in The Levant
Mamluk Sultanate (Arabic: سلطنة المماليك
Salṭanat al-Mamālīk) was a medieval realm spanning Egypt, the
Levant, and Hejaz. It lasted from the overthrow of the Ayyubid dynasty
until the Ottoman conquest of
Egypt in 1517. Historians have
traditionally broken the era of Mamlūk rule into two periods—one
covering 1250–1382, the other, 1382–1517. Western historians call
the former the "Baḥrī" period and the latter the "Burjī" due to
the political dominance of the regimes known by these names during the
respective eras. Contemporary Muslim historians refer to the same
divisions as the "Turkish" and "Circassian" periods
in order to stress the change in the ethnic origins of the majority of
The Mamlūk state reached its height under Turkic rule with Arabic
culture and then fell into a prolonged phase of decline under the
Circassians. The sultanate's ruling caste was composed of
Mamluks, soldiers of predominantly Cuman-
Kipchaks (from Crimea),
Circassian, Abkhazian, Oghuz Turks and Georgian slave
Mamluks were purchased, their status was above
ordinary slaves, who were not allowed to carry weapons or perform
Mamluks were considered to be "true lords", with social
status above citizens of Egypt. Though it declined towards the end of
its existence, at its height the sultanate represented the zenith of
medieval Egyptian and Levantine political, economic, and cultural
glory in the Islamic era.
2.2 Rise to power
2.2.1 Conflict with the Ayyubids
2.2.2 Factional power struggles
2.3 Bahri rule
2.3.1 Reign of Baybars
2.3.2 Early Qalawuni period
2.3.3 Third reign of an-Nasir Muhammad
2.3.4 End of the Bahri regime
2.4 Burji rule
2.4.1 Reign of Barquq
2.4.2 Crises and restoration of state power
2.4.3 Reign of Barsbay
3.2.1 Muslim community
3.2.2 Christian and Jewish communities
Bedouin relationship with the state
4.1 Authority of the sultan
4.2 Role of the caliph
4.3 Military and administrative hierarchy
5.1 Iqtaʿ system
5.3 Trade and industry
6 List of sultans
7 See also
9.1 Primary sources
Mamluk Sultanate is a modern historiographical term.
Arabic sources for the period of the Bahri
Mamluks refer to the
dynasty as the State/Realm of the Turks (Arabic: دولة
الاتراك, Dawlat al-Atrāk; دولة الترك, Dawlat
al-Turk; الدولة التركية, al-Dawla
al-Turkiyya). Other official names used were State of the
Circassians (دولة الجراكسة, Dawlat al-Jarākisa). A
variant thereof (دولة التركية الجراكسية, al-Dawla
al-Turkiyya al-Jarkasiyya) emphasized the fact that the Circassians
Some misconception names include “the Baḥrī Sultanate/period”
dawlat al-Baḥriyya (الدولة البحرية) and the “Burjī
Sultanate/period” al-Dawla al-Burijyya (الدولة البرجية)
these were rarely used by medieval
Mamluk historians but are currently
used as sub-periods of the
Mamluk Sultanates.[clarification needed]
The term Mongol State (الدولة المغولية, al-Dawla
al-Mughuliyya) was used during
Sultan al-Adil Kitbugha's rule, who was
of Mongol extraction.
During Baybars al-Jāshankīr’s reign the state was known as
al-dawla al-burijyya (الدولة البرجية) which meant the
“Burjī Sultanate/period”, when in fact he was a ruler during the
Baḥrī Sultanate/period but was of Circassian extraction that
dominated in Burjī Sultanate/period. Dawlatāl Qalāwūn(دولة
قلاوون) or Dawlat Banī Qalāwūn (دولة بني قلاوون)
which means "Qalāwūnī State/Dynasty" which have ruled for hundred
years between 1279 and 1382. Al-dawla al-Ẓāhiriyya (الدولة
الظاهرية) which meant "Ẓāhirī state/dynasty" which is the
Baibars and his two sons al-Said Barakah and Solamish. This
dynasty have ruled consecutively for 19 years.
See also: Mamluk
Mamluk nobleman from Aleppo
The mamluk was an "owned slave", distinguished from the garya and
ghulam, or household slaves. After thorough training in various fields
such as martial arts, court etiquette and Islamic sciences, these
slaves were freed. However, they were still expected to remain loyal
to their master and serve his household.
Mamluks had formed a part
of the state or military apparatus in
Egypt since at least
the 9th century, during the Tulunid period.
constituted the backbone of Egypt's military under Ayyubid rule in the
late 12th and early 13th centuries, beginning with
replaced the Fatimids' African infantry with mamluks. Each Ayyubid
sultan and high-ranking emir had a private mamluk corps. Most of
the mamluks in the Ayyubids' service were ethnic Kipchak Turks from
Central Asia, who, upon entering service, were converted to Sunni
Islam and taught Arabic. They were highly committed to their
masters, who they often referred to as "father", and were in turn
treated more as kinsmen than as slaves by their masters. Sultan
as-Salih Ayyub (r. 1240–49), the last of the Ayyubid sultans, had
acquired some 1,000 mamluks (some of them free-born) from Syria, Egypt
Arabian Peninsula by 1229, while serving as na'ib (viceroy) of
Egypt during the absence of his father,
Sultan al-Kamil. These mamluks
became known as the "Salihiyyah" (singular "Salihi").
Mamluk training with a lance, early 16th century
As-Salih became sultan of
Egypt in 1240, and upon his accession to the
Ayyubid throne, he manumitted and promoted large numbers of his
original and newly recruited mamluks on the condition that they remain
in his service. To provision his mamluks, as-Salih forcibly seized
the iqtaʿat (fiefs; singular iqtaʿ) of his predecessors' emirs.
As-Salih sought to create a paramilitary apparatus in
Egypt loyal to
him, and his aggressive recruitment and promotion of mamluks led
contemporaries to view
Egypt as "Salihi-ridden", according to
historian Winslow William Clifford. Despite his close relationship
with his mamluks, tensions existed between as-Salih and the
Salihiyyah, and a number of Salihi mamluks were imprisoned or exiled
throughout as-Salih's reign. While historian Stephen Humphreys
asserts that the Salihiyyah's increasing dominance of the state did
not personally threaten as-Salih due to their fidelity to him,
Clifford believes the Salihiyyah developed an autonomy within the
state that fell short of such loyalty. Opposition among the
Salihiyyah to as-Salih rose when the latter ordered the assassination
of his brother Abu Bakr al-Adil in 1249, a task which many of the
Salihiyyah were affronted by and rejected; four of the Salihiyyah
ultimately agreed to execute the controversial operation.
Rise to power
Conflict with the Ayyubids
Tensions between as-Salih and his mamluks came to a head later in 1249
Louis IX of France's forces captured
Damietta in their bid to
Egypt during the Seventh Crusade. As-Salih believed
Damietta should not have been evacuated and was rumored to have
threatened punitive action against the
Damietta garrison. The rumor,
accentuated by the execution of civilian notables who evacuated
Damietta, provoked a mutiny by the garrison of his camp in
al-Mansurah, which included numerous Salihi mamluks. The situation
was calmed after the intervention of the atabeg al-askar (commander of
the military), Fakhr ad-Din ibn Shaykh al-Shuyukh.
As the Crusaders advanced, as-Salih died and was succeeded by his son
al-Muazzam Turanshah, who was in al-Jazira at the time. Initially,
the Salihiyyah welcomed Turanshah's succession, with many greeting him
and requesting confirmation of their administrative posts and iqtaʿ
assignments at his arrival to the Egyptian frontier. However,
Turanshah sought to challenge the dominance of the Salihiyyah in the
paramilitary apparatus by promoting his Kurdish retinue from al-Jazira
Syria as a counterweight to the predominantly Turkic
Salihiyyah. Before Turanshah could arrive at the front, the
Bahriyyah, a junior regiment of the Salihiyyah, defeated the Crusaders
at the Battle of al-Mansurah and captured Louis, effectively ending
the crusade. Turanshah proceeded to place his own entourage and
mamluks, known as the "Mu'azzamiyah", in positions of authority to
the detriment of Salihi interests. On 2 May 1250, a group of
disgruntled Salihi officers had Turanshah assassinated at his camp in
According to Humphreys, as-Salih's frequent wars against his Ayyubid
relatives likely voided the Salihiyyah's loyalty to other members of
the Ayyubid dynasty. Nonetheless, the Salihiyyah were careful not
to depict the assassination of Turanshah as an assault against Ayyubid
legitimacy, but rather an act against a deviant of the Muslim
polity. Moreover, an electoral college dominated by the Salihiyyah
convened to choose a successor to Turanshah among the Ayyubid emirs,
with opinion largely split between an-Nasir Yusuf of
al-Mughith Umar of al-Karak. Ultimately, however, consensus settled on
as-Salih's widow, Shajar ad-Durr.
Shajar ad-Durr ensured the Salihiyyah's dominance of the paramilitary
elite, and ushered in a process of establishing patronage and kinship
ties with the Salihiyyah. In particular, she cultivated close ties
with the Jamdari (pl. Jamdariyyah) and Bahri (pl. "Bahriyyah")
elements of the Salihiyyah, by distributing to them iqtaʿ and other
benefits. The Bahriyya were named after the
Arabic word bahr,
meaning "sea" or "large river", because their barracks was located on
Nile River island of Rawda. They were mostly drawn from among the
Kipchaks who controlled the steppes north of the Black Sea.
