Ratnākaraśānti

Ratnākaraśānti (also known as Ratnākara, Śāntipa, and Śānti) (late 10th-century CE to mid 11th-century CE) was an influential Buddhist philosopher and vajrayana tantric adept and scholar. He was the "gate scholar" of Vikramaśilā university's eastern gate (modern-day Bihar in India), a key post in the university's leadership. Ratnākara was known by the title ''kalikālasarvajña'' ("the Omniscient One of the Degenerate Age") and is depicted as one of the eighty-four mahāsiddhas (great yogic masters).

Ratnākara wrote over forty works which include several influential commentaries to Mahayana sutras and tantras (especially the '' Hevajra tantra''), treatises on Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and Pramāṇa. Because his unique philosophy attempts to merge the insights of both Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, Ratnākara referred to it as Trisvabhāva-mādhyamaka ("the middle way of the three natures"). He also known as a major defender of the "nirākāravāda" (without images") interpretation of Yogācāra.

At Vikramaśilā, Ratnākara was a teacher to Atīśa, Maitrīpa, Drokmi Śākya Yeshe among others. He was also a contemporary of Vāgīśvarakīrti. Ratnākaraśānti was influential on some Tibetan Buddhist figures. Defenders of the shentong view him as a forerunner of this tradition and as a defender of shentong. His work on the ''Hevajra Tantra'' was also influential.

Life

Panorama of Vikramaśīla monastery, modern day Bhagalpur district, Bihar.
There is much uncertainty about the facts of Ratnākaraśānti's life since Tibetan and Sanskrit sources disagree on many issues. Many sources refer to him as a "''pūrvadeśīya''" born in Magadha (Mahajanapada), Magadha (modern-day Bihar in India).

Abhayadatta Sri places him during the reign of the Pāla king Devapāla (c. 810-850 CE). However, modern scholars have now determined that the most likely dating for Ratnākaraśānti's birth (based on philological, philosophical and biographical evidence) is in the late tenth century, "slightly before Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti, and Atiśa." Tāranātha says that he took his post at Vikramaśīla during the reign of King Canaka (active in the early 11th century).

Naktso Lotsāwa Tsultrim Gyelwa, a Tibetan student of Ratnākaraśānti, states that Ratnākaraśānti was a student of * Dharmakīrtiśrī (a.k.a. Bla ma Gser ling pa, *Dharmakīrti of Suvarṇadvīpa). Tibetan sources also state he was a student of Nāropa, though it is hard to say how reliable this claim is as many of these sources are unreliable historically.

In the early stages of his career, Ratnākaraśānti received his ordination at the monastery of Odantapuri. He seems to have gained much fame and status during the middle of his life when became acting head of Vikramaśīla and attracted many offers to teach abroad and this allowed him to secure many donations for the upkeep of Vikramaśīla. Several sources mention that Ratnākaraśānti lived long and was still at Vikramaśīla when Adhīśa ( Atisha) when to Tibet in 1041. Sources seem to indicate that he died sometime before 1050 CE.

Thought

Yogācāra and Madhyamaka

Ratnākaraśānti was a Yogācāra philosopher who defended the nirākāravāda ("without images", also known as alikākāravāda) view of Yogācāra as well as the compatibility of Madhyamaka with this Yogācāra view. His works, like the ''Prajñāpāramitopadeśa,'' state that the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka schools are congruent, having the same ultimate intent and final realisation, even if they describe it somewhat differently.Brunnhölzl, Karl (2011). ''Prajñāpāramitā, Indian "gzhan Stong Pas", and the Beginning of Tibetan Gzhan Stongm'' p. 133. Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien. Kano, Kazuo. "Ratnākaraśānti’s Understanding of Buddha-Nature." ''China Tibetology'' 25, no. 2 (2015): 52–77.

