* 90,000 men * 12 air squadrons -------------------------
* 12,000–15,000 Chetniks
Unknown (about 20,000 men)
CASUALTIES AND LOSSES
GERMAN CASUALTIES: 514–583 killed, 1,214–1,642 wounded, 145–158 missing ITALIAN CASUALTIES: 1,605 killed, 983 captured CROATIAN CASUALTIES: 126 killed, 258 wounded, 218 missing ------------------------- CHETNIK CASUALTIES: 2,000–3,000 ------------------------- TOTAL AXIS CASUALTIES: 7,000–8,600 11,915–12,000 killed, 616 executed, 2,099–2,506 captured (German claim) 10,000 killed, wounded and missing and 2,000 captured (Yugoslav claim)
3,370 civilians killed and 1,722 deported to concentration camps
* v * t * e
Axis invasion June 1941 uprising in eastern
CASE WHITE (German : Fall Weiss), also known as the FOURTH ENEMY
OFFENSIVE (Serbo-Croatian : Četvrta neprijateljska ofenziva/ofanziva)
was a combined Axis strategic offensive launched against the Yugoslav
Partisans throughout occupied
World War II
Since its final stage took place on the Neretva River , the operation was known in Yugoslavia as the BATTLE OF THE NERETVA (Bitka na Neretvi). This stage is also known as the BATTLE FOR THE WOUNDED (Bitka za ranjenike).
* 1 Background
* 2 Operation
* 2.1 Weiss 1
* 2.1.1 Partisan Defense * 2.1.2 Attack on Grmeč
* 2.6 Battle of the Neretva
* 3 Aftermath
* 4 Order of battle
* 4.1 Partisans
* 5 In popular culture * 6 See also * 7 Notes
* 8 References
* 8.1 Books * 8.2 Journals
* 9 External links
In late 1942, with the Axis situation in North Africa deteriorating,
the German high command became concerned about the possibility of an
Allied landing in the Balkans. In such an event, resistance forces in
Yugoslavia would be likely to interfere with German defensive
operations as well as their economic exploitation of natural
resources, including timber, copper and bauxite. As a result, on 16
Adolf Hitler ordered the Armed Forces Commander in
Alexander Löhr , to crush the
resistance in Yugoslavia. In a meeting of 18–19 December, the
General Staff of the Wehrmacht decided on the destruction of the
Bihać Republic . On 8 January Löhr and
The operation was planned to be carried out in three stages:
* Weiss 1 aimed at destroying Partisan-held areas
The Germans aimed to destroy the central command of the Partisan movement, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as well as the bulk of the Partisan units around the Supreme HQ. The Axis mustered ten divisions equaling 90,000 troops and 12 air squadrons.
Chetnik auxiliaries and units consisting of between 12,000-15,000 men
also took part and worked closely with the Italians. The operation
coincided with the so-called "March on Bosnia", a plan that called for
the use of
Chetniks from Lika, northern Bosnia, northern Dalmatia,
The orders for the operation called for extreme severity towards captured Partisans and the civilian population. The former were to be shot after capture, and civilian populations deemed hostile were to be deported to transit camps. Villages in the combat area were to be razed to the ground. The commanders on the ground were prohibited from punishing their subordinates for excessive harshness.
