2023 Turkey–Syria Earthquakes

On 6 February 2023, at 04:17  TRT (01:17 UTC), a  7.8 earthquake struck southern and central Turkey and northern and western Syria. The epicenter was west–northwest of Gaziantep. The earthquake had a maximum Mercalli intensity of XII (''Extreme'') around the epicenter and in Antakya. It was followed by a 7.7 earthquake at 13:24. This earthquake was centered north-northeast from the first. There was widespread damage and tens of thousands of fatalities.

The 7.8 earthquake is the largest in Turkey since the 1939 Erzincan earthquake of the same magnitude, and jointly the second-largest in the country, after larger estimates for the 1668 North Anatolia earthquake. It is also one of the strongest earthquakes ever recorded in the Levant. It was felt as far as Egypt and the Black Sea coast of Turkey. There were more than 30,000 aftershocks in the three months that followed. The seismic sequence was the result of shallow strike-slip faulting along segments of the Dead Sea Transform, East Anatolian and Sürgü–Çardak faults.

There was widespread damage in an area of about , about the size of Germany. An estimated 14 million people, or 16 percent of Turkey's population, were affected. Development experts from the United Nations estimated that about 1.5 million people were left homeless.

The confirmed death toll in Turkey was 53,537; estimates of the number of dead in Syria were between 5,951 and 8,476. It is the deadliest earthquake in what is now present-day Turkey since the 526 Antioch earthquake and the deadliest natural disaster in its modern history. It is also the deadliest in present-day Syria since the 1822 Aleppo earthquake; the deadliest earthquake or natural disaster in general since the 2010 Haiti earthquake; and the fifth-deadliest earthquake of the 21st century. The damage was estimated at US$148.8 billion in Turkey, or nine-percent of the country's GDP, and US$9 billion in Syria.

Damaged roads, winter storms, and disruption to communications hampered the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency's rescue and relief effort, which included a 60,000-strong search-and-rescue force, 5,000 health workers and 30,000 volunteers. Following Turkey's call for international help, more than 141,000 people from 94 countries joined the rescue effort.

Tectonic setting

Geology

Central southern Turkey and northwestern Syria are affected by the interaction between three tectonic plates: the African plate, Arabian plate, and Anatolian sub-plate. The boundary between the African and Arabian plates is represented by the Dead Sea Transform (DST)—a major zone of left-lateral strike-slip fault—it accommodates the relative northward movement of Arabia with respect to Africa. The northern end of the DST truncates at the East Anatolian Fault (EAF), another major left-lateral strike-slip fault zone that accommodates the overall westward movement of the Anatolian plate as it is extruded in that direction by the northward movement of the Arabian plate. The DST and EAF meet at the Marash triple junction. The EAF continues west of the triple junction, forming the boundary between the African and Anatolian plates, linking into the Cyprus arc to the west via the Latakia Ridge.

The EAF is subdivided into seven segments, from the northeast; the Karlıova, Ilıca, Palu, Pütürge, Erkenek, Pazarcık and Amanos segments. The Amanos segment is also considered part of the DST by some geologists, or a transitional structure between the EAF and DST by others. A northern strand to the EAF has also been recognized, including the Sürgü, Çardak, Savrun, Çokak, Toprakkale, Yumurtalık, Karataş, Yakapınar and Düziçi–İskenderun segments. The estimated slip rate on the main strand of the EAF system decreases south-westwards from per year on the Karlıova segment down to per year on the Amanos segment. On the northern strand, a slip rate of per year was estimated on the Çardak segment. The Sürgü-Çardak Fault is an east–west striking long fault that runs north of the EAF. It branches away from the EAF west of Çelikhan and extends westwards to Göksun. Comprising two segments; the Sürgü Fault runs between Çelikhan and Nurhak; the Çardak Fault runs between Nurhak and Göksun. Seismicity on the fault is low—the only associated earthquake was a M 6.8 event in 1544.

