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Necessity Of Identity
In modal logic, the necessity of identity is the thesis that for every object x and object y, if x and y are the same object, it is necessary that x and y are the same object. The thesis is best known for its association with Saul Kripke, who published it in 1971, although it was first derived by the logician Ruth Barcan Marcus in 1947, and later, in simplified form, by W. V. O. Quine in 1953. Kripke's derivation The derivation in Kripke's 'Identity and Necessity' is in three steps: :(1) \forall x \Box (x = x). :(2) \forall x \forall y(x = y \to (\Box (x = x) \to \Box (x = y))). :(3) \forall x \forall y(x = y \to \Box (x = y)) The first premise is simply postulated: every object is identical to itself. The second is an application of the principle of substitutivity: if a = b, then a has all the properties b has, thus from Fa, infer Fb, where F is \Box (a = \_). The third follows by elementary predicate logic. Rigid designation In the later ''Naming and Necessity'', Kripke sugg ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Modal Logic
Modal logic is a collection of formal systems developed to represent statements about necessity and possibility. It plays a major role in philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, and natural language semantics. Modal logics extend other systems by adding unary operators \Diamond and \Box, representing possibility and necessity respectively. For instance the modal formula \Diamond P can be read as "possibly P" while \Box P can be read as "necessarily P". Modal logics can be used to represent different phenomena depending on what kind of necessity and possibility is under consideration. When \Box is used to represent epistemic necessity, \Box P states that P is epistemically necessary, or in other words that it is known. When \Box is used to represent deontic necessity, \Box P states that P is a moral or legal obligation. In the standard relational semantics for modal logic, formulas are assigned truth values relative to a ''possible world''. A formula's truth value at ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Necessary Proposition
Modal logic is a collection of formal systems developed to represent statements about necessity and possibility. It plays a major role in philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, and natural language semantics. Modal logics extend other systems by adding unary operators \Diamond and \Box, representing possibility and necessity respectively. For instance the modal formula \Diamond P can be read as "possibly P" while \Box P can be read as "necessarily P". Modal logics can be used to represent different phenomena depending on what kind of necessity and possibility is under consideration. When \Box is used to represent epistemic necessity, \Box P states that P is epistemically necessary, or in other words that it is known. When \Box is used to represent deontic necessity, \Box P states that P is a moral or legal obligation. In the standard relational semantics for modal logic, formulas are assigned truth values relative to a ''possible world''. A formula's truth value at ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Saul Kripke
Saul Aaron Kripke (; November 13, 1940 – September 15, 2022) was an American philosopher and logician in the analytic tradition. He was a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and emeritus professor at Princeton University. Since the 1960s, Kripke has been a central figure in a number of fields related to mathematical logic, modal logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology, and recursion theory. Much of his work remains unpublished or exists only as tape recordings and privately circulated manuscripts. Kripke made influential and original contributions to logic, especially modal logic. His principal contribution is a semantics for modal logic involving possible worlds, now called Kripke semantics. He received the 2001 Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy. Kripke was also partly responsible for the revival of metaphysics after the decline of logical positivism, claiming necessity i ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Ruth Barcan Marcus
Ruth Barcan Marcus (; born Ruth Charlotte Barcan; 2 August 1921 – 19 February 2012) was an American academic philosopher and logician best known for her work in modal and philosophical logic. She developed the first formal systems of quantified modal logic and in so doing introduced the schema or principle known as the Barcan formula. (She would also introduce the now standard "box" operator for necessity in the process.) Marcus, who originally published as Ruth C. Barcan, was, as Don Garrett notes "one of the twentieth century's most important and influential philosopher-logicians". Timothy Williamson, in a 2008 celebration of Marcus' long career, states that many of her "main ideas are not just original, and clever, and beautiful, and fascinating, and influential, and way ahead of their time, but actually – I believe – ''true''". Academic career and service Ruth Barcan (as she was known before marrying the physicist Jules Alexander Marcus in 1942 Gendler, T. S."Ruth B ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Willard Van Orman Quine
Willard Van Orman Quine (; known to his friends as "Van"; June 25, 1908 – December 25, 2000) was an American philosopher and logician in the analytic tradition, recognized as "one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century". From 1930 until his death 70 years later, Quine was continually affiliated with Harvard University in one way or another, first as a student, then as a professor. He filled the Edgar Pierce Chair of Philosophy at Harvard from 1956 to 1978. Quine was a teacher of logic and set theory. Quine was famous for his position that first order logic is the only kind worthy of the name, and developed his own system of mathematics and set theory, known as New Foundations. In philosophy of mathematics, he and his Harvard colleague Hilary Putnam developed the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument, an argument for the reality of mathematical entities.Colyvan, Mark"Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics" The Stanford Encyclopedi ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Identity Of Indiscernibles
