Mīmāṃsā

''Mīmāṁsā'' (Sanskrit: मीमांसा; IAST: Mīmāṃsā) is a Sanskrit word that means "reflection" or "critical investigation" and thus refers to a tradition of contemplation which reflected on the meanings of certain Vedic texts. This tradition is also known as Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā because of its focus on the earlier (''pūrva'') Vedic texts dealing with ritual actions, and similarly as Karma-Mīmāṁsā due to its focus on ritual action (''karma'').Chris Bartley (2013), "Purva Mimamsa", in ''Encyclopaedia of Asian Philosophy'' (Editor: Oliver Leaman), Routledge, 978-0415862530, pages 443–445. It is one of six Vedic "affirming" ( āstika) schools of Hindu philosophy. This particular school is known for its philosophical theories on the nature of Dharma, based on hermeneutics of the Vedas, especially the Brāḥmanas and samhitas.Oliver Leaman (2006), Shruti, in ''Encyclopaedia of Asian Philosophy'', Routledge, , page 503. The Mīmāṃsā school was foundational and influential for the Vedāntic schools, which were also known as Uttara-Mīmāṁsā for their focus on the "later" (''uttara'') portions of the Vedas, the Upanishads. While both "earlier" and "later" Mīmāṃsā investigate the aim of human action, they do so with different attitudes towards the necessity of ritual praxis.

Mīmāṁsā has several sub-schools, each defined by its pramana. The Prabhākara sub-school, which takes its name from the seventh-century philosopher Prabhākara, described the five epistemically reliable means to gaining knowledge: '' pratyakṣa'' or perception; ''anumāna'' or inference; ''upamāṇa'', comparison and analogy; ''arthāpatti'', the use of postulation and derivation from circumstances; and ''shabda'', the word or testimony of past or present reliable experts. The Bhāṭṭa sub-school, from philosopher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, added a sixth means to its canon; '' anupalabdhi'' meant non-perception, or proof by the absence of cognition (e.g., the ''lack'' of gunpowder on a suspect's hand)John A. Grimes, ''A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English'', State University of New York Press, , page 238.

The school of Mīmāṃsā consists of both non-theistic and theistic doctrines, but the school showed little interest in systematic examination of the existence of Gods. Rather, it held that the soul is an eternal, omnipresent, inherently active spiritual essence, and focused on the epistemology and metaphysics of ''Dharma''. For the Mīmāṃsā school, ''Dharma'' meant rituals and social duties, not '' Devas'', or Gods, because Gods existed only in name. The Mīmāṃsakas also held that Vedas are "eternal, author-less, ndinfallible", that Vedic ''vidhi'', or injunctions and mantras in rituals are prescriptive ''kārya'' or actions, and the rituals are of primary importance and merit. They considered the Upaniṣads and other texts related to self-knowledge and spirituality as subsidiary, a philosophical view that Vedānta disagreed with.

While their deep analysis of language and linguistics influenced other schools of Hinduism, their views were not shared by others. Mīmāṃsakas considered the purpose and power of language was to clearly ''prescribe'' the proper, correct and right. In contrast, Vedāntins extended the scope and value of language as a tool to also ''describe'', ''develop'' and ''derive''. Mīmāṁsakās considered orderly, law driven, procedural life as central purpose and noblest necessity of Dharma and society, and divine (theistic) sustenance means to that end.

The Mīmāṁsā school is a form of philosophical realism. A key text of the Mīmāṁsā school is the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra of Jaimini.M. Hiriyanna (1993), Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, , pages 298-335.

Terminology

Mīmāṃsā (IAST), also romanized Mimansa or Mimamsa, means "reflection, consideration, profound thought, investigation, examination, discussion" in Sanskrit.Mimamsa
Monier Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon (Germany) It also refers to the "examination of the Vedic text" and to a school of Hindu philosophy that is also known as ("prior" inquiry, also ), in contrast to ("posterior" inquiry, also ) – the opposing school of Vedanta. This division is based on classification of the Vedic texts into ', the early sections of the Veda treating of mantras and rituals (Samhitas and Brahmanas), and the ' dealing with the meditation, reflection and knowledge of Self, Oneness, Brahman (the Upaniṣads). Between the ''Samhitas'' and ''Brahmanas'', the Mīmāṃsā school places greater emphasis to the Brahmanas – the part of Vedas that is a commentary on Vedic rituals.

The word comes from the desiderative stem of √man (Macdonell, A. A, 1883, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary), from Proto-Indo-European *men- (“to think”). Donald Davis translates Mīmāṃsā as the "desire to think", and in colloquial historical context as "how to think and interpret things". In the last centuries of the first millennium BCE, the word Mīmāṃsā began to denote the thoughts on and interpretation of the Vedas, first as ''Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā'' for rituals portions in the earlier layers of texts in the Vedas, and as ''Uttara-Mīmāṃsā'' for the philosophical portions in the last layers. Over time, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā was just known as the Mīmāṃsā school, and the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā as the Vedanta school.

