Qatar Diplomatic Crisis

The Qatar diplomatic crisis was a diplomatic incident in the Middle East that began on 5 June 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt severed diplomatic relations with Qatar and banned Qatar-registered planes and ships from utilising their airspace and sea routes, along with Saudi Arabia blocking Qatar’s only land crossing. The crisis ended in January 2021 following a resolution between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

The Saudi-led coalition cited Qatar's alleged support for terrorism as the main reason for their actions, alleging that Qatar had violated a 2014 agreement with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which Qatar is a member. Saudi Arabia and other countries have criticized Al Jazeera and Qatar's relations with Iran. Qatar acknowledged that it had provided assistance to some Islamist groups (such as the Muslim Brotherhood), but denied aiding militant groups linked to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Qatar also claimed that it had assisted the United States in the War on Terror and the ongoing military intervention against ISIL.

One day into the crisis, the Saudi-led coalition was joined by Jordan, and were further supported thereafter by the Maldives, Mauritania, Senegal, Djibouti, the Comoros, and the Tobruk-based government in Libya in severing relations with Qatar. The demands against Qatar included reducing diplomatic relations with Iran, stopping military coordination with Turkey, and closing ''Al Jazeera''; Qatar refused to agree to any of the Saudi-led coalition's demands. Initial supply disruptions were minimised by additional imports from Iran, with which Qatar restored full diplomatic relations in August 2017, and Turkey.

On 4 January 2021, Qatar and Saudi Arabia agreed to a resolution of the crisis brokered by Kuwait and the United States, which stated that Saudi Arabia will reopen its border with Qatar and begin the process for reconciliation. An agreement and final communique signed on 5 January 2021 following a GCC summit at Al-'Ula marks the resolution of the crisis. According to ''Foreign Policy'', the publication views the crisis as a failure for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, because Qatar generated closer ties to Iran and Turkey, and became economically and militarily stronger and more autonomous.

Background

Since he took power in 1995 as Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani believed Qatar could find security only by transforming itself from a Saudi appendage to a rival of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador to Doha from 2002 to 2008 to try to pressure Qatar to curb its individualistic tendencies. This approach broadly failed. The Arab Spring left a power vacuum which both Saudi Arabia and Qatar sought to fill, with Qatar being supportive of the revolutionary wave and Saudi Arabia opposing it; since both states are allies of the United States, they avoid direct conflict with one another. Qatar has had differences with other Arab governments on a number of issues: it broadcasts Al Jazeera; it is accused of maintaining good relations with Iran; and it has supported the Muslim Brotherhood in the past. Qatar has been accused of sponsoring terrorism. Some countries have faulted Qatar for funding rebel groups in Syria, including al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, the al-Nusra Front, although Saudi Arabia has done the same. Qatar has allowed the Afghan Taliban to set up a political office inside the country. Qatar is a close ally of the United States, hosting the largest American base in the Middle East, Al Udeid Air Base.

In March 2014, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar. This severing of relations was the first of its kind since the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The crisis affected the GCC negatively at first – raising questions among member states, revealing shifts in their political agendas, and changing the balance of power in the region to some extent.

The exact reasons for the break in diplomatic relations in 2017 are unclear, but contemporary news coverage primarily attributed this to several events in April and May 2017:

April 2017 hostage negotiations

In April 2017, Qatar was involved in a deal with both Sunni and Shi'ite militants in Iraq and Syria. The deal had two goals. The immediate goal was to secure the return of 26 Qatari hostages (including Qatari royals) who had been kidnapped by Shi'ite militants while falcon hunting in southern Iraq and kept in captivity for more than 16 months. The second goal was to get both Sunni and Shi'ite militants in Syria to allow humanitarian aid to pass through and allow the safe evacuation of civilians. According to the ''New York Times'', this deal allowed the evacuation of at least 2,000 civilians from the Syrian village of Madaya alone. What outraged Saudi Arabia and the UAE was the amount of money Qatar paid to secure the deal. According to the ''Financial Times'', Qatar paid $700 million to multiple Iranian-backed Shi'a militias in Iraq, $120–140 million to Tahrir al-Sham, and $80 million to Ahrar al-Sham.