According to the plan, four German divisions (7th SS Volunteer
Mountain , 369th , 714th and 717th ) were to attack from the arc
stretching from Karlovac across Glina , Kostajnica ,
Bosanski Novi and
German divisions were reinforced with the 202nd Tank Battalion and
2nd and 3rd Home Guard Mountain Brigade. Italian divisions used the
The attacks from all directions began on 20 January, but none of the
divisions succeeded in keeping the original schedule. The Axis forces
attacked the territory controlled by the Partisan 1st Croatian and 1st
Bosnian Corps —the areas of Banija, Kordun,
The 717th Division encountered difficulties while trying to reach Bosanski Petrovac from Sanski Most. The Division launched its attack on 20 January with the 749th Regiment and elements of the 202nd Tank Battalion. Despite air support, it was halted by the 1st Krajina and one battalion of the 7th Krajina Brigade some 10 km south of Sanski Most. The division’s 737th Regiment was in reserve, standing ready to exploit a breakthrough, but the 749th Regiment failed to make one. Over the following days both sides stepped up their efforts, building up strength at the key point; the Partisans remained successful in blocking German attacks, while launching fierce night counterattacks. The 717th Division tried a diversionary attack from Sanski Most westwards with the 2nd Mountain Home Guard Brigade. On 25 January this battle group of two Home Guard battalions and one German company were attacked by the 1st Battalion of the 6th and the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Krajina Brigade, and were routed with heavy losses. The Partisans seized weaponry including 40 light and 10 heavy machine guns and four mountain and one anti-tank cannons. Gen. Dippold , commander of the 717th Division, reported to Gen. Lüters that on 26 January the 2nd Home Guard Brigade was completely shattered, and that the remnants of the 2nd and 4th battalions were absorbed into 749th Grenadier Regiment. The more ambitious attack heading west was launched on 27 January with the reinforced 737th Regiment. It reached Benakovac before being halted by the 6th Krajina Brigade. In the meantime, the 2nd and 5th Krajina Brigades arrived from Kozara as reinforcements, and the 737th Regiment suddenly found itself in a difficult situation. Seeing no alternative, the regiment set up an all-around defense ; it remained cut off and under attack until 3 February.
Simultaneously, the 717th Division resumed the attack on the main enemy forces towards Ključ and Bosanski Petrovac. The attack was scheduled to begin in the early hours of 28 January, but battalions of the 1st Krajina Brigade succeeded in surprising the Germans during the night with a preventive attack at their starting-off positions and scattering their units. The next day the Germans launched an attack led by tanks with the intention of collecting weapons and stragglers, but Partisan anti-tank fire destroyed the first tank, killing the commander of the 202nd Tank Battalion, Lt. Col. von Geyso.
Attack On Grmeč
The Partisan defense line, which had withstood most of the German
attacks to that point, was finally compromised by the advance of the
7th SS Division. This unit, with the help of two Italian divisions on
the right flank, steadily pushed back the four Partisan brigades,
The 7th SS Division continued to push towards Petrovac, against
Partisan defenses consisting mainly of the 7th
According to a German report from 18 February for Weiss 1, the 7th SS Division suffered losses of 149 dead, 222 wounded and 68 missing, and the 717th Division's castualtes were 118 dead, 290 wounded and 20 missing. The same report puts the Partisan losses at 6,561 dead, but adds that only 286 rifles were captured. This drastic imbalance between the figures suggests that those killed were mainly civilians.
During the first half of 1942 the Partisans were expelled from the eastern parts of Yugoslavia, and the Axis powers largely succeeded in pacifying these areas. The Partisans established a stronghold in the western parts of the country, but returning to the east remained one of their main objectives. Localization of guerrilla activity enabled the Germans to leave the control of pacified areas to second-tier forces, and to concentrate their best units in the endangered areas. The 714th, 717th and 7th SS Divisions (all in west Bosnia in January 1943) were all originally deployed in Serbia. Tito started with the plans for a march to the east in early autumn 1942. The original idea was to start the large movement in the spring, but signs of an imminent Axis offensive in January 1943 made Tito order the commencement of the operation without delay.
The operation was to be carried out in three stages: the first was an advance to Neretva, the second was from Neretva to Drina , and the third from Drina to the river Lim , and further to the south-east. The main intention was to revive Partisan presence and activities in these areas. On 8 February in Tomislavgrad , Tito presented the plan for the first stage in a conference with the staffs of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Division, and issued the necessary orders and directives.
The execution of the offensive was facilitated by the fact that the main forces Tito was counting on for the operation (the 1st and 2nd Proletarian and 3rd Shock Division) were deployed outside the area affected by the operation Weiss 1. The most distant unit, the 1st Proletarian Division, was ordered to begin preparing for a start-off march in late January. The main Partisan force was divided into three columns:
* Right Column—the (2nd Proletarian Division ) was to advance over
Posušje and Drežnica with the aim of cutting off
communications in the
Neretva valley, and protecting the right flank
of the Partisan main force against the enemy garrison at Mostar.
* Central Column—the (3rd Shock Division ) had the most difficult
task: to capture
Gornji Vakuf , Prozor , Ostrožac on
Destroyed Italian column near Drežnica, February 1943.
