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The Intuitive Criterion
The intuitive criterion is a technique for equilibrium refinement in signaling games. It aims to reduce possible outcome scenarios by restricting the possible sender types to types who could obtain higher utility levels by deviating to off-the-equilibrium messages, and to types for which the off-the-equilibrium message is not equilibrium dominated. Background A signaling game is a game in which one player ("sender") has private information regarding his type. He sends a signal ("message") to the other player ("receiver") to indicate his type. The receiver then takes an action. Both the signal and the receiver action can affect both players' utilities. A '' Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)'' in such a game consists of three elements. * A ''sender strategy'' - a function from the sender type to a signal that maximizes this type's utility given the receiver strategy. * A ''receiver belief'' - a function from the signal to a probability distribution over sender types; the belief m ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Equilibrium Refinement
In game theory, a solution concept is a formal rule for predicting how a game will be played. These predictions are called "solutions", and describe which strategies will be adopted by players and, therefore, the result of the game. The most commonly used solution concepts are equilibrium concepts, most famously Nash equilibrium. Many solution concepts, for many games, will result in more than one solution. This puts any one of the solutions in doubt, so a game theorist may apply a refinement to narrow down the solutions. Each successive solution concept presented in the following improves on its predecessor by eliminating implausible equilibria in richer games. Formal definition Let \Gamma be the class of all games and, for each game G \in \Gamma, let S_G be the set of strategy profiles of G. A ''solution concept'' is an element of the direct product \Pi_2^; ''i.e''., a function F: \Gamma \rightarrow \bigcup\nolimits_ 2^ such that F(G) \subseteq S_G for all G \in \Gamma. ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Signaling Game
In game theory, a signaling game is a simple type of a dynamic Bayesian game.Subsection 8.2.2 in Fudenberg Trole 1991, pp. 326–331 The essence of a signalling game is that one player takes an action, the signal, to convey information to another player, where sending the signal is more costly if they are conveying false information. A manufacturer, for example, might provide a warranty for its product in order to signal to consumers that its product is unlikely to break down. The classic example is of a worker who acquires a college degree not because it increases their skill, but because it conveys their ability to employers. A simple signalling game would have two players, the sender and the receiver. The sender has one of two types that we might call "desirable" and "undesirable" with different payoff functions, where the receiver knows the probability of each type but not which one this particular sender has. The receiver has just one possible type. The sender moves first, ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
In game theory, a Bayesian game is a game that models the outcome of player interactions using aspects of Bayesian probability. Bayesian games are notable because they allowed, for the first time in game theory, for the specification of the solutions to games with Complete information, incomplete information. Hungarian economist John C. Harsanyi introduced the concept of Bayesian games in three papers from 1967 and 1968: He was awarded the Nobel Prize for these and other contributions to game theory in 1994. Roughly speaking, Harsanyi defined Bayesian games in the following way: players are assigned by nature at the start of the game a set of characteristics. By mapping Probability distribution, probability distributions to these characteristics and by calculating the outcome of the game using Bayesian probability, the result is a game whose solution is, for technical reasons, far easier to calculate than a similar game in a non-Bayesian context. For those technical reasons, see th ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Probability Distribution
In probability theory and statistics, a probability distribution is the mathematical function that gives the probabilities of occurrence of different possible outcomes for an experiment. It is a mathematical description of a random phenomenon in terms of its sample space and the probabilities of events (subsets of the sample space). For instance, if is used to denote the outcome of a coin toss ("the experiment"), then the probability distribution of would take the value 0.5 (1 in 2 or 1/2) for , and 0.5 for (assuming that the coin is fair). Examples of random phenomena include the weather conditions at some future date, the height of a randomly selected person, the fraction of male students in a school, the results of a survey to be conducted, etc. Introduction A probability distribution is a mathematical description of the probabilities of events, subsets of the sample space. The sample space, often denoted by \Omega, is the set of all possible outcomes of a random phe ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Bayes' Theorem
In probability theory and statistics, Bayes' theorem (alternatively Bayes' law or Bayes' rule), named after Thomas Bayes, describes the probability of an event, based on prior knowledge of conditions that might be related to the event. For example, if the risk of developing health problems is known to increase with age, Bayes' theorem allows the risk to an individual of a known age to be assessed more accurately (by conditioning it on their age) than simply assuming that the individual is typical of the population as a whole. One of the many applications of Bayes' theorem is Bayesian inference, a particular approach to statistical inference. When applied, the probabilities involved in the theorem may have different probability interpretations. With Bayesian probability interpretation, the theorem expresses how a degree of belief, expressed as a probability, should rationally change to account for the availability of related evidence. Bayesian inference is fundamental to Bayesia ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Cho In-Koo
