed by historical investments and ongoing port and agriculture projects.

The UAE's ties to the RSF date back to the Yemen war in 2018. Its involvement is said to include cooperation with the Wagner Group for arms deliveries and financing RSF logistics from within the Emirates. Identity documents recovered from a 2024 plane crash in Sudan included a Russian passport and an ID that linked to a UAE-based company.

The US and the UK have called on the UAE to halt support, with US lawmakers introducing multiple bills to block arms sales to Abu Dhabi. The EU and Human Rights Watch also demanded accountability. Emirati diplomatic initiatives toward Sudan continued, such as hosting a humanitarian conference and pledging $200 million aid—actions seen by Sudan as attempts by UAE to improve its image.

On 30 April 2025 UAE authorities said they had intercepted millions of rounds of ammunition at an airport in the UAE which was being illegally transferred to the SAF, which the latter denied.

Sudan opened a case at the International Court of Justice alleging that the UAE was complicit in genocide against the Masalit. The court hearings began on 10 April 2025. On 5 May, the court dismissed the case, stating it "manifestly lacks" authority.

United Kingdom

In June 2024, ''The Guardian'' reported that according to multiple sources, UK government officials "attempted to suppress criticism" of the United Arab Emirates and its alleged role in supplying arms to the RSF. Furthermore, the UK is the UN Security Council's " penholder" for Sudan. In early 2023, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office initiated secret talks between the RSF and the UK.

Sudan's Deputy Chairman of the Sovereign Council Malik Agar criticized the British government during a December 2024 meeting with the Head of the UK Office for Sudan. Agar said that "If Britain wants to end the suffering of the Sudanese people, it must communicate with the UAE to stop the logistical support it provides to the militia". Agar also denounced the UK's penholder status for Sudan on the United Nations Security Council, and demanded a change in the UK's foreign policy towards Sudan as a prerequisite for improving bilateral ties.

United States

On 20 January 2025, the Trump administration froze USAID payments for 90 days, redirecting most funds to military aid. This resulted in the closure of hundreds of soup kitchens, and increased deaths from starvation. A court ordered the freeze lifted on 13 February, but the administration cancelled nearly 10,000 aid contracts instead. The judge later demanded payments by 26 February, but Chief Justice John G. Roberts paused the order pending a Supreme Court ruling by 28 February.

Humanitarian impact

Humanitarian crisis

The humanitarian crisis following the fighting was further exacerbated by the violence occurring during a period of high temperatures, and drought starting during the fasting month of Ramadan. Civilians were unable to venture outside of their homes to obtain food and supplies for fear of getting caught in the crossfire. A doctors' group said that hospitals remained understaffed and were running low on supplies as wounded people streamed in. The World Health Organization (WHO) recorded around 26 attacks on healthcare facilities, some of which resulted in casualties among medical workers and civilians. The WHO said 80% of hospitals in conflict areas were out of service with 32 forcibly evacuated by soldiers or caught in the crossfire. This included about half of Khartoum's 130 medical facilities and all hospitals in West Darfur. Outbreaks of diseases such as measles, cholera and diarrhea were reported across the country. In August 2024 cholera was declared an epidemic in the country and , there were 5,692 cases of cholera including 185 deaths.

In April 2023, the United Nations reported that shortages of basic goods, such as food, water, medicines and fuel have become "extremely acute". The delivery of badly-needed remittances from overseas migrant workers was also halted after Western Union announced in the same month that it was closing all operations in Sudan until further notice. The World Food Programme said that more than $13 million worth of food aid destined for Sudan had been looted in the twenty days since the fighting broke out. The looting of the WFP's warehouses in El-Obeid on 1 June led to the loss of food aid meant to feed 4.4 million people. An estimated 25 million people, equivalent to more than half of Sudan's population, were said to be in need of aid in June 2023. On 25 July, Humanitarian Coordinator Clementine Nkweta-Salami said attacks on humanitarian facilities had led to more than 50 warehouses looted, 82 offices ransacked, and over 200 vehicles stolen.

