Early life and education
Wood was born on 16 April 1881 at Powderham Castle in Devon, the home of his maternal grandfather, the 11th Earl of Devon. He was born into aEarly political career and war service
Wood had not stood in theEarly ministerial career
In May 1920, he accepted theViceroy of India
Appointment
In October 1925, Lord Birkenhead,Simon Commission
The 1919 Government of India Act had incorporated the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms (" Diarchy" – shared rule between British and Indians at the local level) and had promised that after ten years there would be a commission to inquire about a new constitution and to advise on whether further reforms were needed. Irwin accepted that greater self-government was necessary, as Indian national aspirations had grown since 1919. Birkenhead brought forward the date of the commission, and put it underThe Irwin Declaration
In June 1929, a new Labour government took office in the UK, with Ramsay MacDonald Prime Minister for the second time and William Wedgwood Benn as Secretary of State for India. On 13 July 1929, Irwin arrived in the UK on leave, bringing with him a "suggested" draft exchange of letters between MacDonald and Simon. His plan was for Simon to write proposing a Round Table Conference to discuss the findings of the commission, and that MacDonald would then reply pointing out that the 1917 Montagu Declaration implied a commitment to dominion status (i.e. that India should become completely self-governing, like Canada or Australia). Simon saw the drafts and had serious misgivings about the planned Round Table Conference. The exchange of letters did not mention Dominion Status as the other Commissioners did not favour it, although Simon did not report the depth of their feeling, which he came to share, that such a declaration would undermine the findings of the Commission and that Dominion Status would now become a minimum demand for the Indian leaders rather than an ultimate goal. The author David Dutton finds it "curious" that Irwin, who had believed that Simon would not object to Dominion Status, did not understand this. The Irwin Declaration of October 1929 committed Britain to eventual Dominion Status for India. Despite such a policy having been implicit for a decade, the Declaration was denounced by many on the Tory Right.Agreement with Mahatma Gandhi
In November 1930, King George V opened the First Round Table Conference in London; no Congress delegates took part because Gandhi was in jail. In January 1931, Gandhi was released and at Irwin's invitation they had eight meetings together. Irwin wrote to his aged father that "it was rather like talking to someone who had stepped off another planet onto this for a short visit of a fortnight and whose mental outlook was quite other to that which was regulating most of the affairs on the planet to which he had descended". But they had mutual respect based on their respective religious faiths. The fortnight-long discussions resulted in theAssessments
A month following the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, Lord Irwin's term ended and he left India. On Irwin's return to England in April 1931, the situation was calm, but within a year the conference collapsed and Gandhi was again arrested. Despite the mixed outcomes, Irwin was overall a successful Viceroy; he had charted a clear and balanced course and had not lost the confidence of his home government. He had demonstrated toughness and independence. His successful term as Viceroy ensured that he returned to British politics with significant prestige.British politics 1931–1935
Irwin returned to the UK on 3 May 1931. He was honoured with the KG (he became chancellor of the order in 1943). In 1931 he declined the Foreign Office in the new National Government, not least because the Tory Right would not have liked it. Officially, he declared that he wanted to spend time at home. He went to Canada, at the invitation of Vincent Massey, to speak at theForeign policy
Colleague of Eden
By this time, Halifax was becoming increasingly influential in foreign affairs. Cabinet met on the morning of 18 December 1935 to discuss the public outcry over theAs I looked out of the car window, on eye level, I saw in the middle of this swept path a pair of black trousered legs, finishing up in silk socks and pumps. I assumed this was a footman who had come down to help me out of the car and up the steps and was proceeding in leisurely fashion to get myself out of the car when I heard von Neurath or somebody throwing a hoarse whisper at my ear of ''Der Führer, der Führer''; and it then dawned upon me that the legs were not the legs of a footman, but of Hitler.Halifax said later that had he not been so warned, he would have attempted to hand his coat to Hitler, and likely thus caused a diplomatic incident. A long and tense meeting with Hitler followed.The Earl of Halifax, ''Fulness of Days'' (London: Collins, 1957), p. 185. In these discussions, Halifax spoke of "possible alterations to the European order which might be destined to come about with the passage of time". Ignoring Eden's reservations, he did not object in principle to Hitler's designs on
