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Asymmetry (population Ethics)
The Asymmetry, also known as the Procreation Asymmetry, is the idea in population ethics that there is a moral or evaluative asymmetry between bringing into existence individuals with good or bad lives. It was first discussed by Jan Narveson in 1967, and Jeff McMahan coined the term 'the Asymmetry' in 1981. McMahan formulates the Asymmetry as follows: "while the fact that a person's life would be worse than no life at all ... constitutes a strong moral reason for not bringing him into existence, the fact that a person's life would be worth living provides no (or only a relatively weak) moral reason for bringing him into existence." Professor Nils Holtug formulates the Asymmetry evaluatively in terms of the value of outcomes instead of in terms of moral reasons. Holtug's formulation says that "while it detracts from the value of an outcome to add individuals whose lives are of overall negative value, it does not increase the value of an outcome to add individuals whose lives are o ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Population Ethics
Population ethics is the philosophical study of the ethical problems arising when our actions affect ''who'' is born and ''how many'' people are born in the future. An important area within population ethics is population axiology, which is "the study of the conditions under which one state of affairs is better than another, ''when the states of affairs in question may differ over the numbers and the identities of the persons who ever live''." Moral philosopher Derek Parfit brought population ethics to the attention of the academic community as a modern branch of moral philosophy in his seminal work ''Reasons and Persons'' in 1984. Discussions of population ethics are thus a relatively recent development in the history of philosophy. Formulating a satisfactory theory of population ethics is regarded as "notoriously difficult". While scholars have proposed and debated many different population ethical theories, no consensus in the academic community has emerged. Gustaf Arrhenius, Pr ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Antinatalism
Antinatalism or anti-natalism is the view that procreation is wrong. Antinatalists argue that humans should abstain from procreation because it is morally wrong. In scholarly and literary writings, various ethical arguments have been put forth in defense of antinatalism. Some of the earliest surviving formulations of the idea that it would be better not to have been born can be found in ancient Greece. The term antinatalism is in opposition to the term natalism, pronatalism or pro-natalism, and was used probably for the first time as the name of the position by Théophile de Giraud in his book ''L'art de guillotiner les procréateurs: Manifeste anti-nataliste''. The most prominent recent arguments in favor of antinatalism have been put forward by South African philosopher David Benatar. Arguments In religion Buddhism The teaching of the Buddha, among other Four Noble Truths and the beginning of Mahāvagga, is interpreted by Hari Singh Gour as follows: The issue of Bud ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Population Ethics
Population ethics is the philosophical study of the ethical problems arising when our actions affect ''who'' is born and ''how many'' people are born in the future. An important area within population ethics is population axiology, which is "the study of the conditions under which one state of affairs is better than another, ''when the states of affairs in question may differ over the numbers and the identities of the persons who ever live''." Moral philosopher Derek Parfit brought population ethics to the attention of the academic community as a modern branch of moral philosophy in his seminal work ''Reasons and Persons'' in 1984. Discussions of population ethics are thus a relatively recent development in the history of philosophy. Formulating a satisfactory theory of population ethics is regarded as "notoriously difficult". While scholars have proposed and debated many different population ethical theories, no consensus in the academic community has emerged. Gustaf Arrhenius, Pr ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Suffering-focused Ethics
Suffering-focused ethics are those positions in ethics that give moral priority to the reduction of suffering. This means that they give greater weight to the reduction of suffering than to the promotion of pleasure, happiness, or to other things that one might consider valuable. According to some suffering-focused ethics, humans should concentrate exclusively on reducing preventable suffering. Other views can include additional features as the prevention of other disvalues or the promotion of other positive values while giving priority to reducing preventable suffering over them. Different suffering-focused ethics "Suffering-focused ethics" is an umbrella term that covers different normative positions which share the common element of giving priority to suffering. Even though all these doctrines share this common general aim, they make different claims regarding how we should act. An example of these views is negative consequentialism, which claims that we should minimize suffer ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Person-affecting View
A person-affecting or person-based view (also called person-affecting restrictionGustaf Arrhenius. "The Person-Affecting Restriction, Comparativism, and the Moral Status of Potential People". 2003. https://www.iffs.se/media/2287/the-person-affecting-restriction-comparativism-and-the-moral-status-of-potential-people.pdf) in population ethics captures the intuition that an act can only be bad if it is bad ''for'' someone.Roberts, M. A., "The Nonidentity Problem", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Winter 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonidentity-problem/ Similarly something can be good only if it is good ''for'' someone. Therefore, according to standard person-affecting views, there is no moral obligation to create people nor moral good in creating people because nonexistence means "there is never a person who could have benefited from being created". Whether one accepts person-affecting views greatly influences to what extent shaping ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Negative Consequentialism