In September 2023, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said that 1,200 children had died from disease outbreaks in refugee camps in White Nile State since May. In Central Darfur, the head of the Hamidiya refugee camp said at least 43 children had died in the camp since July. UNICEF also estimated that the conflict had led to the number of children being out of school in Sudan to rise from seven million prior to the fighting to 19 million in October 2023. By 2024, the war's economic costs had surpassed all prior armed conflicts since Sudanese independence in 1956 due to extensive destruction of infrastructure, particularly in urban areas such as the capital city of Khartoum.

The dramatic decrease in agricultural activity ("cereal production in 2023 was nearly halved") caused increases in food prices, and the conflict led to infrequent aid convoys. According to an army official cited by Al Jazeera, as of 29 March 2024, "70 aid trucks have been stuck in North Kordofan since October". The UN estimated that 25 million people still needed aid, with 5 million facing famine and 18 million enduring "acute food insecurity". Mobile networks being cut for nearly two months compounded the problems for those being helped by remittances from relatives abroad. According to the United Nations, both the SAF and RSF are posing obstacles to food aid because they want to prevent food from getting to areas controlled by the other.

In June 2024, Amnesty International's report, "New Weapons Fuelling the Sudan Conflict", stated that the constant flow of foreign weapons is fueling the war and breaching the Darfur arms embargo. The organization found that the recently manufactured or transferred weapons and ammunition were being imported in large quantities into Sudan from China, the UAE, Russia and Turkey. The weapons supply has impacted the war by causing massive civilian displacement and a humanitarian crisis in Sudan. Both warring sides were using Chinese-manufactured advanced drone jammers, mortars and anti-material rifles. The RSF was also reported to be using recently manufactured armoured personnel carriers from the UAE.

Famine

Nearly 25 million people, half of Sudan's population, face extreme famine, according to the World Food Program, in April 2025.

On 1 August 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Famine Review Committee (FRC) concluded that IPC Phase 5 famine conditions are prevalent and ongoing in parts of North Darfur, including the Zamzam camp south of El Fashe and that there was a high risk of similar conditions throughout internally displaced persons (IDP) camps.

In late January 2025, the new administration of US President Donald Trump froze foreign aid for 90 days with waivers supposed to be available for urgent and life-saving aid. However, the waiver process has been slow to get rolling.

By February 2025, famine had taken hold in at least five regions, with over 600,000 people at risk of starvation. The World Food Programme reported that 80% of emergency food kitchens had shut down due to U.S. aid cuts. In North Darfur, MSF and WFP suspended operations at Zamzam camp, which houses around 500,000 people. Cholera outbreaks have surged due to the collapse of Sudan's healthcare infrastructure.

Sudanese factions were accused of using famine as a weapon of war, by attacking the country's most fertile states, displacing farmers, preventing humanitarian assisting and arresting volunteers. Both parties have also imposed food and aid sieges on areas they do not control. Observers call for the establishment of safe aid distribution zones, that rely on local initiatives, as well as accountability for perpetrators.

Refugees

As of February 2025, over 12.3 million residents of Sudan have been displaced due to the fighting. The United Nations said that the conflict had produced more than 8.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), while more than 3.5 million had fled the country. This makes Sudan the largest host of IDPs globally. The International Organization for Migration estimated that 31% of IDPs originated from Khartoum state, followed by 18% from South Darfur state and 15% from North Darfur state. In November 2023, the UN said the conflict created the largest child displacement crisis in the world. 53% of people who have been internally displaced due to the conflict are children.