The Right Column (2nd Proletarian Division) started its advance with
easy victories over NDH garrisons in
With this success, the 2nd Division wrested control over the Neretva
valley north of
In the opening phase the Central Column (3rd Division) captured Gornji Vakuf on 30 January, and by 8 February was making preparations for an attack on the Prozor garrison. Prozor was defended by the 3rd Battalion of the Italian 259th Regiment, reinforced with some infantry and artillery units, along with a company of L3 light tanks . The town was heavily fortified with a large number of stone and concrete bunkers surrounded by wire obstacles and covered by a well-organized fire system. The Partisan attack began on the evening of 15 February, but failed due to the fierce resistance of the garrison.
After receiving reinforcements, the 3rd Division made another attempt and the second attack ultimately succeeded. The Italian garrison was destroyed, with 120 killed and 220 captured. Partisans also captured four 100 mm howitzers, two 47 mm anti-tank guns, nine 81 mm mortars and 12 heavy and 25 light machine-guns. All of the tanks were captured or destroyed: nine of them were captured in the Prozor area, and two were captured later in Ostrožac, and all eleven were used for the formation of the Tank Company of the Supreme Command. The Italian reinforcements sent earlier that day were also destroyed: the 1st Battalion of the 260th Regiment near Drežnica, and a company of 1st Battalion of the 259th Regiment, sent from Konjic, was destroyed near Prozor.
According to the popular myth, on the eve of the attack, a conference in the 3rd Division HQ was interrupted by the arrival of a courier with a note from Tito (who was in nearby Šćit). The note simply read: "Prozor must fall tonight" (Prozor noćas mora pasti). Historical records and participants' memories are divided on the subject, but the phrase became popular, and entered into everyday speech and pop culture.
The offensive continued with the 10th
In the meantime, the 4th Proletarian Brigade from the Right Column
captured a further 270 Italians, 140 of which were in the town of
Jablanica, which was taken on 22 February. Among the captured were
Lieutenant Colonel Pelleroni, commander of the Jablanica garrison, and
Colonel Malantonio, Commander of the 259th Regiment. Colonel
Malantonio was shot after the Partisans had determined that he was a
prominent member of the
Fascist Party , and that he had taken part in
Spanish Civil War
The Left Column (1st Proletarian Division) was only partially
concentrated, but decided to go ahead with the plan using only two of
its brigades. The main objectives on the Sarajevo-
The surprise raid on
The other two battalions of the brigade attacked
Tarčin on the night
20/21 February. The attack coincided with the arrival of the German
reinforcements from Sarajevo. As the Partisans were outnumbered, the
Germans succeeded in throwing them back, and resuming their movement
towards Ivan sedlo. The appearance of German units in
the beginning of the Weiss
By the third week of February the Partisans had managed to breach the
Italian blockade along the
Neretva River, thus compromising one of the
main aspects of the operational plan for Weiss 2. Worst of all, the
Posušje and endangered the wider
The 718th Division started its attack on 19 February, with one column
The column from Sarajevo (named "Battle Group Annacker"), consisted
of the 750th Regiment (minus one battalion), two battalions of the 7th
Home Guard Regiment, one Ustaša battalion, artillery, and one platoon
of tanks. It was this battle group which attacked two battalions of
1st Proletarian Brigade in
Tarčin on 21 February. The group
repulsed the Partisan attack on Tarčin, threw back Partisan
battalions, and on the same day reached Ivan sedlo and Raštelica.
After regrouping, the Partisans reclaimed their positions on the Ivan
sedlo on the next day, but a substantial part of the battle group,
including one German and one Home Guard battalion, an Ustaša company,
and a number of tanks, succeeded in breaking through to
ATTACK ON KONJIC
The fact that
The 3rd Division decided to storm the town by using two of its
brigades (the third remained in Prozor), with one (the 5th Montenegro
Brigade) attacking along the right bank of the river, and the second
For the next attempt, on 24 February in the evening, the attacking
forces were reinforced with the 4th
As the blockade of the Ivan Sedlo Pass by the 1st Proletarian Division seemed to be holding, and no further parts of the battle group Annaker reached Konjic, Tito decided to send another brigade. Early on 26 February, the 3rd Krajina Brigade left its positions around Prozor, and started the march to the embattled town. However, after only a few hours, it was summoned back. The appearance of the 717th Infantry Division (now attacking Prozor instead of Livno, as originally envisaged by the plan for Weiss 2) on the flank of battle group Vogel endangered the whole western front of the NOVJ; the Central Hospital at Šćit was now directly exposed to the German onslaught. Consequently, the attack on Konjic, using additional forces from the Prozor area, had to be cancelled.
