1st Forfarshire Artillery Volunteers

The 1st Forfarshire Artillery Volunteers was a part-time unit of the British Army's Royal Artillery founded in Forfarshire (now Angus) in Scotland in 1859. It served with 51st (Highland) Division through many of the major battles on the Western Front during World War I. In World War II its regiments saw action in the Battle of France, in the campaigns in North Africa and Sicily, and in North West Europe from D-Day to VE Day. It continued in the postwar Territorial Army until 1975.

Volunteer Force

The enthusiasm for the Volunteer movement following an invasion scare in 1859 saw the creation of many Rifle and Artillery Volunteer Corps composed of part-time soldiers eager to supplement the Regular British Army in time of need. By the end of April 1860 seven Artillery Volunteer Corps (AVCs) had been formed in Forfarshire:Frederick, pp. 658, 661.Grierson, pp. 135–137.Litchfield & Westlake, pp. 77–80.
* 1st (Arbroath) Forfarshire AVC formed on 31 October 1859
* 2nd ( Montrose) Forfarshire AVC formed on 31 October 1859
* 3rd (Broughty Ferry) Forfarshire AVC formed on 5 December 1859
* 4th (Broughty Ferry) Forfarshire AVC formed on 5 December 1859
* 5th (Dundee) Forfarshire AVC formed on 16 January 1860
* 6th (Dundee) Forfarshire AVC formed on 24 April 1860
* 7th (Dundee) Forfarshire AVC formed on 30 April 1860

On 14 December 1860 these units were brought together as the 1st Administrative Brigade, Forfarshire Artillery Volunteers based in Dundee under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel James Erskine. Each of the original corps consisted of a single battery, but in 1862 the units at Broughty Ferry amalgamated as a two-battery unit (the 3rd) and those at Dundee as a three-battery corps (the 4th). The 1st AVC at Arbroath added batteries in 1865 and 1877, and the 2nd had an additional half battery between 1866 and 1875. In 1867 the 4th AVC was increased to four batteries, in 1868 to six batteries with its own lieutenant-colonel commandant (Frank Stewart-Sandeman, who commanded the Administrative Brigade as well from 1872), and to seven batteries in 1879. The headquarters (HQ) of the Administrative Brigade moved to Broughty Ferry in 1862 and back to Dundee in 1875. In 1876 the 2nd (Johnshaven), 3rd (St Cyrus) and 4th ( Bervie) Kincardineshire AVCs were transferred from the 1st Aberdeen Administrative Brigade to the 1st Forfarshire Administrative Brigade.''Army List'', various dates.

In 1880 the Volunteer Force was consolidated into larger units. The 1st Forfar Administrative Brigade became the 1st Forfarshire (Forfar and Kincardine) AVC in March 1880, but the three Kincardine batteries returned to the 1st Aberdeen in May 1882 and the 'Forfar and Kincardine' subtitle was dropped. The size of the corps was increased again when a new battery was raised at Perth the following year, giving the following organisation:
* Nos 1–7 Batteries at Dundee
* Nos 8–10 Batteries at Arbroath
* No 11 Battery at Montrose
* Nos 12–13 Batteries at Broughty Ferry
* No 14 Battery at Perth

Position artillery

The AVCs were intended to serve as garrison artillery manning fixed defences, but a number of the early units manned semi-mobile 'position batteries' of smooth-bore field guns pulled by agricultural horses. The Dundee batteries of the 1st Forfarshire AVC had two batteries of four field guns from 1868, but they were only occasionally turned out, and were not officially recognised by the War Office (WO). However the concept was revived in 1888 when some Volunteer batteries were reorganised as position artillery to work alongside the Volunteer infantry brigades. In 1889 the 1st Forfarshire AVC was issued with a position battery of 16-pounder Rifled Muzzle-Loading guns, which were manned by two of the Dundee garrison batteries. In 1891 this was numbered the 1st Position Battery and the remaining garrison batteries were redesignated companies (Nos 2–6 at Dundee, 7–9 at Arbroath, 10 at Montrose, 11–12 at Broughty Ferry and 13 at Perth).Litchfield and Westlake, pp. 3–6.