The northern part of the DST is subdivided into several segments, although there is some disagreement between scientists as to which faults should be assigned to the DST and which to the EAF, at the northernmost end of the structure. Following the 2013 "Active Fault Map of Turkey", seven DST segments are recognized in Turkey and neighbouring parts of Syria; the Afrin, Sermada, Armanaz, Hacıpaşa, Yesemek, Sakçagöz and Narlı segments.

Seismicity

The EAF has produced large or damaging earthquakes in the past few hundred years along various segments, including the 1789 (M 7.2, Palu), 1795 (M 7.0, Pazarcık), 1866 (M 7.2 Karlıova), 1872 (M 7.2, Amanos), 1874 (M 7.1, Palu), 1875 (M 6.7, Palu), 1893 (M 7.1, Erkenek), 1971 (M6.6, Karlıova) and 2020 (M 6.8, Pütürge) events. Other large historical earthquakes have been tentatively assigned to segments of the EAF, such as the 1114 and 1513 Marash earthquakes, both thought to have ruptured the Pazarcık segment.

The Palu and Pütürge segments in the east display a recurrence interval of about 150 years for M 6.8–7.0 earthquakes. The Pazarcık and Amanos segments in the west have recurrence intervals of 237–772 years and 414–917 years, respectively, for M 7.0–7.4 earthquakes. A research paper published by ''Earth and Planetary Science Letters'' in 2002 studied stress accumulation and increased seismic hazard along the East Anatolian Fault. The study concluded two sections of the fault with a considerably high potential for future earthquakes. One of these sections was in Elazığ and Bingöl, located between the rupture zones of the 1874 and 1971 earthquakes. The seismic gap ruptured during a 6.1 earthquake in 2010. The 2020 6.8 earthquake ruptured to the southwest between the 1893/1905 and 1874 earthquakes. Another seismic gap was located in Kahramanmaraş—this long section—according to the study, believed to last rupture in 1513 has the potential to produce magnitude 7.3 earthquakes.

Large earthquakes on the northern part of the DST include events in 115, 526, 587, 1138, 1170 and 1822, which resulted in several tens of thousands to several hundreds of thousands of fatalities.

Earthquake sequence

The first and largest earthquake in the sequence struck at 01:17 UTC. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) and Global Centroid Moment Tensor (GCMT) measured it at 7.8 and 7.8, respectively. GEOSCOPE reported 8.0 and Kandilli Observatory (KOERI) reported 7.7 and 7.4. It had an epicenter west of Gaziantep in Gaziantep Province, which is near the border with Syria. The earthquake hypocenter was at a depth of according to USGS and according to KOERI. The shock had a focal mechanism corresponding to strike-slip faulting.

It is one of the strongest ever recorded in Turkey, equivalent in magnitude to the 1939 Erzincan earthquake (7.8). These earthquakes are surpassed only by the larger estimates for the 1668 North Anatolia earthquake. Globally it was the strongest recorded since August 2021.

At 10:24 UTC, an earthquake measuring 7.5 according to USGS, 7.6 according to KOERI, or 7.7 according to Geoscope and the GCMT, struck with an epicenter near Ekinözü, 95 km northeast of the M7.8 event. It had a depth of according to the USGS, by KOERI, and by Geoscope. The shock was also the result of strike-slip faulting; it had an epicenter north of the previous large earthquake.

A reevaluation of the earthquakes using long-period coda moment magnitude obtained 7.95 ± 0.013 and 7.86 ± 0.012, respectively. These earthquakes were some of the largest Turkish earthquakes in over 2,000 years. Both earthquakes are the largest and only observed to occur on land within a short span of time.

Aftershocks

Over 570 aftershocks were recorded within 24 hours of the 7.8 earthquake and over 30,000 recorded by May 2023. An aftershock measuring 6.7 occurred about 11 minutes after the mainshock. There were 25 aftershocks 4.0 or greater recorded within six hours of the main tremor, according to the USGS. More than 12 hours later, the USGS had reported at least 54 aftershocks of 4.3 or greater magnitude, while the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) recorded at least 120 total aftershocks.