Cho or CHO may refer to: People * Chief Happiness Officer Surnames * Cho (Korean surname) Jo (, sometimes written as Cho) is a Korean family name, traditionally a royal family name in Korea. As of 2000, there were 1,347,730 people by this surname in South Korea, about 1% of the total population. The name may represent either of the H ..., one romanization of the common Korean surname * Zhuo (), romanized Cho in Wade–Giles, Chinese surname * Cho, a Minnan romanization of the Chinese surname Cao (Chinese surname), Cao () * Chō, the romaji for the uncommon Japanese surname derived from the Chinese Zhang (surname), Zhang (Kanji ) ** Cho U (born 1980), Taiwanese ''go'' player who romanizes his name in the Japanese fashion ** Chō (born 1957), Japanese actor and voice actor **Isamu Chō (1895-1945), Japanese lieutenant general Characters * Cho Hakkai, the Japanese name for ''Zhū Bājiè'' or "Pigsy", a character in the 16th-century Chinese novel, ''Journey to the West'', by ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
David M
David (; , "beloved one") (traditional spelling), , ''Dāwūd''; grc-koi, Δαυΐδ, Dauíd; la, Davidus, David; gez , ዳዊት, ''Dawit''; xcl, Դաւիթ, ''Dawitʿ''; cu, Давíдъ, ''Davidŭ''; possibly meaning "beloved one". was, according to the Hebrew Bible, the third king of the United Kingdom of Israel. In the Books of Samuel, he is described as a young shepherd and harpist who gains fame by slaying Goliath, a champion of the Philistines, in southern Canaan. David becomes a favourite of Saul, the first king of Israel; he also forges a notably close friendship with Jonathan, a son of Saul. However, under the paranoia that David is seeking to usurp the throne, Saul attempts to kill David, forcing the latter to go into hiding and effectively operate as a fugitive for several years. After Saul and Jonathan are both killed in battle against the Philistines, a 30-year-old David is anointed king over all of Israel and Judah. Following his rise to power, David ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Divine Equilibrium
The Divinity Criterion or Divine Equilibrium or Universal Divinity is a refinement of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a signaling game proposed by Banks and Sobel (1987). One of the most widely applied refinement is the D1-Criterion. It is a restriction of receiver's beliefs to the type of senders for whom deviating towards an off-the-equilibrium message could improve their outcome compared to the equilibrium payoff. The Intuitive and Divinity Criterion: Interpretation and Step-by-Step Examples Felix Munoz-Garcia, Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Journal of Industrial Organization Education. Volume 5, Issue 1, Pages 1–20, ISSN (Online) 1935-5041, DOI: 10.2202/1935-5041.1024, March 2011 In addition to the restriction suggested by the Intuitive Criterion, the Divinity Criterion considers only those types which are most likely to send the off-the-equilibrium message. If more than one sender could benefit from the deviation, the Intuitive Criterion assigns equal probabilities for all the send ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Pooling Equilibrium
A pooling equilibrium in game theory is an equilibria result of a signaling game. In a signaling game, players send actions called "signals" to other players in the game. Signaling actions are chosen based on privately held information (not known by other players in the game). These actions do not reveal a player's "type" to other players in the game, and other players will choose strategies Strategy (from Greek στρατηγία ''stratēgia'', "art of troop leader; office of general, command, generalship") is a general plan to achieve one or more long-term or overall goals under conditions of uncertainty. In the sense of the " ar ... accordingly. Under this equilibria, all types of a given sender will send the same signal, some representing their true type, some correctly mimicking the type of others, as they have no incentive to differentiate themselves. The receiver therefore acts like having received no information/message maximizing his/her utility according to his ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
In game theory, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is an equilibrium concept relevant for dynamic games with incomplete information (sequential Bayesian games). It is a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE). A perfect Bayesian equilibrium has two components -- ''strategies'' and ''beliefs'': * The strategy of a player in given information set specifies his choice of action in that information set, which may depend on the history (on actions taken previously in the game). This is similar to a sequential game. * The belief of a player in a given information set determines what node in that information set he believes the game has reached. The belief may be a probability distribution over the nodes in the information set, and is typically a probability distribution over the possible ''types'' of the other players. Formally, a belief system is an assignment of probabilities to every node in the game such that the sum of probabilities in any information set is 1. The strate ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Separating Equilibrium
In signaling games, a separating equilibrium is a type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium where agents with different characteristics choose different actions. See also *Signaling games *Pooling equilibrium *Cheap talk In game theory, cheap talk is communication between players that does not directly affect the payoffs of the game. Providing and receiving information is free. This is in contrast to signaling in which sending certain messages may be costly for th ... References {{Game theory Game theory game classes ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Signalling Games
In game theory, a signaling game is a simple type of a dynamic Bayesian game.Subsection 8.2.2 in Fudenberg Trole 1991, pp. 326–331 The essence of a signalling game is that one player takes an action, the signal, to convey information to another player, where sending the signal is more costly if they are conveying false information. A manufacturer, for example, might provide a warranty for its product in order to signal to consumers that its product is unlikely to break down. The classic example is of a worker who acquires a college degree not because it increases their skill, but because it conveys their ability to employers. A simple signalling game would have two players, the sender and the receiver. The sender has one of two types that we might call "desirable" and "undesirable" with different payoff functions, where the receiver knows the probability of each type but not which one this particular sender has. The receiver has just one possible type. The sender moves first, ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
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