Royal Garrison Artillery

In 1882 all the AVCs were affiliated to one of the territorial garrison divisions of the Royal Artillery (RA) and the 1st Forfarshire AVC became part of the Scottish Division. In 1889 the structure was altered, and the corps joined the Southern Division. In 1899 the RA was divided into separate field and garrison branches, and the artillery volunteers were all assigned to the Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA). When the divisional structure was abolished their titles were changed, the unit becoming the 1st Forfarshire Royal Garrison Artillery (Volunteers) on 1 January 1902. The following year the position batteries were redesignated as heavy batteries.

In 1908 the unit's HQ was at Albany Quarters, Bell Street, Dundee, and it had a drill battery at Barry Links for gun practice. The Dundee and Broughty Ferry companies used a rifle range at Monifieth Links, while the other companies used ranges at Eliot Links near Arbroath and near Montrose.

Territorial Force

When the Volunteers were subsumed into the new Territorial Force (TF) under the Haldane Reforms of 1908, the personnel of the 1st Forfarshire RGA was distributed to two new units:''London Gazette'' 20 March 1908.
/ref>Litchfield, pp. 273–275.
* North Scottish RGA, a defended ports unit at Broughty Ferry, with additional batteries from the 1st Fife RGA (V), 1st Aberdeen RGA (V) and Highland RGA (V)
* II (or 2nd) Highland Brigade, Royal Field Artillery (RFA), with one battery from the 1st Fife RGA (V), giving the following organisation:Frederick, p. 676.Angus at Drill Hall Project.
/ref>

II Highland Brigade, RFA
* HQ at Dudhope Drill Hall, Brown Street, DundeeAngus at Great War Centenary Drill Halls.
/ref>
* Forfarshire Battery at 22–26 East Abbey Street, Arbroath
* Fifeshire Battery at Leven
* City of Dundee Battery at Dudhope Drill Hall
* 2nd Highland Ammunition Column at Dudhope Drill Hall

This unit was part of the TF's Highland Division. The batteries were each issued with four 15-pounder guns.Becke, Pt 2a, pp. 101–107.51 (H) Division at Long, Long Trail.
/ref>51 Divisional RA at Long, Long Trail.
/ref>

World War I

Mobilisation

A warning order of the imminence of war was received at the Highland Division's HQ on 29 July 1914, and the order to mobilise was received at 17.35 on Tuesday 4 August 1914. Mobilisation began the following day at unit drill halls. On 12 August the division was ordered to concentrate at Bedford and entrainment began on 15 August. Concentration was completed by 17 August and the division formed part of First Army (Home Forces) in Central Force.

On the outbreak of war, units of the Territorial Force were invited to volunteer for Overseas Service. On 15 August the WO issued instructions to separate those men who had signed up for Home Service only, and form these into reserve units. Then on 31 August the formation of a reserve or 2nd Line unit was authorised for each 1st Line unit where 60 per cent or more of the men had volunteered for Overseas Service. The titles of these 2nd Line units would be the same as the original, but distinguished by a '2/' prefix. In this way duplicate batteries, brigades and divisions were created, mirroring those TF formations being sent overseas.

1/II Highland Brigade

During the winter of 1914–15 the division's 1st Line units underwent war training, and a number left to join the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the Western Front. The division was warned for overseas service on 13 April and on 3 May it crossed to France, the artillery embarking at Southampton for Le Havre. The Highland Division completed its concentration at Lillers, Busnes and Robecq by 6 May and on 12 May it was officially numbered as the 51st (Highland) Division.

Western Front

The raw division was soon in action at the Battle of Festubert (18–25 May). The 51st (Highland) and 1st Canadian Division together formed 'Alderson's Force', which relieved the attacking divisions at the end of the first day's fighting. It was also engaged at the Battle of Givenchy (15–16 June). Afterwards the division was moved to a quiet front to gain more experience. 1/II Highland Bde's old 15-pounders were replaced with modern 18-pounder guns on 28 August.

