Life
Early years
Childhood
Tübingen (1788–1793)
At the age of eighteen, Hegel entered theBern (1793–1796) and Frankfurt (1797–1801)
Having received his theological certificate ('' Konsistorialexamen'') from the Tübingen Seminary, Hegel became ''Hofmeister'' (house tutor) to an aristocratic family inCareer years
Jena, Bamberg and Nuremberg (1801–1816)
In 1801, Hegel came toI saw the Emperor—this world-soul 'Weltseele''.html"_;"title="Weltseele.html"_;"title="'Weltseele">'Weltseele''">Weltseele.html"_;"title="'Weltseele">'Weltseele''riding_out_of_the_city_on_reconnaissance._It_is_indeed_a_wonderful_sensation_to_see_such_an_individual,_who,_concentrated_here_at_a_single_point,_astride_a_horse,_reaches_out_over_the_world_and_masters_it.Pinkard_(2000)_notes_that_Hegel's_comment_to_Niethammer_"is_all_the_more_striking_since_he_had_already_composed_the_crucial_section_of_the_''Phenomenology''_in_which_he_remarked_that_the_French_Revolution.html" "title="Weltseele">'Weltseele''.html" ;"title="Weltseele.html" ;"title="'Weltseele">'Weltseele''">Weltseele.html" ;"title="'Weltseele">'Weltseele''riding out of the city on reconnaissance. It is indeed a wonderful sensation to see such an individual, who, concentrated here at a single point, astride a horse, reaches out over the world and masters it. Pinkard (2000) notes that Hegel's comment to Niethammer "is all the more striking since he had already composed the crucial section of the ''Phenomenology'' in which he remarked that the French Revolution">Revolution In political science Political science is the scientific study of politics Politics (from , ) is the set of activities that are associated with making decisions in groups, or other forms of power relations between individuals, suc ...
Heidelberg and Berlin (1816–1831)
Having received offers of a post from the Universities ofPhilosophical work
Logic and metaphysics
During the era ofIndeed, "logic" in the field of nineteenth-century continental philosophy takes on a range of meanings from "metaphysics" to "theory of science," from "critical epistemology" to "first philosophy." And debates about the nature of logic were intertwined with competition to inherit the mantle of Kant and with it the future direction of German philosophy. Each new logic book staked a new claim in a century-long expansionist turf war among philosophical trends.With the possible exception of the study of inference, what was called "logic" in nineteenth-century Europe bears little resemblance to what logicians study today. Logic, especially the doctrine of the concept, was metaphysics. It was the search for a fundamental ontological structure within the relations of the most basic predicates (quantity, time, place etc.), a practice that goes back to the Pythagorean Table of Opposites, Plato's ''Sophist (dialogue), Sophist'', Aristotle's ''Categories (Aristotle), Categories''. This research program took on new meaning with the 1781 publication of Kant's ''Critique of Pure Reason''. Kant derived his own Category (Kant), table of categories––what he called the twelve pure, ancestral concepts of the understanding that structure all experience irrespective of content––from a standard Term logic, term-logical table of judgments, noting also that
...the true ancestral concepts...also have their equally pure derivative concepts, which could by no means be passed over in a complete system of transcendental philosophy, but with the mere mention of which I can be satisfied in a merely critical essay.Hegel's ''Science of Logic'' is a notable contribution to the philosophical study of category metaphysics in its post-Kantian form. Hegel takes up the project that Kant suggested is necessary but did not complete, namely "to take note of and, as far as possible, completely catalog" the derivative concepts of the pure understanding and "completely illustrate its family tree." The affinity between Hegel and Kant's logics (Speculative reason, speculative and Transcendental idealism, transcendental respectively) is reflected in their vocabulary. Kant spoke of ''Entstehen'' (coming-to-be) and ''Vergehen'' (ceasing-to-be), the same two terms that Hegel used to refer to the two compositional elements of ''Werden'' (becoming). And although the ''Logic''
...profounder insight into the antinomial, or more truly into the dialectical nature of reason demonstrates ''any'' Concept [''Begriff''] whatsoever to be a unity of opposed elements [''Momente''] to which, therefore, the form of antinomial assertions could be given.In other words, every concept thus contains a contradiction that is itself the determination of another concept. All concepts are thus interrelated through a process of concretization (the introduction of new terms) that Hegel calls self-determination or freedom. The fully concrete system of logic (what Hegel calls the "diamond net" of concepts) thus grows out of a single, abstract seed concept––just as a tree grows from an actual seed. For this reason, Hegel's ''Logic'' begins with "Being, pure Being"––which is the abstract idea of God ("and ''God'' has the absolutely undisputed right that the beginning be made with him")––from which issue the further determinations of