Overview
In this scheme, a signer possessing a private key can publish a signature of a message. However, the signature reveals nothing to a recipient/verifier of the message and signature without taking part in either of two interactive protocols: * Confirmation protocol, which confirms that a candidate is a valid signature of the message issued by the signer, identified by the public key. * Disavowal protocol, which confirms that a candidate is not a valid signature of the message issued by the signer. The motivation for the scheme is to allow the signer to choose to whom signatures are verified. However, that the signer might claim the signature is invalid at any later point, by refusing to take part in verification, would devalue signatures to verifiers. The disavowal protocol distinguishes these cases removing the signer'sZero-knowledge protocol
The following protocol was suggested byMessage signing
# Alice signs the message, ''m'', by computing and publishing the signature, ''z = mx''.Confirmation (i.e., avowal) protocol
Bob wishes to verify the signature, ''z'', of ''m'' by Alice under the key, ''y''. # Bob picks two random numbers: ''a'' and ''b'', and uses them to blind the message, sending to Alice: # Alice picks a random number, ''q'', uses it to blind, ''c'', and then signing this using her private key, ''x'', sending to Bob: Note that # Bob reveals ''a'' and ''b''. # Alice verifies that ''a'' and ''b'' are the correct blind values, then, if so, reveals ''q''. Revealing these blinds makes the exchange zero knowledge. # Bob verifies ''s1'' = ''cgq'', proving ''q'' has not been chosen dishonestly, and proving z is valid signature issued by Alice's key. Note that Alice can cheat at step 2 by attempting to randomly guess ''s2''.Disavowal protocol
Alice wishes to convince Bob that ''z'' is not a valid signature of ''m'' under the key, ''gx''; i.e., ''z ≠ mx''. Alice and Bob have agreed an integer, ''k'', which sets the computational burden on Alice and the likelihood that she should succeed by chance. # Bob picks random values, ''s ∈ '' and ''a'', and sends: where exponentiating by ''a'' is used to blind the sent values. Note that # Alice, using her private key, computes ''v'' and then the quotient, Thus, ''vv'' = 1, unless ''z'' ≠ ''m''. # Alice then tests ''vv'' for equality against the values: which are calculated by repeated multiplication of ''mz'' (rather than exponentiating for each ''i''). If the test succeeds, Alice conjectures the relevant ''i'' to be ''s''; otherwise, she conjectures random value. Where ''z'' = ''m'', ''(mz)'' = ''vxv'' = 1 for all ''i'', ''s'' is unrecoverable. # Alice commits to ''i'': she picks a random ''r'' and sends ''hash(r, i)'' to Bob. # Bob reveals ''a''. # Alice confirms that ''a'' is the correct blind (i.e., ''v'' and ''v'' can be generated using it), then, if so, reveals ''r''. Revealing these blinds makes the exchange zero knowledge. # Bob checks ''hash(r, i)'' = ''hash(r, s)'', proving Alice knows ''s'', hence ''z'' ≠ ''m''. If Alice attempts to cheat at step 3 by guessing ''s'' at random, the probability of succeeding is ''1/(k + 1)''. So, if ''k = 1023'' and the protocol is conducted ten times, her chances are 1 to 2100.See also
* Non-repudiation * Designated verifier signature * Topics in cryptographyReferences
{{Reflist Cryptography Digital signature schemes