Of those who fled abroad, more than 160,000 were Masalit who fled to Chad to escape ethnically based attacks by the RSF and allied militias. Fighting between the SAF and the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) reportedly displaced more than 35,000 people in Blue Nile State alone, with 3,000 fleeing to Ethiopia, while more than 83,000 were displaced in South Kordofan. As of August, more than 400,000 people had fled to Chad, making it the largest single destination of refugees from the conflict, while others fled to other neighboring countries such as the Central African Republic, Egypt, and South Sudan.

Criticism was levelled at diplomatic missions operating in Sudan for their slow response in helping Sudanese visa applicants whose passports were left behind in embassies following their closure during evacuation efforts, preventing them from leaving the country.

The UN estimated that economic activity in Sudan fell by more than a third during the first three weeks of the conflict. In July, Sudanese economists estimated the total amount of damage brought by the conflict at $9 billion, or an average of $100 million per day, while the value of property and goods looted was estimated at another $40 billion, with the most affected areas being Khartoum and South Darfur. The exchange rate of the US dollar against the Sudanese pound in the black market rose to SDG730 in September, while it reached SDG625 at the official rate. This later reached SDG1250 in February 2024. The formal economy was described as being in a "near standstill". Gold production was also reduced to just 2 tons from the previous year's output of 18 tons. Sudanese minister for minerals Mohamed Bashir Abu Nammu accused the RSF of looting around 15 tons of silver and 1,273 kilograms of gold from the Sudan Gold Refinery at the start of the conflict.

In February 2024, finance minister Gibril Ibrahim said that the Sudanese economy had contracted by 40 per cent in 2023 due to the fighting, with an additional decline of 28 per cent expected in 2024. He added that state revenues had also decreased by 80 per cent. Sudanese port authorities estimated that international trade had fallen by 23 per cent in 2023. The Sudanese finance ministry was unable to set a national budget for 2023 or 2024 and stopped issuing quarterly reports. It also raised the exchange rate for imports and exports from SDG650 to SDG950. The fighting also rendered more than 60 per cent of Sudan's agricultural land out of service, according to Fikra for Studies and Development.

In May 2024, ''The Wall Street Journal'' reported that both the RSF and SAF were using revenue from the sale of gum arabic, which is primarily grown in Sudan, to finance their operations.

The suspension of USAID funding in 2025 significantly reduced cash assistance, which grassroots emergency response groups relied on to sustain food kitchens. The crisis also impacted neighboring countries, with over two million Sudanese refugees facing deteriorating conditions.

International reactions

A senior official from the U.N. World Food Programme warned in April 2025 that Sudan was facing the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with nearly 25 million people experiencing extreme hunger, over 12 million displaced, and at least 20,000 confirmed dead. It is considered to be under-reported in mainstream media. Observers call for an increase of humanitarian aid, the enforcement of international law to protect humanitarian workers, the establishment of clear pathways for refugees to seek safety, as well as halting the delivery of weapons to the RSF by the United Arab Emirates.

Disinformation

Throughout the Sudan conflict, both the SAF and RSF waged aggressive disinformation campaigns, using social media to manipulate public opinion, spread false narratives, and bolster their own images. The RSF ran digital propaganda teams from Khartoum and Dubai, using verified social media accounts to distribute misleading content. The SAF used Twitter for morale-boosting and to counter RSF claims, though some of its posts were proven false.

Widespread disinformation included recycled footage from video games, past conflicts like Ukraine and Libya, and even archaeological props misrepresented as war crimes. For instance, SAF posted a video allegedly showing recent air operations, which was actually from the video game Arma 3. The SAF also circulated altered images, including a fabricated photo of Hemedti hospitalized in Nairobi.

The RSF shared footage of a SAF and Egyptian Air Force warplane reportedly shot down by the RSF found to be that of an Su-25 fighter jet that crashed in Mali, and the other of a Libyan aircraft taken outside Sudan in 2020.

The RSF also sent bulletins to UK politicians with the help of Dubai-based Capital Tap Holdings, aiming to counter what it called "disproportionate" disinformation. Facebook removed RSF pages in August 2024, citing policy violations. The RSF blamed SAF for instigating the ban and said it was negotiating with Meta to restore its accounts.