becoming, determinate being, something, infinity, and so on. This process culminates in what Hegel calls the Absolute Idea, which is "being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and is all truth" and outside of which there is only "error, confusion, opinion, endeavor, caprice and transitoriness." This process of self-concretization has been the subject of much philosophical controversy and interest. Scholars such as Clark Butler hold that a good portion of the ''Logic'' is formalizable, proceeding deductively via Proof by contradiction, indirect proof. Others, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, theorize that Hegel's course in the ''Logic'' is determined primarily by the associations of ordinary words in the German language. Both of these interpretations are in a way equally true, because form and content are unified in logic according to Hegel. Hegel also understood the course of his logic to be reflected in history:
...different stages of the logical Idea assume the shape of successive systems, each based on a particular definition of the Absolute. As the logical Idea is seen to unfold itself in a process from the abstract to the concrete, so in the history of philosophy the earliest systems are the most abstract, and thus at the same time the poorest...The concepts developed in the ''Science of'' ''Logic'' are thus also to be found in Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy. For example: Parmenides took pure being to be the absolute; Gorgias replaced it with pure nothing; Heraclitus replaced both being and nothing with becoming (which is a unity of two contraries: coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be). Hegel understood the history of philosophy to be a transhistorical Socratic method, socratic argument concerning the identity of Absolute (philosophy), the Absolute. That history should resemble this dialectic indicated to Hegel that history is something ''rational''.
Things-in-themselves
For both Hegel and Kant, "we arrive at the concept of the thing in itself by removing, or abstracting from, everything in our experiences of objects of which we can become conscious."If we abstract 'Ding' [''thing''] from 'Ding an sich' [''thing in itself''], we get one of Hegel's standard phrases: 'an sich.' [''in itself'']....A child, in Hegel's example, is thus 'in itself' the adult it will become: to know what a 'child' is means to know that it is, in some respects, a vacancy which will only gain content after it has grown out of childhood.The "thing as it is in itself" is indeed knowable: it is the indeterminate, "futural" aspect of the thing we experience—it is what we will come to know. In other words, although the thing-in-itself is at any given moment thoroughly unknown, it nevertheless remains that part of the thing about which it is possible to learn more. At the same time, this should not be construed as a merely epistemological claim (having to do only with our understanding of the thing); the in-itself may be equally taken in the ''ontological'' sense, namely as the undeveloped (for example, the seed is the in-itself of the plant).
Life
Karen Ng writes that "there is a central, recurring rhetorical device that Hegel returns to again and again throughout his philosophical system: that of describing the activity of reason and thought in terms of the dynamic activity and development of organic life." Hegel went so far as to include the concept of life as a category in his ''Science of'' ''Logic'', likely inspired by Aristotle's emphasis on teleology, as well as Kant's treatment of ''Naturzweck'' (natural purposiveness) in the ''Critique of Judgment''. Within this work, the category of life is conceived to be the absolute idea in the form of the subjective concept; an illustrative contrast may be seen in contrasting this with how the category of cognition is thought as being the absolute idea in the form of the judgement. The speculative identity of mind and nature suggests that reason and history progress in the direction of the Absolute (philosophy), Absolute by traversing various stages of relative immaturity, just like a sapling or a child, overcoming necessary setbacks and obstacles along the way (see Hegel#Progress, Progress below). The structure of Hegel's ''Logic'' appears to exhibit self-similarity, with sub-sections, in their treatment of more specific subject matter, resembling the treatment of the whole. Hegel's concept of ''Aufheben, Aufhebung'', by which parts are preserved and repurposed within the whole, anticipates the concept of emergence in contemporary systems theory and evolutionary biology. Hegel's system is often presented in the form of a Sierpiński triangle due to his tendency to Trichotomy (philosophy), group concepts by triads. However, Hegel himself describes the system as a "circle of circles:"...the science presents itself as a circle that winds around itself, where the mediation winds the end back to the beginning which is the simple ground; the circle is thus a circle of circles, for each single member ensouled by the method is reflected into itself so that, in returning to the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a new member.