Foreign Secretary
Analysis
Halifax's political line as Foreign Secretary must be seen in the context of existing British foreign policy, which was predicated on a broad consensus that in none of the democracies was there popular support for war, military pressure, or even rearmament. There was debate about the extent to which the dictatorships' very separate interests could be teased apart. It was clear that an alignment of Germany and Italy would divide Britain's forces in any general war and that, without at least a neutral Italy, Britain would be unable to move large naval forces east to confront Japan, given strong isolationist sentiment in America. For many, especially in the Foreign Office, appeasement was a necessary compromise to buy time for rearmament, a process to which Britain was already heavily committed. Others, especially Churchill, hoped that a strong military alliance with France would permit a more robust foreign policy towards the dictators. Many shared Churchill's confidence in the large French Army, although fewer shared his belief that France would be a resilient ally. Chamberlain embraced the policy of appeasement as a moral force for good, as did many others who were deeply opposed to war and defence spending. By comparison, Halifax's policy appears more pragmatic, like that of Samuel Hoare, coupled to a firm commitment to rearmament, albeit unenthusiastically. All parties recognised the hostility of public opinion to war or military preparations, and the difficulty of acting without a readiness on the part of America or the Soviet Union to play their part (the Labour Party (UK), Labour Party opposed rearmament until well after the Munich Agreement). Nonetheless, Halifax was criticised as an appeaser, along with Chamberlain, Hoare, and twelve others, in the anonymous 1940 book ''Guilty Men''.Munich
Hitler's Anschluss, annexation of Austria in March 1938 made Halifax keener on British rearmament.After Munich
After Munich, Halifax (successfully) advised Chamberlain against capitalising on his popularity by calling a snap general election; instead he urged (in vain) that Chamberlain widen the National Coalition by offering jobs not just to Churchill and Eden but also to Labour and Liberal figures. Halifax was also disgusted by the anti-Jewish pogrom of Kristallnacht (10 November). He advocated British financial aid to the countries of central and eastern Europe to discourage them from coming under Germany's influence. With Hitler's lack of commitment regarding the Munich Agreement becoming clearer, Halifax worked steadily to assemble a stronger British position, pushing Chamberlain to take economic steps to underpin British interests in Eastern Europe and prevent additional military supplies from reaching Germany, such as tungsten. In January 1939, Halifax accompanied Chamberlain to Rome for talks with Mussolini. That month Halifax pushed for staff talks with France, in view of the danger of war with both Germany and Italy simultaneously. After Hitler broke the Munich agreement and occupied the rump of "Czecho-slovakia" (the hyphen had been added after Munich), Chamberlain gave a speech in Birmingham on 17 March 1939, pledging that Britain would go to war to defend Poland. Halifax had been one of the drivers in this change of policy. By March 1939, Eden, then out of office, observed that thanks to Halifax the government are "now doing what we would wish". Halifax granted a guarantee to Poland on 31 March 1939, triggered by alarming intelligence of German preparations, in hopes of sending clear signals to Germany that, in Halifax's words, there would be "no more Munichs". The Foreign Office received intelligence in early April 1939 that Italy was about to Italian invasion of Albania, invade Albania. At a Cabinet meeting on 5 April 1939, Halifax rejected these reports. Two days later, Italy invaded Albania; Halifax met Sir Alexander Cadogan and "decided we can't ''do'' anything to stop it". Although he disliked the Soviet regime, not least because of its atheism, Halifax was quicker than Chamberlain to realise that Britain should attempt to ally with the USSR. He told the Foreign Affairs committee: "Soviet Russia is something between that of the unconquerable steamroller and looking on her as entirely useless militarily. We cannot ignore a country with a population of 180,000,000 people." The negotiations (in summer 1939) failed, and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, USSR allied with Germany