Abbasid victory
Abbasid appropriation of most former Umayyad territory
Eventual establishment of the Emirate of Córdoba
End of privileged status for Arabs
End of official discrimination against non-Arabs
Belligerents
Abbasids
Support
Shia Muslims
Non-Arab Sunni Muslims
Non-Tribal Arab Muslims
Middle Eastern Christians
Mizrahi Jews
Zoroastrian

Zoroastrian Iranians
Indian and
Afghan Buddhists
Umayyad Caliphate
Support
Tribal Arabs
Commanders and leaders
Abu Muslim Khorasani
Qahtaba ibn Shabib al-Ta'i †
Al-Hasan ibn Qahtaba
Abdallah ibn Ali
Marwan II †
Nasr ibn Sayyar †
Yazid ibn Umar al-Fazari †
v
t
e
Civil wars of
the early Caliphates
Ridda wars
First Fitna
Second Fitna
Revolt of Ibn al-Ash'ath
Revolt of Yazid b. al-Muhallab
Revolt of Harith b. Surayj
Zaydi Revolt
Berber Revolt
Third Fitna
Abbasid Revolution
Alid revolt of 762–763
Alid revolt of 786
Qaysi–Yamani war
Fourth Fitna
Anarchy at Samarra
Fifth Fitna
Kharijite

Kharijite Rebellions
The
Abbasid Revolution

Abbasid Revolution refers to the overthrow of the Umayyad
Caliphate

Caliphate (661–750 CE), the second of the four major Caliphates in
early Islamic history, by the third, the
Abbasid Caliphate

Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258
CE). Coming to power three decades after the death of the Muslim
prophet
Muhammad

Muhammad and immediately after the Rashidun Caliphate, the
Umayyads were a feudal Arab empire ruling over a population which was
overwhelmingly non-Arab as well as primarily non-Muslim. Non-Arabs
were treated as second class citizens regardless of whether or not
they converted to Islam, and this discontent cutting across faiths and
ethnicities ultimately led to the Umayyads' overthrow.[1] The Abbasid
family claimed to have descended from al-Abbas, an uncle of the
Prophet.
The revolution essentially marked the end of the Arab empire and the
beginning of a more inclusive, multiethnic state in the Middle
East.[2] Remembered as one of the most well-organized revolutions
during its period in history, it reoriented the focus of the Muslim
world to the east.[3]
Contents
1 Background
2 Causes
2.1 Discontent among Shia Muslims
2.2 Discontent among Sunni Muslims who were non-Arab
2.2.1 Repression of Iranian culture
2.3 Discontent among non-Muslims
3 Events
3.1 Buildup
3.1.1 Revolt of Ibn Surayj
3.2 Khorasan phase
3.3 Mesopotamia phase
4 Tactics
4.1 Ethnic equality
4.2 Propaganda
4.3 Secrecy
5 Aftermath
6 Legacy
7 Historiography
8 See also
9 References
10 Further reading
11 External links
Background[edit]
By the 740s, the Umayyad Empire found itself in critical condition. A
dispute over succession in 744 led to the Third Muslim Civil War,
which raged across the
Middle East
.svg/440px-Middle_East_(orthographic_projection).svg.png)
Middle East for two years. The very next year,
al-Dahhak ibn Qays al-Shaybani initiated a
Kharijite

Kharijite rebellion that
would continue until 746. Concurrent with this, a rebellion broke out
in reaction to Marwan II's decision to move the capital from Damascus
to Harran, resulting in the destruction of
Homs

Homs – also in 746. It
was not until 747 that
Marwan II

Marwan II was able to pacify the provinces; the
Abbasid Revolution

Abbasid Revolution began within months.[4]
Nasr ibn Sayyar

Nasr ibn Sayyar was appointed governor of Khorosan by Hisham ibn Abd
al-Malik in 738. He held on to his post throughout the civil war,
being confirmed as governor by
Marwan II

Marwan II in the aftermath.[4]
Khorosan's expansive size and low population density meant that the
Arab denizens – both military and civilian – lived largely outside
of the garrisons built during the spread of Islam. This was in
contrast to the rest of the Umayyad provinces, where
Arabs

