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Regret-free Mechanism
In mechanism design, a regret-free truth-telling mechanism (RFTT, or regret-free mechanism for short) is a mechanism in which each player who reveals his true private information does not feel regret after seeing the mechanism outcome. A regret-free mechanism incentivizes agents who want to avoid regret to report their preferences truthfully. Regret-freeness is a relaxation of ''truthfulness'': every truthful mechanism is regret-free, but there are regret-free mechanisms that are not truthful. As a result, regret-free mechanisms exist even in settings in which strong impossibility results prevent the existence of truthful mechanisms. Formal definition There is a finite set ''X'' of potential outcomes. There is a set ''N'' of agents. Each agent i has a ''preference'' Pi over ''X''. A ''mechanism'' or ''rule'' is a function ''f'' that gets as input the agents' preferences P1,...,Pn, and returns as output an outcome from ''X''. The agents' preferences are their private information ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Mechanism Design
Mechanism design (sometimes implementation theory or institution design) is a branch of economics and game theory. It studies how to construct rules—called Game form, mechanisms or institutions—that produce good outcomes according to Social welfare function, some predefined metric, even when the designer does not know the players' true preferences or what information they have. Mechanism design thus focuses on the study of solution concepts for a class of private-information games. Mechanism design has broad applications, including traditional domains of economics such as market design, but also political science (through voting theory). It is a foundational component in the operation of the internet, being used in networked systems (such as inter-domain routing), e-commerce, and Sponsored search auction, advertisement auctions by Facebook and Google. Because it starts with the end of the game (a particular result), then works backwards to find a game that implements it, it ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Strategyproofness
In mechanism design, a strategyproof (SP) mechanism is a game form in which each player has a weakly- dominant strategy, so that no player can gain by "spying" over the other players to know what they are going to play. When the players have private information (e.g. their type or their value to some item), and the strategy space of each player consists of the possible information values (e.g. possible types or values), a truthful mechanism is a game in which revealing the true information is a weakly-dominant strategy for each player. An SP mechanism is also called dominant-strategy-incentive-compatible (DSIC), to distinguish it from other kinds of incentive compatibility. A SP mechanism is immune to manipulations by individual players (but not by coalitions). In contrast, in a group strategyproof mechanism, no group of people can collude to misreport their preferences in a way that makes every member better off. In a strong group strategyproof mechanism, no group of people can c ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Cut And Choose
Divide and choose (also cut and choose or I cut, you choose) is a procedure for fair division of a continuous resource between two parties. It involves a heterogeneous good or resource and two partners who have different preferences over parts of the cake (both want as much of it as possible). The procedure proceeds as follows: one person divides the resource into two pieces; the other person selects one of the pieces; the cutter receives the remaining piece. Since ancient times some have used the procedure to divide land, food and other resources between two parties. Currently, there is an entire field of research, called fair cake-cutting, devoted to various extensions and generalizations of cut-and-choose. Divide and choose is envy-free in the following sense: each of the two partners can act in a way that guarantees that, according to their own subjective taste, their allocated share is at least as valuable as the other share, regardless of what the other partner does. Descr ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Repeated Game
In game theory, a repeated game (or iterated game) is an extensive form game that consists of a number of repetitions of some base game (called a stage game). The stage game is usually one of the well-studied 2-person games. Repeated games capture the idea that a player will have to take into account the impact of their current action on the future actions of other players; this impact is sometimes called their reputation. Single stage game or single shot game are names for non-repeated games. Example Consider two gas stations that are adjacent to one another. They compete by publicly posting pricing, and have the same and constant marginal cost ''c'' (the wholesale price of gasoline). Assume that when they both charge , their joint profit is maximized, resulting in a high profit for everyone. Despite the fact that this is the best outcome for them, they are motivated to deviate. By modestly lowering the price, either can steal all of their competitors' customers, nearly doub ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Fair Cake-cutting
Fair cake-cutting is a kind of fair division problem. The problem involves a ''heterogeneous'' resource, such as a cake with different toppings, that is assumed to be ''divisible'' – it is possible to cut arbitrarily small pieces of it without destroying their value. The resource has to be divided among several partners who have different preferences over different parts of the cake, i.e., some people prefer the chocolate toppings, some prefer the cherries, some just want as large a piece as possible. The division should be ''unanimously'' fair – each person should receive a piece believed to be a fair share. The "cake" is only a metaphor; procedures for fair cake-cutting can be used to divide various kinds of resources, such as land estates, advertisement space or broadcast time. The prototypical procedure for fair cake-cutting is divide and choose, which is mentioned in the book of Book of Genesis, Genesis to resolve Abraham and Lot's conflict. This procedure solves the fa ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Condorcet-consistent
A Condorcet method (; ) is an election method that elects the candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate. A candidate with this property, the ''pairwise champion'' or ''beats-all winner'', is formally called the ''Condorcet winner'' or ''Pairwise Majority Rule Winner'' (PMRW). The head-to-head elections need not be done separately; a voter's choice within any given pair can be determined from the ranking. Some elections may not yield a Condorcet winner because voter preferences may be cyclic—that is, it is possible that every candidate has an opponent that defeats them in a two-candidate contest. The possibility of such cyclic preferences is known as the Condorcet paradox. However, a smallest group of candidates that beat all candidates not in the group, known as the Smith set, always exists. The Smith set is guaranteed to have the Condorcet winner in it should one exist. Man ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
