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Subgame Perfection
In game theory, a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept, specifically designed for dynamic games where players make sequential decisions. A strategy profile is an SPE if it represents a Nash equilibrium in every possible subgame of the original game. Informally, this means that at any point in the game, the players' behavior from that point onward should represent a Nash equilibrium of the continuation game (i.e. of the subgame), no matter what happened before. This ensures that strategies are credible and rational throughout the entire game, eliminating non-credible threats. Every finite extensive game with complete information (all players know the complete state of the game) and perfect recall (each player remembers all their previous actions and knowledge throughout the game) has a subgame perfect equilibrium. A common method for finding SPE in finite games is backward induction, wher ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Nash Equilibrium
In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is the most commonly used solution concept for non-cooperative games. A Nash equilibrium is a situation where no player could gain by changing their own strategy (holding all other players' strategies fixed). The idea of Nash equilibrium dates back to the time of Cournot, who in 1838 applied it to his model of competition in an oligopoly. If each player has chosen a strategy an action plan based on what has happened so far in the game and no one can increase one's own expected payoff by changing one's strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices constitutes a Nash equilibrium. If two players Alice and Bob choose strategies A and B, (A, B) is a Nash equilibrium if Alice has no other strategy available that does better than A at maximizing her payoff in response to Bob choosing B, and Bob has no other strategy available that does better than B at maximizing his payoff in response to Alice c ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Ultimatum Game
The ultimatum game is a popular experimental economics game in which two players interact to decide how to divide a sum of money, first described by Nobel laureate John Harsanyi in 1961. The first player, the proposer, proposes a division of the sum with the second player, the responder. The responder can either accept the proposed division or reject it. If the responder accepts, the money is split according to the proposal; if the responder rejects, neither player receives anything. Both players know in advance the rules of the game. The game is typically designed as a one-shot interaction to isolate immediate reactions to fairness, thereby minimizing the influence of potential future interactions. However, even within this one-shot context, participants' decision-making processes may implicitly involve considering the potential consequences of repeated interactions, due to the fact that humans have evolved within societies that interact repeatedly. This design is crucial for o ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Go (board Game)
# Go is an abstract strategy game, abstract strategy board game for two players in which the aim is to fence off more territory than the opponent. The game was invented in China more than 2,500 years ago and is believed to be the oldest board game continuously played to the present day. A 2016 survey by the International Go Federation's 75 member nations found that there are over 46 million people worldwide who know how to play Go, and over 20 million current players, the majority of whom live in East Asia. The Game piece (board game), playing pieces are called ''Go equipment#Stones, stones''. One player uses the white stones and the other black stones. The players take turns placing their stones on the vacant intersections (''points'') on the #Boards, board. Once placed, stones may not be moved, but ''captured stones'' are immediately removed from the board. A single stone (or connected group of stones) is ''captured'' when surrounded by the opponent's stones on all Orthogona ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Tic-tac-toe
Tic-tac-toe (American English), noughts and crosses (English in the Commonwealth of Nations, Commonwealth English), or Xs and Os (Canadian English, Canadian or Hiberno-English, Irish English) is a paper-and-pencil game for two players who take turns marking the spaces in a three-by-three grid, one with Xs and the other with Os. A player wins when they mark all three spaces of a row, column, or diagonal of the grid, whereupon they traditionally draw a line through those three marks to indicate the win. It is a solved game, with a forced draw assuming Best response, best play from both players. Names In American English, the game is known as "tic-tac-toe". It may also be spelled "tick-tack-toe", "tick-tat-toe", or "tit-tat-toe". In Commonwealth English (particularly British English, British, South African English, South African, Indian English, Indian, Australian English, Australian, and New Zealand English), the game is known as "noughts and crosses", alternatively spelled ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Vertex (graph Theory)
In discrete mathematics, and more specifically in graph theory, a vertex (plural vertices) or node is the fundamental unit of which graphs are formed: an undirected graph consists of a set of vertices and a set of edges (unordered pairs of vertices), while a directed graph consists of a set of vertices and a set of arcs (ordered pairs of vertices). In a diagram of a graph, a vertex is usually represented by a circle with a label, and an edge is represented by a line or arrow extending from one vertex to another. From the point of view of graph theory, vertices are treated as featureless and indivisible objects, although they may have additional structure depending on the application from which the graph arises; for instance, a semantic network is a graph in which the vertices represent concepts or classes of objects. The two vertices forming an edge are said to be the endpoints of this edge, and the edge is said to be incident to the vertices. A vertex ''w'' is said to be ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Non-credible Threat