instead on 23 August. It has been suggested that Halifax should have led the negotiations himself, but this would not have suited Halifax's purpose because his government were not carrying out the negotiations in good faith. The Foreign Office confirmed to the US chargé d'affaires on 8 August 1939 that "the military mission, which had now left Moscow, had been told to make every effort to prolong discussions until 1 October 1939". Halifax disclosed to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 10 July 1939: "Although the French were in favour of the military conversations commencing, the French Government thought that the military conversations would be spun out over a long time and as long as they were taking place we should be preventing Soviet Russia from entering the German camp." While H Roberts has spoken of Halifax's fellow Foreign Minister (of the Soviet Union), Litvinov, as having acute perceptive skills and an ability "to detect major trends in the 1930s and to anticipate the course of events indicates his tremendous understanding of the decade", Halifax had completely misunderstood Hitler. Halifax said: "Hitler had a very low opinion of the Soviet Union, and our action [in aligning with the USSR] would confirm to him the idea that we were a weak and feeble folk." On the contrary, what made Hitler worried was the thought of a joint pact between France, Britain and the Soviet Union, in order to prevent a pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. Halifax was not to know that during April 1939 Hitler told Ernst von Weizsäcker, von Weizsäcker that he was contemplating a reconciliation with the Soviet Union; on 2 August 1939 Hitler asked Konstantin von Neurath, von Neurath, former Foreign Minister and career diplomat at the time of the Weimar Republic, whether the German people would accept such an ideological shift from anti-communism to signing a pact with the Soviet Union. Neurath assured Hitler he "could do what he liked with the [National Socialist] Party". With Poland now looking likely to be carved up between Germany and the USSR (as indeed soon took place), the diarist Henry Channon, "Chips" Channon, Parliamentary Private Secretary, PPS to Halifax's junior minister Rab Butler, recorded (25 August 1939) that "the barometer of war kept shifting" and that "the Polish guarantee was [Halifax]'s pet scheme and favourite god-child" (Butler opposed the guarantee). When Germany invaded Poland, Halifax refused any negotiations while German troops remained on Polish soil. However, he stood solid with Chamberlain, who delayed in giving a commitment to go to war until the French also committed. The two of them were the objects of the Cabinet revolt which insisted that Britain honour the guarantee to Poland. Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939.Phoney War
After the outbreak of war, Halifax's diplomacy aimed to dissuade the Soviets from formally joining the Axis. He opposed the bombing of Germany, lest the Germans retaliate. Swedish intermediary Birger Dahlerus had approached Britain for peace talks in August 1939, just before the outbreak of war. Again, on 1 November 1939, Halifax replied to an approach through Swedish channels that no peace was possible with Hitler in power. Even that aroused the wrath of Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, who sent a private note to Halifax rebuking him that such talk was dangerous. Halifax remained opposed to any hint of a compromise peace during the Phoney War.Matthew 2004, p. 87.Churchill as Prime Minister
On 8 May 1940, Chamberlain's government survived a motion of no confidence brought about by the deteriorating military situation in Norway. The government had a nominal majority of 213 in the House: at the end of the "Norway Debate", they won the vote with a majority of only 81; 33 Conservatives and 8 of their allies voted with the opposition parties, and 60 abstained. Churchill had only grudgingly been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty. Nevertheless, he mounted a strong and passionate defence of Chamberlain and his government in the debate preceding the vote. Under ordinary circumstances, such a weak vote would not have been politically disastrous, but it was decisive at a time when the Prime Minister was being strongly criticised by both sides of the House and there was a strong desire for national unity. Talking to Churchill after the vote, Chamberlain admitted his dismay and said that he would try for a coalition government with the Labour and Liberal Parties, but Churchill opposed that. At 10.15am the next morning (9 May), Chamberlain met with Halifax and Churchill in the Cabinet Room. Churchill's own account of these events, published eight years later in ''The Gathering Storm'', the first volume of his ''The Second World War (book series), The Second