On 7 April 1916 1/II Highland Bde formed an additional battery (D Bty). Then on 19 May the TF brigades of the RFA received numbers, the 1/II Highland becoming CCLVI (256) Brigade, and the old batteries were redesignated A, B and C. D Battery was then exchanged for R (Howitzer) Bty from the III Highland (CCLVIII) Howitzer Bde, which became D (H) Bty, equipped with 4.5-inch howitzers. (R (H) Battery had originally been C (H) Bty of CLI (1st County Palatine) Bde of 30th Division, a 'Kitchener's Army' unit raised by the Earl of Derby in Lancashire in 1914.) The brigade ammunition columns were abolished at the same time, and absorbed within the divisional ammunition column.Frederick, p. 687.

Somme

In July 51st (Highland) Division joined in the Somme Offensive. An attack on 14 July had failed to capture the dominating ground of High Wood, and 51st (H) Division was tasked with renewing the attack on High Wood a week later. A night attack was to be tried: the bombardment began at 19.00 on 22 July, under the direction of low-flying artillery observation aircraft. German sources reported that the shelling was of 'painful accuracy' and prevented the troops in High Wood from being relieved, despite the number of casualties they suffered. At 01.30 the following morning the division attacked, but by 03.00 they were back on their start line having suffered heavy casualties of their own. British gunners had difficulty supporting attacks on High Wood, because they had to fire over Bazentin Ridge. The low elevation of the guns meant that shells skimmed the British trenches, the margin for error was small and numerous complaints were made that British infantry casualties were caused by friendly fire. Worn guns, defective ammunition and inaccurate information about the location of British infantry positions were blamed for short-shooting. The setback seemed to confirm the division's nickname of 'Harper's Duds' (from their commander, Major-General George Harper, and their 'HD' formation badge). The division was withdrawn from the front on 7 August for rest and reorganisation. On 23 August CCLVI Bde was reorganised again: B Bty and the Left Section of C Bty of CCLVIII Bde joined to make A, B and C Btys up to six 18-pounders each.

The division returned to the front in October for the Battle of the Ancre Heights, the final series of actions of the Somme Offensive. A mass of guns was assembled, with the artillery of no less than eight divisions and eight heavy artillery groups supporting 51st (H) Division's attack on Beaumont-Hamel, which had been an uncaptured objective on the first day of the offensive on 1 July. The operation was planned for 24 October, and the batteries began firing to cut the barbed wire on 20 October, but it was postponed several times because of bad weather. Eventually 13 November was chosen. H hour was 05.45, when the 18-pounders started a Creeping barrage (a recent innovation) moving in front of the infantry at every five minutes. A quarter of the 18-pounders deliberately fired short of the barrage line – this would have suppressed German outposts sheltering in shell craters in No man's land. The attack was helped by a dense fog, which screened the infantry from retaliatory shellfire as they struggled through the mud towards their objectives. The barrage halted for an hour on the first objective before moving on. Some of the infantry were held up by machine guns in the notorious 'Y Ravine', which had caused so much trouble on 1 July, but reserves were employed and both attacking brigades had reached the third German trench line (the Purple Line) by 07.50. The Green Line was next taken, but the fourth wave of attackers lost the barrage on their way to the final (Yellow) objectives and had to pull back to the Green Line to consolidate a position in captured trenches. Beaumont Hamel had finally fallen, and 51st (Highland) Division had gone some way to shaking off the 'Harper's Duds' slur.