Arabs tended to
seclude themselves in fortresses and avoided interaction with the
locals.[5] Arab settlers in Khorasan left their traditional lifestyle
and settled among the native Iranian peoples.[4] While intermarriage
with
Arabs

Arabs elsewhere in the Empire was discouraged or even
banned,[6][7] it slowly became a habit within eastern Khorasan; as the
Arabs

Arabs began adopting Persian dress and the two languages influenced
one another, the ethnic barriers came down.[8]
Causes[edit]
Support for the
Abbasid Revolution

Abbasid Revolution came from people of diverse
backgrounds, with almost all levels of society supporting armed
opposition to Umayyad rule.[9] This was especially pronounced among
Muslims of non-Arab descent,[10][11][12] though even Arab Muslims
resented Umayyad rule and centralized authority over their nomadic
lifestyles.[11][13] Both
Sunnis

Sunnis and
Shias

Shias supported efforts to
overthrow the Umayyads,[9][10][12][14][15] as did non-Muslim subjects
of the empire who resented religious discrimination.[16]
Discontent among Shia Muslims[edit]
Remnants Qasr Amra, a desert palace where Umayyad princes were
notorious for indulgence and extravagance.[17]
Following the
Battle of Karbala

Battle of Karbala which led to the massacre of Husayn
ibn Ali, the grandson of Muhammad, and his kin and companions by the
Umayyad army in 680 CE, the
Shias

Shias used this event as a rallying cry of
opposition against the Umayyads. The Abbasids also used the memory of
Karbala extensively to gain popular support against the Umayyads.[18]
The Hashimiyya movement (a sub-sect of the Kaysanites Shia) were
largely responsible for starting the final efforts against the Umayyad
dynasty,[4] initially with the goal of replacing the Umayyads with an
Alid ruling family.[19][20] To an extent, rebellion against the
Umayyads bore an early association with Shi'ite ideas.[13][21] A
number of Shi'ite revolts against Umayyad rule had already taken
place, though they were open about their desire for an Alid ruler.
Zayd ibn Ali

Zayd ibn Ali fought the Umayyads in Iraq, while Abdallah ibn Mu'awiya
even established temporary rule over Persia. Their murder not only
increased anti-Umayyad sentiment among the Shia, but also gave both
Shias

Shias and
Sunnis

Sunnis in
Iraq

Iraq and Persia a common rallying cry.[15] At the
same time, the capture and murder of the primary Shi'ite opposition
figures rendered the Abbasids as the only realistic contenders for the
void that would be left by the Umayyads.[22]
The Abbasids kept quiet about their identity, simply stating that they
wanted a ruler from the descendant of
Muhammad

Muhammad upon whose choice as
caliph the Muslim community would agree.[23][24] Many Shi'ites
naturally assumed that this meant an Alid ruler, a belief which the
Abbasids tacitly encouraged to gain Shi'ite support.[25] Though the
Abbasids were members of the
Banu Hashim

Banu Hashim clan, rivals of the Umayyads,
the word "Hashimiyya" seems to refer specifically to Abd-Allah ibn
Muhammad

Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah, a grandson of
Ali

Ali and son of
Muhammad

Muhammad ibn
al-Hanafiyyah.
According to certain traditions, Abd-Allah died in 717 in
Humeima in
the house of Mohammad ibn
Ali

Ali Abbasi, the head of the Abbasid family,
and before dying named
Muhammad

Muhammad ibn
Ali

Ali as his successor.[26] Although
the anecdote is considered a fabrication,[22] at the time it allowed
the Abbasids to rally the supporters of the failed revolt of Mukhtar
al-Thaqafi, who had represented themselves as the supporters of
Muhammad

Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya. By the time the revolution was in full
swing, most Kaysanite Shia had either transferred their allegiance to
the Abbasid dynasty (in the case of the Hashimiyya),[27][28] or had
converted to other branches of Shi'ism and the Kaysanites ceased to
exist.[29]
Discontent among Sunni Muslims who were non-Arab[edit]
The Umayyad state is remembered as an Arab-centric state, being run by
and for the benefit of those who were ethnically Arab though Muslim in
creed.[11][30] The non-Arab Muslims resented their marginal social
position and were easily drawn into Abbasid opposition to Umayyad
rule.[13][14][26]
Arabs