Riyadh Summit 2017

As part of the Riyadh Summit in late May 2017, many world leaders, including US President Donald Trump visited the region. Trump gave strong support for Saudi Arabia's efforts in fighting against states and groups allied with Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, leading to an arms deal between the countries. The ''Business Insider'' reported that "Elliott Broidy a top fundraiser for President Donald Trump; and George Nader, Broidy's business partner ... pushed for anti-Qatar policies at the highest levels of government, and expected large consulting contracts from Saudi Arabia and the UAE." Trump's support may have induced other Sunni states to fall in line with Saudi Arabia to take a stance against Qatar. Trump's public support for Saudi Arabia, according to ''The New York Times'', emboldened the kingdom and sent a chill through other Gulf states, including Oman and Kuwait, that fear that any country that defies the Saudis or the United Arab Emirates could face ostracism as Qatar had. The Saudi-led move was at once an opportunity for the GCC partners and Egypt to punish their adversaries in Doha, please their allies in Washington, and remove attention from their own shortcomings and challenges.

Hacking operations against Qatar

According to Qatar-based Al Jazeera and the American FBI, the Qatar News Agency speculated that changes to Al Jazeera would be a necessary part of any peaceful resolution. In June, Qatar-based beIN Sports (a spin-off from Al Jazeera) was also blocked by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The UAE lifted this ban the following month, but the channels remained banned in Saudi Arabia, and the channels' programming was illegally rebranded and redistributed by a large-scale pirate television operation known as beoutQ. beoutQ operated out of Saudi Arabia using the Arabsat satellites, and was promoted by Saudi politicians.

In 2018, the Saudi government also began to target beIN Sports for allegedly holding monopoly in sports broadcasting, including revoking its broadcast licenses based on accusations of anti-competitive behaviour, and pulling its rights to the Asian Football Confederation in the Kingdom in 2019. beIN Sports considered the moves to be politically motivated, while it was feared that the service was normalising the practice of piracy.

Finances

At the start of the crisis, Standard & Poor's downgraded Qatar's debt by one notch from AA to AA-. Qatar's stock market dropped 7.3% on the first day of the crisis, and reached a 9.7% drop by 8 June 2017. Additionally, in the first months following the crisis the government of Qatar injected $38.5 billion, which was equivalent to 23% of the country's GDP, to support the country's economy and its banking sector.

As per S&P Global Ratings, banks in Qatar are strong enough to survive a withdrawal of all Gulf country deposits.

Despite the ongoing diplomatic blockade led by Saudi Arabia, international banks like HSBC, Goldman Sachs and others sought to repair their ties with Qatar by building stronger financial and business relations. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates informally warned the bankers not to have close relations with Doha or else there would be consequences.

On 20 January 2019, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani attended the opening session of the Arab Economic Summit in Beirut, Lebanon. This helped Qatar increase its influence and soft power in the region. Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani and Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz were the only two Arab leaders to attend the summit. Since Sheikh Tamim was the only GCC leader to attend, he received praise from the President of Lebanon himself, Michel Aoun. Hilal Khashan, a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut, said "He became the star of the summit."

Energy

Qatar is a global leader in liquefied natural gas production. Despite the severing of ties, Qatari natural gas continues to flow to the UAE and Oman through Abu Dhabi based Dolphin Energy's pipeline. The pipeline meets about 30–40 percent of UAE's energy needs. Shipping constraints from the crisis have also rerouted multiple shipments of oil and gas to and from the Gulf, which has caused reverberations in many local energy markets.
On 8 June 2017, gas futures spiked nearly 4 percent in the United Kingdom, which had nearly a third of all its imported gas arriving from Qatar. A secondary effect of the dispute has been on worldwide supplies of helium, which is often extracted from natural gas. Qatar is the world's second largest supplier of helium (the US ranks first).