Mīmāṃsā scholars are referred to as ''Mīmāṃsāka''s.

Development

Foundational Text

The foundational text for the Mīmāṃsā school is the Purva Mīmāṃsā Sutras of Jaimini (c. 2nd century BCE). The 's organize the correct way to interpret the Vedas.

Commentarial Tradition

(c. 1st century BCE) is the first commentator of the ', whose work is available to us. His ' is the basis of all later works of '. The commentaries on the ' by , , Hari and are no more extant.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Mandana Miśra, Pārthasārathi Miśra, Sucarita Miśra, Ramakrishna Bhatta, Madhava Subhodini, Sankara Bhatta, Krsnayajvan, Anantadeva, Gaga Bhatta, Ragavendra Tirtha, VijayIndhra Tirtha, Appayya Dikshitar, Paruthiyur Krishna Sastri, Mahomahapadyaya Sri Ramsubba Sastri, Sri Venkatsubba Sastri, Sri A. Chinnaswami Sastri, Sengalipuram Vaidhyanatha Dikshitar were some of Mīmāmsā scholars. The school reached its height with and (fl. ca. 700 CE).

(7th century CE), the founder of the first school of the ' commented on both the ' and its '. His treatise consists of 3 parts, the ', the ' and the '. (8th century CE) was a follower of , who wrote ''Vidhiviveka'' and '. There are several commentaries on the works of . wrote a ' (commentary) on the '. wrote ', also known as ', a commentary on the '. wrote ' (1300 CE), another commentary on the '. He also wrote ', an independent work on the ' and ''Tantraratna''. ’s ' is a commentary on the '.

(8th century CE), the originator of the second school of the ' wrote his commentary ' on the '. ’s ' (ninth century CE) is a commentary on the '. His ' is an independent work of this school and the ' is a brief explanation of the '. ’s ' deals with the views of this school in details.

The founder of the third school of the ' was , whose works have not reached us.

(17th century) wrote an elementary work on the ', known as ' or '. ' of is based on the '. ’s ' was an attempt to combine the views of the ' and the ' schools.

Darśana (philosophy) – central concerns

Mīmāṁsā is one of the six classical Hindu ''darśanas''. It is among the earliest schools of Hindu philosophies. It has attracted relatively less scholarly study, although its theories and particularly its questions on exegesis and theology have been highly influential on all classical Indian philosophies. Its analysis of language has been of central importance to the legal literature of India.

Ancient Mīmāṁsā's central concern was epistemology (''pramana''), that is what are the reliable means to knowledge. It debated not only "how does man ever learn or know, whatever he knows", but also whether the nature of all knowledge is inherently circular, whether those such as foundationalists who critique the validity of any "justified beliefs" and knowledge system make flawed presumptions of the very premises they critique, and how to correctly interpret and avoid incorrectly interpreting dharma texts such as the Vedas. It asked questions such as "what is ''devata'' (god)?", "are rituals dedicated to ''devatas'' efficacious?", "what makes anything efficacious?", and "Can it be proved that the Vedas, or any canonical text in any system of thought, is fallible or infallible (''svatah pramanya'', intrinsically valid)?, if so, how?" and others. To Mīmāṁsā scholars, the nature of non-empirical knowledge and human means to it are such that one can never demonstrate certainty, one can only falsify knowledge claims, in some cases. According to Francis Clooney, the Mīmāṁsā school is "one of the most distinctively Hindu forms of thinking; it is without real parallel elsewhere in the world".

The central text of the Mīmāṁsā school is Jamini's ''Mīmāṁsā Sutras'', accompanied by the historically influential commentary of Sabara and Kumarila Bhatta's commentary (''Ślokavārttika'') on Sabara's commentary. Together, these texts develop and apply the rules of language analysis (such as the rules of contradiction), asserting that one must not only examine injunctive propositions in any scripture but also examine the alternate related or reverse propositions for better understanding. They suggested that to reach correct and valid knowledge it is not only sufficient to demand proof of a proposition, it is important to give proof of a proposition's negative as well as declare and prove one's preferred propositions. Further, they asserted that whenever perception is not the means of direct proof and knowledge, one cannot prove such non-empirical propositions to be "true or not true", rather one can only prove a non-empirical proposition is "false, not false, or uncertain".