Arabs dominated the bureaucracy and military, and
were housed in fortresses separate from the local population outside
of Arabia.[5] Even after converting to Islam, non-
Arabs

Arabs or Mawali
could not live in these garrison cities. The non-
Arabs

Arabs were not
allowed to work for the government nor could they hold officer
positions in the Umayyad military and they still had to pay the jizya
tax for non-Muslims.[30][31][32][33] Non-Muslims under Umayyad rule
were subject to these same injunctions.[34] Racial intermarriage
between
Arabs

Arabs and non
Arabs

Arabs was rare.[6] When it did occur, it was
only allowed between an Arab man and a non-Arab woman while non-Arab
men were generally not free to marry Arab women.[7]
Conversion to
Islam

Islam occurred gradually. If a non-Arab wished to
convert to Islam, they not only had to give up their own names but
also had to remain a second-class citizen.[12][32] The non-Arab would
be "adopted" by an Arab tribe,[33] though they would not actually
adopt the tribe's name as that would risk pollution of perceived Arab
racial purity. Rather, the non-Arab would take the last name of
"freedman of al-(tribe's name)", even if they were not a slave prior
to conversion. This essentially meant they were subservient to the
tribe who sponsored their conversion.[12][35]
Although converts to
Islam

Islam made up roughly 10% of the native
population – most of the people living under Umayyad rule were not
Muslim – this percent was significant due to the very small number
of Arabs.[11] Gradually, the non-Arab Muslims outnumbered the Arab
Muslims, causing alarm among the Arab nobility.[30] Socially, this
posed a problem as the Umayyads viewed
Islam

Islam as the property of the
aristocratic Arab families.[36][37] There was a rather large financial
problem posed to the Umayyad system as well. If the new converts to
Islam

Islam from non-Arab peoples stopped paying the jizya tax stipulated by
the Qur'an for non-Muslims, the empire would go bankrupt. This lack of
civil and political rights eventually led the non-Arab Muslims to
support the Abbasids, despite the latter also being Arab.[38]
Even as the Arab governors adopted the more sophisticated Iranian
methods of governmental administration, non-
Arabs

Arabs were still prevented
from holding such positions.[6] Non-
Arabs

Arabs were not even allowed to
wear Arabian style clothing,[39] so strong were the feelings of Arab
racial superiority cultivated by the Umayyads. Much of the discontent
this caused led to the
Shu'ubiyya movement, an assertion of non-Arab
racial and cultural equality with Arabs. The movement gained support
among Egyptians,
Arameans

Arameans and Berber people,[40] though this movement
was most pronounced among Iranian people.
Repression of Iranian culture[edit]
Coinage depicting Umayyad Caliph Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan.
The early
Muslim conquest of Persia

Muslim conquest of Persia was coupled with an anti-Iranian
Arabization policy which led to much discontent.[41] The controversial
Umayyad governor
Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf

Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf was upset at the usage of Persian
as the court language in the eastern Islamic empire, and ordered all
written and spoken Persian to be suppressed in both government and
even among the general public, by force if necessary.[42][43]
Contemporary historians record that al-Hajjaj contributed to the death
of the Khwarezmian language, closely related to Persian. Once the
Umayyads expanded into Khwarezm, a stronghold of east Iranian
civilization, al-Hajjaj ordered the execution of anyone who could read
or write the language, to the point that only the illiterate
remained.[44]
Discontent among non-Muslims[edit]
Support for the
Abbasid Revolution

Abbasid Revolution was an early example of people of
different faiths aligning with a common cause. This was due in large
part to policies of the Umayyads which were regarded as particularly
oppressive to anyone following a faith other than Islam. In 741, the
Umayyads decreed that non-Muslims could not serve in government
posts.[45] The Abbasids were aware of this discontent, and made
efforts to balance both its Muslim character as well as its partially
non-Muslim constituency.[46]
Persecution of Zoroastrians