The 7.8 earthquake had aftershocks distributed along about of the EAF. A 6.3 aftershock struck near Uzunbağ in Hatay Province on 20 February; the earthquake was the result of oblique-normal faulting. This 6.3 event produced an independent cluster of aftershocks with a similar focal mechanism. Aftershocks from the sequence also occurred in the Gulf of Alexandretta, consistent with a northwest–southeast striking fault that produced the large aftershock. This aftershock occurred because the 7.8 event transferred sufficient on another normal fault sufficient for it to fail.

The 7.7 earthquake triggered its own aftershock sequence, including two  6.0 aftershocks. Aftershocks of the second earthquake continued through at least 9 February. Thousands of aftershocks associated with this earthquake were distributed along an east–west trend corresponding to the Çardak Fault for about .

Seismology

A source model for the 7.8 earthquake produced by the USGS from observed seismic waves, taking into account preliminary rupture mapping from satellite data, uses three fault segments with individual lengths, widths, strikes and dips of > × , 028°/85° (Segment 1), > × , 060°/85° (Segment 2) and > × , 025°/75° (Segment 3). The mainshock produced a maximum slip of along Segment 2, beneath Sakarya in Kahramanmaraş Province, northeast of the junction where it meets Segment 1. Another zone of large slip estimated at occurred further northeast along Segment 2, northwest of Adıyaman.

The USGS source model for the 7.7 earthquake which struck nine hours later has three large fault segments with individual lengths, widths, strikes and dips of > × >, 276°/80° (Segment 1), > × >, 250°/80° (Segment 2) and ~ × >, 060°/80° (Segment 3). Maximum displacement occurred on Segment 1 at .

Three segments of the EAF were involved in the 7.8 rupture; the Amanos, Pazarcık and Erkenek segments. The earthquake ruptured ~ of the EAF, producing a maximum slip of up to ~ along the Pazarcık segment. The northern end of the rupture was about south of the 6.8 earthquake that struck in 2020. This section of the EAF, the Pütürge segment, between both earthquakes, may represent a seismic gap. The southern segment of the EAF rupture was at its termination, near Antakya. Slip peaked at from the surface to depth during the 7.7 earthquake; slip was at the surface. Slip along the fault was compact—mostly confined to within the Çardak Fault; it was also shallower—attenuating from . Slip during the 7.8 event extended to and for the 7.7 event. The 6.4 aftershock that struck Antakya on 20 February had a rupture area of × and produced a peak slip of at depth.

Preliminary analysis of the effects of stress changes caused by the M7.8 earthquake on the Çardak–Sürgü Fault, based on the USGS fault model, indicated up to 3 bars of added stress near the epicenter of the M7.7 shock, sufficient to trigger rupture on that zone, assuming that it was already close to failure. Stress on the Hatay Fault, source of the 20 February 6.4 aftershock, increased by 1 bar following the 6 February earthquakes.

Rupture propagation

Preliminary analysis based on seismology and observations of surface rupture suggest rupture along a branch of the DST before transitioning onto the EAF where most of the faulting was observed. The initial rupture at the site of the epicenter of the M7.8 shock on the Narlı Fault, the northernmost section of the DST. The fault ruptured unilaterally northwards until it reached the Pazarcık segment of the East Anatolian Fault. Ruptures then continued bilaterally to the northeast and southwest along this segment. This subevent on the Narlı Fault corresponded to a 7.0 earthquake which ruptured for 20 seconds. It had a focal mechanism corresponding to oblique-normal faulting. A preliminary analysis of near-field (within of the fault rupture) seismic records indicates that the initial rupture speed transitioned to supershear after propagating about away from the epicenter along the Narlı Fault before it reached the EAF. Back projection suggests the total rupture length was ~.