On 25 January 1917 CCLVI Bde was joined by the Left Section of C (H) Bty from CCLX (I Lowland) Bde to make D (H) Bty up to six howitzers. (C (H)/CCLX Bty had originally been 535 (H) Bty RFA.) The brigade then had the following organisation for the rest of the war:
* A (1/Forfarshire + section III Highland) Bty – 6 x 18-pdrs
* B (1/Fifeshire + section III Highland) Bty – 6 x 18-pdrs
* C (1/City of Dundee + section III Highland) Bty – 6 x 18-pdrs
* D (C/CLI (1st County Palatine) + section 535) (H) Bty – 6 x 4.5-inch

Arras

For the Battle of Arras opening on 9 April, the biggest concentration of guns yet seen was assembled, all working to a single plan. 51st (H) Division was in XVII Corps, where the field batteries were placed from to yards behind the line. The 18-pdrs began firing a creeping barrage at Zero hour to protect the infantry advance while 4.5s laid down a standing barrage on each objective in turn. The barrage lasted for over 10 hours, advancing at a prescribed rate onto the final objective, over from the guns, some of which were moved forward during the day. Overall, XVII Corps' attack was a great success, even though some of 51st Highland's men were held up by unsubdued machine guns and drifted away from their barrage. The following day the brigade's CO, Lt-Col L.M. Dyson, personally went forward to reconnoitre the confused situation on the division's front, finding that the objective of Point de Jour was only partially held. After the first day the successes were harder won: the British guns had to move up through appalling conditions, and the follow-up attacks were less well planned and executed.

51st (H) Division attacked again at Gavrelle on 23 April under a full barrage (the 2nd Battle of the Scarpe), with the chemical works and village of Roeux as its objectives, but could not hold Roeux itself. The divisional artillery supported an attack by 34th Division on 28 April (the Battle of Arleux). The fire was not as effective as had been hoped, failing to cut the barbed wire or subdue all the enemy machine guns, although a German counter-attack was 'mown down by the 18-pounders firing shrapnel'. 51st (H) Division distinguished itself in the eventual capture and defence of Roeux; CCLVI Bde first helped 4th Division take the west end of the village on 13 May, then 152nd Bde of 51st (H) Division occupied the rest during the night and held it against counter-attacks over the following days.

Ypres

An even greater concentration of guns was massed for the Third Ypres Offensive, but the circumstances were less favourable. Gun batteries were packed into the Ypres Salient, where they were under observation and counter-battery (CB) fire from the Germans on the higher ground. Casualties among guns and gunners were high even before Zero hour on 31 July (the Battle of Pilckem Ridge). Two thirds of the field guns fired a creeping barrage, the other third and the 4.5-inch howitzers provided the standing barrage. 51st (H) Division reached the German second line and was consolidating when it was hit by a German counter-bombardment followed by a counter-attack. The British guns fired their pre-arranged protective barrages and destroyed the counterattack. Gains had been made, but now the rain came, and the guns had to move up through shell-churned mud to fresh positions before the attack could be renewed, and continued to suffer badly from German CB fire. 51st (H) Division was relieved on 8 August.

The division was back in the line for the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge starting at 05.40 on 20 September. This was a limited attack made with massive artillery support. 51st (H) Division attacked towards the Poelcappelle Spur with one brigade ( 154th (3rd Highland)), supported by 22 batteries of 18-pdrs and six of 4.5s. At first the going was heavy and there was strong German resistance at 'Pheasant Trench', but thereafter there were no problems and the brigade had occupied its final objective across the spur by 08.25. A heavy German bombardment in the afternoon was followed by a counter-attack, but this was completely destroyed by the British artillery.

Cambrai

51st (Highland) Division was then moved south to take part in Third Army's surprise attack with tanks against the Hindenburg Line at Cambrai on 20 November. There was no preliminary bombardment, but for the attack the divisional artillery was reinforced, firing a lifting barrage of smoke, high explosive (HE) and shrapnel shells. The initial attack was a brilliant success, but on 51st (H) Division's front the advance stalled once the tanks crossed the Flesquières ridge, where many were knocked out by unsuppressed enemy guns. Artillery support could not be requested because of broken communications. The fight at Flesquières went on all afternoon, but the Highlanders made little ground. However, the defenders in the village were almost cut off, and withdrew during the night. By now the division's guns were moving up into the former No man's land. They began a bombardment at 07.05 and at 07.30 the Highlanders moved on across the Graincourt road, but could not take the village of Cantaing until tanks came up. Although 51st (H) Division took Fontaine by 23 November, German opposition was stiffening, and the troops had to consolidate a line.