Persecution of Zoroastrians was part of state policy during the
Umayyad era. Al-Hajjaj allegedly killed all
Zoroastrian

Zoroastrian clergy upon
the conquest of east Iranian lands, burning all
Zoroastrian

Zoroastrian literature
and destroying most religious buildings.[44] The non-Muslim
aristocracy around
Merv

Merv supported the Abbasids, and thus retained
their status as a privileged governing class regardless of religious
belief.[13]
Events[edit]
Buildup[edit]
Beginning around 719, Hashimiyya missions began to seek adherents in
Khurasan. Their campaign was framed as one of proselytism. They sought
support for "a member of the House of the Prophet who shall be
pleasing to everyone",[47] without making explicit mention of the
Abbasids.[25][48] These missions met with success both among
Arabs

Arabs and
non-Arabs, although the latter may have played a particularly
important role in the growth of the movement. A number of Shi'ite
rebellions – by Kaysanites, Hashimiyya and mainstream Shi'ites –
took place in the final years of Umayyad rule, just around the same
time that tempers were flaring among the Syrian contingents of the
Umayyad army regarding alliances and wrongdoings during the
Second[32][49] and Third Fitna.[50]
At this time
Kufa

Kufa was the center for the opposition to Umayyad rule,
particularly Ali's supporters and Shias. In 741-42
Abu Muslim made his
first contact with Abbasid agents there, and eventually he was
introduced to the head of Abbasids, Imam Ibrahim, in Mecca. Around
746,
Abu Muslim assumed leadership of the Hashimiyya in Khurasan.[51]
Unlike the Alid revolts which were open and straightforward about
their demands, the Abbasids along with the Hashimite allies slowly
built up an underground resistance movement to Umayyad rule. Secret
networks were used to build a power base of support in the eastern
Muslim lands to ensure the revolution's success.[21][49] This buildup
not only took place right on the heels of the
Zaydi Revolt

Zaydi Revolt in Iraq,
but also concurrently with the
Berber Revolt

Berber Revolt in
Iberia

Iberia and Maghreb,
the
Ibadi

Ibadi rebellion in
Yemen

Yemen and Hijaz,[52] and the
Third Fitna

Third Fitna in the
Levant, with the revolt of al-Harith ibn Surayj in
Khurasan

Khurasan and
Central Asia
.svg/400px-Central_Asia_(orthographic_projection).svg.png)
Central Asia occurring concurrently with the revolution
itself.[11][12] The Abbasids spent their preparation time watching as
the Umayyad Empire was besieged from within itself in all four
cardinal directions,[53] and School of Oriental and African Studies
Professor

Professor
Emeritus
G. R. Hawting has asserted that even if the Umayyad
rulers had been aware of the Abbasids' preparations, it would not have
been possible to mobilize against them.[4]
Revolt of Ibn Surayj[edit]
Main article: Al-Harith ibn Surayj
In 746, Ibn Surayj began his revolt at
Merv

Merv without success at first,
even losing his secretary Jahm bin Safwan.[54] After joining forces
with other rebel factions, Ibn Surayj drove Ibn Sayyar and the Umayyad
forces to Nishapur; the two factions double-crossed each other shortly
thereafter, with Ibn Surayj's faction being crushed. Western Khorasan
was controlled by
Abdallah ibn Mu'awiya

Abdallah ibn Mu'awiya at the time, cutting Ibn
Sayyar in the east off from Marwan II. In the summer of 747, Ibn
Sayyar sued for peace, which was accepted by the remaining rebels. The
rebel leader was assassinated by a son of Ibn Surayj in a revenge
attack while at the same time, another Shi'ite revolt had begun in the
villages. The son of the remaining rebels signed the peace accord and
Ibn Sayyar returned to his post in
Merv

Merv in August of 747[54] – just
after
Abu Muslim initiated a revolt of his own.
Khorasan phase[edit]
On June 9, 747 (Ramadan 25, 129AH),
Abu Muslim successfully initiated
an open revolt against Umayyad rule,[11][55] which was carried out
under the sign of the Black Standard.[51][56][57] Close to 10,000
soldiers were under Abu Muslim's command when the hostilities
officially began in Merv.[3] On February 14, 748 he established
control of Merv,[54] expelling Umayyad governor
Nasr ibn Sayyar