For example, Mīmāṁsakas welcome not only the demand for proof of an injunctive proposition such as " agnihotra ritual leads one to heaven", but suggest that one must examine and prove alternate propositions such as "ritual does not lead one to heaven", "something else leads one to heaven", "there is heaven", "there is no heaven" and so on. Mīmāṁsā literature states that if satisfactory, verifiable proof for all of such propositions cannot be found by its proponents and its opponents, then the proposition needs to be accepted as a part of a "belief system". Beliefs, such as those in the scriptures (Vedas), must be accepted to be true unless its opponents can demonstrate the proof of the validity of their own texts or teacher(s) these opponents presume to be ''prima facie justified'', and until these opponents can demonstrate that the scriptures they challenge are false. If they do not try to do so, it is hypocrisy; if they try to do so, it can only lead to an infinite regress, according to Mīmānsākas. Any historic scripture with widespread social acceptance, according to Mīmāṁsāka, is an activity of communication (''vyavaharapravrtti'') and is accepted as authoritative because it is socially validated practice unless perceptually verifiable evidence emerges that proves parts or all of it as false or harmful.

Mīmāṁsākas were predominantly concerned with the central motivation of human beings, the highest good, and actions that make this possible. They stated that human beings seek ''niratisaya priti'' (unending ecstatic pleasure, joy, happiness) in this life and the next. They argued that this highest good is the result of one's own ethical actions (''dharma''), that such actions are what the Vedic sentences contain and communicate, and therefore it important to properly interpret and understand Vedic sentences, words and meaning. Mīmāṁsā scholarship was centrally concerned with the philosophy of language, how human beings learn and communicate with each other and across generations with language in order to act in a manner that enables them to achieve that which motivates them. The Mīmāṁsā school focussed on ''dharma'', deriving ethics and activity from the ''karma-kanda'' (rituals) part of the Vedas, with the argument that ethics for this life and efficacious action for ''svarga'' (heaven) cannot be derived from sense-perception, and can only be derived from experience, reflection and understanding of past teachings.

In every human activity, the motivating force to perform an action is his innate longing for ''priti'' (pleasure, happiness),
whether at the lowest level or the highest level.
At the highest level, it is nothing but an unsurpassed state of ''priti'',
which is ensured only by performing ethical actions.

– Sabara, 2nd century Mīmānsā scholar

According to Daniel Arnold, Mīmāṁsā scholarship has "striking affinities" with that of William Alston, the 20th century Western philosopher, along with some notable differences. The Mīmāṁsākas subjected to a radical critique, more than two thousand years ago, states Francis Clooney, the notions such as "God," the "sacred text," the "author" and the "anthropocentric ordering of reality".

Epistemology

In the realm of epistemological studies, subsequent Mīmāṃsākas scholars have made significant contributions. Unlike the Nyaya or the Vaisheshika systems, the branch of Mīmāṃsā recognizes five means of valid knowledge (Skt. ''pramāṇa''). In addition to these, the sub-school of Mīmāṃsā acknowledges a sixth means, namely ''anuapalabdhi'', akin to the Advaita Vedanta school of Hinduism. The following are the six epistemically reliable means of gaining knowledge:

Pratyaksa

'' Pratyakṣa'' (प्रत्यक्ष means perception. It is of two types in Mīmānsā and other schools of Hinduism: external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind.MM Kamal (1998), The Epistemology of the Carvaka Philosophy, ''Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies'', 46(2): 13–16 The ancient and medieval Indian texts identify four requirements for correct perception: ''Indriyarthasannikarsa'' (direct experience by one's sensory organ(s) with the object, whatever is being studied), ''Avyapadesya'' (non-verbal; correct perception is not through hearsay, according to ancient Indian scholars, where one's sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's perception), ''Avyabhicara'' (does not wander; correct perception does not change, nor is it the result of deception because one's sensory organ or means of observation is drifting, defective, suspect) and ''Vyavasayatmaka'' (definite; correct perception excludes judgments of doubt, either because of one's failure to observe all the details, or because one is mixing inference with observation and observing what one wants to observe, or not observing what one does not want to observe).Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in ''Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies'', Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, , pages 160–168 Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as ''pramana'' and called it internal perception, a proposal contested by other Indian scholars. The internal perception concepts included ''pratibha'' (intuition), ''samanyalaksanapratyaksa'' (a form of induction from perceived specifics to a universal), and ''jnanalaksanapratyaksa'' (a form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of study' by observing its current state). Further, some schools of Hinduism considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from ''Pratyakṣa-pramana'', so as to contrast ''nirnaya'' (definite judgment, conclusion) from ''anadhyavasaya'' (indefinite judgment).