Freedom
Hegel's thinking can be understood as a constructive development within the broad tradition that includes Schelling, Fichte, Aristotle, andProgress
The mystical writings of Jakob Böhme had a strong effect on Hegel. Böhme had written that the Fall of Man was a necessary stage in the evolution of the universe. This evolution was the result of God's desire for complete self-awareness. Hegel was fascinated by the works of Kant, Rousseau andCivil society
Hegel distinguished between civil society and state in his ''Elements of the Philosophy of Right''. In this work, civil society (Hegel used the term "''bürgerliche Gesellschaft''" though it is now referred to as ''Zivilgesellschaft'' in German to emphasize a more inclusive community) was a stage in the dialectical, dialectical relationship between Hegel's perceived opposites, the macro-community of the State (polity), state and the micro-community of the family. Broadly speaking, the term was split, like Hegel's followers, to the political left and political right. On the left, it became the foundation for Karl Marx's civil society as an base and superstructure, economic base; to the right, it became a description for all non-state (and the state is the peak of the objective spirit) aspects of society, including culture, society and politics. This liberal distinction between political society and civil society was used by Alexis de Tocqueville. In fact, Hegel's distinctions as to what he meant by civil society are often unclear. While it appears that he felt that a civil society, such as the one in which he lived, was an inevitable step in the dialectic, he allowed for the crushing of other "lesser," not fully realized civil societies as they were not fully conscious of their lack of progress. It was perfectly legitimate in Hegel's eyes for a conqueror, such as Napoleon, to come and destroy that which was not fully realized.State
Hegel's State is the final culmination of the embodiment of freedom or right (''Rechte'') in the ''Elements of the Philosophy of Right.'' The State subsumes family and civil society and fulfills them. All three together are called "ethical life" (''Sittlichkeit''). The State involves three "wikt:moment#Noun, moments". In a Hegelian State, citizens both know their place and choose their place. They both know their obligations and choose to fulfill them. An individual's "supreme duty is to be a member of the state" (''Elements of the Philosophy of Right'', section 258). The individual has "substantial freedom in the state". The State is "objective spirit" so "it is only through being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life" (section 258). Every member loves the State with genuine patriotism, but has transcended simple "team spirit" by reflectively endorsing their citizenship.Heraclitus
According to Hegel, "Heraclitus is the one who first declared the nature of the infinite and first grasped nature as in itself infinite, that is, its essence as process. The origin of philosophy is to be dated from Heraclitus. His is the persistent Idea that is the same in all philosophers up to the present day, as it was the Idea of Plato and Aristotle". For Hegel, Heraclitus's great achievements were to have understood the nature of the infinite, which for Hegel includes understanding the inherent contradictoriness and negativity of reality; and to have grasped that reality is becoming or process and that "being" and "nothingness" are empty abstractions. According to Hegel, Heraclitus's "obscurity" comes from his being a true (in Hegel's terms "speculative") philosopher who grasped the ultimate philosophical truth and therefore expressed himself in a way that goes beyond the abstract and limited nature of common sense and is difficult to grasp by those who operate within common sense. Hegel asserted that, in Heraclitus, he had an antecedent for his logic: "[...] there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my logic". Hegel cites a number of fragments of Heraclitus in his ''Lectures on the History of Philosophy''. One to which he attributes great significance is the fragment he translates as "Being is not more than Non-being", which he interprets to mean the following:''Sein und Nichts sei dasselbe''Heraclitus did not form any abstract nouns from his ordinary use of "to be" and "to become" and seemed to oppose any identity A to any other identity B, C and so on, which is not-A. However, Hegel interprets not-A as not existing at all, not nothing at all, which cannot be conceived, but an indeterminate or "pure"
Being and non-being are the same.