Due to his unique doctrinal view, which draws on both Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, Tibetan authors like Taranatha labelled Ratnākara's position "Vijñapti-madhyamaka" (rNam rig gi dbu ma).Mimaki, Katsumi. "The intellectual sequence of Ratnakaraksanti, Jñanasrimitra and Ratnakrti", Asiatische Studien: Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft, Études asiatiques: revue de la Société Suisse-Asie,46 (1992), Études bouddhiques offertes à Jacques May. http://doi.org/10.5169/seals-146959. Modern scholars have also described his position with other terms including just "nirākāravāda", "nirākāravāda yogācāra-mādhyamika" and trisvabhāva-mādhyamika.Luo, H. (2018). Is Ratnākaraśānti a gZhan stong pa? ''Journal of Indian Philosophy'', ''46''(3), 577–619. H. Luo notes that various texts by Ratnākara show that he associated his view with the term "Rang bzhin gsum gyi dbu ma pa" which can be reconstructed in Sanskrit as *Trisvabhāva-mādhyamika ("the middle way of the three natures"). The term indicates that he saw himself as a follower of Nagarjuna's mādhyamaka thought who also defended the yogacara school's doctrine of the three natures (trisvabhāva).

Ratnākaraśānti's ''Prajñāpāramitopadeśa'' states:

The Yogacaras and likewise the Madhyamikas assert that the fourth nd finalyogabhumi consists of the supramundane wisdom that is absolute without stains and infinite, appearing like space, and in which, by emptiness, all phenomena are not observable and do not appear at all...the Yogacaras assert that the fundamental nature of phenomena - sheer lucidity - exists substantially, while the Madhyamikas do not even assert such a substance. However, this difference is understood as eing one inname only. Therefore, those Yogacaras and Madhyamikas who dispute with each other without any basis o do soare persons of very bad character.

According to Ratnākara, true Mādhyamikas cannot ultimately deny reflexive awareness (Sanskrit: svasaṃvedana or svasaṃvitti). Those who deny this undermine the very epistemic force (pramāṇa) of their system and their own negative arguments. This is because for Ratnākara to be able to logically refute anything there must be a foundation for one's epistemology. Thus, Ratnākara argues that as long as Mādhyamikas accept reflexive awareness as a real foundation, their intent is equal to that of nirākāravāda Yogācāra.

Ratnākara called those Madhyamikas who denied the real existence of reflexive awareness “pseudo-Mādhyamikas” (Tibetan: dbu ma’i ltar snang, ''*madhyamakābhāsa'') and he states that they fail to understand Nāgārjuna’s true intent, which he sees as fully consistent with the '' Madhyāntavibhāga'' and Dharmakīrti’s '' Pramāṇavārttika''.McNamara, Daniel
“The Two Truths are not Enough: Ratnākaraśānti on the Two Truths and the impossibility of Pramāṇa for Mādhyamikas.”
Paper presented in American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting, 2021. Ratnākara's main critique is against Śāntarakṣita, whom he cites and attempts to refute in the ''Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti madhyamāpratipad-siddhi'' (''Proving the Middle Path: A Commentary that Ornaments Madhyamaka'').

Śāntarakṣita's ''Madhyamakālaṃkā'' accepts the Yogācāra analysis of things at the conventional level, but he sees it as a view which must be superseded by Madhyamaka's anti-foundationalism at the level of ultimate truth. This is because Śāntarakṣita thinks that the dependent nature, the Yogācāra explanation of the ultimate reality, cannot be defended as being either a single thing or as manifold (and thus, it cannot be ultimately real).