In March 2019, Qatar lodged a complaint to International Atomic Energy Agency regarding the United Arab Emirates Barakah nuclear power plant, stating that it poses a serious threat to regional stability and the environment. The UAE denied that there are safety issues with the plant, which is being built by Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) with operation by French utility Électricité de France, and stated “The United Arab Emirates ... adheres to its commitment to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation.”

23rd and 24th Gulf Cup

The 23rd Arabian Gulf Cup was scheduled to be hosted in Qatar. In November 2017, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain pulled out of the Gulf Cup due to the Qatar boycott. On 7 December 2017, it was announced that Kuwait will host the football tournament after Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain all withdrew because of the diplomatic crisis.

Qatar hosted the 24th Arabian Gulf Cup in 2019. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates announced their participation in the tournament on 12 November (two weeks before the event kicked off), reversing an attempted second boycott of the event.

Qatari military relations

On 7 June 2017, the Turkish parliament passed, with 240 votes in favour and 98 against, a legislative act first drafted in May allowing Turkish troops to be deployed to a Turkish military base in Qatar. During a speech on 13 June 2017, the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, condemned the boycott of Qatar as "inhumane and against Islamic values" and stated that "victimising Qatar through smear campaigns serves no purpose". On 23 June 2017, Turkey rejected demands to shut down its military base in Qatar.

Qatar hosts about 10,000 US troops at Al Udeid Air Base, which houses the forward operating base of United States Central Command that is strategically located for US airstrikes in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. A Pentagon spokesperson claimed the diplomatic crisis would not affect the US military missions in Qatar.

On 30 January 2018 an inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue meeting was held, co-chaired by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defence Affairs Khalid al-Attiyah and Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani. The meeting expressed the need for an immediate resolution of the crisis which respects Qatar's sovereignty. In a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, the United States expressed its readiness to deter and quell any external threat to Qatar's territorial integrity. Qatar offered to help fund the expansion of facilities at US bases in Qatar.

On 25 March 2018, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) officially quashed rumours that the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey and the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar will be closed despite the ongoing regional conflict.

In January 2018, Qatar's ambassador communicated with Russia with the intent to purchase S-400 surface-to-air missiles. Both countries signed an agreement on military and technical cooperation in 2017. In May 2018, the French daily newspaper ''Le Monde'' reported that King Salman of Saudi Arabia would take military action if Qatar installed the Russian air defence system. However, a senior Russian official remarked the system would still be delivered even against the will of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were themselves approaching Russia to improve economic and military ties in 2017, but bargaining relating to the arms deal was hindered by concerns the United States and Saudi Arabia had with regard to the Russian position towards Iran's military and strategic involvement in the Middle East.

In June 2018, Qatar expressed its wish to join NATO. However, NATO declined Qatar's membership proposal, stating that only additional European countries could join according to Article 10 of NATO's founding treaty. Qatar and NATO have previously signed a security agreement together in January 2018.

In January 2022, the United States President Joe Biden nominated Qatar as a "Major Non-NATO Ally" (MNNA). The elevation to MNNA status placed Qatar into the United States’ closest allies with growing responsibility as a strong and enduring partner in countering violent extremism, removing terrorism, and deterring external aggressors.

Arab League Council 2017

During the 148th Session of the Arab League Council at the level of Foreign Ministers which was held in Cairo, Qatar’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sultan Al Muraikhi, got into a heated argument with Saudi delegate Ahmad Al Qattan. The argument was caused after Al Muraikhi gave a short speech about how Qatar had to go back to supporting Iran after it recalled the Qatari ambassador to Iran to support Saudi Arabia in 2016.

2019 Asian Cup

During the semi-final match between the Qatar national football team and the tournament hosts the United Arab Emirates, the UAE supporters threw shoes and bottles onto the pitch. This conduct was preceded by booing the Qatari national anthem. Qatar won 4–0, paving the way to their first Asian Cup final and eventual title.