Religion
As a graduate of a Protestant seminary, Hegel's theological concerns were reflected in many of his writings and lectures. For instance, in his "The Philosophy of History", Hegel argued the Protestant cause in the Thirty Years War was part of the struggle against absolutism and advanced the cause of human freedom. His thoughts on the person of Jesus, Jesus Christ stood out from the theologies of the Enlightenment. In his posthumously published ''Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Part 3'', Hegel is particularly interested in demonstrations of God's existence and the ontological proof. He espouses that "God is not an abstraction but a concrete God [...] God, considered in terms of his eternal Idea, has to generate the Son, has to distinguish himself from himself; he is the process of differentiating, namely, love and Spirit". This means that Jesus, as the Son of God, is posited by God over and against himself as other. Hegel sees relational and metaphysical unities between Jesus and God the Father. To Hegel, Jesus is both divine and human. Hegel further attests that God (as Jesus) not only died, but "[...] rather, a reversal takes place: God, that is to say, maintains himself in the process, and the latter is only the death of death. God rises again to life, and thus things are reversed". The philosopher Walter Kaufmann (philosopher), Walter Kaufmann argued that there was sharp criticism of traditional Christianity in Hegel's early theological writings. Kaufmann also pointed out that Hegel's references to God or to the divine and spirit drew on classical Greek as well as Christian connotations of the terms. Kaufmann wrote:Aside to his beloved Greeks, Hegel saw before him the example of Spinoza and, in his own time, the poetry of Goethe, Schiller, and Hölderlin, who also liked to speak of gods and the divine. So he, too, sometimes spoke of God and, more often, of the divine; and because he occasionally took pleasure in insisting that he was really closer to this or that Christian tradition than some of the theologians of his time, he has sometimes been understood to have been a Christian.Hegel seemed to have an ambivalent relationship with Magic (supernatural), magic, myth and Paganism. He formulated an early philosophical example of a disenchantment narrative, arguing that Judaism was responsible both for realizing the existence of ''Geist'' and, by extension, for separating nature from ideas of spiritual and magical forces and challenging polytheism. However, Hegel's manuscript " The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism" suggests that Hegel was concerned about the perceived decline in myth and enchantment in his age, and he therefore called for a "new myth" to fill the cultural vacuum. Hegel continued to develop his thoughts on religion both in terms of how it was to be given a 'wissenschaftlich', or "theoretically rigorous," account in the context of his own "system," and how a fully modern religion could be understood.
Works
In addition to some articles published early in his career and during his Berlin period, Hegel published four major works during his lifetime: # ''Posthumous works
During the last ten years of his life, Hegel did not publish another book but thoroughly revised the ''Encyclopedia'' (second edition, 1827; third, 1830). In his political philosophy, he criticized Karl Ludwig von Haller's reactionary work, which claimed that laws were not necessary. A number of other works on the philosophy of history, Philosophy of religion, religion,Legacy
There are views of Hegel's thought as the summit of early 19th-century German philosophicalReading Hegel
Some of Hegel's writing was intended for those with advanced knowledge of philosophy, although his ''Encyclopedia'' was intended as a textbook in a university course (education), course. Nevertheless, Hegel assumed that his readers are well-versed inLeft and right Hegelianism
Some historians have spoken of Hegel's influence as represented by two opposing camps. The Right Hegelians, the allegedly direct disciples of Hegel at the Humboldt University of Berlin, Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, advocated a Protestant orthodoxy and the political conservatism of the post-Napoleon I of France, Napoleon Restoration period. Today this faction continues among conservative Protestants, such as the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, which was founded by missionaries from Germany when the Hegelian Right was active. The Young Hegelians, Left Hegelians, also known as the Young Hegelians, interpreted Hegel in a revolutionary sense, leading to an advocation of atheism in religion and liberal democracy in politics. Recent studies have questioned this paradigm. No Hegelians of the period ever referred to themselves as "Right Hegelians", which was a term of insult originated by David Strauss, a self-styled Left Hegelian. Critiques of Hegel offered by the Left Hegelians radically diverted Hegel's thinking into new directions and eventually came to form a large part of the literature on and about Hegel.''The Universal Mind: The Evolution of Machine Intelligence and Human Psychology'', by Xiphias Press The Left Hegelians also influenced