Gödel's Completeness Theorem
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Gödel's Completeness Theorem
Gödel's completeness theorem is a fundamental theorem in mathematical logic that establishes a correspondence between semantic truth and syntactic provability in first-order logic. The completeness theorem applies to any first-order theory: If ''T'' is such a theory, and φ is a sentence (in the same language) and every model of ''T'' is a model of φ, then there is a (first-order) proof of φ using the statements of ''T'' as axioms. One sometimes says this as "anything universally true is provable". This does not contradict Gödel's incompleteness theorem, which shows that some formula φu is unprovable although true in the natural numbers, which are a particular model of a first-order theory describing them — φu is just false in some other model of the first-order theory being considered (such as a non-standard model of arithmetic for Peano arithmetic). It makes a close link between model theory that deals with what is true in different models, and proof theory tha ...
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Natural Deduction
In logic and proof theory, natural deduction is a kind of proof calculus in which logical reasoning is expressed by inference rules closely related to the "natural" way of reasoning. This contrasts with Hilbert-style systems, which instead use axioms as much as possible to express the logical laws of deductive reasoning. Motivation Natural deduction grew out of a context of dissatisfaction with the axiomatizations of deductive reasoning common to the systems of Hilbert, Frege, and Russell (see, e.g., Hilbert system). Such axiomatizations were most famously used by Russell and Whitehead in their mathematical treatise ''Principia Mathematica''. Spurred on by a series of seminars in Poland in 1926 by Łukasiewicz that advocated a more natural treatment of logic, Jaśkowski made the earliest attempts at defining a more natural deduction, first in 1929 using a diagrammatic notation, and later updating his proposal in a sequence of papers in 1934 and 1935. His proposals led to diffe ...
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Consistency
In classical deductive logic, a consistent theory is one that does not lead to a logical contradiction. The lack of contradiction can be defined in either semantic or syntactic terms. The semantic definition states that a theory is consistent if it has a model, i.e., there exists an interpretation under which all formulas in the theory are true. This is the sense used in traditional Aristotelian logic, although in contemporary mathematical logic the term ''satisfiable'' is used instead. The syntactic definition states a theory T is consistent if there is no formula \varphi such that both \varphi and its negation \lnot\varphi are elements of the set of consequences of T. Let A be a set of closed sentences (informally "axioms") and \langle A\rangle the set of closed sentences provable from A under some (specified, possibly implicitly) formal deductive system. The set of axioms A is consistent when \varphi, \lnot \varphi \in \langle A \rangle for no formula \varphi. If there e ...
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