A British-Sudanese football fan was allegedly beaten by fans for wearing a Qatar football shirt to a match in which Qatar was playing and then, after investigation by the UAE police, arrested for wasting police time and making false statements of being assaulted. According to ''The Guardian'', the fan was arrested for wearing a Qatar football shirt. The claim was denied by UAE authorities who stated the fan was arrested for wasting police time and making false assault claims to the police. The UAE police said that the fan had admitted to making false statements. A UAE official in London stated "He was categorically not arrested for wearing a Qatar football shirt. This is instead an instance of a person seeking media attention and wasting police time." According to photos shown by ''The National'', fans were seen waving the Qatari flag and wearing Qatari football shirts without any instances of arrests in the final. According to ''The New York Times'', the UAE accuses Qatar of fielding ineligible players due to them being not originally Qatari. The players accused were the competitions' top scorer Almoez Ali, a Sudan born striker, as well as Bassam Al-Rawi, an Iraq born defender.

2022 FIFA World Cup

Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Mauritania, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt in a letter asked FIFA to replace Qatar as 2022 FIFA World Cup host, calling the country as a "base of terrorism". In reaction to the Qatar diplomatic crisis over the alleged support of terrorism by the Qatari Government, the president of the German Football Association, Reinhard Grindel stated in June 2017, that "the football associations of the world should conclude that major tournaments cannot be held in countries which actively support terrorism", and that the German Football Association will talk with UEFA and the German Government in order to evaluate whether to boycott the tournament in Qatar in 2022. Hassan Al Thawadi, general secretary of Qatar’s FIFA World Cup organizing committee, stated that "Qatar does not support terrorism. Qatar is at the forefront of the fight against terrorism on the ground. It’s one of the main partners in the coalition fighting ISIS (the Islamic State group)." Thawadi said: "Our projects are going ahead as scheduled. This (blockade) is no risk in relation to the hosting of the World Cup."

In October 2017, Lieutenant General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, deputy chief of Dubai Police, wrote about the Qatar diplomatic crisis on Twitter in Arabic; "If the World Cup leaves Qatar, Qatar’s crisis will be over … because the crisis is created to get away from it". According to observers, the message appeared to imply that the blockade was enacted due to Qatar hosting the world's biggest football event. In reaction to media coverage of his tweet, Dhahi Khalfan tweeted; "I said Qatar is faking a crisis and claims it’s besieged so it could get away from the burdens of building expensive sports facilities for the World Cup". UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash said the official, Dhahi Khalfan, had been misunderstood in media coverage. Gargash stated that Qatar's hosting of World Cup 2022 "should include a repudiation of policies supporting extremism & terrorism."

Hassan al-Thawadi, secretary general of the Qatar World Cup supreme committee, stated that projects were progressing as scheduled for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Qatar's only land border and air and sea routes have been cut off by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). As the blockade came into play, World Cup organizers were asked to investigate a "Plan B", FIFA however has confidence in not exploring a "Plan B" for an alternate 2022 host. According to Thawadi, all these logistical obstacles are being overcome and building progress is continuing with only minimal cost increases, in preparation for the first World Cup in the Middle East.

Resolution

An article published by the ''Financial Times'' stated that, according to people briefed on the matter, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia moved towards ending the 2017 blockade against the State of Qatar after the victory of President-elect Joe Biden in 2020. An advisor to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, was quoted as calling the shift in the Kingdom’s policy towards Qatar "a gift for Biden" signaling that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had shown willingness "to take steps" towards resolving differences with Qatar. The prince is said to have been intimidated by the incoming administration, as the former administration had reportedly supported the Riyadh government in times of crisis such as casualties in the Yemen war, detention of activists, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, etc. On the other hand, UAE’s ambassador to the US, Yousef al-Otaiba, was quoted as stating that ending the dispute was not a priority, referring to the ongoing differences with the blockaded nation.

On 4 January 2021, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia's neighbour and a fellow GCC member, along with the United States, jointly brokered a deal resolving the crisis. Under the deal, Saudi Arabia will end its blockade of its Gulf neighbour and reopen its border.