Shajar al-Durr's efforts and the lingering desire among the military
Egypt to maintain the Ayyubid state was made evident when the
Salihi mamluk and atabeg al-askar, Aybak, attempted to claim the
sultanate, but was prevented from monopolizing power by the army and
the Bahriyyah and Jamdariyyah, which asserted that only an Ayyubid
could exercise sultanic authority. The Bahriyyah compelled
Aybak to share power with al-Ashraf Musa, a grandson of Sultan
Factional power struggles
Aybak was one of the oldest of the Salihi mamluks and a senior member
of as-Salih's inner circle, despite only being an emir awsat
(middle-ranked emir). He served as the principal bulwark against
the more junior Bahri and Jamdari elements of the Salihiyyah, and his
promotion to atabeg al-askar was met by Bahri rioting in Cairo, the
first of many examples of intra-Salihi tensions surrounding Aybak's
ascendancy. The Bahriyyah and Jamdariyyah were represented by
their patron, Faris ad-Din Aktay, a principal organizer of Turanshah's
assassination and the recipient of Fakhr ad-Din's large estate by
Shajar al-Durr; the latter saw Aktay as a counterweight to Aybak.
Aybak moved against the Bahriyyah in 1251 by shutting down their Rawda
headquarters in a bid to sap Aktay's power base.
Aybak was still
unable to promote his own mamluks, known as the "Mu'izziyah", to
senior posts until 1252. That year, he managed to dispatch Aktay to
Egypt to suppress an
Arab uprising. Instead of isolating
Aktay as was Aybak's intention, the assignment allowed Aktay to impose
extortionate taxes in Upper
Egypt and provide him the personal funds
to finance his patronage of the Bahriyyah. In 1254,
Aybak had his
Mu'izzi mamluks assassinate Aktay in the Citadel of Cairo.
Aybak proceeded to purge those in his retinue and in the
Salihiyyah who he believed were disloyal to him, causing a temporary
exodus of Bahri mamluks, most of whom settled in Gaza, but also in
Egypt and Syria. The purge led to a dearth of military
support for Aybak, which in turn led to Aybak's recruitment of new
supporters from among the army in
Egypt and the Turkic Nasiri and
Azizi mamluks from Syria, who had defected from their Ayyubid masters,
namely an-Nasir Yusuf, and moved to
Egypt in 1250. The Syrian
mamluks were led by their patron Jamal ad-Din Aydughdi and were
assigned most of the iqtaʿ of Aktay and his allies. However,
Aydughdi's growing ambitions made
Aybak view him as a threat. After
Aybak learned that Aydughdi was plotting to topple him and recognize
an-Nasir Yusuf as Ayyubid sultan, which would likely leave Aydughdi in
virtual control of Egypt,
Aybak had Aydughdi imprisoned in Alexandria
in 1254 or 1255.
Meanwhile, the Bahriyya faction in Gaza commanded by Baybars sought to
enlist their services with an-Nasir Yusuf. In an attempt to dislodge
Aybak, the Bahriyyah petitioned an-Nasir Yusuf to claim the Ayyubid
throne and invade Egypt, but an-Nasir Yusuf initially refused.
However, in 1256, he dispatched a Bahri-led expedition to Egypt, but
no battle occurred when
Aybak met an-Nasir Yusuf's army.
assassinated on 10 April 1257, possibly on the orders of Shajar
al-Durr, who was assassinated a week later. Their deaths left
a relative power vacuum in Egypt, with Aybak's teenage son, al-Mansur
Ali, as heir to the sultanate. While al-Mansur Ali was sultan, the
Egypt was Aybak's former close aide, Sayf ad-Din
Qutuz, who also had hostile relations with the Salihiyyah,
including the Bahri mamluks.
By the time of Aybak's death, the Bahriyyah had entered the service of
al-Mughith Umar of al-Karak, who agreed to invade
Egypt and claim the
Ayyubid sultanate, but al-Mughith's small Bahri-dominated invading
force was routed at the frontier with
Egypt in November. The
Bahriyyah and al-Mughith launched a second expedition in 1258, but
were again defeated. The Bahriyyah subsequently raided areas
around Syria, threatening an-Nasir Yusuf's power in Damascus. After a
first attempt to defeat the Bahriyyah near Gaza failed, an-Nasir Yusuf
launched a second expedition against them with al-Mansur Muhammad II
of Hama, resulting in a Bahriyyah defeat at Jericho. An-Nasir
Yusuf proceeded to besiege al-Mughith and the Bahriyyah at al-Karak,
but the growing threat of a Mongol invasion of
Syria ultimately led to
a reconciliation between an-Nasir Yusuf and al-Mughith, and Baybars'
defection to the former.
Qutuz deposed al-Mansur Ali in 1259.
Afterward, he purged and/or arrested the Mu'izziyah and any Bahri
mamluks he could locate in
Egypt in a bid to eliminate dissent towards
his rule. The surviving Mu'izzi and Bahri mamluks made their way
to Gaza, where Baybars had created a virtual shadow state in
opposition to Qutuz.
Mamluk lancers, early 16th century (etching by Daniel Hopfer)
While various mamluk factions competed for control of
Egypt and Syria,
Mongols under the command of
Hulagu Khan had sacked Baghdad, the
intellectual and spiritual center of the Islamic world, in 1258, and
proceeded westward, capturing
Aleppo and Damascus.
military reinforcements to his erstwhile enemy an-Nasir Yusuf in
Syria, and reconciled with the Bahriyyah, including Baybars, who was
allowed to return to Egypt, to face the common Mongol threat.
Hulagu sent emissaries to
Qutuz in Cairo, demanding submission to
Qutuz had the emissaries killed, an act which historian
Joseph Cummins called the "worst possible insult to the Mongol
Qutuz then prepared Cairo's defenses to ward off the
Mongols' threatened invasion of Egypt, but after hearing news that
Hulagu withdrew from
Syria to claim the Mongol throne,
preparations for the conquest of Syria. He mobilized a force of some
120,000 soldiers and gained the support of his main
Mamluks entered Palestine to confront the Mongol army that Hulagu
left behind under the command of Kitbuqa. In September 1260, the
two sides met in the plains south of
Nazareth in a major confrontation
known as the Battle of Ain Jalut.
Qutuz had some of his cavalry
units hide in the hills around Ain Jalut (Goliath's Spring), while
directing Baybars's forces to advance past Ain Jalut against Kitbuqa's
Mongols. In the ensuing half-hour clash, Baybars' men feigned a
retreat and were pursued by Kitbuqa. The latter's forces fell into a
Mamluk trap once they reached the springs of Ain Jalut, with Baybars'
men turning around to confront the
Mongols and Qutuz's units ambushing
Mongols from the hills. The battle ended in a Mongol rout and
Kitbuqa's capture and execution. Afterward, the
Mamluks proceeded to
Damascus and the other Syrian cities taken by the
Mongols. Upon Qutuz's triumphant return to Cairo, he was
assassinated in a Bahri plot. Baybars subsequently assumed power in
Egypt in late 1260, and established the Bahri Mamluk
Main article: Bahri dynasty
Reign of Baybars
Main article: Baibars
Baybars rebuilt the Bahriyyah's former headquarters in Rawdah island
and put Qalawun, one of his most senior associates, in command of it.
In 1263, Baybars deposed al-Mughith of al-Karak based on allegations
of collaborating with the Mongol
Ilkhanate of Persia, and thus
consolidated his authority over Muslim Syria. During his early
reign and through heavy financial expense, Baybars rebuilt and
stringently trained the
Mamluk army, which grew from 10,000 cavalry to
40,000, with a 4,000-strong royal guard at its core. The new force
was rigidly disciplined and highly trained in horsemanship,
swordsmanship and archery.
Another major component to Baybar's rule was intrastate communication.
To accomplish this, he instituted a postal network that extended
across the cities of
Egypt and Syria. The need for smooth delivery
of correspondence also led to the large scale repair or construction
of roads and bridges along the postal route. Baybars attempted to
institute dynastic rule by assigning his four-year-old son al-Said
Barakah as co-sultan, thereby ending the
Mamluk tradition of electing
a leader, but this effort was ultimately unsuccessful, at least for
his Zahirid household; successful rulership became highly dependent on
Baybars' personal qualities. However, Baybars success in
establishing centralized rule resulted in the consolidation of the
Mamluk Sultanate. Through opening diplomatic channels with the
Mongols, Baybars also sought to stifle a potential alliance between
Mongols and the Christian powers of Europe, while also sowing
divisions between the Mongol
Ilkhanate and the Mongol Golden Horde. In
addition, his diplomacy was also intended to maintain the flow of
Turkic mamluks from Mongol-held Central Asia.
the lion passant was the heraldic blazon of
Baibars from 1260
With Bahri power in
Egypt and Muslim
Syria consolidated by 1265,
Baybars launched expeditions against the Crusader fortresses
throughout Syria, capturing
Arsuf in 1265, and Halba and
1266. According to historian Thomas Asbridge, the methods used to
Arsuf demonstrated the "Mamluks' grasp of siegecraft and their
overwhelming numerical and technological supremacy". Baybars'
strategy regarding the Crusader fortresses along the Syrian coast was
not to capture and utilize the fortresses, but to destroy them and
thus prevent their potential future use by new waves of Crusaders.