World War'', does not tally exactly with contemporary accounts such as Halifax's own diary and Alexander Cadogan's record of his conversations with Halifax, or accounts given by Chamberlain or by the Chief Whip David Margesson, 1st Viscount Margesson, David Margesson (whose presence at the meeting Churchill does not mention). Churchill described a battle of wills in which Chamberlain opened the meeting by arguing that Churchill could not command the support of the Labour Party after he had had to defend the government at the Norway Debate, only to be met with a lengthy silence before Halifax, with some hesitation, expressed his own unfitness for the job. Other accounts describe Halifax demurring much more rapidly, and Churchill actively agreeing with him. Churchill also misdates the events of 9 May to the following day, and although his writing assistant William Deakin accepted responsibility for this error he later confirmed, in an interview in 1989, that Churchill's account was embellished after numerous retellings and was not meant to be taken seriously. The description of Chamberlain attempting to persuade Churchill to agree tacitly to Halifax's appointment as Prime Minister is also hard to reconcile with Halifax's having expressed his reluctance to do so to Chamberlain at a meeting between the two men on the morning of the 9th. At 4.30pm that afternoon Chamberlain held another meeting, attended by Halifax, Churchill, and the leader and the deputy leader of the opposition Labour Party (Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood respectively). He asked the Labour leaders if they would agree to serve in a coalition government. They replied that it might be possible but only with a different Prime Minister and that before they could give an official answer, they would need the approval of Labour's National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, National Executive Committee, then in Bournemouth preparing for the annual conference which was to start on the Monday. They were asked to telephone with the result of the consultation by the following afternoon.Jenkins 2002, p. 586. In his diary entry for 9 May, written up the following morning, Halifax later wrote:I had no doubt at all in my own mind that for me to succeed him would create a quite impossible situation. Apart altogether from Churchill's qualities as compared with my own at this particular juncture, what would in fact be my position? Churchill would be running Defence, and in this connexion one could not but remember the relationship between H. H. Asquith, Asquith and Lloyd George had broken down in the first war... I should speedily become a more or less honorary Prime Minister, living in a kind of twilight just outside the things that really mattered.The Labour leaders telephoned at 5pm on the 10th to report that the party would take part in a coalition government, although it had to be under the leadership of someone other than Chamberlain. Accordingly, Chamberlain went to Buckingham Palace to tender his resignation, recommending that King George VI, the King ask Churchill to form a government. On doing so, one of Churchill's first actions was to form a new, smaller War Cabinet by replacing six of the Conservative politicians with Greenwood and Attlee, retaining only Halifax and Chamberlain. Churchill's political position was weak, although he was popular with the Labour and Liberal Parties for his stance against appeasement in the 1930s. He was unpopular in the Conservative Party, however, and he might not have been the choice of the King. Halifax had the support of most of the Conservative Party and of the King and was acceptable to the Labour Party. His position as a peer was a merely technical barrier given the scale of the crisis, and Churchill reportedly was willing to serve under Halifax. As Lord Beaverbrook said, "Chamberlain wanted Halifax. Labour wanted Halifax. Archibald Sinclair, 1st Viscount Thurso, Sinclair wanted Halifax. The Lords wanted Halifax. George VI, The King wanted Halifax. And Halifax wanted Halifax." Only the last sentence was incorrect, however; Halifax did not want to become Prime Minister. He believed that Churchill's energy and leadership skills were superior to his own. Unlike Simon, Hoare and Chamberlain, Halifax was not the object of Labour hatred in May 1940. Dutton argues that he "drew back" because of "inner self-doubt". "Political ambition had never been the most compelling motivation". He had a stomach ache, possibly psychosomatic, at the thought of becoming Prime Minister, and also probably thought that he could wield more influence as Churchill's deputy. Like Chamberlain, he served in Churchill's cabinet but was frequently exasperated by Churchill's style of doing business. Like many others, Halifax had serious doubts about Churchill's judgement.