Nasr ibn Sayyar less
than a year after the latter had put down Ibn Surayj's revolt, and
dispatched an army westwards.[51][56][58]
Newly commissioned Abbasid officer Qahtaba ibn Shabib al-Ta'i, along
with his sons
Al-Hasan ibn Qahtaba and Humayd ibn Qahtaba, pursued Ibn
Sayyar to
Nishapur

Nishapur and then pushed him further west to Qumis, in
western Iran.[59] That August, al-Ta'i defeated an Umayyad force of
10,000 at Gorgan. Ibn Sayyar regrouped with reinforcements from the
Caliph at Rey, only for that city to fall as well as the Caliph's
commander; once again, Ibn Sayyar fled west and died on December 9,
748 while trying to reach Hamedan.[59] Al-Ta'i rolled west through
Khorosan, defeating a 50,000 strong Umayyad force at
Isfahan

Isfahan in March
749.
At Nahavand, the Umayyads attempted to make their last stand in
Khorosan. Umayyad forces fleeing
Hamedan

Hamedan and the remainder of Ibn
Sayyar's men joined with those already garrisoned.[59] Qahtaba
defeated an Umayyad relief contingent from Syria while his son
al-Hasan laid siege to
Nahavand

Nahavand for more than two months. The Umayyad
military units from Syria within the garrison cut a deal with the
Abbasids, saving their own lives by selling out the Umayyad units from
Khorosan who were all put to death.[59] After almost ninety years,
Umayyad rule in Khorosan had finally come to an end.
At the same time that al-Ta'i took Nishapur,
Abu Muslim was
strengthening the Abbasid grip on the Muslim far east. Abbasid
governors were appointed over
Transoxiana

Transoxiana and Bactria, while the
rebels who had signed a peace accord with
Nasr ibn Sayyar

Nasr ibn Sayyar were also
offered a peace deal by
Abu Muslim only to be double crossed and wiped
out.[59] With the pacification of any rebel elements in the east and
the surrender of
Nahavand

Nahavand in the west, the Abbasids were the
undisputed rulers of Khorosan.
Mesopotamia phase[edit]
Folio from the records of Balami depicting
As-Saffah
.jpg/440px-Balami_-_Tarikhnama_-_Abu'l-'Abbas_al-Saffah_is_proclaimed_the_first_'Abbasid_Caliph_(cropped).jpg)
As-Saffah as he receives
pledges of allegiance in Kufa.
The Abbasids wasted no time in continuing from Khorosan into
Mesopotamia. In August 749, Umayyad commander Yazid ibn Umar al-Fazari
attempted to meet the forces of al-Ta'i before they could reach Kufa.
Not to be outdone, the Abbasids launched a nighttime raid on
al-Fazari's forces before they had a chance to prepare. During the
raid, al-Ta'i himself was finally killed in battle. Despite the loss,
al-Fazari was routed and fled with his forces to Wasit.[60] The Siege
of
Wasit

Wasit took place from that August until July 750. Although a
respected military commander had been lost, a large portion of the
Umayyad forces were essentially trapped inside
Wasit

Wasit and could be left
in their virtual prison while more offensive military actions were
made.[61]
Concurrently with the siege in 749, the Abbasids crossed the Euphrates
and took Kufa.[32][56] The son of
Khalid al-Qasri – a disgraced
Umayyad official who had been tortured to death a few years prior –
began a pro-Abbasid riot starting at the city's citadel. On September
2, 749, al-Hasan bin Qahtaba essentially just walked right in to the
city and set up shop.[61] Some confusion followed when Abu Salama, an
Abbasid officer, pushed for an Alid leader. Abu Muslim's confidante
Abu Jahm reported what was happening, and the Abbasids acted
preemptively. On Friday, November 28, 749, before the siege of Wasit
had even finished, As-Saffah, the great-grandson of Muhammad's uncle,
al-Abbas, was recognized as the new caliph in the mosque at
Kufa.[51][62] Abu Salama, who witnessed twelve military commanders
from the revolution pledging allegiance, was embarrassed into
following suit.[61]
Just as quickly as Qahtaba's forces marched from Khorosan to Kufa, so
did the forces of
Abdallah ibn Ali and Abu Awn Abd al-Malik ibn Yazid
march on Mosul.[61] At this point
Marwan II