In August 1266, the
Mamluks launched a punitive expedition against the
Armenian Cilician Kingdom for its alliance with the Mongols, laying
waste to numerous to Armenian villages and significantly weakening the
kingdom. At around the same time, Baybars' forces captured
the Knights Templar, and shortly after, Ramla, both cities in interior
Palestine. Unlike the coastal Crusader fortresses, the Mamluks
strengthened and utilized the interior cities as major garrisons and
administrative centers. Campaigns against the Crusaders continued
in 1267, and in the spring of 1268, Baybars' forces captured Jaffa
before conquering the major Crusader fortress of
Antioch on 18
Baybars initiated a more aggressive policy than his predecessors
toward the Christian Nubian kingdom of Makuria on Egypt's southern
border. In 1265, the
Mamluks launched an invasion of northern Makuria,
and forced the Nubian king to become a vassal of the Mamluks.
Around that time, the
Mamluks had conquered the
Red Sea areas of
Suakin and the Dahlak Archipelago, while attempting to extend their
control to the Hejaz, the desert regions west of the Nile, and
Cyrenaica. In 1268, the Makurian king, David I, overthrew the
Mamluks' vassal and in 1272, raided the
Red Sea port of
Louis IX of France
Louis IX of France launched the Eighth Crusade, this time
Tunis with the intention of ultimately invading Egypt.
Louis IX died, allowing the
Mamluks to refocus their efforts
at further conquests of Crusader territories in Syria, including the
County of Tripoli's
Krak des Chevaliers
Krak des Chevaliers fortress, which Baybars
captured in 1271. Despite an alliance with the
Assassins in 1272,
in July 1273, the Mamluks, who by then determined that the Assassins'
independence was problematic, wrested control of the Assassins'
fortresses in Jabal Ansariyah, including Masyaf. In 1275, the
Mamluk governor of Qus, with
Bedouin allies, launched an expedition
against Nubia, defeating David near
Dongola in 1276, and installed
Shakanda as king. This brought the fortresses of
Qasr Ibrim and
Mamluk jurisdiction. The conquest of
Nubia was not
permanent, however, and the process of invading the region and
installing a vassal king would be repeated by Baybars' successors.
Nonetheless, Baybars' initial conquest led the annual expectation of
tribute from the Nubians by the
Mamluks until the Makurian kingdom's
demise in the mid-14th century. In 1277, Baybars launched an
expedition against the Ilkhanids, routing them in
Anatolia, before ultimately withdrawing to avoid overstretching their
forces and risk being cut off from
Syria by a second, large incoming
Early Qalawuni period
See also: Qalawun
In July 1277, Baybars died en route to Damascus, and was succeeded by
Barakah. However, the latter's ineptness precipitated a power
struggle that ended with
Qalawun being elected sultan in November
1279. The Ilkhanids took advantage of the disarray of Baybars'
succession by raiding
Mamluk Syria, before launching a massive
Syria in the autumn of 1281. Qalawun's forces were
significantly outnumbered by the estimated 80,000-strong
Ilkhanid-Armenian-Georgian-Seljuk coalition, but marched north from
Damascus to meet the Ilkhanid army at Homs. In the 28 October battle
of Homs, the
Mamluks routed the Ilkhanids and confirmed Mamluk
dominance in Syria. The defeat of the Ilkhanids allowed
proceed and eliminate the remaining Crusader outposts in Syria. In May
1285, he captured the Marqab fortress and garrisoned it.
Qalawun's early reign was marked by policies that were meant to gain
the support of important societal elements, namely the merchant class,
the Muslim bureaucracy and the religious establishment. Among
these early policies were the elimination of illegal taxes that
burdened the merchant community and extensive building and renovation
projects for Islam's holiest sites, such as the Prophet's Mosque in
Medina, the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and the
Ibrahimi Mosque in
Hebron. Following the détente with the
Ilkhanate after 1280,
Qalawun launched a wide arrest campaign to eliminate internal dissent,
imprisoning dozens of high-ranking emirs in
Egypt and Syria. The
détente also saw a shift in Qalawun's building activities to focus on
more secular and personal purposes, including a large, multi-division
hospital complex in
Cairo across from the tomb of as-Salih Ayyub.
Construction of the hospital, a contrast from his
who focused on establishing madrasas, was done to gain the goodwill of
the public, create a lasting legacy, and secure his spot in the
afterlife. Its location facing as-Salih's tomb was meant
demonstrate Qalawun's lasting connection to his master and to honor
the Salihiyyah. While the Salihi mamluks were typically Kipchak
Qalawun diversified mamluk ranks purchasing numerous non-Turks,
particularly Circassians, forming out of them the Burji regiment.
14th century illustration from a manuscript of depicting the Battle of
Wadi al-Khazandar, in which the
Mamluks were routed by the Mongol
Qalawun was the last Salihi sultan and following his death in 1290,
his son, al-Ashraf Khalil, drew his legitimacy as a
emphasizing his lineage from Qalawun, thus inaugurating the Qalawuni
period of Bahri rule. Like his two Bahri predecessors, Khalil's
main priorities were organization of the sultanate, defeat of the
Crusaders and the Mongols, incorporation of
Syria into the Mamluk
domain and preservation of the import of new mamluks and weaponry.
With regards to the latter policy, Baybars had purchased 4,000
Qalawun purchased 6,000–7,000 and by the end of Khalil's
reign, there was an estimated total of 10,000 mamluks in the
sultanate. In 1291, Khalil captured Acre, the last major Crusader
fortress in Palestine and thus
Mamluk rule extended across the
entirety of Syria.
Khalil's death in 1293 led to period of factional struggle, with
Khalil's prepubescent brother, an-Nasir Muhammad, being overthrown the
following year by a Mongol mamluk of Qalawun, al-Adil Kitbugha, who in
turn was succeeded by a Greek mamluk of Qalawun, Husam ad-DIn
Lajin. In a bid to consolidate his control,
Lajin attempted to
redistribute iqtaʿat to his supporters.
Lajin was unable to
retain the sultanate and al-Nasir Muhammad was restored to power in
1298, ruling a fractious realm until being toppled a second time by
Baybars II, a Circassian mamluk of Qalawun, who was known to be more
wealthy, pious and cultured than his immediate predecessors. Early
into an-Nasir Muhammad's second reign, the Ilkhanids, whose leader,
Mahmud Ghazan, had converted to Islam, invaded
Syria and routed a
Mamluk army near
Homs in the Battle of Wadi al-Khazandar. However,
Ghazan withdrew most of his troops from
Syria shortly after due to a
dearth in fodder for their numerous horses and the residual Ilkhanid
force retreated in 1300 at the approach of the rebuilt Mamluk
army. A further Ilkhanid invasion in 1303 was repelled after the
Ilkhanid defeat at the Battle of Marj al-Suffar in the plains south of
Third reign of an-Nasir Muhammad
See also: al-Nasir Muhammad
Baybars II ruled for roughly one year before an-Nasir Muhammad became
sultan again in 1310, this time ruling for over three consecutive
decades in a period that is often considered by historians of the
Mamluk period to be the apex of both the Bahri regime specifically and
Mamluk Sultanate in general. To avoid the experiences of his
previous two reigns where the mamluks of
Qalawun and Khalil held sway
and periodically assumed the sultanate, an-Nasir Muhammad launched
efforts to establish a centralized autocracy. Early into his third
reign, in 1310, an-Nasir Muhammad imprisoned, exiled or killed any
Mamluk emirs that supported those who toppled him in the past,
including the Burji mamluks. He then assigned emirates to over
thirty of his own mamluks. Initially, an-Nasir Muhammad left most
of his father's mamluks undisturbed, but in 1311 and 1316, he
imprisoned and executed most of them, and again redistributed emirates
to his own mamluks. By 1316, the number of mamluks was reduced to
An-Nasir Muhammad went further in imposing his rule by
intervening to have al-Wathiq succeed
Caliph al-Mustakfi, as well as
compelling the qadi to issue legal rulings that advanced his
The third reign of an-Nasir Muhammad also saw a departure from the
traditions of succession and administrative elevation of his
predecessors since he observed in his first two reigns that such
traditions had been ignored anyway, while sultans were being
assassinated and mamluks were abusing other mamluks in bids for
power. Moreover, an-Nasir Muhammad's being the son of a mamluk
instead of a mamluk himself risked undermining his position among the
largely mamluk elite. This partially explains his purges of the
thousands of mamluks purchased by his predecessors. Amid conditions
that stemmed the flow of mamluks from the Mongol-held lands to the
sultanate, an-Nasir Muhammad resolved to make up for the loss of the
purged mamluks by adopting new methods of training and military and
financial advancement that introduced a great level of
permissiveness. This permissiveness, which manifested in far more
relaxed conditions for new mamluks, encouraged the pursuit of military
Egypt by aspiring mamluks outside of the country, to the
point that parents would sell their children as mamluks with the
belief the children would enjoy an improved standard of living.
Under an-Nasir Muhammad, the
Mamluks successfully repelled an Ilkhanid
Syria in 1313 and then concluded a peace treaty with the
Ilkhanate in 1322, bringing a long-lasting end to the Mamluk-Mongol
wars. Following the détente, an-Nasir Muhammad was able to usher
in a period of stability and prosperity in the sultanate through the
enacting of major political, economic and military reforms that were
ultimately intended to ensure his continued rule and consolidate the
Qalawunid-Bahri regime. Concurrent with an-Nasir Muhammad's reign
was the disintegration of the
Ilkhanate into several smaller dynastic
states and the consequent
Mamluk effort to establish diplomatic and
commercial relationships with the new political entities. An-Nasir
Muhammad also attempted to assert permanent
Mamluk control over the
Makurian vassal state, launching an invasion in 1316 and installing a
Muslim Nubian king, Abdallah Barshambu. The latter was overthrown
by Kanz al-Dawla, who an-Nasir Muhammad temporarily ousted in a
End of the Bahri regime
An-Nasir Muhammad died in 1341 and his rule was followed by a
succession of his descendants to the throne in a period marked by
political instability. Most of his successors, except for an-Nasir
Hasan (r. 1347–1351, 1354–1361) and al-Ashraf Sha'ban (r.