May 1940 War Cabinet Crisis
Germany invaded Battle of Belgium, Belgium, Battle of the Netherlands, the Netherlands, and Battle of France, France on 10 May 1940, the day that Churchill became Prime Minister. On 22–23 May, the Wehrmacht, German army reached the English Channel, isolating the British Expeditionary Force (World War II), British Expeditionary Force at Battle of Dunkirk, Dunkirk. Churchill soon had a confrontation with Halifax who believed that the United Kingdom should try to negotiate a peace settlement with Hitler, using Mussolini as an intermediary. Halifax believed it better to try to get terms "safeguarding the independence of our Empire, and if possible that of France", in the belief that peace talks would make it easier to get the BEF home. He did not believe that there was any realistic chance of defeating Germany. Churchill disagreed, believing that "nations which went down fighting rose again, but those which surrendered tamely were finished" and that Hitler was unlikely to honour any agreement. Moreover, he believed that this was the view of the British people. On 24 May, Hitler ordered his armies to halt before they reached Dunkirk, and two days later, the British and French navies began to evacuate the Allied forces. Between 25 and 28 May, Churchill and Halifax each fought to bring the War Cabinet around to their own respective points of view; by 28 May, it seemed as if Halifax had the upper hand and that Churchill might be forced from office. Halifax came close to resignation, which might have brought down Churchill's government. However, Churchill outmanoeuvred Halifax by calling a meeting of his 25-member Outer Cabinet, to whom he delivered a passionate speech, saying, "If this long island story of ours is to end at last, let it end only when each one of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground", convincing all who were present that Britain must fight on against Hitler whatever the cost. Churchill also obtained the backing of Neville Chamberlain, who was still Conservative Party leader. Churchill told the War Cabinet that there would be no negotiated peace. Halifax had lost. A few weeks later, in July 1940, Halifax rejected German peace offers presented through Filippo Bernardini, the Papal Nuncio in Berne and the António de Oliveira Salazar, Portuguese and Risto Ryti, Finnish prime ministers. Halifax wrote in his memoirs of an occasion during a short holiday inOne such interlude early in June 1940 is for ever graven into my memory. It was just after the fall of France, an event which at the time it happened seemed something unbelievable as to be almost surely unreal, and if not unreal then quite immeasurably catastrophic. Dorothy and I had spent a lovely summer evening walking over the Wolds, and on our way home sat in the sun for half an hour at a point looking across the plain of York. All the landscape of the nearer foreground was familiar—its sights, its sounds, its smells; hardly a field that did not call up some half-forgotten bit of association; the red-roofed village and nearby hamlets, gathered as it were for company round the old greystone church, where men and women like ourselves, now long dead and gone, had once knelt in worship and prayer. Here in Yorkshire was a true fragment of the undying England, like the White Cliffs of Dover, or any other part of our land that Englishmen have loved. Then the question came, is it possible that the Prussian jackboot will force its way into this countryside to tread and trample over it at will? The very thought seemed an insult and an outrage; much as if anyone were to be condemned to watch his mother, wife or daughter being raped.
Ambassador to the United States
When Chamberlain retired from the Cabinet due to ill health, Churchill tried to ease Halifax out of the Foreign Office by offering him a job as ''de facto'' Deputy Prime Minister, living at 11 Downing Street. Halifax refused, although he agreed to become Leader of the Lords once again. In December 1940, the Philip Kerr, 11th Marquess of Lothian, Marquess of Lothian, British Ambassador to the United States, died suddenly. Halifax was told to take the job by Churchill, with the proviso that he could still attend meetings of the War Cabinet when he was home on leave in London. Churchill's secretary Jock Colville, John Colville recorded on 20 December that Churchill thought the Washington job was a great opportunity for Halifax to help bring the United States into the war. Colville recorded Churchill's view that Halifax "would never live down the reputation for appeasement which he and the F.O. had won themselves here. He had no future in this country." Colville thought Churchill had