At this stage, Tito and his HQ had suddenly found themselves facing
an entirely different situation from the one they faced only days
earlier. By 20 February, the prospects looked good for the "Main
Operational Group": all but one Italian garrison in the
were destroyed and the road to Eastern
Second stage, German operations Weiss
Based on the gathered intelligence, German command concluded that Livno was the center of the southeastern half of the Partisan territory. For that reason, Weiss 2 had been conceived as a concentric attack on Livno, with the assumption that the Partisans would be pushed back, encircled and destroyed there. In the meantime, the situation had changed. The Partisans broke into the Neretva valley, and their main concentration was now between Prozor and Konjic. In spite of this, German command largely proceeded with the original plan. In light of the recent developments, however, first one (718th), and after a week another (717th) division were directed towards the new flashpoint.
Two divisions, the 7th SS and the 369th, were used for the Weiss 2
operation. Their advance commenced on 25 February. The route assigned
to the 7th SS Division was from Bosanski Petrovac, over
Bosansko Grahovo to Livno, while the 369th Division had to cover the
route from Mrkonjić-Grad over Mliništa and
After this maneuver, all the units of the 1st Bosnia Corps found
themselves out of reach of the advancing Germans, except the 7th and
9th Krajina Brigades. They were temporarily subordinated directly to
the Supreme HQ which had ordered them to slow down the German advance
towards Neretva. On 5 March, the two German divisions had finally
Livno and taken it without a fight. After several days of
rest, the 7th SS Division resumed its movements to the
Further to the south, the group of
BATTLE OF THE NERETVA
In the last days of February, Tito's Main Operational Group found itself in a critical position with no open road remaining. On the one side it was stuck in front of the stubborn defense of the Konjic garrison, and on the other, it was exposed to the mounting pressure on Prozor. There was also constant pressure from the reinforced parts of the 718th division from Sarajevo, increasing pressure of the Italian-Chetnik battlegroups from Mostar, build-up of further Chetnik forces on the eastern bank of Neretva, and a further two German divisions (7th SS and 369th) were approaching from the west. Alarming news about the imminent threat to the Central Hospital was arriving in Tito's HQ on a daily basis. Neretva river and destroyed bridge
In that situation, Tito took the tactical command firmly in his hands. On 28 February he decided to reverse the direction of the attack, and, instead of pushing over Neretva, decided to strike hard at the Germans pressuring Prozor. According to this new direction, he ordered the Pioneer Company to destroy all the bridges across the Neretva, which was done between 1 and 4 March. He also ordered all the forces to concentrate attacks against Gornji Vakuf, with only necessary rearguards left on the Neretva.
Counterattack At Gornji Vakuf
The counterattack began not a minute too soon. The 717th Division and the battlegroup Vogel were attacking along the Gornji Vakuf – Prozor road with the main column, while trying to circumvent the partisan defense with flanking columns over Pidriš and Vilića gumno, intending to capture the important pass at Makljen. On 2 March at dawn, the 4th Proletarian Brigade, led by its 2nd Battalion, bypassing the columns of the wounded from the Central Hospital, reached Vilića gumno, and assumed positions in the deep snow, 30 to 50 meters from German lines, to be attacked almost immediately by the German 749th Regiment. After several hours of defense, the Brigade charged the enemy positions and pushed the Germans back down the slopes of the Raduša mountain . The fighting was intense and dramatic, under difficult circumstances, and the losses were serious. The report for that day counted 51 killed, 83 wounded, 21 missing and 31 cases of frostbite. On the other side, 3rd Company of the 2nd Battalion fell down to only 8 men. For this success, the 2nd Battalion and its commander Niko Strugar were officially commended by Tito.
During 2 and 3 March, brigades were arriving in Prozor and assuming
their positions along the line of fire. On 4 March, a full-scale
Partisan counterattack was launched with all nine brigades. Five
brigades were attacking German positions frontally, and the remaining
four were trying to circumvent the flanks. The Germans were pushed
back all the way to near
Forcing The Way Over Neretva
Final Partisan push over Neretva.