1363–1367), were sultans in name only, with the patrons of the
leading mamluk factions holding actual power. The first of
an-Nasir Muhammad's son to accede to the sultanate was Abu Bakr, who
an-Nasir Muhammad designated as his successor before his death.
However, an-Nasir Muhammad's senior aide, Qawsun, held real power and
ultimately imprisoned and executed Abu Bakr and had an-Nasir
Muhammad's infant son, al-Ashraf Kujuk, appointed in his stead. By
January 1342, however,
Kujuk were toppled, and the latter's
half-brother, an-Nasir Ahmad of al-Karak, was declared sultan.
Ahmad relocated to al-Karak and left a deputy to rule on his behalf in
Cairo. This unorthodox move, together with his seclusive and
frivolous behavior and his execution of loyal partisans, ended with
Ahmad's deposition and replacement by his half-brother as-Salih Ismail
in June 1342. Isma'il ruled until his death in August 1345, and
was succeeded by his brother al-Kamil Sha'ban. The latter was killed
in a mamluk revolt and was succeeded by his brother al-Muzaffar Hajji,
who was also killed in a mamluk revolt in late 1347.
Following Hajji's death, the senior emirs of an-Nasir Muhammad hastily
appointed another of his sons, the twelve-year-old an-Nasir Hasan.
Coinciding with Hasan's first term, in 1347–1348, the Bubonic
Plague arrived in
Egypt and other plagues followed, causing mass death
in the country, which in turn led to major social and economic changes
in the region. In 1351, Hasan attempted to assert his executive
power and was ousted by the senior emirs, led by
Emir Taz, and
replaced with his brother, as-Salih Salih. The emirs
Sirghitmish deposed Salih and restored Hasan in a coup in 1355, after
which Hasan gradually purged Taz,
Sirghitmish and their
mamluks from his administration. Concurrently, Hasan began
recruiting and promoting the awlad al-nas (descendants of mamluks who
did not experience the enslavement/manumission process) in the
military and administration, a process that lasted for the remainder
of the Bahri period. This led to resentment from Hasan's own
mamluks, led by
Emir Yalbugha al-Umari, who killed Hasan in
Yalbugha became the regent of Hasan's successor and the young son of
the late sultan Hajji, al-Mansur Muhammad. By then, mamluk solidarity
and loyalty to the emirs had dissipated. To restore discipline and
unity within the
Mamluk state and military, Yalbugha applied the
rigorous educational methods used for mamluks during the reigns of
sultans Baybars and Qalawun. In 1365, attempts by the
annex Armenia, which had since replaced Crusader Acre as the Christian
commercial foothold of Asia, were stifled by an invasion of Alexandria
by Peter I of Cyprus. The
Mamluks concurrently experienced a
deterioration of their lucrative position in international trade and
the economy of the sultanate declined, further weakening the Bahri
regime. Meanwhile, the perceived harshness of Yalbugha's
educational methods and his refusal to rescind his disciplinary
reforms led to a mamluk backlash. Yalbugha was subsequently killed
by his own mamluks in an uprising in 1366. The rebellious mamluks
were supported by
Sultan al-Ashraf Sha'ban, who Yalbugha installed in
1363. Sha'ban was able to rule as the real power in the sultanate
until 1377, when he was killed by mamluk dissidents on his way to
Mecca to perform the Hajj.
Main article: Burji dynasty
Reign of Barquq
Main article: Barquq
Sha'ban was succeeded by his seven-year-old son al-Mansur Ali,
although the oligarchy of the senior emirs held the reins of
power. Among the senior emirs who rose to prominence under Ali was
Barquq, a Circassian mamluk of Yalbugha who was involved in Sha'ban's
assassination, and Baraka, another of Yalbugha's
Barquq was made atabeg al-asakir in 1378, giving him
command of the
Mamluk army, which he used to oust Baraka in
1380. Afterward, he managed to bring to
Egypt his father Anas and
many of his kinsmen, possibly in an attempt to establish a power
base outside of the
Mamluk establishment. Ali died in May 1381 and
was succeeded by his nine-year-old brother, as-Salih Hajji.
However, power was in the hands of Barquq, as-Salih Hajji's regent;
Barquq tried to succeed Ali as sultan, but his bid was vetoed by the
other senior emirs. Nonetheless, in the following year, Barquq
toppled as-Salih Hajji with the backing of Yalbugha's mamluks and
assumed the sultanate, adopting the title of Baybars, "al-Malik
Barquq copper fals
Damascus 1382 1389
Barquq's accession had been made possible by the support of Yalbugha's
mamluks, whose subsequent rise to power also made Barquq's position
vulnerable. His rule was challenged in
Syria in 1389 during a
revolt by the
Mamluk governor of Malatya, Mintash, and the governor of
Aleppo, Yalbugha an-Nasiri, who was a former mamluk of both an-Nasir
Hasan and Yalbugha al-Umari. The rebels took over
headed for Egypt, prompting
Barquq to abdicate in favor of as-Salih
Hajji. The alliance between Yalbugha an-Nasiri and Mintash soon
fell apart, however, and factional fighting ensued in
with Mintash ousting Yalbugha.
Barquq was arrested and exiled to
al-Karak where he was able to rally support for his return to the
throne. In Cairo, Barquq's loyalists took over the citadel and
arrested as-Salih Hajji. This paved the way for Barquq's
usurpation of the sultanate once more in February 1390, firmly
establishing the Burji regime.
Barquq solidified his control over the sultanate in 1393, when his
forces killed the major opponent to his rule, Mintash, in Syria.
Barquq's reign saw the mass recruitment of
Circassians (estimated at
5,000 recruits) into the mamluk ranks and the restoration of the
Mamluk state's authority throughout its realm in the tradition of the
Mamluk sultans, Baybars and Qalawun. A major innovation to
this system by
Barquq was the division of
Egypt into three provinces
(niyabat) similar to the administrative divisions in Syria. The
new Egyptian niyabas were Alexandria,
Damanhur and Asyut. Barquq
instituted this change as a means to better control the Egyptian
countryside from the rising strength of the
Arab tribes. To that
Barquq dispatched the Berber Hawwara tribesmen of the Nile Delta
Egypt to keep the
Arab tribes in check.
During Barquq's reign, in 1387, the
Mamluks were able to force the
Anatolian entity in
Sivas to become a
Mamluk vassal state.
Towards the end of the 14th century, challengers to the Mamluks
emerged in Anatolia, including the
Ottoman dynasty who absorbed the
territory of the Karamanids in central
Anatolia and installed a vassal
as the leader of the
Dulkadirids in 1399, and the Turkic allies of
Timur, the Aq Qoyonlu and Kara Qoyounlu tribes who entered southern
Anatolia in the same time period.
Barquq entered into
a brief engagement with
Timur at the Euphrates in 1394, but Timur
withdrew during that episode.
Crises and restoration of state power
Barquq died in 1399 and was succeeded by his eleven-year-old son,
an-Nasir Faraj, who was in
Damascus at the time. In that same
Timur invaded Syria, sacking
Aleppo before proceeding to sack
Damascus. The latter had been abandoned by Faraj and his late
father's entourage, who left for Cairo.
Timur ended his occupation of
Syria in 1402 to pursue his war against the Ottomans in Anatolia, who
he deemed to be a more dangerous threat to his rule. Faraj was
able to hold onto power during this turbulent period, which in
addition to Timur's devastating raids, the rise of Turkic tribes in
Jazira and attempts by Barquq's emirs to topple Faraj, also saw a
Egypt in 1403, a severe plague in 1405 and a
that virtually ended the Mamluks' hold over Upper
Egypt between 1401
and 1413. Thus,
Mamluk authority throughout the sultanate was
significantly eroded, while the capital
Cairo experienced an economic
Faraj was toppled in 1412 by the Syria-based emirs, Tanam, Jakam,
Nawruz and al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh, who Faraj sent a total of seven
military expeditions against during his reign. The emirs could
not usurp the throne themselves, however, and had
installed; the caliph had the support of the non-Circassian mamluks
and legitimacy with the local population. Six months later,
Shakyh eased al-Musta'in out of power after neutralizing his main
rival, Nawruz, and assumed the sultanate. Shaykh's main goal in
office was restoration of the state's authority within the sultanate,
which saw further plagues in 1415–1417 and 1420. During his
reign, Shaykh reestablished the state's fiscal administration to
replenish the treasury. To that end, his fiscal administrator led
tax collection expeditions that were akin to plundering throughout the
sultanate to compensate for the tax arrears that had accumulated under
Faraj's reign. Shaykh also commissioned and led military
expeditions against the Mamluks' enemies in Anatolia, reasserting the
state's influence in that region.
Reign of Barsbay
Before Shaykh died in 1421, he sought to offset the power of the
Circassian mamluks by importing Turkish mamluks and installing a Turk
as atabeg al-asakir in 1420 to serve as regent for his infant son
Ahmad. However, following his death, a Circassian emir, Tatar,
married Shaykh's widow, ousted the atabeg al-asakir and assumed
power. Tatar died three months into his reign and was succeeded
by Barsbay, another Circassian emir of Barquq, in 1422.