The rupture continued northeast onto the Ekernek segment and to the southwest onto the Amanos segment. The northeastern rupture ceased 55 seconds after initiation while the southwestern rupture ceased near Antakya about 80 seconds later. A 6.8 aftershock occurring 11 minutes later and west of the first M>7 epicenter may have ruptured along the Sakçagöz Fault, the next segment of the DST to the south. Rupture along the EAF during the event occurred at subshear velocity (maximum per second). An analysis of near-field seismic data revealed transient supershear rupture episodes throughout the EAF rupture. Supershear rupture occurred along the northernmost section of the Narlı Fault where it meets the EAF. The rupture transitioned onto the EAF and propagated northeast at supershear velocity until its termination near Malatya. Rupture towards the southwest was mostly subshear, but at the southern termination in Hatay, where the fault has multiple branches and kinks, supershear was likely observed. Supershear rupture at the southern termination contributed to the intense ground motion in Antakya.

The second M>7 earthquake initiated on a separate fault known as the Çardak– Sürgü Fault Zone, part of the northern strand of the East Anatolian Fault. The rupture propagated bilaterally along the Çardak segment, continuing eastwards onto the Sürgü segment before continuing eastwards to Malatya along the northeast–southwest trending Doğanşehir Fault Zone. Rupture also propagated towards the southwest along the Çardak segment. The total rupture length was estimated at . The westward-propagating rupture occurred at supershear velocity (maximum per second) while the eastward-propagating rupture occurred at subshear velocity (maximum per second). The rupture lasted about 35 seconds.

The 6.4 aftershock on 20 February occurred along the Hatay Fault. The focal mechanism indicated normal faulting along a northeast–southwest striking fault.

Surface rupture

The extent of surface ruptures associated with the M7.8 and M7.7 earthquakes have been mapped using a mixture of satellite imagery and ground observations. Pixel matching on images captured by Sentinel-1 before and after the earthquakes showed sharp discontinuities in displacement, revealing two separate zones of surface rupture. The longer of the pair, produced by the first earthquake, measured while the second earthquake produced of surface rupture. These observations were backed up with direct imaging of the ruptures using other satellite data, such as from the DigitalGlobe's WorldView-1, 2 & 3 and GeoEye-1, and by field work. The surface rupture and focal mechanism during the first subevent on the Narlı Fault also indicated a large normal faulting component.

The zone of surface rupture extended from north of Antakya, Hatay Province towards Pazarcık, Kahramanmaraş Province and Gölbaşı, Adıyaman Province. Surface ruptures continued north of these cities. Surface rupture occurred in the Amik Valley. The westernmost part of Hatay Airport was damaged by surface ruptures but cracks in the runway were attributed to ground deformation. A major canal was damaged and lead to flooding in parts of the Amik Valley which was formerly Lake Amik. Field observations indicate a maximum displacement of on the surface. Geologists traced a surface rupture trending south from Pazarcık with an offset of . From Golbasi to Nurdağı ground displacements were up to . The surface rupture observed during the M7.8 earthquake was unusually large, comparable to that during the 1906 San Francisco earthquake along the San Andreas Fault.

Large surface offsets of were observed along the Sürgü-Çardak Fault. Along a road west of , the rupture displaced the road left-laterally for . The largest maximum surface offset was ; one of the largest surface offsets ever observed from an earthquake.

Ground motion

Ground acceleration values recorded in some areas near the fault rupture were in excess of 1 '' g''. Three USGS seismic installations, two at Antakya and one at Hassa, recorded large ground accelerations and velocities. The town of Hassa recorded 0.9082 ''g'' in ground acceleration (pga) and in ground velocity. The station data corresponded to a Modified Mercalli intensity of X (''Extreme''). A peak ground acceleration of 1.62 ''g'' was recorded by a station at Fevzipaşa. The peak ground acceleration generally exceeded 0.5 ''g'' in a large area around the epicenter, near Adiyaman and a large part of Hatay. High pga values of 2 ''g'' were recorded in Hatay. The maximum recorded pga was 2.212 ''g'' at a station in Pazarcık Belediyesi Parkı, Pazarcık; a government health facility nearby had limited damage but the surrounding town was devastated. The maximum recorded pga during the 7.7 earthquake was 0.59 ''g'' at Göksun.