Marwan II mobilized his troops from
Harran
.JPG/500px-Harran_beehive_houses_(2).JPG)
Harran and advanced toward Mesopotamia. On January 16, 750 the two
forces met on the left bank of a tributary of the Tigris in the Battle
of the Zab, and nine days later
Marwan II

Marwan II was defeated and his army
was completely destroyed.[12][32][61][63] The battle is regarded as
what finally sealed the fate of the Umayyads. All
Marwan II

Marwan II could do
was flee through Syria and into Egypt, with each Umayyad town
surrendering to the Abbasids as they swept through in pursuit.[61]
Damascus

Damascus fell to the Abbasids in April, and in August
Marwan II

Marwan II and
his family were tracked down by a small force led by Abu Awn and Salih
ibn
Ali

Ali (the brother of Abdallah ibn Ali) and killed in
Egypt.[12][32][51][57][63] Al-Fazari, the Umayyad commander at Wasit,
held out even after the defeat of
Marwan II

Marwan II in January. The Abbasids
promised him amnesty in July, but immediately after he exited the
fortress they executed him instead. After almost exactly three years
of rebellion, the Umayyad state came to an end.[11][20]
Tactics[edit]
Ethnic equality[edit]
Militarily, the unit organization of the Abbasids was designed with
the goal of ethnic and racial equality among supporters. When Abu
Muslim recruited mixed Arab and Iranian officers along the Silk Road,
he registered them based not on their tribal or ethno-national
affiliations but on their current places of residence.[55] This
greatly diminished tribal and ethnic solidarity and replaced both
concepts with a sense of shared interests among individuals.[55]
Propaganda[edit]
The
Abbasid Revolution

Abbasid Revolution provides an early medieval example of the
effectiveness of propaganda. The
Black Standard

Black Standard unfurled at the start
of the revolution's open phase carried messianic overtones due to past
failed rebellions by members of Muhammad's family, with marked
eschatological and millennial slants.[3] The Abbasids – their
leaders descended from Muhammad's uncle Al-‘Abbas ibn ‘Abd
al-Muttalib – held vivid historical reenactments of the murder of
Muhammad's grandson
Husayn ibn Ali

Husayn ibn Ali by the army of the second Umayyad
ruler Yazid I, followed by promises of retribution.[3] Focus was
carefully placed on the legacy of Muhammad's family while details of
how the Abbasids actually intended to rule were not mentioned.[64]
While the Umayyads had primarily spent their energy on wiping out the
Alid line of the prophetic family, the Abbasids carefully revised
Muslim chronicles to put a heavier emphasis on the relationship
between
Muhammad

Muhammad and his uncle.[64]
The Abbasids spent more than a year preparing their propaganda drive
against the Umayyads. There were a total of seventy propagandists
throughout the province of Khorasan, operating under twelve central
officials.[65]
Secrecy[edit]
The
Abbasid Revolution

Abbasid Revolution was distinguished by a number of tactics which
were absent in the other, unsuccessful anti-Umayyad rebellions at the
time. Chief among them was secrecy. While the Shi'ite and other
rebellions at the time were all led by publicly known leaders making
clear and well-defined demands, the Abbasids hid not only their
identities but also their preparation and mere existence.[49][66]
As-Saffah
.jpg/440px-Balami_-_Tarikhnama_-_Abu'l-'Abbas_al-Saffah_is_proclaimed_the_first_'Abbasid_Caliph_(cropped).jpg)
As-Saffah would go on to become the first Abbasid caliph, but he did
not come forward to receive the pledge of allegiance from the people
until after the Umayyad caliph and a large number of his princes were
already killed.[9]
Abu Muslim al-Khorasani, who was the primary Abbasid military
commander, was especially mysterious; even his name, which literally
means "father of a Muslim from the large, flat area of the eastern
Muslim empire" gave no meaningful information about him
personally.[65] Even today, although scholars are sure he was one
real, consistent individual, there is broad agreement that all
concrete suggestions of his actual identity are doubtful.[51] Abu
Muslim himself discouraged inquiries about his origins, emphasizing
that his religion and place of residence were all that mattered.[65]
Whoever he was,
Abu Muslim built a secret network of pro-Abbasid
sentiment based among the mixed Arab and Iranian military officers
along the
Silk Road