Barsbay pursued an economic policy of establishing state monopolies
over the lucrative trade with Europe, particularly regarding spices,
to the chagrin of the civilian merchants of the sultanate.
Red Sea traders to offload their goods at
the Mamluk-held Hejazi port of
Jeddah rather than the Yemeni port of
Aden in order to derive the most financial benefit from the Red Sea
transit route to Europe.
Barsbay also undertook efforts to better
protect the caravan routes to the
Bedouin raids and the
Egyptian Mediterranean coast from Catalan and Genoese piracy.
With regards to European pirates, he launched campaigns against Cyprus
in 1425–1426, during which the island's king was taken captive,
because of his alleged assistance to the pirates; the large ransoms
paid to the
Mamluks by the Cypriots allowed them to mint new gold
coinage for the first time since the 14th century. Barsbay's
efforts at monopolization and trade protection were meant to offset
the severe financial losses of the sultanate's agricultural sector due
to the frequent recurring plagues that took a heavy toll on the
Barsbay launched military expeditions against the Aq Qoyonlu in 1429
and 1433. The first expedition involved the sacking of
the massacre of its Muslim inhabitants in retaliation for the Aq
Qoyonlu's raids against the Mamluks' Mesopotamian territories.
The second expedition was against the Aq Qoyonlu capital of Amid,
which ended with the Aq Qoyonlu recognizing
Mamluks were able to force the
Anatolian beyliks to
generally submit to their hegemony in the region,
Mamluk authority in
Egypt was largely relegated to the emirs of the Hawwara
tribe. The latter had grown wealthy from their burgeoning trade
with central Africa and achieved a degree of local popularity due to
their piety, education and generally benign treatment of the
While the Ottoman sultan
Bayezid II was engaged in Europe, a new round
of conflict broke out between
Egypt and the
Safavid dynasty in Persia
in 1501. Shah
Ismail I sent an embassy to Venice and
them to join arms and recover the territory taken from them by the
"Porte" (Ottomans). Mameluk Egyptian sultan Al-Ghawri was told by
Selim I that he was providing the envoys of the
Ismail I safe
Syria on their way to Venice and harboring refugees.
To appease him, Al-Ghawri placed in confinement the Venetian merchants
Syria and Egypt, but after a year released them.
Battle of Chaldiran
Battle of Chaldiran in 1514,
Selim I attacked the
Dulkadirids, an Egyptian vassal, and sent his head to
Al-Ashraf Qansuh al-Ghawri. Secure now against Shah Ismail I, in AD
1516 he drew together a great army aiming at conquering Egypt, but to
deceive it he represented his army to further the war against Shah
Ismail I. The war started in 1516 which led to the later incorporation
Egypt and its dependencies in the Ottoman Empire, with Mamluk
cavalry proving no match for the Ottoman artillery and the
janissaries. On August 24, 1516, at the
Battle of Marj Dabiq
Battle of Marj Dabiq Sultan
al-Ghawri was killed.
Syria passed into Ottoman Turkish
possession, who were welcomed in many places as deliverance from
Mamluk Sultanate survived until 1517, when it was conquered by the
Ottoman Empire. Ottoman sultan
Selim I captured
Cairo on January 20,
the center of power transferred then to Constantinople. Although not
in the same form as under the Sultanate, the
Ottoman Empire retained
Mamluks as an Egyptian ruling class and the
Mamluks and the Burji
family succeeded in regaining much of their influence, but remained
vassals of the Ottomans.
By the time the
Mamluks took power,
Arabic had already been
established as the language of religion, culture and the bureaucracy
in Egypt, and was widespread among non-Muslim communities there as
well. Arabic's wide use among Muslim and non-Muslim commoners had
likely been motivated by their aspiration to learn the language of the
ruling and scholarly elite. Another contributing factor was the
Arab tribal migration to
Egypt and subsequent intermarriage
between Arabs and the indigenous population. The Mamluks
contributed to the expansion of
Egypt through their victory
Mongols and the Crusaders and the subsequent creation of a
Muslim haven in
Syria for Arabic-speaking immigrants from
other conquered Muslim lands. The continuing invasions of Syria
by Mongol armies led to further waves of Syrian immigrants, including
scholars and artisans, to Egypt.
Arabic was used as the administrative language of the
sultanate, Turkish was the spoken language of the
elite. According to Petry, "the
Mamluks regarded Turkish as their
caste's vehicle of communication, even though they themselves spoke
Central Asian dialects such as Qipjak, or Circassian, a Caucasic
language." According to historian Michael Winter, "Turkishness"
was the distinctive aspect of the
Mamluk ruling elite, for only they
knew how to speak Turkish and had Turkish names. While the Mamluk
elite was ethnically diverse, those who were not Turkic in origin were
Turkicized nonetheless. As such, the ethnically Circassian
mamluks who gained prominence with the rise of the Burji regime and
became the dominant ethnic element of the government, were educated in
Turkish language and were considered to be Turks by the
The ruling military elite of the sultanate was exclusive to those of
mamluk background, with rare exceptions. Ethnicity served as a
major factor separating the mostly Turkic or Turkicized
from their Arabic-speaking subjects. Ethnic origin was a key
component of an individual mamluk's identity, and ethnic identity
manifested itself through given names, dress, access to administrative
positions and was indicated by a sultan's nisba. The sons of
mamluks, known as the awlad al-nas, did not typically hold positions
in the military elite and instead, were often part of the civilian
administration or the Muslim religious establishment. Among the
Bahri sultans and emirs, there existed a degree of pride of their
Kipchak Turkish roots, and their non-Kipchak usurpers such as
sultans Kitbuqa, Baybars II and
Lajin were often de-legitimized in the
Bahri-era sources for their non-Kipchak origins. The Mamluk
elites of the Burji period were also apparently proud of their
A wide range of Islamic religious expression existed in
Mamluk era, namely
Sunni Islam and its major madhabs
(schools of thought) and various Sufi orders, but also small
communities of Ismai'li Shia Muslims, particularly in Upper
Egypt. In addition, there was a significant minority of Coptic
Sultan Saladin, the Ayyubids embarked on a
program of reviving and strengthening
Sunni Islam in
Egypt to counter
Christianity, which had been reviving under the religiously benign
rule of the Fatimids, and Ismailism, the branch of Islam of the
Fatimid state. Under the Bahri sultans, the promotion of Sunni
Islam was pursued more vigorously than under the Ayyubids. The
Mamluks were motivated in this regard by personal piety or political
expediency for Islam was both an assimilating and unifying factor
Mamluks and the majority of their subjects; the early
mamluks had been brought up as Sunni Muslims and the Muslim faith was
the only aspect of life shared between the
Mamluk ruling elite and its
subjects. While the precedent set by the Ayyubids highly
Mamluk state's embrace of Sunni Islam, the
circumstances in the Muslim Middle East in the aftermath of the
Crusader and Mongol invasions also left
Egypt as the last major
Islamic power able to confront the Crusaders and the Mongols.
Thus, the early
Mamluk embrace of
Sunni Islam also stemmed from the
pursuit of a moral unity within their realm based on the majority
views of its subjects.
Mamluks sought to cultivate and utilize Muslim leaders to channel
the religious feelings of the sultanate's Muslim subjects in a manner
that did not disrupt the sultanate's authority. Similar to their
Ayyubid predecessors, the Bahri sultans showed particular favoritism
Shafi'i madhab, while also promoting the other major Sunni
madhabs, namely the Maliki,
Hanbali and Hanafi. Baybars ended the
Ayyubid and early
Mamluk tradition of selecting a
Shafi'i scholar as
qadi al-qudah (chief judge) and instead had a qadi al-qudah appointed
from each of the four madhabs. This policy change may have been
partly motivated by a desire to accommodate an increasingly diverse
Muslim population whose components had immigrated to
regions where other madhabs were prevalent. Ultimately, however,
the diffusion of the post of qadi al-qudah among the four madhabs
Mamluk sultans to act as patrons for each madhab and thus gain
more influence over them. Regardless of the policy change, the
Shafi'i scholars maintained a number of privileges over their
colleagues from the other madhabs.
Mamluks also embraced the various Sufi orders that existed in the
Sufism was widespread in
Egypt by the 13th century,
and the Shadhiliyyah was the most popular Sufi order. The
Shadhiliyyah lacked an institutional structure and was flexible in its
religious thought, allowing it to easily adapt to its local
environment. It incorporated Sunni Islamic piety with its basis
Qur'an and hadith, Sufi mysticism, and elements of popular
religion such as sainthood, ziyarat (visitation) to the tombs of
saintly or religious individuals, and dhikr (invocation of God).
Other Sufi orders with large numbers of adherents were the Rifa'iyyah
and Badawiyyah. While the
Mamluks patronized the Sunni ulama
through appointments to government office, they patronized the Sufis
by funding zawiyas (Sufi lodges). On the other end of the
spectrum of Sunni religious expression were the teachings of the
Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, which emphasized stringent moral rigor
based on literal interpretations of the
Qur'an and the Sunnah, and a
deep hostility to the aspects of mysticism and popular religious
innovations promoted by the various Sufi orders. While Ibn
Taymiyyah was not a typical representative of Sunni orthodoxy in the
sultanate, he was the most prominent Muslim scholar of the
and was arrested numerous times by the
Mamluk government for his
religious teachings, which are still influential in the modern-day
Muslim world. Ibn Taymiyyah's doctrines were regarded as being
heretic by the Sunni establishment patronized by the Mamluks.