The infantry of 51st (H) Division had been relieved by the time the German counter-attack came in on 30 November, but the divisional artillery remained in the line, supporting 59th (2nd North Midland) Division. The attack against the 59th was easily broken by the guns of 51st (H) and Guards Division. But breakthroughs elsewhere meant a scrambled retirement to a line further back.

Spring Offensive

In March 1918 it was clear that the Germans were planning a major offensive on the Western Front. Air photos revealed signs of these preparations on 51st (H) Division's front, including numerous rectangular mounds in the valley of the River Agache that the staff dubbed 'lice'. The divisional artillery probed these curious mounds by firing a 4.5-inch howitzer at one: it exploded, revealing the lice to be ammunition dumps. A divisional shoot was therefore prepared, and CCLVI Bde alone caused over 100 of these dumps to explode within 90 minutes. Probing fire revealed similar dumps in all the known German gun positions, whether or not they were occupied. To meet the anticipated attack, 51st (H) Division deployed its guns in depth. Each RFA brigade (CCLVI was supporting 153rd (2nd Highland) Bde on the division's left) deployed nine 18-pdrs and four 4.5s forward, with the remainder of the guns in the main battery positions back. In addition 51st Divisional Artillery deployed seven single 18-pdrs and two old 15-pdrs as anti-tank guns in the support and reserve line where they could cover the main approaches over open sights. On the afternoon of 20 March a patrol observed large numbers of German troops in fighting order entering their trenches, obviously preparing for an attack. All the available divisional and corps guns opened fire on these assembly trenches and the Agache Valley.

The German spring offensive was launched on the misty morning of 21 March 1918 with a massive bombardment from 05.00. This was particularly severe on 153rd Bde and the neighbouring 6th Division. All the battery positions, whether they had been active or silent, and the HQs were shelled with HE and Mustard gas. Within 15 minutes almost all communications had been knocked out, and the mist prevented observation. The German bombardment slackened off on 51st (H) Division's front after 07.00, but remained intense on 6th Division. At 09.53 one of CCLVI Bde's observation posts (OPs), which still had a telephone line, reported men moving between the British front and support lines. Two minutes later, the two young officers manning it, 2/Lts W.H. Crowder and J. Stuart, confirmed that these were German troops, and at 10.00 they reported that their OP was surrounded and that the Germans were throwing grenades into it. No further message was received.Bewsher, pp. 274–5.Middlebrook, pp. 210–1. 153rd Brigade's battalion manning the front and support line had been overrun, and 6th Division's front had been penetrated. Most of CCLVI Bde's forward and anti-tank guns had been destroyed by shellfire, but as the mist began to clear the survivors took a heavy toll of the German infantry. 2/Lieutenant A.B. McQueen of A/CCLVI Bty engaged large enemy parties at ranges of to , causing heavy casualties. When the Germans got a machine gun firing into the emplacement in enfilade, McQueen destroyed his gun by putting one shell in the muzzle and another in the breech and firing it with a long rope. His detachment then withdrew with a Lewis gun to a sunken road and engaged the enemy. When ammunition ran short he withdrew his men, carrying a wounded sergeant of the Black Watch. The mist had cleared about midday and despite their heavy casualties the batteries could now fire at observed targets. On 51st (H) Division's front the attacking Germans described the British artillery fire as 'unbearable'. However, the division's flank had already been turned, and 153rd Bde had to fall back to a 'switch' line while the rear of the main battle zone was firmly held from about 15.00.