Silk Road garrison cities. Through this networking, Abu
Muslim ensured armed support for the Abbasids from a multi-ethnic
force years before the revolution even came out in the open.[21] These
networks proved essential, as the officers garrisoned along the Silk
Road had spent years fighting the ferocious Turkic tribes of Central
Asia and were experienced and respected tacticians and warriors.[58]
Aftermath[edit]
National borders in the region by 800AD.
The victors desecrated the tombs of the Umayyads in Syria, sparing
only that of Umar II, and most of the remaining members of the Umayyad
family were tracked down and killed.[9][32] When Abbasids declared
amnesty for members of the Umayyad family, eighty gathered in
Jaffa

Jaffa to
receive pardons and all were massacred.[67]
In the immediate aftermath, the Abbasids moved to consolidate their
power against former allies now seen as rivals.[9] Five years after
the revolution succeeded,
Abu Muslim was accused of heresy and treason
by the second Abbasid caliph al-Mansur.
Abu Muslim was executed at the
palace in 755 despite his reminding al-Mansur that it was he (Abu
Muslim) who got the Abbasids into power,[16][20][58] and his travel
companions were bribed into silence. Displeasure over the caliph's
brutality as well as admiration for
Abu Muslim led to rebellions
against the Abbasid Dynasty itself throughout Khorasan and
Kurdistan.[20][68]
Although Shi'ites were key to the revolution's success, Abbasid
attempts to claim orthodoxy in light of Umayyad material excess led to
continued persecution of Shi'ites.[10][13] On the other hand,
non-Muslims regained the government posts they had lost under the
Umayyads.[10] Jews, Nestorian Christians, Zoroastrians and even
Buddhists
.jpeg/476px-Gandhara_Buddha_(tnm).jpeg)
Buddhists were re-integrated into a more cosmopolitan empire centered
around the new, ethnically and religiously diverse city of
Baghdad.[3][33][46]
The Abbasids were essentially puppets of secular rulers starting from
950,[9][14] though their lineage as nominal caliphs continued until
1258 when the Mongol hordes killed the last Abbasid caliph in
Baghdad.[11][14] The period of actual, direct rule by the Abbasids
lasted almost exactly two-hundred years.[69]
One grandson of Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik, Abd ar-Rahman I, survived and
established a kingdom in
Al-Andalus

Al-Andalus (Moorish Iberia) after five years
of travel westward.[11][12][32] Over the course of thirty years, he
ousted the ruling
Fihrids and resisted Abbasid incursions to establish
the Emirate of Córdoba.[70][71] This is considered an extension of
the Umayyad Dynasty, and ruled from Cordoba from 756 until
1031.[10][30]
Legacy[edit]
The
Abbasid Revolution

Abbasid Revolution has been of great interest to both Western and
Muslim historians.[56] According to State University of New York
professor of sociology Saïd Amir Arjomand, analytical interpretations
of the revolution are rare, with most discussions simply lining up
behind either the Iranic or Arabic interpretation of events.[2]
Frequently, early European historians viewed the conflict solely as a
non-Arab uprising against Arabs. Bernard Lewis, professor emeritus of
Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, points out that while
the revolution has often been characterized as a Persian victory and
Arab defeat, the caliph was still Arab, the language of administration
was still Arabic and Arab nobility was not forced to give up its land
holdings; rather, the
Arabs