The identity of indiscernibles is an ontological principle that states that there cannot be separate objects or entities that have all their properties in common. That is, entities ''x'' and ''y'' are identical if every predicate possessed by ''x'' is also possessed by ''y'' and vice versa. It states that no two distinct things (such as snowflakes) can be exactly alike, but this is intended as a metaphysical principle rather than one of natural science. A related principle is the indiscernibility of identicals, discussed below. A form of the principle is attributed to the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. While some think that Leibniz's version of the principle is meant to be only the indiscernibility of identicals, others have interpreted it as the conjunction of the identity of indiscernibles and the indiscernibility of identicals (the converse principle). Because of its association with Leibniz, the indiscernibility of identicals is sometimes known as Leibniz's law. I ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Naming And Necessity
''Naming and Necessity'' is a 1980 book with the transcript of three lectures, given by the philosopher Saul Kripke, at Princeton University in 1970, in which he dealt with the debates of proper names in the philosophy of language. The transcript was brought out originally in 1972 in ''Semantics of Natural Language'', edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman. Among analytic philosophers, ''Naming and Necessity'' is widely considered one of the most important philosophical works of the twentieth century. Overview Language is a primary concern of analytic philosophers, particularly the use of language to express concepts and to refer to individuals. In ''Naming and Necessity'', Kripke considers several questions that are important within analytic philosophy: *How do names refer to things in the world? (the problem of intensionality) *Are all statements that can be known ''a priori'' necessarily true, and are all statements that are known '' a posteriori'' contingently true? *D ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Rigid Designator
In modal logic and the philosophy of language, a term is said to be a rigid designator or absolute substantial term when it designates (picks out, denotes, refers to) the same thing in ''all possible worlds'' in which that thing exists. A designator is ''persistently rigid'' if it also designates nothing in all other possible worlds. A designator is ''obstinately rigid'' if it designates the same thing in every possible world, period, whether or not that thing exists in that world. Rigid designators are contrasted with ''connotative terms'', ''non-rigid'' or ''flaccid designators'', which may designate different things in different possible worlds. History The Scholastic philosophers in the Middle Ages developed a theory of properties of terms in which different classifications of concepts feature prominently. Concepts, and the terms that signify them, can be divided into absolute or connotative, according to the mode in which they signify. If they signify something absolutely, ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Possible World
A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. Possible worlds are widely used as a formal device in logic, philosophy, and linguistics in order to provide a semantics for intensional logic, intensional and modal logic. Their metaphysics, metaphysical status has been a subject of controversy in philosophy, with Modal realism, modal realists such as David Lewis (philosopher), David Lewis arguing that they are literally existing alternate realities, and others such as Robert Stalnaker arguing that they are not. Logic Possible worlds are one of the foundational concepts in modal logic, modal and intensional logics. Formulas in these logics are used to represent statements about what ''might'' be true, what ''should'' be true, what one ''believes'' to be true and so forth. To give these statements a formal interpretation, logicians use structures containing possible worlds. For instance, in the relational semantics for classical propositional mo ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Definite Description
In formal semantics and philosophy of language, a definite description is a denoting phrase in the form of "the X" where X is a noun-phrase or a singular common noun. The definite description is ''proper'' if X applies to a unique individual or object. For example: " the first person in space" and " the 42nd President of the United States of America", are proper. The definite descriptions "the person in space" and "the Senator from Ohio" are ''improper'' because the noun phrase X applies to more than one thing, and the definite descriptions "the first man on Mars" and "the Senator from some Country" are ''improper'' because X applies to nothing. Improper descriptions raise some difficult questions about the law of excluded middle, denotation, modality, and mental content. Russell's analysis As France is currently a republic, it has no king. Bertrand Russell pointed out that this raises a puzzle about the truth value of the sentence "The present King of France is bald." The sen ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
A Priori And A Posteriori
("from the earlier") and ("from the later") are Latin phrases used in philosophy to distinguish types of knowledge, justification, or argument by their reliance on empirical evidence or experience. knowledge is independent from current experience (e.g., as part of a new study). Examples include mathematics,Some associationist philosophers have contended that mathematics comes from experience and is not a form of any a priori knowledge () tautologies, and deduction from pure reason.Galen Strawson has stated that an argument is one in which "you can see that it is true just lying on your couch. You don't have to get up off your couch and go outside and examine the way things are in the physical world. You don't have to do any science." () knowledge depends on empirical evidence. Examples include most fields of science and aspects of personal knowledge. The terms originate from the analytic methods found in ''Organon'', a collection of works by Aristotle. Prior analytic ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
A Posteriori Necessity
''A posteriori'' necessity is a thesis in metaphysics and the philosophy of language, that some statements of which we must acquire knowledge a posteriori are also necessarily true. It challenges previously widespread belief that only ''a priori'' knowledge can be necessary. It draws on a number of philosophical concepts such as necessity, the causal theory of reference, rigidity, and the a priori a posteriori distinction. It was first introduced by philosopher Saul Kripke in his 1970 series of lectures at Princeton University. The transcript of these lectures was then compiled and assembled into his seminal book, ''Naming and Necessity''. Main argument for a posteriori necessity Here is an overview of the argument: :(P1) 'Hesperus' is a proper name that refers to the evening star. 'Phosphorus' is also a proper name and it refers to the morning star. But the evening star and the morning star are the same planetary body (Venus). So both names designate Venus. :(P2) If both ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