According to Daniel McNamara, Ratnākaraśānti criticises this view, holding that "there must be a substratum—the other-dependent nature—and that this does indeed survive the neither-one nor-many argument." Ratnākaraśānti argues that Śāntarakṣita's position is untenable epistemically (since there would be no foundation for pramāṇas and thus, for knowledge) and metaphysically (since pure negation cannot explain dependent arising and causality). Ratnākaraśānti states:

Now, some do not accept that the imagination of the unreal exists; they posit that everything is false. To them, we respond: ''If verythingwere just false, there would be no cause and no regularity. There would be no causal capacity, only error. Every kind of pramāṇa would be impossible.'' If everything were false, there would be no causes, so verythingwould arise causelessly. They would also not arise only on particular occasions (re ’ga’). s Dharmakīrti states, in ''Pramanavarttika'' 1.35ab ''Since that which is causeless does not depend on anything else, it would be either permanently existent or permanently nonexistent.'' There would be no causal capacity because capacity is defined in terms of existence; it is not possible for something non-existent to have causal capacity, The iew thateverything is only error would be attained because what is manifest is non-existent. It would then absurdly follow that the āryas, who do not eedelusory things, would not see nything Moreover, if everything were an error, there would be no valid direct perception or inference, and so everything without exception would be non-pramāṇa.

Thus, according to Ratnākara, "pseudo-Madhyamikas" undermine their own arguments when they reject a foundation like the dependent nature. For Ratnākara, without some ultimate reference point which really exists, one cannot establish the truth of anything via epistemology - including basic Buddhist theories like dependent arising.

The three natures

Ratnākaraśānti defends the importance of the Yogācāra three natures theory for Mahayana Buddhism and for understanding the ultimate truth. Following closely the '' Madhyāntavibhāga'' and the '' Triṃśikā'', Ratnākaraśānti maintains that the perfected or consummate nature (pariniṣpanna svabhava) is the dependent (paratantra) nature's emptiness of the imagined (parikalpita) nature.

Ratnākaraśānti summarises his interpretation of the three natures theory and how it relates to the two truths theory of Madhyamaka in the following verse (found in his ''Madhyamakālaṅkāropadeśa'' and in his ''Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti madhyama pratipatsiddhi''):

Every dharma which has as its nature the two, .e., the apprehended and the apprehending,does not exist; very dharma whichhas as its nature the error as being two, owever,exists; very dharma which hasas its nature the emptiness of he two also exists That is accepted as the Middle Way. The three natures are named the Imagined, the Dependent, and the Consummate, because, thus in sequence, the Imagined is superimposed as an error, the Dependent arises from the causes, the Consummate is changeless.

In this way, Ratnākaraśānti seeks to provide a theory of the middle way which unites the two main Indian Mahayana schools at the time. In this view, the consummate nature is seen as ultimate and changeless, while the other two natures are relative truth.

The ''Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti madhyama pratipatsiddhi'' further explains why the three natures are the madhyamaka middle way:

To say “ ll dharmasexist” is one extreme, to say “ ll dharmasdo not exist” is another extreme. The middle of these two is the Middle Way, which is the definitive realization of the hreenatures. What, then, is that efinitive realization That which sserts All dharmas are neither existent nor non-existent, that is to say, from the perspective of the Imagined, ll dharmasare not existent, from the perspective of the Dependent and the Consummate, they are not nonexistent.

According to H. Luo understanding of Madhyamaka is similar to later Tibetan views described as shentong, such as the view of Sakya Chokden.

Emptiness and the three natures

According to Karl Brunnholzl, there are two models of the three natures and their relationship to emptiness found in Indian sources:

# The common model found in most Yogacara sources (such as the works of Asanga and Vasubandhu) is that the dependent nature is empty of the imagined nature, and this very emptiness is the perfected nature.
# The second model, which is found in Prajñaparamita commentaries like the ''Bṛhaṭṭīkā'' and the ''Āmnāyānusāriṇī,'' is that the perfected nature is empty of both the dependent and the imagined natures.
Brunnholzl argues that Ratnākaraśānti defends model one in all texts except the ''Sutrasamuccaya-bhasya'' (which is a questionable text).

However, Hong Luo disagrees with this view and instead argues that model 2 (together with model 1) can be found in ''Prajñāpāramitopadeśa,'' ''Madhyamakālaṅkāropadeśa'' and in the ''Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti''.