The German Command was confused and worried by the successful Partisan attack at Gornji Vakuf. On the assumption that the Partisans would continue their advance towards Bugojno, General Lüters ordered the 369th Division to the area on 6 March, noting in the War diary that "the key error (was) G.Vakuf". However, Tito was not pleased with the prospects of the advance/retreat to the Vrbas valley, fearing the Partisans would thus merely exchange one cauldron for another. In light of these considerations, and much to the surprise of his closest associates, Tito ordered a 180-degree turn and re-directed the bulk of his army back to the Neretva.
The key role in forcing the way over Neretva was assigned to the 2nd Dalmatian Brigade . During the Gornji Vakuf counterattack preparations, the brigade was left on the Neretva as a rearguard. After the counter-attack had been launched, the brigade commander Ljubo Vučković did not consider the possibility of return to the river, and consequently ordered the evacuation of Jablanica, deploying his unit on the hills outside the town. However, on March 4, Tito summoned him to a meeting, criticized him for leaving Jablanica, and ordered him to reoccupy the town immediately. Furthermore, Vučković was instructed to cross the Neretva with his unit the following night, clear the Chetniks from the eastern bank, and secure a bridgehead. Partisans crossing the Neretva river over the construction of the broken bridge at Jablanica.
The reoccupation of Jablanica turned out to be easier than previously thought. As the Tank Company of the Supreme HQ was available, it was ordered to spearhead the attack. The town was held by two battalions of the Durmitor Chetnik Brigade. After seeing tanks, the Chetniks assumed that it was the Italian relief column, and moved out to meet them. The Partisans took advantage of the Chetnik confusion and opened fire, causing them to panic and run away. The 2nd Dalmatian Brigade spent the whole day considering various options for crossing the river. Since the pioneer detachment did not come until late in the evening, Vučković informed the Supreme Command that it would be impossible to cross the Neretva during the same night. On the following day, 6 March, the brigade was reinforced by the 2nd Proletarian Brigade. Under the cover of darkness, one group of 12 men from the 2nd Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Dalmatian crossed the skeleton of the railway bridge and began climbing up the steep eastern bank. The Chetniks occupying the bunker above the bridge sensed something was afoot and began firing blindly, killing two soldiers. The remaining ten men succeeded in reaching the top of the cliff and destroying the bunker with hand grenades. Once this obstacle was out of the way, the rest of the battalion followed, and after it two battalions from the 2nd Proletarian Brigade. On the following day, these three battalions scattered the Chetnik Durmitor Brigade, causing its soldiers to flee deep to the rear where they spread panic among other Chetnik units. With this success, the bridgehead was secured, and the pioneers started their work on the construction of the new improvised bridge, resting on the skeleton of the old one.
Tito's new plan was to push the Germans back from Prozor to gain some
space and breathing room, and then to cross the
Neretva at Jablanica
as fast as possible. The renewal of attacks on
The final push over Neretva was to be carried out in the following fashion:
* 3rd Division on the left flank, with the task of blockading
* 2nd Division reinforced with the 1st Proletarian Brigade, as the
central column, had the task of crossing the northern slopes of Prenj
and reaching the upper
In order to counter this strategic "checkmate " Tito prepared an elaborate deception. He ordered his sappers to actually blow up all the bridges on the river. When air reconnaissance brought this information to the German command, they concluded that the Partisans must be preparing a final dash north of their current position (along the western shore of the Neretva), and had blown up the bridge to prevent desertion as well as attack by Chetnik forces from the other side of the river. They thus began a redeployment of troops in the area to block the anticipated movement.
This redeployment gave the Partisan engineers precious time needed to sufficiently repair the bridge and to eliminate the Chetnik troops defending its far side. The Germans, characteristically, quickly caught on, but were unable to correct their mistake and prepare a serious attack in time, because of their previous redeployment orders. With their rearguard fighting off an increasingly powerful German advance, the Partisans crossed the river under intense aerial bombardment (the Axis deployed large Luftwaffe formations), but the mountainous landscape prevented accurate destruction of the makeshift bridge. After the escape was complete, the weak bridge was finally rendered useless to prevent pursuit. The humiliating strategic defeat was amplified by Tito being able to keep his well-known pledge not to leave the wounded behind, as they faced certain execution at the hands of the Axis (which later actually happened in the aftermath of the Battle of the Sutjeska ).
