Universal prescriptivism (often simply called prescriptivism) is the
meta-ethical
In metaphilosophy and ethics, meta-ethics is the study of the nature, scope, and meaning of moral judgment. It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers, the others being normative ethics (questions of how one ought ...
view that claims that, rather than expressing
proposition
In logic and linguistics, a proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence. In philosophy, " meaning" is understood to be a non-linguistic entity which is shared by all sentences with the same meaning. Equivalently, a proposition is the no ...
s, ethical
sentences function similarly to
imperatives which are
universalizable—whoever makes a moral judgment is committed to the same judgment in any situation where the same relevant facts pertain.
This makes prescriptivism a
universalist form of
non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions (i.e., statements) and thus cannot be true or false (they are not truth-apt). A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are ...
. Prescriptivism stands in opposition to other forms of non-cognitivism (such as
emotivism
Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes. Hence, it is colloquially known as the hurrah/boo theory. Influenced by the growth of analytic philosophy and logical positi ...
and
quasi-realism Quasi-realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:
# Ethical sentences do not express propositions.
# Instead, ethical sentences project emotional attitudes as though they were real properties.
This makes quasi-realism a form of non-cogn ...
), as well as to all forms of
cognitivism (including both
moral realism and
ethical subjectivism
Ethical subjectivism or moral non-objectivism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:
#Ethical sentences express propositions.
#Some such propositions are true.
#The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actu ...
).
Since prescriptivism was introduced by philosopher
R. M. Hare
Richard Mervyn Hare (21 March 1919 – 29 January 2002), usually cited as R. M. Hare, was a British moral philosopher who held the post of White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford from 1966 until 1983. He subseque ...
in his 1952 book ''The Language of Morals'', it has been compared to emotivism and to the
categorical imperative
The categorical imperative (german: kategorischer Imperativ) is the central philosophical concept in the deontological moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Introduced in Kant's 1785 '' Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals'', it is a way of eva ...
of
Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant (, , ; 22 April 1724 – 12 February 1804) was a German philosopher and one of the central Enlightenment thinkers. Born in Königsberg, Kant's comprehensive and systematic works in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and ...
. Unlike Kant, however, Hare does not invoke universalizability as a test of moral permissibility. Instead, he sees it as a consistency requirement that is built into the logic of moral language and helps to make moral thinking a rational enterprise.
What prescriptivists claim
Hare originally proposed prescriptivism as a kind of amendment to emotivism. Like emotivists, Hare believes that moral discourse is not primarily informative or fact-stating. But whereas emotivists claim that moral language is mainly intended to express feelings or to influence behavior, Hare believes that the central purpose of moral talk is to guide behavior by telling someone what to do. Its main purpose is to "prescribe" (recommend) a certain act, not to get someone to do that act or to express one's personal feelings or attitudes.
To illustrate the prescriptivist view, consider the moral sentence, "Suicide is wrong." According to
moral realism, such a sentence claims there to be some objective property of "wrongness" associated with the act of suicide. According to some versions of
emotivism
Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes. Hence, it is colloquially known as the hurrah/boo theory. Influenced by the growth of analytic philosophy and logical positi ...
, such a sentence merely expresses an attitude of the speaker; it only means something like "Boo on suicide!" But according to prescriptivism, the statement "Suicide is wrong" means something more like "Do not commit suicide." What it expresses is thus not primarily a description or an emotion but an ''imperative''. General value terms like "good", "bad", "right", "wrong" and "ought" usually also have
descriptive
In the study of language, description or descriptive linguistics is the work of objectively analyzing and describing how language is actually used (or how it was used in the past) by a speech community. François & Ponsonnet (2013).
All acad ...
and emotive meanings, but these are not its primary meanings according to prescriptivists.
Criticisms
Prescriptivism has been widely criticized and has few adherents today. Many ethicists reject Hare's claim that moral language is not informative—that the purpose of moral talk is not to express moral truths or moral facts. Numerous critics also question Hare's contention that providing guidance is always the main purpose of moral talk. Hare seems to implicitly assume that moral language is always used in a context of discussion, debate, or command in which one person is telling another person, or persons, what to do. This, it is claimed, ignores the fact that moral talk is a "language-game" that is used for a wide variety of purposes. Finally, many critics have argued that prescriptivism conflicts with the commonsense distinction between good and bad reasons for moral beliefs. According to Hare, a racist "fanatic" who claims that all minority-group members should be deported, and is willing to stick with this consistently (e.g., even if the racist herself were a member of the minority group),cannot be faulted for either irrationality or falsehood. Ethics, for Hare, is thus ultimately a matter of non-rational choice and commitment.
[Kerner, ''The Revolution'' ''in Ethical Theory'', p. 193.] Many of Hare's critics object that reason does and should play a larger role in ethics than he recognizes.
See also
*
Non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions (i.e., statements) and thus cannot be true or false (they are not truth-apt). A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are ...
Notes
References
*
External links
Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivismin the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
The ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (''SEP'') combines an online encyclopedia of philosophy with peer-reviewed publication of original papers in philosophy, freely accessible to Internet users. It is maintained by Stanford University. Eac ...
Universal Prescriptivism FAQ
{{Ethics
Meta-ethics
Ethical theories