Luo quotes the ''Prajñāpāramitopadeśa'' which states:

Therefore, all factors are mere mind (cittamātram), mere cognition (vijñānamātram), mere luminosity (prakāśamātram). There is neither external object-referent to be apprehended by cognition nor the apprehending nature of the cognition. These two, .e., the apprehended and the apprehending,are the Imagined of the factors, because they are fabricated by mental speech. Where are they fabricated? In the imagination of the unreal, hicharises through the strength of the impregnation of the attachment to the Imagined, nd whichcontains the image of an object-referent despite the non-existence of object-referent. The imagination of the unreal is the Dependent of the factors, t isan error (bhrāntiḥ), a perverseness (viparyāsaḥ), a false cognition (mithyājñānam). Thus, in the magination of the unreal the image of the apprehending as well as the image of the apprehended are indeed unreal. By the power of confusion (viplavavaśāt), hich arisesonly through the strength of error (bhrāntivaśāt), the imagination of the unreal manifests. Therefore, the form (rūpam) of the magination of the unrealis unreal. What is the real? t ismere luminosity.

Furthermore, the ''Madhyamakālaṅkāropadeśa'' also argues that only the consummate/perfected nature is true: "there is nothing which establishes luminosity, because it is undifferentiated, and because, therwise,there will be an undesirable infinite regress. Thus, since luminosity as such cannot be erroneous to itself, it is valid knowledge." The text then states that the other two natures "like hairs in the sky, are erroneous."

Thus, for Ratnākara, what is truly real is luminosity (prakāśa), the perfected nature, also termed Suchness ( tathatā), and the transcendent wisdom of a buddha, which is empty of the imagined and the dependent natures and is always without change.

The ultimate reality

Ratnākaraśānti also held that ultimate reality is an implicative negation, which is the natural luminosity (prakrti-prabhasvara) and the tathagatagarbha (i.e. buddha-nature) which is also non-dual self-awareness ( svasamvedana). This non-dual self-awareness is what remains after all afflictive and cognitive obscurations and duality have been removed.

In the ''Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti madhyamāpratipad-siddhi'' Ratnākaraśānti encapsulates his view of the ultimate reality as follows: "Those dharmas—which do not exist—appear Not from matter, nor from what is other, Nor from non-existence, because of two faults. Therefore, their identity is awareness." He comments that the dharmas, the apparent relative phenomena, are not truly existent since they are non-dual, "they lack a nature which is singular or multiple." They do not arise from matter "because appearances are established through awareness alone", nor from something other than awareness, "because phenomena could not manifest in a field of experience from which they are separate." Thus, the only real thing is "the true nature of awareness itself, that is falsely apprehended as appearances."

This ultimate reality is also described as having the nature of radiance ( prakāśa, ‘shining forth’), which is the true nature of all phenomena. In the ''Prajñāpāramitopadeśa,'' Ratnakara says that all dharmas which appear must have radiance (prakāśa), which is the capacity to appear (pratibhāsa), as their self-nature (ātmabhūtaḥ). Without this capacity for shining forth, that consciousness has, nothing could appear to consciousness.

Buddha nature

Ratnākara mentions buddha-nature in his ''* Guhyasamāja-maṇḍalavidhi-ṭīkā.'' He describes buddha-nature as the five kinds of Buddha wisdom (such as ādarśajñāna, mirror-like wisdom, and the rest) which are completely pure, abide in sentient beings "forever, throughout beginningless and endless time", and are merely veiled by adventitious stains but always remain unchanged.

Ratnākara calls the buddha-nature the seed of a Bodhisattva (*bodhisattvabīja), and the “spiritual disposition” of a Buddha, or the Tathāgata-family (tathāgatagotra). Thus, Ratnākara argues that only some sentient beings have buddha-nature, mainly, those who have the disposition (gotra) to become bodhisattvas (but not sravakas or pratyekabuddhas). This is why he says in his ''Muktāvalī'' that "all bodhisattvas are Buddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha)".