During the night reinforcements came up from 25th Division, and CCLVI Bde was allocated two batteries of CXII Bde to make up its losses. The Germans maintained the pressure on the following day. Attempting to widen the hole in the flank, large numbers of Germans were seen at range: all four of CCLVI Bde's batteries hauled their guns out of their pits, swung them round, and engaged the enemy over open sights, inflicting such heavy casualties that further progress was checked for a time. B Battery then fired smoke to cover the advance of a battalion of British tanks coming up. When the Germans ran from this counter-attack, the four batteries again did great execution, and were able to catch the German artillery coming up to support their infantry, B Bty's 18-pdrs and D Bty's howitzers combining to destroy two guns and their teams and prevent the enemy battery from coming into action. The brigade fired continuously for four hours over open sights, the howitzers using instantaneous fuzes. Luckily the brigade was close to the divisional ammunition dump, and there was no shortage: the 18 surviving guns of the brigade fired 18,100 rounds of 18-pdr ammunition, and 2500 of howitzer; B Bty alone fired 1750 rounds per gun (rpg). By the time the German guns were able to fire it was dusk, and CCLVI Bde slipped away to the new line being taken up by 51st (H) Division. That night 51st (H) Divisional Artillery received 17 new guns to replace those it had lost. All the field artillery covering the divisional front was placed under the command of Lt-Col L.M. Dyson, CO of CCLVI Bde.

Over the next two days the division retired slowly, its units becoming increasingly tired and reduced in numbers. On 23 March the very weak 152nd Bde threw back three attacks with rifle and artillery fire. Next day the division pulled back into the Red (fourth) Line behind other formations that took over holding the Green (third) Line, covered by 51st (D) Division's guns. On 24 March all the artillery of the divisions in IV Corps was pooled, CCLVI Bde forming part of 'Right Group'. About 14.00 the infantry in front began to give way, and the artillery group had to withdraw, CCLVI Bde going to the north of Irles. 51st (H) continued to hold the Red Line all day, forming a defensive flank, before falling back during the night. On 25 March 51st (H) Division was presented with some remarkable targets of German masses at long range, which were prevented from closing, but the enemy continued to move round the flank. However, reserves came up, and the exhausted 51st (H) Division was finally withdrawn that evening for rest.

51st (H) Division was sent north to First Army, absorbing drafts of reinforcements ''en route''. The divisional artillery arrived on the evening of 9 April, just after the second phase of the German offensive (Operation Georgette) had struck First Army (the Battle of the Lys). The division's infantry had already been thrown into the gap left by the defeat of the 2nd Portuguese Division. The infantry and artillery together held the line through the next critical days. On 10 April 2/Lt R. Scott of CCLVI Bde observed a party of Germans digging into the riverbank and called forward a single gun to engage them. When this arrived at the position selected by Scott, it fired 96 rounds in three hours, causing heavy casualties. That evening Germans were observed collecting for a new attack, and the artillery laid down harassing fire on their approach roads through the night. Soon after dawn the battery positions became untenable, so they opened rapid fire on the advancing enemy as each battery in turn withdrew to its new position and resumed covering fire for the others, CCLVI Bde ending up near Le Cornet Malo.Blaxland, pp. 119–120.Edmonds, ''1918'', Vol II, pp. 148, 160, 177, 189, 254.

During the fighting on 11 April, a large number of stragglers separated for their units were gathered at 153rd Bde HQ, and volunteers were called from CCLVI Bde and an Australian field artillery brigade to officer these men. Two officers of CCLVI Bde acted as infantry platoon commanders for the next two days, keeping their men well under control during a series of fighting withdrawals. During 12 April an enemy breakthrough threatened the gun lines; while 153rd Bde HQ staff manned an improvised defence line, CCLVI Bde opened fire at ranges down to then limbered up its guns and the batteries withdrew in succession. The last to leave was D Bty, which only cleared its position when the enemy were within and several killed and wounded horses had to be cut out of their traces. That battery's liaison officer with the infantry was last seen emptying his revolver into the enemy at close quarters. By 13.00 the brigade was in new positions on the Robecq–St Venant road, collecting its ammunition from a dump that had already been set on fire. During 13 April 51st (H) Division was able to patch up a defence line, which it held for the next 10 days.