According to Kandilli Observatory, the maximum Mercalli intensity (MMI) of the mainshock was estimated to have reached MMI XI–XII (''Extreme'') in Antakya and near the epicenter. MMI XI (''Extreme'') or higher was observed along the fault rupture from the epicenter to Antakya. The MMI also reached IX–X (''Violent''–''Extreme'') in Kahramanmaraş and İskenderun, VIII–IX (''Severe''–''Violent'') in Malatya and Adıyaman, VII–VIII (''Very strong''–''Severe'') in Gaziantep, Kilis, Idlib and Aleppo, and VI–VII (''Strong''–''Very strong'') in Adana and Şanlıurfa. The maximum MMI of the second earthquake was XI (''Extreme'').

Geological effects

Liquefaction was identified via satellite and remote sensing along the southern portion of the 7.8 rupture on the East Anatolian Fault from Antakya to Gölbaşı. Liquefaction and lateral spreading were observed at and near coastal areas, fluvial valleys and drained lake or swamp areas, covered by Holocene sediments. These effects were widespread in the Amik Valley and Orontes River plain, north of Antakya, Hatay Province. Limited observations were made in high-elevation areas due to snow cover and lack of satellite observations. Liquefaction was also observed in Samandağ. At Lake Gölbaşı, Adıyaman Province, lateral spreading occurred along the northern, eastern and southern coast. Parts of the lakeshore were also submerged. Gölbaşı was also damaged by liquefaction and lateral spreading.

Subsidence due to lateral spreading caused extensive damage in İskenderun. Liquefaction produced sand ejecta that buried Atatürk Boulevard in Çay District. Regular flooding in the city was observed after the earthquakes. Earlier flooding may be attributed to liquefaction while subsequent occurrences may be due to damage to the coast and water infrastructure. The sea inundated parts of the city by as much as . Large areas of the coast and sections of piers were flooded due to lateral spreading. Large waves from bad weather and a tsunami may have contributed to the effects observed at İskenderun.

Both earthquakes caused shaking levels (≥0.12 ''g'') sufficient for landslide-triggering across a area. About 3,673 earthquake-triggered landslides were identified using satellite imagery, aerial photos, and one field survey of the area. Landslides mainly occurred in the northern region of the affected area. Rockslides were the most commonly observed; there were also many bedrock rotational landslides, translational slides and lateral spreads. Surface ruptures propagating through hillsides also triggered landslides. These landslides blocked roads and river channels, destroyed or seriously damaged buildings and caused many deaths.

One of the largest landslides occurred near Tepehan village, Hatay Province; a translational slide which detached a block . This landslide occurred in a region comprising marl and clay-rich limestone. It produced a vertical displacement along its scarp. ITV News reported the landslide scarp was up to long and "wider than a football pitch" in some areas.

Tsunami

Despite an epicenter inland, a tsunami was recorded in the Mediterranean Sea. It was the first recorded tsunami in the eastern Mediterranean Sea region since the one produced by the 1953 6.2 earthquake in Cyprus. The largest wave measured along the Mediterranean coast of Turkey. Although no underwater surveys results have been made available to identify the sources of these tsunamis, they were likely produced by landsliding at Iskenderun Port and liquefaction on the coastal flatlands of Antakya.

Small tsunami waves were recorded off the coast of Famagusta, Cyprus, without damage. The tsunami measured , and tsunami waves were recorded at at İskenderun and at Erdemli. Tsunami warnings were issued for the southern Turkish coast, southern and eastern Italian coasts and the whole eastern Mediterranean Sea area, but later withdrawn.