Arabs were merely forced to share the fruits of
the empire equally with other races.[56]
Al-Ukhaidir Fortress, an early example of Abbasid architecture.
C.W. Previté-Orton argues that the reasons for the decline of the
Umayyads was the rapid expansion of Islam. During the Umayyad period,
mass conversions brought Iranians, Berbers, Copts, and Assyrians to
Islam. These "clients," as the
Arabs

Arabs referred to them, were often
better educated and more civilised than their Arab masters. The new
converts, on the basis of equality of all Muslims, transformed the
political landscape. Previté-Orton also argues that the feud between
Syria and
Iraq

Iraq further weakened the empire.[72]
The revolution led to the enfranchisement of non-Arab people who had
converted to Islam, granting them social and spiritual equality with
Arabs.[73] With social restrictions removed,
Islam

Islam changed from an
Arab ethnic empire to a universal world religion.[33] This led to a
great cultural and scientific exchange known as the Islamic Golden
Age, with most achievements taking place under the Abbasids. What was
later known as Islamic civilization and culture was defined by the
Abbasids, rather than the earlier Rashidun and Umayyad
caliphates.[14][33][46] New ideas in all areas of society were
accepted regardless of their geographic origin, and the emergence of
societal institutions that were Islamic rather than Arab began. Though
a class of Muslim clergy was absent for the first century of Islam, it
was with the
Abbasid Revolution

Abbasid Revolution and after that the
Ulama

Ulama appeared as a
force in society, positioning themselves as the arbitors of justice
and orthodoxy.[73]
With the eastward movement of the capital from
Damascus

Damascus to Baghdad,
the Abbasid Empire eventually took on a distinctly Persian character,
as opposed to the Arab character of the Umayyads.[13] Rulers became
increasingly autocratic, at times claiming divine right in defense of
their actions.[13]
Historiography[edit]
An accurate and comprehensive history of the revolution has proven
difficult to compile for a number of reasons. There are no
contemporary accounts, and most sources were written more than a
century after the revolution.[74][75] Because most historical sources
were written under Abbasid rule, the description of the Umayyads must
be taken with a grain of salt;[74][76] such sources describe the
Umayyads, at best, as merely placeholders between the Rashidun and
Abbasid Caliphates.[77]
The historiography of the revolution is especially significant due to
Abbasid dominance of most early Muslim historical narratives;[75][78]
it was during their rule that history was established in the Muslim
world as an independent field separate from writing in general.[79]
The initial two-hundred year period when the Abbasids actually held de
facto power over the
Muslim world

Muslim world coincided with the first composition
of Muslim history.[69] Another point of note is that while the Abbasid
Revolution carried religious undertones against the irreligious and
almost secular Umayyads, a separation of mosque and state occurred
under the Abbasids as well. Historiographical surveys often focus on
the solidifying of Muslim thought and rites under the Abbasids, with
the conflicts between separated classes of rulers and clerics giving
rise to the empire's eventual separation of religion and politics.[80]
See also[edit]
Arab–Byzantine wars
Muslim conquest of the Maghreb
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Further reading[edit]
Blankinship, Khalid Yahya (1994). The End of the Jihâd State: The
Reign of Hishām ibn ʻAbd al-Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads.
Albany, NY:
State University of New York

State University of New York Press.
ISBN 978-0-7914-1827-7.
Daniel, Elton L. (1979). The Political and Social History of Khurasan
under Abbasid Rule, 747–820. Minneapolis and Chicago: Bibliotheca
Islamica, Inc. ISBN 0-88297-025-9.
Hourani, Albert, History of the Arab Peoples
Kennedy, Hugh N. (2004). The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates:
The Islamic Near East from the 6th to the 11th Century (Second ed.).
Harlow, UK:
Pearson Education Ltd. ISBN 0-582-40525-4.
Shaban, M. A. (1979). The ʿAbbāsid Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. ISBN 0-521-29534-3.
Sharon, Moshe (1990). Revolt: the social and military aspects of the
ʿAbbāsid revolution. Jerusalem: Graph Press Ltd.
ISBN 965-223-388-9.
External links[edit]
Abbasid Calipahte Bibliography at
Oxford

Oxford Bibliographies
The Rise a