been influenced by the monthly censorship reports, which showed that Halifax had inherited some of Chamberlain's unpopularity. Halifax was the last man linked with appeasement to leave the Cabinet, as Chamberlain had by then died, and both Samuel Hoare, 1st Viscount Templewood, Hoare and John Simon, 1st Viscount Simon, Simon had already moved to other jobs. Halifax and his wife desperately tried to persuade Eden to take the Washington job instead, but to no avail. Eden was restored to the Foreign Office in Halifax's place. Halifax set sail for the still neutral United States in January 1941. He and his wife departed from the Royal Navy base at Scapa Flow, Scotland. They had been accompanied there from London by a large party which included Churchill and others, including Harry Hopkins, whom Roosevelt had sent to Britain to assess Britain's determination and situation. President Franklin D. Roosevelt welcomed him in person when he arrived. Casting aside diplomatic protocols, Roosevelt took the presidential yacht the ''Potomac'' to greet Halifax as his ship made harbour in the Chesapeake Bay. Initially Halifax damaged himself by a series of public relations disasters. Two weeks after his arrival in the United States, Halifax went to Capitol Hill, meeting with House and Senate leaders. Upon leaving, Halifax told reporters that he had inquired about the timetable for passage of the Lend-Lease, Lend-Lease Act. Isolationists seized upon the meetings to decry British meddling in American political affairs. He likened Washington politics to "a disorderly day's rabbit shooting". Halifax was initially a cautious and elusive public figure, not an effective public diplomat like his predecessor. His relations with Roosevelt were satisfactory, but Halifax kept a low profile. Churchill's close engagement with the United States and his investment in personal communication with the President meant a more constrained role for the British Ambassador. Communications technology meant that Churchill could communicate directly with Roosevelt and was a regular visitor to Washington. Halifax's cousin Angus McDonnell helped him find his feet, and he soon led a very effective propaganda effort. Even an incident that autumn where he was pelted with rotten eggs and tomatoes by isolationists helped his reputation in the long run. He maintained good relations with Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins, and toured the country, meeting many more ordinary Americans than his predecessor had done. He became especially popular after Attack on Pearl Harbor, Pearl Harbor. Relations also increasingly turned on military issues channelled through the Joint Chiefs of Staff secretariat in Washington. Halifax wearied of Washington, especially after the death in action of his middle son Peter in November 1942, and the serious wounding of his younger son Richard in January 1943. In March 1943 he vainly asked Anthony Eden to be relieved of his post, but had to stay. In May 1944 he was created Earl of Halifax, the fourth creation of the title. Halifax took part in a plethora of international conferences over the UN and the Soviet Union. With Labour in power under Clement Attlee from July 1945, Halifax agreed to Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's request to stay on until May 1946. In February 1946, he was present at Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri, of which he did not entirely approve. He believed that Churchill's view of the Soviet threat was exaggerated and urged him to be more conciliatory. He also helped John Maynard Keynes negotiate the Anglo-American loan, which was finalised in July 1946. The final year of his Ambassadorship also witnessed the transition to President Harry S. Truman. Those years contained fraught moments and challenges for the relationship, as American power eclipsed that of Britain, and Britain's interests and rights were ignored on occasion, in particular, the cessation of nuclear co-operation after construction of the atom bomb. However, the partnership in World War II was immensely successful and as close as any other such partnership. It was a demanding post by any standards, but Halifax could reasonably claim to have played his part, and he enjoyed a notably longer term than his less successful successor Archibald Clark Kerr, 1st Baron Inverchapel.Later life