Effects on other faults

The earthquake rupture terminated near Suvatlı in the Amik Valley, where some to its east is the Hacıpaşa Fault, a Dead Sea Transform segment. The rupture was arrested by a stepover that connects the East Anatolian Fault with the Hacıpaşa Fault. Though it did not rupture, the Coulomb stress increased on the Hacıpaşa Fault. With a combination of the increases stress, 600–900 years without major earthquakes, and an annual slip rate of , it is a potential source of magnitude 7.0 or greater earthquakes. The accumulated slip along this segment is estimated at . An earthquake "domino effect" remains plausible along the Dead Sea Transform beginning with the Hacıpaşa Fault, as observed along the North Anatolian Fault, where successive earthquakes have migrated westwards along the fault since 1939.

Casualties and damage

In Turkey

There were 53,537 deaths and 107,213 injured across 11 of the 17 affected provinces of Turkey. About 140 people remain missing; 118 in Hatay Province. At least 15.73 million people and 4 million buildings were affected. More than 2 million residents in the affected provinces were evacuated to nearby provinces including Mersin, Antalya, Mardin, Niğde. At least 518,009 houses and over 345,000 apartments were destroyed. More than 20 percent of Turkey's agriculture production was affected. The United Nations said crops, livestock, fisheries, aquaculture and rural infrastructure were heavily damaged. At least 516 university buildings were affected, of which 106 were heavily damaged.

By 23 February 2023, the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change conducted damage inspections for 1.25 million buildings; revealing 164,000 buildings were either destroyed or severely damaged. Another inspection carried out in March revealed that 1,411,304 housing units sustained light to moderate damage. Over 150,000 commercial infrastructure were at least moderately damaged. The International Organization for Migration estimated over 2.7 million people were made homeless. Additionally, the International Labour Organization estimated that 658,000 workers in Turkey and 170,000 others in Syria had lost their jobs as a result of the earthquake, increasing risks of poverty and child labour. A damage assessment by the Turkish government revealed at least 61,722 buildings had to be demolished including 11,900 in Gaziantep Province, 10,900 in Hatay Province, 10,800 in Kahramanmaraş Province and 36,046 in Malatya Province. Broad fissures appeared on roads. During recovery efforts, body parts were often found in the rubble.

In Adana, 12 buildings collapsed in the city center, 23 were badly damaged and 120 were moderately damaged. Three apartments were among the buildings that were destroyed in the city; the collapse of the 14-storey Alpargün Apartment in Çukurova resulted in 96 deaths. Across Adana Province, damage assessments revealed 59 buildings, 1,274 apartments and 2,952 houses were destroyed, severely damaged or required demolition.

At least 300 buildings were razed in Malatya. Sixty percent of the city's buildings received damage. Nearly every neighborhood of the city was affected by collapsed buildings. Out of the 968 mosques in the city, 25 were destroyed and 420 others were damaged. Two hotels collapsed in Malatya, causing many casualties. The ceiling of Malatya Erhaç Airport experienced a partial collapse, as did the historic Yeni Camii mosque. Damage was also reported at the Arslantepe Mound. In Akçadağ, 29 people died, 93 were injured, 32 buildings collapsed and 78 were seriously damaged. At least 263 deaths were reported in Doğanşehir, where roughly 6,000 of the 12,000 buildings collapsed or suffered heavy damage.

Across Gaziantep Province, 12,964 buildings, 31,522 apartments and 29,155 houses collapsed, were severely damaged or required demolition, while 486,779 other structures, including 256,748 houses, 196,199 apartments and 33,832 buildings had been damaged. Many historical sites were severely damaged, such as Gaziantep Castle, Şirvani Mosque and Liberation Mosque. The city recorded 16,211 collapses and buildings which were severely damaged or required demolition. In the city center, at least 154 people died after a four-story building collapsed; four other collapsed buildings left another 102 dead. In Nizip, at least 51 people were killed when a six-story apartment building collapsed. Gaziantep Oğuzeli Airport was forced to restrict its service to rescue flights.