Buddhahood

According to Ratnākaraśānti, Buddhahood is the merging of a transcendent awareness with a pure mundane awareness (which is ultimately free of ākāras - representations). Out of their great compassion, all Buddhas deliberately retain a tiny amount of cognitive distortion or mistakenness (bhrānti), so that they interact with and aid sentient beings.

Works

There are about 40 texts attributed to Ratnākaraśānti in the Tibetan canon.

His philosophical works, generally written from a Yogācāra alikākāravāda perspective, include several commentaries to the Perfection of Wisdom literature. Three key works stand out:

* ''Sāratamāpañjikā''
* ''Śuddhimatī'' ( D 3801)
* ''Pith Instructions for the Perfection of Wisdom'' (D 4079, ''Prajñāpāramitābhāvanopadeśa'').

He also wrote three doxographical texts (two of which are commentaries to Śāntarakṣita's ''Madhyamākalaṃkāra''):''''

* ''*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi'' (D 4259),
* ''*Madhyamapratipadāsiddhi-nāma-Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti'' (D 4072)
* ''Madhyamākalaṃkāraopadeśa'' (D 4085)

He is often critical of the viewpoints of Madhyamikas, including Candrakīrti and Śāntarakṣita.

Ratnākaraśānti composed three commentaries to the '' Guhyasamāja Tantra,'' as well as commentaries to the ''Hevajra Tantra'' and the '' Mahāmāyā Tantra.'' His three main tantric texts are:

* ''Muktāvalīpañjikā'' (D 1189), a commentary on the ''Hevajratantra''
* ''Bhramaharasādhana'' (D 1245)
* ''Hevajrasahajasadyoga'' (D 1246)
He also wrote ''Kusumāñjalīnāma Guhyasamājanibandha,'' a commentary on the '' Guhyasamāja.''

Furthermore, he also wrote a technical treatise on Buddhist pramāṇa theory called the ''Antarvyāptisamarthana''.Kajiyama, Yūichi. 1999. ''The Antarvyāptisamarthana of Ratnākaraśānti''. Bibliotheca Philologica et Philosophica Buddhica 2. Tokyo: International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology.

Spurious works

A '' Sutrasamuccaya-bhasya'' is attributed to an author named Ratnākaraśānti''.'' However, this treatise defends the ekayana view of buddha-nature, and thus it is likely to be by a different figure using this name, and not by Ratnākaraśānti the Yogācāra philosopher from Vikramaśīla.

See also

*Mahasiddha

Notes

References

* Abhayadhatta and Robinson, James (trans.) (1979). ''Buddha's Lions: The Lives of the Eighty-Four Siddhas''. Berkeley: Dharma Publishing.
*Dowman, Keith (1986). ''Masters of Mahamudra: Songs and Histories of the Eighty-four Buddhist Siddhas''. Albany: State University of New York Press.
*Tāranātha, Lama Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, Alaka (trans.) (1970). ''Tāranātha’s History of Buddhism in India''. Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study.
*Tatz, Mark (1998). "Maitrī-pa and Atiśa," in ''Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 4th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies'', ed. Helga Uebach and Jampa L. Panglung. Munchen: Kommission für Zentralasiatische Studien Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften.

External links

The Antarvyāptisamarthana of RatnākaraśāntiThe ''Āloka'' of Haribhadra and the ''Sāratāma'' of Ratnākaraśānti: A Comparative Study of the Two Commentaries of the ''Aṣṭasāhasrikā''Luminosity: Reflexive Awareness in Ratnākaraśānti's Pith Instructions for the Ornament of the Middle Way

{{DEFAULTSORT:Ratnakarasanti
Tibetan Buddhist spiritual teachers
Indian scholars of Buddhism
History of Bihar
Monks of Vikramashila
Yogacara
Vajrayana
Mahayana Buddhism writers
Mahasiddhas
Poets of Charyapada
People from the Pala Empire