Back in the United Kingdom, Halifax refused to rejoin the Conservative front bench, arguing that it would be inappropriate as he had been working for the Labour Government then still in office. The Labour Government were proposing that India become fully independent by May 1948 (later brought forward to August 1947) with no plans in place to protect minorities. Viscount Templewood (as Samuel Hoare was now known) opposed the plan, but Halifax spoke in the government's favour, arguing that it was not appropriate to oppose the plan if no alternative was suggested. He persuaded many wavering peers to support the government. In retirement he returned to largely honorary pursuits. He was Chancellor of the Order of the Garter. He was an active governor of Eton and List of chancellors of the University of Oxford, Chancellor of Oxford University. He was an honorary Fellow of All Souls from 1934. He was Chancellor of the University of Sheffield and High Steward of Westminster. He was Master of the Middleton Hunt. He was President of the Pilgrims Society, a society dedicated to better Anglo-American relations. From 1947 he was chairman of the General Advisory Council of the BBC. From 1957 he was Grand Master of the Order of Saint Michael and Saint George. By the mid-1950s his health was failing. One of his last major speeches in the House of Lords was in November 1956, when he criticised the government's Suez Crisis, Suez policy and the damage it was doing to Anglo-American relations. He did little to challenge the critical view of appeasement which was then fashionable. His 1957 autobiography ''Fulness of Days'' was described in the ''Dictionary of National Biography'' as "gently evasive". David Dutton describes it as "an extremely reticent book which added little to the historical record". He gave the impression that he had been Chamberlain's faithful subordinate, omitting to mention his role in changing policy in spring 1939. He died of a heart attack at his estate atAssessments
Halifax Rhotacism (speech impediment), could not pronounce his "r"s. He had professional charm and the natural authority of an aristocrat, the latter aided by his immense height. He stood . Edward Harold Begbie, Harold Begbie described Halifax as "the highest kind of Englishman now in politics" whose "life and doctrine were in complete harmony with a very lofty moral principle, but who has no harsh judgement for men who err and go astray." Harold Macmillan said that Halifax possessed a "sweet and Christian nature." Rab Butler called him "this strange and imposing figure—half unworldly saint, half cunning politician." In 1968, the official records were released of Halifax's years as Foreign Secretary (the "fifty-year rule" was replaced by the "thirty-year rule"). Conservative historian Maurice Cowling argued that Halifax's stance of increasing resistance to Hitler, especially the Polish guarantee in the spring of 1939, was motivated not so much by considerations of strategy but by a need to keep ahead of a sea-change in British domestic opinion. He wrote in 1975: "To history, until yesterday, Halifax was the arch-appeaser. This, it is now recognised, was a mistake. His role, however, was complicated. In these pages he is not the man who stopped the rot, but the embodiment of Conservative wisdom who decided that Hitler must be obstructed because Labour could not otherwise be resisted." David Dutton argues that Halifax, like Chamberlain, was slow to appreciate the sheer evil of Hitler and was overly confident that negotiation could yield results. His period as Foreign Secretary was "the pivot of his career and it remains the period upon which his historical reputation ultimately depends"; just as Eden saved his reputation by resigning in time, so Halifax damaged his by being Foreign Secretary in 1938–40. "He deserves some credit for abandoning, or at least for decisively modifying, the policy of appeasement". His refusal to seize the premiership in May 1940 was "the most significant act of his long career". He argues that later that month, far from being a potential Quisling, Halifax based his policies on rational considerations, and that "on rational grounds, there had been much to be said for the Foreign Secretary's line that Britain should at least have investigated what peace terms were on offer." However, his "most important role in public life" was, in Dutton's view, as Ambassador to the United States, where he helped to smooth a relationship which was "often more fraught than early interpretations … tended to suggest". Halifax College at the University of York is named after him. Lady Irwin College, a women's college in Delhi, was established under the patronage of Dorothy, Lady Irwin, in 1931.Styles