Christian and Jewish communities
Christians and Jews in the sultanate were governed by the dual
authority of their respective religious institutions and the
sultan. The authority of the former extended to many of the
everyday aspects of Christian and Jewish life and was not restricted
to the religious practices of the two respective communities. The
Mamluk government, often under the official banner of the Pact of Umar
which gave Christians and Jews dhimmi (protected peoples) status,
ultimately determined the taxes that Christians and Jews paid to the
sultanate, including the jizyah (tax on non-Muslims), whether a house
of worship could be constructed and the public appearance of
Christians and Jews. Jews generally fared better than Christians,
and the latter experienced more difficulty under
Mamluk rule than
under previous Muslim powers. The association of Christians
with the Mongols, due to the latter's use of Armenian and Georgian
Christian auxiliaries, the attempted alliance between the
the Crusader powers, and the massacre of Muslim communities and the
sparing of Christians in cities captured by the Mongols, may have
contributed to rising anti-Christian sentiments in the Mamluk
era. The manifestations of anti-Christian hostility were mostly
spearheaded at the popular level rather than under the direction of
Mamluk sultans. The main source of popular hostility was resentment at
the privileged positions many Christians held in the Mamluk
The Coptic decline in
Egypt occurred under the Bahri sultans and
accelerated further under the Burji regime. There were several
instances of Egyptian Muslim protests against the wealth of Coptic
Christians and their employment with the state, and both Muslim and
Christian rioters burned down each other's houses of worship in times
of intercommunal tensions. As a result of popular pressure,
Coptic Christians had their employment in the bureaucracy terminated
at least nine times between the late 13th and mid-15th centuries, and
on one occasion, in 1301, the government ordered the closure of all
churches. Coptic bureaucrats would often be restored to their
positions after the moment of tension passed. Many Coptic
Christians decided to convert to Islam or at least adopt the outward
expressions of Muslim faith to protect their employment, avoid jizyah
taxation and avoid official measures against them. The 14th
century saw a large wave of Coptic conversions to Islam, and by
the end of the
Mamluk period, the ratio of Muslims to Christians in
Egypt may have risen to 10:1.
In Syria, the
Mamluks uprooted the local Maronite and Greek Orthodox
Christians from the coastal areas as a means to prevent their
potential contact with European powers. The
Maronite Church was
especially suspected by the
Mamluks of collaboration with the
Europeans due to the high degree of relations between the Maronite
Church and the papacy in Rome and the Christian European powers,
particularly Cyprus. The Greek Orthodox Church experienced a
decline following the
Mamluk destruction of its spiritual center,
Antioch, and the Timurid destruction of
1400. The Syriac Christians also experienced a significant
Syria due to intra-communal disputes over patriarchal
succession and the destruction of church institutions by the Timurids
and local Kurdish tribes. The
Mamluks brought about a similar
decline of the Armenian Orthodox Church after their capture of the
Armenian Cilician Kingdom in 1374, in addition to the raids of the
Timurids in 1386 and the conflict between the Timurids and the nomadic
Turkmen Aq Qoyunlu and Kara Qoyonlu tribal confederations in
Bedouin relationship with the state
Bedouin tribes served as a reserve force in the
Under the third reign of an-Nasir Muhammad in particular, the Bedouin
tribes, particularly those of Syria, such as the Al Fadl, were
strengthened and integrated into the economy as well. Bedouin
tribes were also a major source of the
Mamluk cavalry's Arabian
Qalawun purchased horses from the
Bedouin of Barqa
(Cyrenaica), which were inexpensive but of high quality, while
an-Nasir Muhammad spent extravagant sums for horses from numerous
Bedouin sources, including Barqa, Syria,
Iraq and Bahrayn.
Sultans Baybars and Qalawun, and the Syrian viceroys of an-Nasir
Muhammad during his first two reigns, emirs Salar and Baybars II, were
averse to granting
Bedouin sheikhs iqtaʿat, and when they did, the
iqtaʿat were of low quality. However, during an-Nasir Muhammad's
third reign, the
Al Fadl were granted high-quality iqtaʿat in
abundance, strengthening the tribe to become the most powerful among
Bedouin of the
Syrian Desert region. Beyond his personal
admiration of the Bedouin, an-Nasir Muhammad's motivation for
distributing iqtaʿat to Al Fadl, especially under the leadership of
Muhanna ibn Isa, was to prevent them from defecting to the Ilkhanate,
which their leaders had done frequently in the first half of the 14th
century. Competition over iqtaʿat and the post of amir al-ʿarab
Bedouin tribes of Syria, particularly the Al Fadl, led to
conflict and rebellion among the two tribes and other Bedouin, leading
to mass bloodshed in
Syria in the aftermath of an-Nasir Muhammad's
Mamluk leadership in Syria, weakened by the losses of
the Black Plague, was unable to quell the
Bedouin through military
expeditions, so they resolved to assassinate the sheikhs of the
tribes. including those of Upper Egypt. The
Al Fadl tribe
eventually lost favor, while the
Bedouin tribes of al-Karak were
strengthened by the later Bahri sultans.
In Egypt, the Mamluks, particularly during an-Nasir Muhammad's third
reign, had a similar relationship with the
Bedouin as in Syria. The
'Isa Ibn Hasan al-Hajjan tribe became powerful in the country after
being assigned massive iqtaʿat. The tribe remained strong after
an-Nasir Muhammad's death, but frequently rebelled against the
succeeding Bahri sultans, but were restored each time, before its
sheikh was finally executed as a rebel in 1353. In Sharqiya in
Lower Egypt, the Tha'laba tribes were charged with overseeing the
postal routes, but they were often unreliable in this regard and
ultimately joined the Al A'id tribes during their raids. Bedouin
tribal wars frequently disrupted trade and travel in Upper Egypt, and
caused the destruction of cultivated lands and sugar processing
plants. In the mid-14th century,
Bedouin tribes in Upper Egypt,
namely the rival Arak and Banu Hilal, became the de facto rulers of
the region, forcing the
Mamluks to rely on them for tax
Bedouin were ultimately purged from Upper and
Egypt by the campaigns of
Shaykhu in 1353.
Mamluks did not significantly alter the administrative, legal and
economic systems that they inherited from the Ayyubid state. The
Mamluk territorial domain was virtually the same as that of the
Ayyubid state i.e. Egypt,
Levant and Hijaz. However, unlike the
collective sovereignty of the Ayyubids where territory was divided
among members of the royal family, the
Mamluk state was unitary.
Under certain Ayyubid sultans,
Egypt had paramountcy over the Syrian
provinces, but under the
Mamluks this paramountcy was consistent and
Cairo remained the capital of the sultanate and its
social, economic and administrative center, with the
serving as the sultan's headquarters.
The foundation of
Mamluk organization and factional unity was based on
the principles of khushdashiyya, defined by historian Amalia Levanoni
as "the fostering of a common bond between mamluks who belonged to the
household of a single master and their loyalty towards him."
Khushdashiyya was likewise a crucial component of a sultan's authority
Authority of the sultan
Mamluk sultan was the ultimate authority, while he delegated power
to provincial governors known as nuwwab as-saltana (deputy sultans,
sing. na'ib as-saltana). Generally, the vice-regent of
the most senior na'ib, followed by the governor of Damascus, then
Aleppo, then the governors of al-Karak, Safad, Tripoli,
Hama. In Hama, the
Mamluks had permitted the Ayyubids to continue
to govern until 1341 (its popular governor in 1320, Abu'l Fida, was
granted the title sultan by
Sultan an-Nasir Muhammad), but otherwise
the nuwwab of the provinces were
A consistent accession process occurred with every new Mamluk
sultan. It more or less involved the election of a sultan by a
counsel of emirs and mamluks (who would give him an oath of loyalty),
the sultan's assumption of the monarchical title al-malik, a
state-organized procession through
Cairo at the head of which was the
sultan, and the reading of the sultan's name in the khutbah (Friday
prayer sermon). The process was not formalized and the electoral
body was never defined, but typically consisted of the emirs and
mamluks of whatever
Mamluk faction held sway; usurpations of the
throne by rival factions were relatively common. Despite the
electoral nature of accession, dynastic succession was nonetheless a
reality at times, particularly during the Bahri regime, where
Baybars' sons Barakah and
Solamish succeeded him, before Qalawun
usurped the throne and was thereafter succeeded by four generations of
direct descendants, with occasional interruptions. The frequency
of hereditary rule was much less frequent during the Burji regime.
Nonetheless, with rare exception, the Burji sultans were all linked to
the regime's founder
Barquq through blood or mamluk affiliation.
The accession of blood relatives to the sultanate was often the result
of the decision or indecision of senior
Mamluk emirs or the will of
the preceding sultan. The latter situation applied to the sultans
Baybars, Qalawun, the latter's son, an-Nasir Muhammad and Barquq, who
formally arranged for one or more of their sons to succeed them.
More often than not, the sons of sultans were elected by the senior
emirs with the ultimate intention that they serve as convenient
figureheads presiding over an oligarchy of the emirs.