Anumana

'' Anumāṇa'' (अनुमान) means inference. It is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason. Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of ''Anumana''. In all except one Hindu philosophies, this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts: ''pratijna'' (hypothesis), ''hetu'' (a reason), and ''drshtanta'' (examples).James Lochtefeld, "Anumana" in ''The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism'', Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. , page 46-47 The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: ''sadhya'' (that idea which needs to proven or disproven) and ''paksha'' (the object on which the ''sadhya'' is predicated). The inference is conditionally true if ''sapaksha'' (positive examples as evidence) are present, and if ''vipaksha'' (negative examples as counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand ''Vyapti'' – the requirement that the ''hetu'' (reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both ''sapaksha'' and ''vipaksha''. A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a ''nigamana'' (conclusion).

Upamana

''Upamāṇa'' means comparison and analogy.DPS Bhawuk (2011), Spirituality and Indian Psychology (Editor: Anthony J. Marsella), Springer, , page 172. Gavin Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, , page 225. Some Hindu schools consider it as a proper means of knowledge. ''Upamana'', states Lochtefeld, may be explained with the example of a traveller who has never visited lands or islands with endemic population of wildlife. He or she is told, by someone who has been there, that in those lands you see an animal that sort of looks like a cow, grazes like a cow, but is different from a cow in such and such way. Such use of analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid means of conditional knowledge, as it helps the traveller identify the new animal later.James Lochtefeld, "Upamana" in ''The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism'', Vol. 2: N-Z, Rosen Publishing. , page 721 The subject of comparison is formally called ''upameyam'', the object of comparison is called ''upamanam'', while the attribute(s) are identified as ''samanya''.Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom – Religious, Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac & Co, London, pages 457–458 Thus, explains Monier Monier-Williams, if a boy says "her face is like the moon in charmingness", "her face" is ''upameyam'', the moon is ''upamanam'', and charmingness is ''samanya''. The 7th century text Bhaṭṭikāvya in verses 10.28 through 10.63 discusses many types of comparisons and analogies, identifying when this epistemic method is more useful and reliable, and when it is not. In various ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism, 32 types of ''Upanama'' and their value in epistemology are debated.

Arthāpatti

'' Arthāpatti'' (अर्थापत्ति) means postulation, derivation from circumstances. In contemporary logic, this ''pramāṇa'' is similar to circumstantial implication. As example, if a person left in a boat on a river earlier, and the time is now past the expected time of arrival, then the circumstances support the truth postulate that the person has arrived. Many Indian scholars considered this ''pramāṇa'' as invalid or at best weak, because the boat may have gotten delayed or diverted. However, in cases such as deriving the time of a future sunrise or sunset, this method was asserted by the proponents to be reliable. Another common example for ''arthāpatti'' found in the texts of Mīmāṃsā and other schools of Hinduism is, that if "Devadatta is fat" and "Devadatta does not eat in the day", then the following must be true: "Devadatta eats in the night". This form of postulation and deriving from circumstances is, claim the Indian scholars, a means to discovery, proper insight and knowledge. The Hindu schools that accept this means of knowledge state that this method is a valid means to conditional knowledge and truths about a subject and object in original premises or different premises. The schools that do not accept this method, state that postulation, extrapolation and circumstantial implication is either derivable from other ''pramāṇas'' or flawed means to correct knowledge, instead one must rely on direct perception or proper inference.

Anupalabdhi

'' Anupalabdhi'' (अनुपलब्धि), accepted only by Kumarila Bhatta sub-school of Mīmāṃsā, means non-perception, negative/cognitive proof. ''Anupalabdhi pramana'' suggests that knowing a negative, such as "there is no jug in this room" is a form of valid knowledge. If something can be observed or inferred or proven as non-existent or impossible, then one knows more than what one did without such means. In the two schools of Hinduism that consider ''Anupalabdhi'' as epistemically valuable, a valid conclusion is either ''sadrupa'' (positive) or ''asadrupa'' (negative) relation – both correct and valuable. Like other ''pramana'', Indian scholars refined ''Anupalabdi'' to four types: non-perception of the cause, non-perception of the effect, non-perception of object, and non-perception of contradiction. Only two schools of Hinduism accepted and developed the concept "non-perception" as a ''pramana''. The schools that endorsed ''Anupalabdi'' affirmed that it as valid and useful when the other five ''pramanas'' fail in one's pursuit of knowledge and truth.

'' Abhava'' (अभाव) means non-existence. Some scholars consider ''Anupalabdi'' to be same as ''Abhava'', while others consider ''Anupalabdi'' and ''Abhava'' as different.D Sharma (1966), Epistemological negative dialectics of Indian logic — Abhāva versus Anupalabdhi, ''Indo-Iranian Journal'', 9(4): 291–300 ''Abhava-pramana'' has been discussed in ancient Hindu texts in the context of ''Padārtha

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