Marxism, which has in turn inspired global movements, from the Russian Revolution (1917), Russian Revolution, the Chinese Revolution (1949), Chinese Revolution and myriad of practices up until the present moment. Twentieth-century interpretations of Hegel were mostly shaped by British idealism, logical positivism, Marxism and Fascism. According to Benedetto Croce, the Italian Fascist Giovanni Gentile "holds the honor of having been the most rigorous neo-Hegelian in the entire history of Western philosophy and the dishonor of having been the official philosopher of Fascism in Italy". Since the fall of the Soviet Union, a new wave of Hegel scholarship has arisen in the West without the preconceptions of the prior schools of thought. and Otto Pöggeler in Germany as well as Peter Hodgson and Howard Kainz in the United States are notable for their recent contributions to post-Soviet Union thinking about Hegel.Triads
In accounts of Hegelianism formed prior to the Hegel renaissance, Hegel's dialectic was often characterized as a three-step process, "thesis, antithesis, synthesis"; a "thesis" (e.g. theRenaissance
In the last half of the 20th century, Hegel's philosophy underwent a major renaissance. This was due to (a) the rediscovery and re-evaluation of Hegel as a possible philosophical progenitor of Marxism by philosophically oriented Marxists; (b) a resurgence of Hegel's historical perspective; and (c) an increasing recognition of the importance of his dialectical method. György Lukács' ''History and Class Consciousness'' (1923) helped to reintroduce Hegel into the Marxist canon. This sparked a renewed interest in Hegel reflected in the work of Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno, Ernst Bloch, Raya Dunayevskaya, Alexandre Kojève and Gotthard Günther among others. In ''Reason and Revolution'' (1941), Herbert Marcuse made the case for Hegel as a revolutionary and criticized Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse's thesis that Hegel was a totalitarian. The Hegel renaissance also highlighted the significance of Hegel's early works (i.e. those written before ''Criticism
Criticism of Hegel has been widespread in the 19th and the 20th centuries. A diverse range of individuals including Arthur Schopenhauer, Karl Marx, Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, Franz Rosenzweig, Eric Voegelin and A. J. Ayer have challenged Hegelian philosophy from a variety of perspectives. Among the first to take a critical view of Hegel's system was the 19th-century German group known as the Young Hegelians, which included Feuerbach, Marx, Engels and their followers. In Britain, the Hegelian British idealism school (members of which included Francis Herbert Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet (philosopher), Bernard Bosanquet and in the United States Josiah Royce) was challenged and rejected by analytic philosophers Moore and Russell. In particular, Russell considered "almost all" of Hegel's doctrines to be false. Regarding Hegel's interpretation of history, Russell commented: "Like other historical theories, it required, if it was to be made plausible, some distortion of facts and considerable ignorance". Logical positivism, Logical positivists such as Ayer and the Vienna Circle criticized both Hegelian philosophy and its supporters, such as Bradley. Hegel's contemporary Schopenhauer was particularly critical and wrote of Hegel's philosophy as "a pseudo-philosophy paralyzing all mental powers, stifling all real thinking". Hegel was described by Schopenhauer as a "clumsy charlatan". Kierkegaard criticized Hegel's "absolute knowledge" unity. The physicist and philosopher Ludwig Boltzmann also criticized the obscure complexity of Hegel's works, referring to Hegel's writing as an "unclear thoughtless flow of words". In a similar vein, Robert Pippin notes that some view Hegel as having "the ugliest prose style in the history of the German language". Russell wrote in ''A History of Western Philosophy'' (1945) that Hegel was "the hardest to understand of all the great philosophers". Karl Popper quoted Schopenhauer as stating, "Should you ever intend to dull the wits of a young man and to incapacitate his brains for any kind of thought whatever, then you cannot do better than give Hegel to read...A guardian fearing that his ward might become too intelligent for his schemes might prevent this misfortune by innocently suggesting the reading of Hegel." Karl Popper wrote that "there is so much philosophical writing (especially in the Hegelian school) which may justly be criticised as meaningless verbiage". Popper also makes the claim in the second volume of ''The Open Society and Its Enemies'' (1945) that Hegel's system formed a thinly veiled justification for the Absolute monarchy, absolute rule ofSelected works
Published during Hegel's lifetime
* ''Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie'', 1801 :'' The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy'', tr. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf, 1977 * ''Phenomenology of Spirit, Phänomenologie des Geistes'', 1807Published posthumously