Mamluk emirs viewed the sultan more as a peer whom they
entrusted with ultimate authority and as a benefactor whom they
expected would guarantee their salaries and monopoly on the
military. When emirs felt the sultan was not ensuring their
benefits, disruptive riots, coup plots or delays to calls for service
were all likely scenarios. Often, the practical restrictions on a
sultan's power came from his own khushdashiyyah or from other emirs,
with whom there was constant tension, particularly in times of peace
with external enemies. According to Holt, the factious nature of
emirs who were not the sultan's khushdashiyyah derived from the
primary loyalty of emirs and mamluks to their own ustadh (master)
before the sultan. However, emirs who were part of the sultan's
khushdashiyyah also rebelled at times, particularly the governors of
Syria who formed power bases out of their territory. Typically,
the faction most loyal to the sultan were the Royal Mamluks,
particularly those mamluks whom the sultan had personally recruited
and manumitted. This was in contrast to the qaranis, who were
those in the Royal Mamluks' ranks who had been recruited by a sultan's
predecessors and thus lacked khushdashiyyah bonds with the
sultan. The qaranis occasionally constituted a hostile faction to
a sultan, such as in the case of
Sultan as-Salih Ayyub and the
Qalawuni successors of an-Nasir Muhammad.
The sultan was the head of state and among his powers and
responsibilities were issuing and enforcing specific legal orders and
general rules, making the decision to go to war, levying taxes for
armed campaigns, ensuring the proportionate distribution of food
supplies throughout the sultanate and, in some cases, overseeing the
investigation and punishment of alleged criminals. A Mamluk
sultan or his appointees led the annual
Hajj pilgrimage caravans from
Damascus in the capacity of amir al-hajj (commander of the
Hajj caravan). Starting with Qalawun, the
Mamluks also monopolized the
tradition of providing the annual decorated covering of the Kaaba, in
addition to patronizing Jerusalem's Dome of the Rock. Another
prerogative, at least of the early Bahri sultans, was to import as
many mamluks as possible into the sultanate, preferring those who
originated from the territories of the Mongols. However, the
Mamluks' enemies, such as the Mongol powers and their Muslim vassals,
the Armenians and the Crusaders, successfully disrupted the flow of
mamluks into the sultanate. Unable to meet the military's need for
new mamluks, the sultans often resorted to turning Ilkhanid deserters
or prisoners of war into soldiers, sometimes while the war the
prisoners were captured in was still ongoing.
Role of the caliph
To legitimize their rule, the
Mamluks presented themselves as the
defenders of Islam, and, beginning with Baybars, sought the
confirmation of their executive authority from a caliph. The Ayyubids
had owed their allegiance to the Abbasid Caliphate, but the latter was
Caliph al-Musta'sim was killed by the
Mongols and the
Abbasid capital Baghdad was sacked in 1258. Three years later,
Baybars reestablished the caliphate as an institution by confirming a
member of the Abbasid family, al-Mustansir, as caliph, who in turn
confirmed Baybars as sultan. In addition, the caliph declared the
sultan's legitimate authority over the lands of Egypt, Syria,
Mesopotamia, Diyarbakir, the
Yemen and any territory
conquered from the Crusaders or Mongols. Al-Mustansir's Abbasid
successors continued in their official capacity as caliphs, but
virtually held no power in the
Mamluk government. The brief reign
Caliph al-Musta'in as sultan in 1412 was an anomaly. In an
anecdotal testament to the caliph's lack of real authority, a group of
rebellious mamluks responded to
Sultan Lajin's presentation of the
Caliph al-Hakim's decree asserting Lajin's authority with the
following comment, recorded by Ibn Taghribirdi: "Stupid fellow. For
God's sake—who pays any heed to the caliph now?"
Military and administrative hierarchy
Mamluk sultans were products of the military hierarchy, entry into
which was virtually restricted to mamluks, i.e. those soldiers who
were imported while young slaves. However, the sons of mamluks could
enter and rise high within the ranks of the military hierarchy,
but typically did not enter military service. Instead, many entered
into mercantile, scholastic or other civilian careers. The army
Baybars inherited consisted of Kurdish and Turkic tribesmen, refugees
from the various Ayyubid armies of
Syria and other troops from armies
dispersed by the Mongols. Following the Battle of Ain Jalut,
Baybars restructured the army into three components: the Royal Mamluk
regiment, the soldiers of the emirs, and the halqa (non-mamluk
soldiers). The Royal Mamluks, who were under the direct command
of the sultan, were the highest-ranking body within the army, entry
into which was exclusive. The Royal
Mamluks were virtually the
private corps of the sultan. The lower-ranking emirs also had their
own corps, which were akin to private armies. The soldiers of the
emirs were directly commanded by the emirs, but could be mobilized by
the sultan when needed. As emirs were promoted, the number of
soldiers in their corps increased, and when rival emirs challenged
each other's authority, they would often utilize their respective
forces, leading to major disruptions of civilian life. The halqa
had inferior status to the mamluk regiments. It had its own
administrative structure and was under the direct command of the
sultan. The halqa regiments declined in the 14th century when
professional non-mamluk soldiers generally stopped joining the
The Ayyubid army had lacked a clear and permanent hierarchical system
and one of Baybars' early reforms was creating a military
hierarchy. To that end, he began the system of assigning emirs
ranks of ten, forty and one hundred, with the particular number
indicating how many mounted mamluk troops were assigned to an emir's
command. In addition, an emir of one hundred could be assigned
one thousand mounted troops during battle. Baybars instituted
uniformity within the army and put an end to the previous improvised
nature of the various Ayyubid military forces of
Egypt and Syria.
To bring further uniformity to the military, Baybars and Qalawun
standardized the undefined Ayyubid policies regarding the distribution
of iqtaʿat to emirs. The reformation of iqtaʿ distribution
created a clear link between an emir's rank and the size of his
iqtaʿ. For example, an emir of forty would be given an iqtaʿ a
third of the size of an emir of one hundred's iqtaʿ. Baybars
also began biweekly inspections of the troops to verify that sultanic
orders were carried out, in addition to the periodic inspections in
which he would distribute new weaponry to the mamluk troops.
Starting with the reign of Qalawun, the sultan and the military
administration maintained lists of all emirs throughout the sultanate
and defined their roles as part of the right or left flanks of the
army should they be mobilized for war.
Gradually, as mamluks increasingly filled administrative and courtier
posts within the state,
Mamluk innovations to the Ayyubid hierarchy
were developed. The offices of ustadar (majordomo), hajib
(chamberlain), emir jandar and khazindar (treasurer), which existed
during the Ayyubid period, were preserved, but Baybars established the
additional offices of dawadar, emir akhur, ru'us al-nawab and emir
majlis. The administrative offices were largely ceremonial posts
and were closely connected to various elements of the military
The ustadar (from the
Arabic ustadh al-dar, "master of the house") was
the chief of staff of the sultan, responsible for organizing the royal
court's daily activities, managing the personal budget of the sultan
and supervising all of the buildings of the
Cairo Citadel and its
staff. The ustadar was often referred to as the ustadar al-aliyah
(grand master of the house) to distinguish from ustadar saghirs
(lesser majordomos) whose authority was subordinate to the ustadar
al-aliyah and who oversaw specific aspects of the court and citadel,
such as the sultan's treasury, private property and the kitchens of
Mamluk emirs also had their own ustadars. The
office of ustadar al-aliyah became a powerful post beginning in the
late 14th century, particularly so under sultans
an-Nasir Faraj, who transferred the responsibilities of the
special bureau for their mamluks to the authority of the ustadar, thus
turning the latter into the sultanate's chief financial official.
Mamluk Wool Carpet, Egypt, circa 1500-1550
Mamluk economy essentially consisted of two spheres: the state
economy, which was organized along the lines of an elite household and
was controlled by a virtual caste government headed by the sultan, and
the free market economy, which was the domain of society in general
and which was associated with the native inhabitants in contrast to
the ethnically foreign origins of the
Mamluk ruling elite. The
Mamluks introduced greater centralization over the economy by
organizing the state bureaucracy, particularly in
Aleppo already had organized bureaucracies), and the
hierarchy and its associated iqtaʿ system. In
particular, the Nile River's centralizing influence also contributed
Mamluk centralization over the region. The
Mamluks used the
same currency system as the Ayyubids, which consisted of gold dinars,
silver dirhams and copper fulus. In general, the monetary system
Mamluk period was highly unstable due to frequent monetary
changes enacted by various sultans. Increased circulation of copper
coins and the increased use of copper in dirhams often led to
Mamluks created an administrative body called the hisbah to
supervise the market, with a muhtasib (inspector-general) in charge of
the body. There were four muhtasibs based in Cairo, Alexandria,
al-Fustat and Lower Egypt. The muhtasib in
Cairo was the most senior
of the four and his position was akin to that of a finance minister.
The role of a muhtasib was to inspect weights and measures and the
quality of goods, maintain legal trade, and to remain vigilant of
price gouging. Typically, a qadi or Muslim scholar would occupy
the post, but in the 15th century,
Mamluk emirs began to be appointed
as muhtasibs in an effort to compensate emirs during cash shortages or
as a result of the gradual shift of the muhtasib's role from the legal
realm to one of enforcement.