51st (H) Division was sent back south in July to assist the French in the Second Battle of the Marne. The divisional artillery covered in three days, crossing the Marne near Épernay at 02.00 on 20 July. After a short halt they pushed on, reaching their assembly position near Nanteuil-la-Fosse, and CCLVI Bde was in action south west of Pourcy by 11.00, although they were only engaged in harassing fire during the Battle of Tardenois, while the division's infantry had attacked behind a barrage fired by French and Italian field guns. An enemy counter-attack was expected, so the batteries were withdrawn at dusk, leaving a few guns in close support of the infantry during the night. In fact, the Germans withdrew across the Marne, and when the division attacked again the following morning the information on enemy positions was so poor that the barrage was fired too far ahead to be of use. On 23 and 27 July the division put in better-organised attacks behind barrages fired by its own artillery supported by French guns, against the now-retreating Germans. On 28 July, in the closing stages of the battle, CCLVI Bde moved up through the village of Chaumuzy under shellfire, having been misinformed that it was already in friendly hands.

Hundred Days Offensive

In August all the Allied armies began attacking in the Hundred Days Offensive. 51st (H) Division returned from the French sector and joined the Canadian Corps in First Army in late August for the Battle of the Scarpe on 26 August. CCLVI Brigade supported the Canadian attack, and then rejoined 51st (H) divisional artillery supplemented by that of 16th (Irish) Division to provide a barrage for its own division's attack on the second objective against little opposition. The division attacked Greenland Hill the following day and failed to capture it, but succeeded two days later behind another barrage from 51st (H) and 16th (I) divisional artillery.

After the Battle of the Selle the Allied armies began a pursuit. By 26 October First Army was lagging behind the advance, and 51st (H) Division was among those given the task of pushing on. The divisional artillery was supplemented by that of 39th Division together with army brigades and heavies. The attack went well, even though in some places the infantry lost the barrage. The Germans were now badly shaken and exhausted, and the campaign developed into a pursuit, although one serious counter-attack was broken up by the guns on 1 November. From 29 October the infantry of 51st (H) Division began to be withdrawn from the line, but the divisional artillery remained in action. On 1 November it supported 49th (West Riding) Division's assault crossing of the Rhonelle (the Battle of Valenciennes), and it remained in action until the Armistice with Germany came into force on 11 November.

After the Armistice the division went into billets and demobilisation began. This was completed by mid-March 1919, and CCLVI Bde passed into suspended animation.

2/II Highland Brigade

Recruiting for the 2nd Line unit was good, and 2/II Highland Bde was completed by the end of 1914.Becke, Pt 2b, pp. 55–59.64 (2nd H) Division at Long, Long Trail.
/ref> 2nd Highland Division formed in January 1915 (numbered as 64th (2nd Highland) Division in August) but the lack of equipment and need to supply drafts to 1st Line units delayed training. 2/II Highland Brigade remained around the Forfar area throughout 1915. In March 1916 the division moved south to Norfolk and joined Northern Army (Home Forces), with the artillery around Blickling and Worstead. It continued to send drafts to units serving overseas. By May, the artillery brigades had received 18-pounders and that month they were numbered: 2/II Highland became CCCXXI (321) Brigade and the batteries became A, B and C; later a D (H) Bty joined (probably from CCCXXIII (2/III Highland) (H) Bde, which was broken up).

In Autumn 1916, B/CCXCIII (2/III County of London) Bty from 58th (2/1st London) Division was temporarily attached to the brigade. In November a new CCCXXII Bde of 18-pdr batteries was raised by V Reserve Bde, RFA, and joined the division, but on 29 January 1917 this was broken up to bring the existing batteries up to six guns each.

By the winter of 1917 the division had become solely a training organisation, with no Highland associations. The artillery were quartered around Norwich, Aylsham and Haveringland