In Nurdağı, nearly 2,500 people died and about 50 percent of the houses were badly damaged or destroyed. An additional 30 percent of its building stock received moderate damage. Mass graves were created to bury the overwhelming number of dead. The collapse of one apartment building in the district center killed 150 people. Ninety percent of houses were heavily damaged or destroyed in Sakçagözü, and 256 people died. On 13 February, it was announced that due to the extreme damage observed in Nurdağı, that all buildings in the district would be demolished and rebuilt. In İslahiye, there were 1,368 deaths, over 1,500 injuries and more than 200 destroyed apartments. There were over 130 deaths in Sulumağara; 200 in Altınüzüm; and 300–400 in Keküklü. Six train carriages at a maintenance station overturned, after rockslides obstructed a railroad near Fevzipaşa Railway Station.

In Hatay Province, 13,517 buildings collapsed, 8,162 required demolition and 67,346 were heavily damaged, along with 215,255 houses. The districts of Antakya, Kırıkhan and İskenderun were the most affected. In Antakya, 70 percent of homes and 6,369 buildings collapsed, 3,734 had to be demolished and 21,830 were badly damaged. The runway at Hatay Airport was split and uplifted, causing flight cancellations. The Ankara Metropolitan Municipality completed repairs on the airport on 12 February, allowing its reopening. Two provincial hospitals and a police station were destroyed, and a gas pipeline exploded. The building that housed the assembly of Hatay State was destroyed, as was St. Paul's Church and the Habib'i Neccar Mosque, while damage occurred at the Antakya Synagogue and the Hatay Archaeology Museum. Several dozen buildings in Güzelburç district and nearly every house in the central and Cebrail districts collapsed. Most of the squad and coaching staff of the local football club Hatayspor were initially trapped in the collapse of their headquarters in Antakya before being rescued, with player Christian Atsu and sporting director Taner Savut dying. At least 982 buildings were destroyed, 8,894 others were badly damaged and 943 had to be demolished in Defne. In Reyhanlı, 318 buildings collapsed and 1,661 others were severely damaged or required demolition. In Kumlu, 131 buildings were destroyed, 738 others were severely damaged and 84 others required demolition. At least 58 buildings collapsed and 669 others were badly damaged or had to be demolished in Payas.

The collapse of the luxury Rönesans Rezidans apartment trapped an estimated 800 people, killing at least 269 and leaving 46 missing as presumed dead. In May 2023, an investigation by ''The New York Times'' found that inadequate design and safety lapses may have contributed to its collapse. An engineer revealed to the newspaper; "the building violated the basic tenets of engineering," after inspecting its blueprints. Contractors of the building said they adhered to building regulations but those were not enough against the earthquake.

The 13-storey apartment block consists of three closely spaced buildings linked externally, but not structurally; when the collapse occurred, all three buildings separated. The basement, two-storey parking space was considered the "strongest part" of the complex as it had more concrete walls than other parts of the structure. The building's exterior walls and those that separated units and rooms consisted of heavy masonry which may have prevented the structure from swaying and possibly held the building mostly intact despite toppling. The building was considered a soft story structure as the ground floor had fewer masonry walls which meant it was at greater risk of damage from seismic ground motion. Among other factors were that the core concrete columns which housed the elevator systems were situated along the north side which left the south side vulnerable without adequate support. Another reason was that beams emerging from either side of the building were misaligned and did not connect to each other. These features may have contributed to the building overturning onto its south side.

In İskenderun, Hatay Province, a large fire at the port was reported on 6 February at 17:00, believed to have originated from a container carrying flammable industrial oil, forcing the port's closure and the diversion of many ships. It was extinguished on 6 and 8 February, only for it to reignite the next day each time. It was finally extinguished on 10 February. A total of 3,670 containers were destroyed by the fire and the port managing authority said it would take three months for operations to resume. The city saw 534 buildings collapse, 337 requiring demolition and 4,622 receiving severe damage. Flooding occurred along the city shoreline, inundating streets up to inland. The Cathedral of the Annunciation, seat of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Vicariate of Anatolia, was almost completely destroyed. At least 3,109 people died in the city and over 12,000 were injured.

