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Data remanence is the residual representation of digital data that remains even after attempts have been made to remove or erase the data. This residue may result from data being left intact by a nominal file deletion operation, by reformatting of storage media that does not remove data previously written to the media, or through physical properties of the storage media that allow previously written data to be recovered. Data remanence may make inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information possible should the storage media be released into an uncontrolled environment (e.g., thrown in the trash or lost).

Various techniques have been developed to counter data remanence. These techniques are classified as clearing, purging/sanitizing, or destruction. Specific methods include overwriting, degaussing, encryption, and media destruction.

Effective application of countermeasures can be complicated by several factors, including media that are inaccessible, media that cannot effectively be erased, advanced storage systems that maintain histories of data throughout the data's life cycle, and persistence of data in memory that is typically considered volatile.

Several standards exist for the secure removal of data and the elimination of data remanence.

Solid-state drives, which are flash-based, differ from hard-disk drives in two ways: first, in the way data is stored; and second, in the way the algorithms are used to manage and access that data. These differences can be exploited to recover previously erased data. SSDs mai

Solid-state drives, which are flash-based, differ from hard-disk drives in two ways: first, in the way data is stored; and second, in the way the algorithms are used to manage and access that data. These differences can be exploited to recover previously erased data. SSDs maintain a layer of indirection between the logical addresses used by computer systems to access data and the internal addresses that identify physical storage. This layer of indirection hides idiosyncratic media interfaces and enhances SSD performance, reliability, and lifespan (see wear leveling); but it can also produce copies of the data that are invisible to the user and that a sophisticated attacker could recover. For sanitizing entire disks, sanitize commands built into the SSD hardware have been found to be effective when implemented correctly, and software-only techniques for sanitizing entire disks have been found to work most, but not all, of the time.[9]:section 5 In testing, none of the software techniques were effective for sanitizing individual files. These included well-known algorithms such as the Gutmann method, US DoD 5220.22-M, RCMP TSSIT OPS-II, Schneier 7 Pass, and Secure Empty Trash on Mac OS (a feature included in versions OS X 10.3-10.9).[9]:section 5

The The TRIM feature in many SSD devices, if properly implemented, will eventually erase data after it is deleted[citation needed], but the process can take some time, typically several minutes. Many older operating systems do not support this feature, and not all combinations of drives and operating systems work.[10]

Data remanence has been observed in static random-access memory (SRAM), which is typically considered volatile (i.e., the contents degrade with loss of external power). In one study, data retention was observed even at room temperature.[11]

Data remanence has also been observed in dynamic random-access memory (DRAM). Modern DRAM chips have a built-in self-refresh module, as they not only require a power supply to retain data, but must also be periodically refreshed to prevent their data contents fro

Data remanence has also been observed in dynamic random-access memory (DRAM). Modern DRAM chips have a built-in self-refresh module, as they not only require a power supply to retain data, but must also be periodically refreshed to prevent their data contents from fading away from the capacitors in their integrated circuits. A study found data remanence in DRAM with data retention of seconds to minutes at room temperature and "a full week without refresh when cooled with liquid nitrogen."[12] The study authors were able to use a cold boot attack to recover cryptographic keys for several popular full disk encryption systems, including Microsoft BitLocker, Apple FileVault, dm-crypt for Linux, and TrueCrypt.[12](p12)

Despite some memory degradation, authors of the above described study were able to take advantage of redundancy in the way keys are stored after they have been expanded for efficient use, such as in key scheduling. The authors recommend that computers be powered down, rather than be left in a "sleep" state, when not in physical control of the owner. In some cases, such as certain modes of the software program BitLocker, the authors recommend that a boot password or a key on a removable USB device be used.[12](p12) TRESOR is a kernel patch for Linux specifically intended to prevent cold boot attacks on RAM by ensuring encryption keys are neither user accessible nor stored in RAM. Newer versions of the disk encryption software VeraCrypt can encrypt in-RAM keys and passwords on 64-bit Windows.[13]