* ''Lectures on Aesthetics'' * ''Lectures on the Philosophy of History'' (also translated as ''Lectures on the Philosophy of World History''), 1837 * ''Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion'' * ''Lectures on the History of Philosophy'' * ''Lectures on Logic'', 1831See also
* Dialectical idealism * "God is dead" * Hegel-Archiv * Political consciousness * Process theology * Pure thought * Rudy Rucker, the great-great-great-grandson of HegelNotes
Explanatory notes
Citations
Sources
* * Frederick C. Beiser, Beiser, Frederick C. (ed.), 1993. ''The Cambridge Companion to Hegel''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . * Beiser, Frederick C., 2005. ''Hegel''. New York: Routledge. * Burbidge, John, 2006. ''The Logic of Hegel's Logic: An Introduction''. Broadview Press. * J. N. Findlay, Findlay, J. N., 1958. ''Hegel: A Re-examination''. New York: Oxford University Press. * * Francke, Kuno, Howard, William Guild, Schiller, Friedrich, 1913–1914 * Gentile, Andrea, 2018. ''Bewusstsein, Anschauung und das Unendliche bei Fichte, Schelling und Hegel. Über den unbedingten Grundsatz der Erkenntnis'', Freiburg, München: Verlag Karl Alber, * * Harris, H. S., 1995. ''Hegel: Phenomenology and System''. Indianapolis: Hackett. * Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1895. ''Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion''. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Eng. tr. E.B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson as ''Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion'', New York: Humanities Press, 1974. . * Houlgate, Stephen, 2005. ''An Introduction to Hegel. Freedom, Truth and History''. Oxford: Blackwell * Houlgate, Stephen, 2005. ''The Opening of Hegel's Logic: From Being to Infinity''. Purdue University Press. * Jean Hyppolite, Hyppolite, Jean, 1946. ''Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit''. Paris: Aubier. Eng. tr. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman as ''Genesis and Structure of Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit"'', Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1979. . * Inwood, M. J., 1983. ''Hegel—The Arguments of the Philosophers''. London & New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul * Kainz, Howard P., 1996. ''G. W. F. Hegel''. Athens: Ohio University Press. . * Walter Kaufmann (philosopher), Kaufmann, Walter, 1965. ''Hegel: A Reinterpretation''. New York: Doubleday (reissued Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978). * Alexandre Kojève, Kojève, Alexandre, 1947. ''Introduction à la lecture de Hegel''. Paris: Gallimard. Eng. tr. James H. Nichols, Jr., as ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit'', Basic Books, 1969. . * * * Domenico Losurdo, Losurdo, Domenico, 2004. ''Hegel and the Freedom of Moderns''. Duke University Press Books * Georg Lukács, Lukács, Georg, 1948. ''Der junge Hegel''. Zürich and Vienna (2nd ed. Berlin, 1954). Eng. tr. Rodney Livingstone as ''The Young Hegel'', London: Merlin Press, 1975. . * Maker, William, 1994. ''Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel''. State University of New York Press. . * * * Herbert Marcuse, Marcuse, Herbert, 1941. ''Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory''. * Mueller, Gustav Emil, 1968. ''Hegel: the man, his vision, and work''. New York: Pageant Press. * * Pinkard, Terry, 1988. ''Hegel's Dialectic: The Explanation of Possibility''. Temple University Press * Pinkard, Terry, 1994. ''Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason''. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. * Robert B. Pippin, Pippin, Robert B., 1989. ''Hegel's Idealism: the Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness''. Cambridge University Press. . * Raymond Plant, Plant, Raymond, 1983. ''Hegel: An Introduction.'' Oxford: Blackwell * * Riedel, Manfred, 1984. ''Between Tradition and Revolution: The Hegelian Transformation of Political Philosophy'', Cambridge. * * Gillian Rose, Rose, Gillian, 1981. ''Hegel Contra Sociology''. Athlone Press. * Rosen, Stanley, 2000. ''G.W.F Hegel: Introduction To Science Of Wisdom'', (Carthage Reprint) St. Augustines Press; 1 edition * John Russon, Russon, John, 2004. ''Reading Hegel's Phenomenology''. Indiana University Press. . * * * Peter Singer, Singer, Peter, 2001. ''Hegel: A Very Short Introduction''. New York: Oxford University Press (previously issued in the OUP ''Past Masters'' series, 1983) * Solomon, Robert, 1983. ''In the Spirit of Hegel'', Oxford: Oxford University Press * * Stewart, Jon, ed., 1996. ''The Hegel Myths and Legends''. Northwestern University Press. * James Hutchison Stirling, Stirling, James Hutchison, ''The Secret of Hegel'': Being the Hegelian System in Origin Principle, Form and Matter, London: Oliver & Boyd * W. T. Stace, Stace, W. T., 1955. ''The Philosophy of Hegel''. New York: Dover. * Charles Taylor (philosopher), Taylor, Charles, 1975. ''Hegel''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . * Williams, Robert R., 2000. ''Hegel's Ethics of Recognition'', University of California Press; New Ed edition * Allen W. Wood, Wood, Allen W., 1990 ''Hegel's Ethical Thought'', Cambridge University PressExternal links
* Andrew Chitty's (University of SussexAudio
*Video
Societies
Hegel texts online
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