In Samandağ, 670 buildings collapsed, 9,212 were badly damaged or required demolition and 7,850 people died. In Kırıkhan District, 1,886 buildings collapsed and 7,190 others were severely damaged or required demolition; the district recorded approximately 3,000 fatalities, 5,000 injuries and many more missing. In the village of Bektashli, 49 people died after their homes collapsed due to severe rockfalls. A section of the Kırıkhan-Reyhanlı highway near Akpınar was severely damaged and buckled. In Erzin District, 31 buildings collapsed and 897 were heavily damaged or had to be demolished. However, there were no collapses or major damage in Erzin, the largest town in the district. Multiple factors including strict building codes prevented destruction. An estimated 20,000 people fled to Erzin, increasing its population by about 50 percent. At least 700 people died, 187 buildings collapsed, 2,176 others were badly damaged and 194 others had to be demolished in Arsuz. However, like in Erzin, numerous people fled to the district, resulting in the district's population tripling by June 2023. At least 1,046 buildings collapsed and 3,452 others were severely damaged or had to be demolished in Hassa District, where 400 people were killed. In Altınözü, 838 buildings were destroyed, 3,892 others were badly damaged and 650 others required demolition. There were 213 collapsed buildings and 1,453 others had been severely damaged or had to be demolished in Yayladağı. At least 139 buildings collapsed, 755 others were badly damaged and 87 others had to be demolished in Belen. In Dörtyol, 115 buildings were destroyed and 2,030 others had to be demolished or were severely damaged.

Mass burials occurred in Kahramanmaraş for more than 5,000 bodies. A city official said the mass grave would eventually be the burial ground for 10,000 bodies. Around 75 percent of the city's buildings were damaged or destroyed. In Türkoğlu, 1,171 buildings collapsed and 4,500 others required demolition. At least 413 people were killed, 379 were injured and 872 buildings collapsed in Pazarcık District. At Ordekdede, a village in the district, 34 people died and almost all single-story buildings were decimated, with none of the village's 140 houses structurally stable.

In Elbistan, 1,038 people died, 3,000 were injured and 2,000 buildings were destroyed. At least 11 people died, 107 houses were destroyed and 70 percent of the building stock were damaged in Ekinözü. In Afşin, at least 180 people died. At least 335 buildings including 90 in the city center were destroyed. The Afşin-Elbistan Thermal Power Plant was also damaged. In Ericek, a village in Göksun, 95 percent of homes were affected and 152 died. In Nurhak, there were around 200 deaths and all houses were severely damaged.

In Adıyaman Province, over 20,000 buildings and 56,256 houses were destroyed. In the city of Adıyaman, four neighborhoods were razed. Many buildings along Atatürk Boulevard collapsed. The city hall, a 6th-century mosque and Gölbaşı District's state hospital were also destroyed. Isias Hotel, the largest hotel in the city, also collapsed, killing 65 people. Up to 10 percent of Adıyaman's population perished. The mayor of Kömür said the Karapınar and Bahçelievler neighborhoods were nearly destroyed. In the nearby village of Yaylakonak, 270 of the 280 homes were destroyed and 107 people died, including 32 children.

Destruction also occurred in Barbaros, Sümerevler and Karapınar districts. In Harmanlı, Gölbaşı, 80–90 percent of it was destroyed. The second earthquake destroyed three buildings in the province. In Gölbaşı, 71 percent of the town's infrastructure was damaged or destroyed and 695 people were killed with over 400 injured, including 286 deaths in the town center. There were also 410 deaths in Besni District, about 90 percent of them in the town itself. At least 103 people were killed and dozens more were injured in Çelikhan District