On 5 January 2021, Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani arrived in Saudi Arabia for a GCC summit in the old town of Al-'Ula. Later, the leaders signed the Al-'Ula statement. Before the signing, Bin Salman said that Kuwait and the United States support had resulted in "the Al-'Ula declaration agreement that will be signed at this blessed summit, in which the Gulf, Arab and Islamic solidarity and stability were emphasized." In addition to the statement, a final communique was signed but their contents are not yet known and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud said it and its allies agreed to restore full ties with Doha, including resumption of flights. Qatar has apparently not fulfilled any of the 13 demands, analysts saying that the Gulf states agreed instead to a joint security declaration.

The United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, welcomed the end of the crisis and the opening of the airspace, land, and sea borders between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, and Qatar. In a statement issued on 5 January 2021, he expressed hope that countries concerned will continue to be positive, to strengthen their relations. He also recognized the contributions of the late Emir of Kuwait and late Sultan of Oman, who worked tirelessly towards resolving the Gulf rift. One Middle East policy analyst believed that the secret pact among the Gulf leaders is likely to have been multi-level, which includes several bilateral agreements between individual states rather than a unitary document.

three sovereign governments had not restored diplomatic ties with Qatar.

See also

* 2017 Lebanon–Saudi Arabia dispute
* Arab Cold War
* Axis of Resistance
* International Maritime Security Construct
* International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism
* Iran–Israel proxy conflict
* Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict
* Middle Eastern Cold War (disambiguation)
* OPEC
* Qatar–Saudi Arabia diplomatic conflict
* Russia–Syria–Iran–Iraq coalition
* Shia–Sunni relations
*

References

{{DEFAULTSORT:Qatar diplomatic crisis
2010s conflicts
2020s conflicts
Conflicts in 2017
Conflicts in 2018
Conflicts in 2019
Conflicts in 2020
Conflicts in 2021
2010s in Qatar
2020s in Qatar
2017 in Qatar
2018 in Qatar
2019 in Qatar
2020 in Qatar
2021 in Qatar
June 2017 events in Asia
2017 in international relations
2018 in international relations
2019 in international relations
2020 in international relations
2021 in international relations
Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict
Arab Winter
Shia–Sunni sectarian violence
Geopolitical rivalry
Gulf Cooperation Council
Politics of Qatar
Politics of the Arab world
Politics of the Middle East
Bahrain–Iran relations
Bahrain–Qatar relations
Bahrain–Turkey relations
Chad–Iran relations
Chad–Qatar relations
Chad–Turkey relations
Comoros–Iran relations
Comoros–Qatar relations
Comoros–Turkey relations
Djibouti–Iran relations
Djibouti–Qatar relations
Djibouti–Turkey relations
Egypt–Iran relations
Egypt–Qatar relations
Egypt–Turkey relations
Iran–Jordan relations
Iran–Maldives relations
Iran–Mauritania relations
Iran–Niger relations
Iran–United Arab Emirates relations
Iran–Saudi Arabia relations
Iran–Senegal relations
Iran–Qatar relations
Iran–Turkey relations
Iran–Yemen relations
Gabon–Iran relations
Gabon–Qatar relations
Gabon–Turkey relations
Jordan–Qatar relations
Jordan–Turkey relations
Maldives–Qatar relations
Maldives–Turkey relations
Mauritania–Qatar relations
Mauritania–Turkey relations
Niger–Qatar relations
Niger–Turkey relations
Qatar–Saudi Arabia relations
Qatar–Senegal relations
Qatar–United Arab Emirates relations
Qatar–Turkey relations
Qatar–Yemen relations
Saudi Arabia–Turkey relations
Senegal–Turkey relations
Turkey–United Arab Emirates relations
Turkey–Yemen relations
Censorship in the United Arab Emirates
Censorship in Saudi Arabia
Censorship in Bahrain
Censorship in Egypt