The operation marked the "high point of Chetnik collaboration with
the Axis powers". In order to ensure the operation's success, Draža
Mihailović relocated from
"I manage the whole operation through Branko . No action is ordered without my approval. Branko is keeping me informed of even the smallest details. All his proposals are reviewed, studied, approved or corrected. In this we follow these principles: we work for ourselves alone and for no one else; we are concerned only with the interests of the Serbs and of future Yugoslavia; for the achievement of our objectives we use one enemy against another, precisely as do all our enemies with exception, and achieve our objectives with the least sacrifice, but are prepared even for the greatest sacrifices if this is necessary in the general interest, and to safeguard the people from all unnecessary exposure to danger in their homes."
By the end of March, the Germans claimed to have killed about 11,915
Partisans, executed 616, and captured 2,506. Despite these heavy
losses and a tactical victory for the Axis powers, the partisan
formations secured their command and the hospital, and were able to
continue operations. In fact, once they reached the eastern parts of
ORDER OF BATTLE
MAIN OPERATIONAL GROUP
* 1st Proletarian Division
* 2nd Proletarian Division
* 2nd Proletarian Brigade
* 4th Proletarian
* 3rd Assault Division
* 9th Dalmatian Division (from 5 March)
* 3rd Dalmatian Brigade * 4th Dalmatian Brigade * 5th Dalmatian Brigade
* 7th Krajina Brigade (from 5 March)
1ST CROATIAN CORPS
* 8th Kordun Division
* 6th Littoral-Gorski Kotar Brigade * 14th Littoral-Gorski Kotar Brigade
1ST BOSNIAN CORPS
* 4th Krajina Division
* 2nd Krajina Brigade * 5th Krajina Brigade * 6th Krajina Brigade * 8th Krajina Brigade * 12th Krajina Brigade (from 20 February)
* 5th Krajina Division
* 1st Krajina Brigade * 4th Krajina Brigade * 7th Krajina Brigade (until 4 March)
* 10th Krajina Division (from 13 February)
* 9th Krajina Brigade * 10th Krajina Brigade
IN POPULAR CULTURE
The 1969 Oscar -nominated motion picture The Battle of Neretva depicts these events.
Alistair MacLean 's 1968 thriller novel
Force 10 From Navarone
* ^ A B "Report of the operations department of the Southeast Command 22 March 1943, National Archives Washington, NAW, T311, Roll 175, frame 000563". Znaci.net. Archived from the original on 11 May 2013. Retrieved 3 March 2014. * ^ A B C D E IV. neprijateljska ofenziva – Unternehmen Weiss II: Bitka na Neretvi * ^ A B Hoare 2006 , p. 333. * ^ Božović 2011 , pp. 121-123. * ^ Milazzo 1975 , p. 116. * ^ A B Roberts 1973 , p. 100. * ^ Roberts 1973 , p. 132. * ^ A B Terzić & Savković 1965 , p. 23. * ^ Tomasevich 1975 , pp. 231–235. * ^ Hoare 2006 , p. 329. * ^ Hoare 2006 , pp. 329–330. * ^ Schmider 2001 , p. 220. * ^ A B C Hoare 2006 , p. 330. * ^ Tomasevich 1975 , p. 236. * ^ Shepherd 2009 , p. 85. * ^ Terzić & Savković 1965 , p. 26. * ^ Karasijević 1986 , pp. 65-66. * ^ Hoare 2006 , p. 332. * ^ Tomasevich 1975 , p. 295. * ^ Terzić & Savković 1965 , p. 28. * ^ Karasijević 1986 , p. 73. * ^ Karasijević 1986 , p. 75. * ^ Dimitrijević & Savić 2011 , p. 119. * ^ A B C Trifkovic 2011 , p. 318. * ^ Karasijević 1986 , p. 83. * ^ Karasijević 1986 , pp. 87-88. * ^ Vojnoistoriski Institut Jugoslovenske Narodne Armije 1954 , pp. 447-448. * ^ Shepherd 2009 , p. 87. * ^ Terzić & Savković 1965 , p. 24. * ^ Terzić & Savković 1965 , p. 25. * ^ Urošević 1988 , p. 208. * ^ Terzić & Savković 1965 , p. 147. * ^ Dimitrijević & Savić 2011 , p. 124. * ^ Novović et al. 1985 , p. 154. * ^ Dimitrijević & Savić 2011 , p. 126. * ^ Terzić & Savković 1965 , p. 31. * ^ Janković 1975 , p. 173. * ^ Djilas 1977 , p. 223. * ^ Vuksanović 1981 , pp. 175-176. * ^ A B Bojić et al. 1984 , p. 96. * ^ A B Trifkovic 2011 , p. 326. * ^ Terzić & Savković 1965 , pp. 279-280. * ^ Terzić & Savković 1965 , p. 37. * ^ Drljević 1969 , pp. 405-410. * ^ Urošević 1988 , p. 216. * ^ Savković 1965 , pp. 265-268. * ^ Savković 1965 , pp. 268-270. * ^ Terzić Vujošević, Jovan-Lola; Dozet, Dušan; Leković, Mišo (1984). Prva proleterska brigada - ilustrovana monografija . Zagreb: Globus. OCLC 12078979 . Cite uses deprecated parameter trans_title= (help ) * Božović, Srđan (2011). Divizija "Princ Eugen" . Pančevo: Narodni muzej Pančevo. ISBN 978-86-90-60393-0 . Cite uses deprecated parameter trans_title= (help ) * Dimitrijević, Bojan; Savić, Dragan (2011). Oklopne jedinice na jugoslovenskom ratištu 1941-1945 . Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju. ISBN 978-86-74-03154-4 . Cite uses deprecated parameter trans_title= (help ) * Djilas, Milovan (1977). Wartime. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. OCLC 875684342 . * Drljević, Savo (1969). Četvrta proleterska crnogorska brigada. Zbornik sjećanja. Knjiga 1 . Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod. OCLC 15609514 . Cite uses deprecated parameter trans_title= (help ) * Hoare, Marko Attila (2006). Genocide and Resistance in Hitler's Bosnia: The Partisans and the Chetniks, 1941–1943. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-726380-8 . * Janković, Blažo S. (1975). Četvrta proleterska crnogorska brigada . Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod. OCLC 680007016 . Cite uses deprecated parameter trans_title= (help ) * Karasijević, Drago (1986). Četvrta krajiška NOU divizija . Beograd: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar. OCLC 17731120 . Cite uses deprecated parameter trans_title= (help ) * Milazzo, Matteo J. (1975). The Chetnik Movement & the Yugoslav Resistance. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 0-8018-1589-4 . * Novović, Mirko; Kronja, Ante Čenčo; Stupar, Bogdan; Đapić, Vaso (1985). Prva dalmatinska proleterska brigada . Beograd: Vojnoizdavački Zavod. OCLC 455623974 . Cite uses deprecated parameter trans_title= (help ) * Popović, Koča; Nenadović, Aleksandar (1989). Razgovori s Kočom . Zagreb: Globus. ISBN 978-86-34-30582-1 . Cite uses deprecated parameter trans_title= (help ) * Roberts, Walter R. (1987). Tito, Mihailović and the allies: 1941–1945. New Brunswick, NJ: Duke University Press. ISBN 0-8223-0773-1 . * Savković, Svetislav (1965). Neretva - zbornik, knjiga 2: Proleterske i udarne divizije u bici na Neretvi, zbornik radova . Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod. OCLC 455642508 . Cite uses deprecated parameter trans_title= (help ) * Shepherd, Ben (2012). Terror in the Balkans: German Armies and Partisan Warfare. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-04891-1 . * Terzić, Velimir; Savković, Svetislav (1965). Neretva - zbornik, knjiga 1: Proleterske i udarne divizije u bici na Neretvi, zbornik radova . Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod. OCLC 440622473 . Cite uses deprecated parameter trans_title= (help ) * Broz, Josip Tito; Damjanović, Pero (1982). Autobiographical Narratives, Book 1. Beograd: Narodna knjiga. OCLC 9080887 . * Tomasevich, Jozo (1975). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: The Chetniks. Stanford: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-0857-9 . * Urošević, Sredoje (1988). Druga proleterska brigada - ratovanje i ratnici (2. izmenjeno i dopunjeno izdanje) . Beograd: Poslovna politika. OCLC 450991448 . Cite uses deprecated parameter trans_title= (help ) * Vojnoistoriski Institut Jugoslovenske Narodne Armije (1954). Zbornik dokum