The conflict's information space has been further destabilized by false claims against organizations like the Sudanese Doctors Syndicate and by deepfake-like imagery. Disinformation experts, including Kyle Walter of Logically, warned that generative AI may be fueling the sophistication of fake content, undermining trust in all sources of information.

Sanctions

United States

In response to ceasefire violations and human rights abuses in Sudan, U.S. President Joe Biden issued an executive order on 4 May 2023 authorizing sanctions against actors destabilizing the country. The first sanctions followed in June, targeting companies linked to both the SAF and RSF, along with visa restrictions on unnamed individuals.

Subsequent rounds of sanctions included RSF leaders Abdul Rahim Dagalo and Abdel Rahman Jumma (accused of killing West Darfur's governor), Islamist leader Ali Karti, firms in Sudan and Russia, and former Bashir regime officials involved in RSF support or coup plots. In May 2024, more RSF commanders were sanctioned for violence in North and Central Darfur.

Facing growing pressure from U.S. lawmakers, the Biden administration considered declaring RSF atrocities as genocide and tightening sanctions—especially due to the UAE's alleged role in smuggling Sudanese gold to fund the RSF. On 7 January 2025, the U.S. said it had determined that the RSF and allied militias committed genocide in Sudan and imposed sanctions on RSF leader Hemedti and affiliated entities to hold them accountable for systematic atrocities and reaffirmed support for Sudanese civil society and a peaceful, democratic future. However, critics said the measures came too late and would have limited impact. One affiliated entity that received sanctions was a UAE LLC; according to Watan, in response, the UAE began lobbying in Washington to avoid direct sanctions. The UAE launched an investigation into the entities and reported that none of these seven companies hold a valid commercial license in the UAE or conduct any business activities within the country.

On 22 May 2025, the US announced new sanctions on Sudan over the SAF's use of chemical weapons against the RSF.

Other countries

On 12 July 2023, the United Kingdom announced sanctions on firms linked to the SAF and the RSF for providing funds and weapons in the conflict. On 15 April 2024, Canada imposed sanctions on two individuals and four entities linked to the SAF and the RSF. On 23 June 2024, the European Union imposed sanctions on six entities for manufacturing and procuring weapons for the SAF and the RSF.

On 6 March 2025, Canada imposed sanctions on al-Burhan and Hemedti, due to "an unwillingness on the part of the leaders to negotiate an end to the war".

In popular culture

* ''The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars'', a 2003 book by Douglas H. Johnson. The book provides insights into the historical roots of the conflict and the ongoing struggles in South Sudan, including the reasons for the continued fighting.
* ''Sudan's Unfinished Democracy: The Promise and Betrayal of a People's Revolution'', a 2022 book by Willow Berridge, Justin Lynch, Raga Makawi, and Alex de Waal. It examines the 2019 uprising that ousted long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir, the subsequent fragile regime, and the events leading to the 2021 military coup and the current conflict.
* '' Sudan, Remember Us'', a 2024 documentary film directed by Hind Meddeb
* ''Khartoum'', a 2025 documentary film by several Sudanese filmmakers

See also

*Sudanese Civil War, an index of three major civil wars that occurred in Sudan's history, as well as other separate conflicts in Sudan.
*New Sudan
*Janjaweed (Janjaweed Coalition)
*Democracy in Africa
*Human rights in Sudan
*War in Darfur
*Darfur genocide
*2021 Sudan coup d'état
* Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2023)
* Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2024)
* Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2025)
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*List of civil wars
*List of conflicts in Africa
* List of ethnic cleansing campaigns
* List of genocides
*List of ongoing armed conflicts
* List of wars: 2003–present
* Sudanese National Forces Coordination

References

External links

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2020s conflicts
2020s in Sudan
2023
Coup-based civil wars
War
2023
Wars involving Ukraine