Negative consequentialism is a version of consequentialism, which is "one of the major theories of normative ethics." Like other versions of consequentialism, negative consequentialism holds that moral right and wrong depend only on the value of outcomes. That is, for negative and other versions of consequentialism, questions such as "what should I do?" and "what kind of person should I be?" are answered only based on consequences. Negative consequentialism differs from other versions of consequentialism by giving greater weight in moral deliberations to what is bad (e.g. suffering or injustice) than what is good (e.g. happiness or justice). Due to this, it can be considered an instance of what has been called "suffering-focused ethics", the view that the reduction of suffering has moral priority over any other possible duties we may think of. Negative Utilitarianism A specific type of consequentialism is utilitarianism, which says that the consequences that matter are those that ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Negative Utilitarianism
Negative utilitarianism is a form of negative consequentialism that can be described as the view that people should minimize the total amount of aggregate suffering, or that they should minimize suffering and then, secondarily, maximize the total amount of happiness. It can be considered as a version of utilitarianism that gives greater priority to reducing suffering (negative utility or 'disutility') than to increasing pleasure (positive utility). This differs from classical utilitarianism, which does not claim that reducing suffering is intrinsically more important than increasing happiness. Both versions of utilitarianism hold that morally right and morally wrong actions depend solely on the consequences for overall aggregate well-being. 'Well-being' refers to the state of the individual. Negative utilitarianism would thus differ from other consequentialist views, such as negative prioritarianism or negative consequentialist egalitarianism. While these other theories would al ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Natalism
Natalism (also called pronatalism or the pro-birth position) is an ideology that promotes the reproduction of human life as the preeminent objective of being human. Compare: The term, as it relates to the belief itself, comes from the French word for 'birthrate', . Natalism promotes child-bearing and parenthood as desirable for social reasons and to ensure the continuance of humanity. Natalism in public policy typically seeks to create financial and social incentives for populations to reproduce, such as providing tax incentives that reward having and supporting children. Those who adhere to more strict interpretations of natalism may seek to limit access to abortion and contraception, as well. The opposite of natalism is antinatalism. Motives Religion Many religions encourage procreation and religiousness in members is tied to higher fertility rates. Judaism, Islam, and major branches of Christianity, including the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the Catholic ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Antifrustrationism
Antifrustrationism is an axiological position proposed by German philosopher Christoph Fehige, which states that "we don't do any good by creating satisfied extra preferences. What matters about preferences is not that they have a satisfied existence, but that they don't have a frustrated existence." According to Fehige, "''maximizers of preference satisfaction'' should instead call themselves ''minimizers of preference frustration''." What makes the world better is "not its amount of preference satisfaction, but the ''avoided preference frustration''." In the words of Fehige, "we have obligations to make preferrers satisfied, but no obligations to make satisfied preferrers." The position stands in contrast to classical utilitarianism, among other ethical theories, which holds that creating "satisfied preferrers" is, or can be, a good in itself. Antifrustrationism has similarities with, although it is different from, negative utilitarianism, the teachings of Buddha, Stoicism, philo ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Ethics
Ethics or moral philosophy is a branch of philosophy that "involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior".''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' The field of ethics, along with aesthetics, concerns matters of value; these fields comprise the branch of philosophy called axiology. Ethics seeks to resolve questions of human morality by defining concepts such as good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, justice and crime. As a field of intellectual inquiry, moral philosophy is related to the fields of moral psychology, descriptive ethics, and value theory. Three major areas of study within ethics recognized today are: # Meta-ethics, concerning the theoretical meaning and reference of moral propositions, and how their truth values (if any) can be determined; # Normative ethics, concerning the practical means of determining a moral course of action; # Applied ethics, concerning what a person is obligated (or permitted) to do ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Nonidentity Problem
The nonidentity problem (also called the paradox of future individuals) in population ethics is the problem that an act may still be wrong even if it is not wrong ''for'' anyone. More precisely, the nonidentity problem is the inability to simultaneously hold the following beliefs: (1) a person-affecting view; (2) bringing someone into existence whose life is worth living, albeit flawed, is not "bad for" that person; (3) some acts of bringing someone into existence are wrong even if they are not bad ''for'' someone. Rivka Weinberg has used the nonidentity problem to study the ethics of reproduction. See also * Derek Parfit * Mere addition paradox The mere addition paradox (also known as the repugnant conclusion) is a problem in ethics identified by Derek Parfit and discussed in his book ''Reasons and Persons'' (1984). The paradox identifies the mutual incompatibility of four intuitively ... References {{Reflist Population ethics Identity (philosophy) ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Timothy Sprigge
Timothy Lauro Squire Sprigge (14 January 1932 – 11 July 2007), usually cited as T. L. S. Sprigge, was a British idealist philosopher who spent the latter portion of his career at the University of Edinburgh, where he was Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, and latterly an Emeritus Fellow. Biography Sprigge was educated at the Dragon School, Oxford, and Bryanston School in Dorset. He studied English at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge (1952–1955), then switched to philosophy, completing his PhD under A. J. Ayer. He taught philosophy at University College, London and Sussex University before becoming Regius Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh. Long concerned with the nature of experience and the relationship between mind and reality, Sprigge was the philosopher who first posed the question made famous by Thomas Nagel: "What is it like to be a bat?"Jane O'Grady"Timothy Sprigge" ''The Guardian'', 4 September 2007. Throughout his career he ar ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