The iqtaʿ system was inherited from the Ayyubids and further
organized under the
Mamluks to fit their military needs. Iqtaʿat
were a central component of the
Mamluk power structure. The
iqtaʿ of the Muslims differed from the European concept of fiefs in
that iqtaʿ represented a right to collect revenue from a fixed
territory and was accorded to an officer (emir) as income and as a
financial source to provision his soldiers. However, prior to the
Mamluks' rise, there was a growing tendency of iqtaʿ holders to treat
their iqtaʿ as personal property, which they passed down to their
Mamluks effectively put an end to this tendency,
with the exception of some areas, namely in Mount Lebanon, where
Druze iqtaʿ holders, who became part of the halqa, were able
to resist the abolition of their hereditary iqtaʿat. In the
Mamluk era, the iqtaʿ was an emir's principal source of income,
and starting in 1337,
Mamluk iqtaʿ holders would lease or sell
rights to their iqtaʿat to non-mamluks in order to derive greater
revenues. By 1343, the practice was common and by 1347, the sale
of iqta'at became taxed. The revenues emanating from the iqtaʿ
also served as a more stable source of income than other methods the
Mamluks sometimes employed, including tax hikes, the sale of
administrative posts and extortion of the population. According
to historian J. van Steenbergen,
The iqtaʿ system was fundamental in assuring a legitimized,
controlled and guaranteed access to the resources of the Syro-Egyptian
realm to an upper level of
Mamluk society that was primarily military
in form and organization. As such it was a fundamental feature of
Mamluk society, on the one hand giving way to a military hierarchy
that crystallized into an even more developed economic hierarchy and
that had substantial economic interests in society at large; on the
other hand, it deeply characterized the realm's economic and social
development, its agriculture, grain trade, and rural demography in
The system largely consisted of land assignments from the state in
return for military services. Land was assessed by the periodic
rawk (cadastral survey), which consisted of a survey of land parcels
(measured by feddan units), assessment of land quality and the annual
estimated tax revenue of the parcels, and classification of a parcel's
legal status as waqf (trust) or iqtaʿ. The rawk surveys
organized the iqtaʿ system and the first rawk was carried out in 1298
Sultan Lajin. A second and final rawk was completed in 1315
Sultan an-Nasir Muhammad and influenced political and economic
developments of the
Mamluk Sultanate until its fall in the early 16th
Over time, the iqtaʿ system was expanded, and increasingly larger
areas of kharaj (taxable lands) were appropriated as iqtaʿ lands in
order to meet the fiscal needs of the
Mamluk military institution,
namely payment of
Mamluk officers and their subordinates. The
Mamluk state resolved to increase allotments by dispersing an
individual emir's iqtaʿat over several provinces and for brief
terms. However, this led to a situation where the iqtaʿ holders
neglected the administrative oversight, maintenance and infrastructure
of their iqtaʿat, while concentrating solely on collecting revenues,
thereby resulting in less productivity of the iqtaʿat.
Agriculture was the primary source of revenue in the Mamluk
economy. Agricultural products were the main exports of
Syria and Palestine. Moreover, the major industries of
sugar and textile production were also dependent on agricultural
products, namely sugar cane and cotton, respectively. Every
agricultural commodity was taxed by the state, with the sultan's
treasury taking the largest share of the revenues; emirs and major
private brokers followed. An emir's main source of income were the
agricultural products of his iqtaʿ, and with those revenues, he was
able to fund his private corps.
Mamluk centralization over agricultural production was more
thorough than in
Syria and Palestine for a number of reasons. Among
them was that virtually all agriculture in
Egypt depended on an
irrigation single source, the Nile, and the measures and rights to
irrigation were determined by the river's flooding, whereas in Syria
and Palestine, there were multiple sources of mostly rain-fed
irrigation, and measures and rights were thus determined at the local
level. Centralization over
Syria and Palestine was also more
complicated than in
Egypt due to the diversity of those regions'
geography and the frequent invasions of the Syro-Palestinian
territories. The state's role in Syro-Palestinian agriculture was
restricted to the fiscal administration and to the irrigation networks
and other aspects of rural infrastructure. Although the level of
centralization not as high as in Egypt, the
Mamluks did impose enough
control over the Syrian economy to derive revenues from
benefited the sultanate and contributed to the defense of its
realm. Furthermore, the maintenance of the
Mamluk army in Syria
relied on the state's control over Syrian agricultural revenues.
Among the responsibilities of a
Mamluk provincial or district governor
were repopulating depopulated areas to foster agricultural production,
protecting the lands from
Bedouin raids, increasing productivity in
barren lands (likely through the upkeep and expansion of existing
irrigation networks), and devoting special attention to the
cultivation of the more arable low-lying regions. In order to
ensure that rural life was undisturbed by
Bedouin raiding, which could
halt agricultural work or damage crops and agrarian infrastructure and
thus decrease revenues, the
Mamluks attempted to prevent Bedouin
armament and confiscate existing weapons from them.
Trade and industry
Syria played a central transit role in international trade
in the Middle Ages. Early into their rule, the
Mamluks sought to
expand their role in foreign trade, and to this end Baybars signed a
commercial treaty with Genoa, while
Qalawun signed a similar agreement
with Ceylon. By the 15th century, internal upheaval as a result
Mamluk power struggles, diminishing iqtaʿ revenues as a result of
plagues, and the encroachment of abandoned farmlands by
led to a financial crisis in the sultanate. To make up for these
Mamluks applied a three-pronged approach: taxation of the
urban middle classes, increasing the production and sale of cotton and
sugar to Europe, and taking advantage of their transit position in the
trade between the Far East and Europe. The latter proved to be
the most profitable method and was done by cultivating trade
relationships with Venetia,
Genoa and Barcelona, and increasing taxes
on commodities. Thus, during the 15th century, the
long-established trade between Europe and the Islamic world began to
make up a significant part of the sultanate's revenues as the Mamluks
imposed taxes on the merchants who operated or passed through the
Egypt was a major producer of textiles and a supplier of raw
materials for Western Europe. However, the frequent outbreaks of
the Black Plague led to a decline in the
production of goods such as textiles, silk products, sugar, glass,
soaps, and paper, which coincided with the Europeans' increasing
production of these goods. Trade continued nonetheless and despite
papal restrictions on trade with the Muslims during the Crusades.
Mediterranean trade was dominated by spices, such as pepper, muscat
nuts and flowers, cloves and cinnamon, as well as medicinal drugs and
indigo. These goods originated in Persia, India, and Southeast
Asia and made their way to Europe via the
Mamluk ports of
Egypt. These ports were frequented by European merchants, who in turn
sold gold and silver ducats and bullions, silk, wool and linen
fabrics, furs, wax, honey and cheeses.
Sultan Barsbay, a state monopoly was established on luxury
goods, namely spices, in which the state set prices and collected a
percentage of profits. To that end, in 1387,
direct control over Alexandria, the principal Egyptian commercial
port, thereby transferring the tax revenues of the port to the
sultan's personal treasury (diwan al-khass) instead of the imperial
treasury which was linked with the military's iqtaʿ system.
Furthermore, in 1429, he ordered that the spice trade to Europe be
Cairo before goods reached Alexandria, thus
attempting to end the direct transportation of spices from the Red Sea
to Alexandria. In the late 15th and early 16th centuries the
Portuguese Empire's expansion into Africa and Asia began to
significantly decrease the revenues of the Mamluk-Venetian monopoly on
the trans-Mediterranean trade. This contributed to and coincided
with the fall of the sultanate.
List of sultans
Main article: List of
Timeline of the
Turkic peoples (500–1300)
List of Turkic dynasties and countries
Egypt in the Middle Ages
List of Sunni Muslim dynasties
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^ Levanoni 1995, p. 176.
^ a b Levanoni 1995, pp. 176–177.
^ a b c Levanoni 1995, pp. 179–180.
^ a b c Levanoni 1995, pp. 182.
^ a b Levanoni, pp. 182–183.
^ Levanoni 1995, p. 183.
^ a b Stilt 2011, p. 14.
^ a b c d e f Holt 1975, p. 237.
^ a b Levanoni 1995, p. 14.
^ a b Holt 1975, p. 238.
^ a b c Holt 1975, p. 239.
^ a b c Holt 1975, p. 240.
^ a b Petry, ed. Petry 1998, p. 468.
^ a b c d e f g Holt 1975, p. 248.
^ a b Stilt 2011, p. 31.
^ Stilt 2011, p. 30.
^ a b Stilt 2011, pp. 30–31.
^ Holt 2005, p. 243.
^ a b c Stilt 2011, pp. 22–23.
^ Stilt 2011, p. 20.
^ a b c d Levanoni 1995, p. 8.
^ Levanoni 1995, pp. 8–9.
^ a b c Levanoni 1995, p. 11.
^ a b c Levanoni 1995, p. 9.
^ a b c Levanoni 1995, p. 10.
^ Levanoni 1995, pp. 11–12.
^ a b Levanoni 1995, p. 12.
^ a b c d e Popper 1955, p. 93.
^ a b Binbaş 2014, p. 158.
^ a b c Northrup 1998, p. 254.
^ a b Northrup 1998, p. 253.
^ a b Islahi 1988, p. 42.
^ Islahi 1988, p. 43.
^ Elbendary 2015, pp. 38–39.
^ a b van Steenbergen, p. 475.
^ a b c d e Elbendary 2015, p. 37.
^ a b c Salibi, Kamal (June 1967). "Northern
Lebanon under the
dominance of Ġazīr (1517-1591)". Arabica. 14 (2): 146–147.
^ a b Elbendary 2015, pp. 37–38
^ a b Levanoni 1995, p. 171.
^ a b van Steenbergen, p. 476.
^ a b Steenbergen, p. 477.
^ Stilt 2011, p. 23.
^ a b c Stilt 2011, p. 24.
^ a b Northrup, p. 270.
^ a b c Northrup 1998, p. 269.
^ a b Northrup 1998, p. 277.
^ Northrup 1998, p. 271.
^ Northrup 1998, p. 261.
^ Islahi 1988, p. 39.
^ Islahi 1988, p. 40.
^ Christ 2012, p. 32.
^ a b c Christ 2012, p. 33.
^ Petry 1981, p. 244.
^ a b c Christ 2012, pp. 19–20.
^ Christ 2012, pp. 33–34.
^ a b Varlik 2015, p. 163.
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