*16 April 1881 – 8 August 1885: Edward Frederick Lindley Wood *8 August 1885 – 1910: The Hon. Edward Frederick Lindley Wood *1910 – 25 October 1922: The Hon. Edward Frederick Lindley Wood MP *25 October 1922 – 22 December 1925: The Rt. Hon. Edward Frederick Lindley Wood MP *22 December 1925 – 3 April 1926: The Rt. Hon. The Lord Irwin PC *3 April 1926 – 18 April 1931: ''His Excellency'' The Rt. Hon. The Lord Irwin PC, Viceroy and Governor-General of India *18 April 1931 – 19 January 1934: The Rt. Hon. The Lord Irwin PC *19 January 1934 – December 1940: The Rt. Hon. The Viscount Halifax PC *December 1940 – 1944: ''His Excellency'' The Rt. Hon. The Viscount Halifax PC, HM Ambassador to the United States of America *1944–1946: ''His Excellency'' The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Halifax PC, HM Ambassador to the United States of America *1946–1959: The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Halifax PCHonours
* Honours of Edward Wood, 1st Earl of HalifaxMarriage and family
Halifax married Lady Dorothy Evelyn Augusta Onslow (1885–1976), daughter of William Onslow, 4th Earl of Onslow, former Governor-General of New Zealand, on 21 September 1909. They had five children together: * Lady Anne Dorothy Wood, (31 July 1910 – 25 March 1995); married Charles Duncombe, 3rd Earl of Feversham, on 14 December 1936. * Lady Mary Agnes Wood (31 July 1910 – 3 August 1910) * Charles Wood, 2nd Earl of Halifax, Charles Ingram Courtenay Wood, 2nd Earl of Halifax (3 October 1912 – 19 March 1980) * Major Hon. Francis Hugh Peter Courtenay Wood (born 5 October 1916, killed in action 26 October 1942) * Richard Wood, Baron Holderness, Richard Frederick Wood, Baron Holderness (5 October 1920 – 11 August 2002); MP from 1950 United Kingdom general election, 1950, holding office from 1955.In popular culture
Lord Halifax was portrayed in Richard Attenborough's blockbuster film ''Gandhi (film), Gandhi'' by John Gielgud, depicting his time as Viceroy of India and his role in negotiations with Gandhi regarding Indian independence. Halifax was also portrayed in the 2017 film ''Darkest Hour (film), Darkest Hour'' by Stephen Dillane.See also
* List of covers of Time magazine (1920s), List of covers of ''Time'' magazine (1920s) – 12 April 1926Notes
Bibliography
* Churchill, Winston S., ''Their Finest Hour''. New York, 1949. * Churchill, Winston S., ''The Gathering Storm''. Boston, 1948. * Jock Colville, Colville, John, ''The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955''. New York, 1985. * Dalton, Hugh, The Fateful Years, Memoirs 1939–1945. London, 1957. * Gilbert, Martin, ''Churchill: A Life''. New York, 1991. * Gilbert, Martin, ''Finest Hour: Winston S. Churchill 1939–1941''. London, 1983. * Gilbert, Martin (ed.), ''The Churchill War Papers Volume I: At the Admiralty. September 1939 – May 1940''. London, 1993. * Gilbert, Martin (ed.), ''The Churchill War Papers Volume II: Never Surrender. May 1940 – December 1940''. London, 19. * Gries, Thomas E. (ed.), ''The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean''. West Point, New York 2002. * Halifax, Lord, ''Fullness of Days''. New York, 1957. * Anthony Howard (journalist), Howard, Anthony, ''RAB: The Life of R. A. Butler'', Jonathan Cape 1987 . * Jago, Michael, ''Rab Butler: The Best Prime Minister We Never Had?'', Biteback Publishing 2015 . *Roy Jenkins, Jenkins, Roy, ''Churchill''. London: Pan, 2002. . *B. H. Liddell Hart, Liddell-Hart, B. H., ''History of the Second World War''. Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky, 1970. . * Lukacs, John, ''Five Days in London: May 1940''. Yale University, 1999 . * , essay on Halifax (pp. 81–89) written by David Dutton. * Roberts, Andrew, ''The 'Holy Fox': The Life of Lord Halifax.'' London, 1991. * Schwoerer, Lois G. "Lord Halifax's Visit To Germany: November 1937." ''Historian'' 32.3 (1970): 353–375. * Peter Young (historian), Young, Peter (ed.), Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia. Volume 2. Jaspard Polus, Monaco 1966.References
*Christopher Andrew, ''The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5'' (London: Allen Lane, 2009). *A Gentleman with a Duster [pseud. for Harold Begbie], ''The Conservative Mind'' (London: Mills & Boon, 1924). *Lord Butler, ''The Art of the Possible'' (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971). *Maurice Cowling, ''The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933–1940'' (Cambridge University Press, 1975). *Keith Feiling, ''A Life of Neville Chamberlain'' (London: Macmillan, 1970). *The Earl of Halifax, ''Fulness of Days'' (London: Collins, 1957). *Andrew Roberts, ''The Holy Fox: The Life of Lord Halifax'' (Phoenix, 1997 (originally published 1991)).Further reading
* Alan Campbell-Johnson and R. Hale. ''Viscount Halifax: A Biography''. 1941 * Frederick Winston Furneaux Smith, 2nd Earl of Birkenhead, Earl of Birkenhead. ''Earl of Halifax: The Life of Lord Halifax''. Hamilton, 1965.External links
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