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Separating Equilibrium
In signaling games, a separating equilibrium is a type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium where agents with different characteristics choose different actions. See also *Signaling games *Pooling equilibrium *Cheap talk In game theory, cheap talk is communication between players that does not directly affect the payoffs of the game. Providing and receiving information is free. This is in contrast to signaling in which sending certain messages may be costly for th ... References {{Game theory Game theory game classes ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Signaling Games
In game theory, a signaling game is a simple type of a dynamic Bayesian game.Subsection 8.2.2 in Fudenberg Trole 1991, pp. 326–331 The essence of a signalling game is that one player takes an action, the signal, to convey information to another player, where sending the signal is more costly if they are conveying false information. A manufacturer, for example, might provide a warranty for its product in order to signal to consumers that its product is unlikely to break down. The classic example is of a worker who acquires a college degree not because it increases their skill, but because it conveys their ability to employers. A simple signalling game would have two players, the sender and the receiver. The sender has one of two types that we might call "desirable" and "undesirable" with different payoff functions, where the receiver knows the probability of each type but not which one this particular sender has. The receiver has just one possible type. The sender moves first ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
In game theory, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is an equilibrium concept relevant for dynamic games with incomplete information (sequential Bayesian games). It is a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE). A perfect Bayesian equilibrium has two components -- ''strategies'' and ''beliefs'': * The strategy of a player in given information set specifies his choice of action in that information set, which may depend on the history (on actions taken previously in the game). This is similar to a sequential game. * The belief of a player in a given information set determines what node in that information set he believes the game has reached. The belief may be a probability distribution over the nodes in the information set, and is typically a probability distribution over the possible ''types'' of the other players. Formally, a belief system is an assignment of probabilities to every node in the game such that the sum of probabilities in any information set is 1. The strate ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Signaling Games
In game theory, a signaling game is a simple type of a dynamic Bayesian game.Subsection 8.2.2 in Fudenberg Trole 1991, pp. 326–331 The essence of a signalling game is that one player takes an action, the signal, to convey information to another player, where sending the signal is more costly if they are conveying false information. A manufacturer, for example, might provide a warranty for its product in order to signal to consumers that its product is unlikely to break down. The classic example is of a worker who acquires a college degree not because it increases their skill, but because it conveys their ability to employers. A simple signalling game would have two players, the sender and the receiver. The sender has one of two types that we might call "desirable" and "undesirable" with different payoff functions, where the receiver knows the probability of each type but not which one this particular sender has. The receiver has just one possible type. The sender moves first ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Pooling Equilibrium
A pooling equilibrium in game theory is an equilibria result of a signaling game. In a signaling game, players send actions called "signals" to other players in the game. Signaling actions are chosen based on privately held information (not known by other players in the game). These actions do not reveal a player's "type" to other players in the game, and other players will choose strategies Strategy (from Greek στρατηγία ''stratēgia'', "art of troop leader; office of general, command, generalship") is a general plan to achieve one or more long-term or overall goals under conditions of uncertainty. In the sense of the " ar ... accordingly. Under this equilibria, all types of a given sender will send the same signal, some representing their true type, some correctly mimicking the type of others, as they have no incentive to differentiate themselves. The receiver therefore acts like having received no information/message maximizing his/her utility according to his ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