A non-credible threat is a term used in game theory and economics to describe a threat in a sequential game that a ''rational'' player would not actually carry out, because it would not be in his best interest to do so. A threat, and its counterparta commitment, are both defined by American economist and Nobel prize winner, T.C. Schelling, who stated that: "A announces that B's behaviour will lead to a response from A. If this response is a reward, then the announcement is a commitment; if this response is a penalty, then the announcement is a threat." While a player might make a threat, it is only deemed credible if it serves the best interest of the player.Heifetz, A., & Yalon-Fortus, J. (2012). Game Theory: Interactive Strategies in Economics and Management. Cambridge University Press. ProQuest Ebook Central In other words, the player would be willing to carry through with the action that is being threatened regardless of the choice of the other player. This is based on the as ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Extensive Form
In game theory, an extensive-form game is a specification of a game allowing for the explicit representation of a number of key aspects, like the sequencing of players' possible moves, their choices at every decision point, the (possibly imperfect) information each player has about the other player's moves when they make a decision, and their payoffs for all possible game outcomes. Extensive-form games also allow for the representation of incomplete information in the form of chance events modeled as " moves by nature". Extensive-form representations differ from normal-form in that they provide a more complete description of the game in question, whereas normal-form simply boils down the game into a payoff matrix. Finite extensive-form games Some authors, particularly in introductory textbooks, initially define the extensive-form game as being just a game tree with payoffs (no imperfect or incomplete information), and add the other elements in subsequent chapters as refinements ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Complete Information
In economics and game theory, complete information is an economic situation or game in which knowledge about other market participants or players is available to all participants. The utility functions (including risk aversion), payoffs, strategies and "types" of players are thus common knowledge. Complete information is the concept that each player in the game is aware of the sequence, strategies, and payoffs throughout gameplay. Given this information, the players have the ability to plan accordingly based on the information to maximize their own strategies and utility at the end of the game. A typical example is the prisoner's dilemma. Inversely, in a game with incomplete information, players do not possess full information about their opponents. Some players possess private information, a fact that the others should take into account when forming expectations about how those players will behave. A typical example is an auction: each player knows their own utility function (valua ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Mixed Strategy
In game theory, a move, action, or play is any one of the options which a player can choose in a setting where the optimal outcome depends ''not only'' on their own actions ''but'' on the actions of others. The discipline mainly concerns the action of a player in a game affecting the behavior or actions of other players. Some examples of "games" include chess, bridge, poker, monopoly, diplomacy or battleship. The term strategy is typically used to mean a complete algorithm for playing a game, telling a player what to do for every possible situation. A player's strategy determines the action the player will take at any stage of the game. However, the idea of a strategy is often confused or conflated with that of a move or action, because of the correspondence between moves and pure strategies in most games: for any move ''X'', "always play move ''X''" is an example of a valid strategy, and as a result every move can also be considered to be a strategy. Other authors treat strate ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Tic Tac Toe
Tic-tac-toe (American English), noughts and crosses (English in the Commonwealth of Nations, Commonwealth English), or Xs and Os (Canadian English, Canadian or Hiberno-English, Irish English) is a paper-and-pencil game for two players who take turns marking the spaces in a three-by-three grid, one with Xs and the other with Os. A player wins when they mark all three spaces of a row, column, or diagonal of the grid, whereupon they traditionally draw a line through those three marks to indicate the win. It is a solved game, with a forced draw assuming Best response, best play from both players. Names In American English, the game is known as "tic-tac-toe". It may also be spelled "tick-tack-toe", "tick-tat-toe", or "tit-tat-toe". In Commonwealth English (particularly British English, British, South African English, South African, Indian English, Indian, Australian English, Australian, and New Zealand English), the game is known as "noughts and crosses", alternatively spelled ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Prisoner's Dilemma
The prisoner's dilemma is a game theory thought experiment involving two rational agents, each of whom can either cooperate for mutual benefit or betray their partner ("defect") for individual gain. The dilemma arises from the fact that while defecting is rational for each agent, cooperation yields a higher payoff for each. The puzzle was designed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950 during their work at the RAND Corporation. They invited economist Armen Alchian and mathematician John Williams to play a hundred rounds of the game, observing that Alchian and Williams often chose to cooperate. When asked about the results, John_Forbes_Nash_Jr., John Nash remarked that rational behavior in the Prisoner's dilemma#The_iterated_prisoner's_dilemma, iterated version of the game can differ from that in a single-round version. This insight anticipated a Folk_theorem_(game_theory), key result in game theory: cooperation can emerge in repeated interactions, even in situations where it i ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
