State Intelligence Agency (Indonesia)

The State Intelligence Agency ( id, Badan Intelijen Negara), commonly referred to as BIN, is Indonesia's primary intelligence agency. The BIN is also responsible for coordinating intelligence activities among various intelligence agencies, including military intelligence, police intelligence, prosecutors intelligence and other relevant entities.

Prior to 2001, it was known as Bakin (, "State Intelligence Coordinating Agency"); its name change was a result of restructuring in the agency. At the time of its name change in 2001, the BIN's role in co-ordinating interagency operations was de-emphasised. However, in the wake of the 2002 Bali bombing, its co-ordinating function was re-strengthened as part of a general expansion of the agency's mandate, which included an expanded budget. Since 9 September 2016, the agency has been headed by Budi Gunawan.

BIN has been the subject of criticism from human rights groups for its treatment of dissidents and human rights advocates in Indonesia and lack of accountability, as even the Indonesian government doesn't know about their activity.

History

1943–1965

The origins of the agency are rooted in the Japanese occupation of Indonesia. In 1943, Japan established an intelligence organisation known as the Nakano Military Intelligence School. One of its graduates was Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, who would go on to lead Indonesia's first intelligence agency.

After declaring independence in 1945, the Government of Indonesia established its first intelligence agency, called . Colonel Lubis returned to lead the agency, as did about 40 former special military investigators. After undergoing special intelligence training period in the Ambarawa region, around 30 young men became members of the Indonesian State Secrets Agency (BRANI) in early May 1946. This agency would go on to become an umbrella organization for the Indonesian intelligence community.

In July 1946, Minister of Defense Amir Sjarifuddin formed "Defense Agency B", which was headed by a former police commissioner. On 30 April 1947 all intelligence agencies, including the BRANI, were merged into the Ministry of Defense to become part of Defense Agency B.

In 1949, Indonesian Minister of Defense Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX was not satisfied with the performance of the Indonesian intelligence community, as it operated independently and was considered poorly coordinated. Hamengkubuwono formed the Special Service or DC, also known by the pseudonym . The DC was intended to be able to respond to future issues of Indonesian security. The recruitment program was the first Indonesian intelligence program involving non-military personnel trained by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Candidates for the DC were sent to Saipan for training until the DC restarted training in Indonesia. DC agents participated in various clandestine operations such as Operations Trikora and Dwikora, as well as the massacre of suspected members of the Communist Party.

In early 1952, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, T.B. Simatupang, demoted the intelligence agency to the (Armed Forces Staff Information Agency). During 1952–1958, due to competition within the military the various military branches and police each had their own intelligence services without national coordination. As a result, on 5 December 1958, President Sukarno formed the Intelligence Coordinating Body (BKI) with Colonel Laut Pirngadi as the head.

On 10 November 1959, the BKI was again reorganized into the Central Intelligence Agency (BPI), headquartered at Jalan Madiun and headed by Dr. Soebandrio. From the 1960s until the beginning of the New Order, Soebandrio's influence on the BPI was particularly strong, especially amidst internal conflict between left- and right-wing factions of the armed forces.

1965–present

After the 1965 upheaval, Suharto headed Kopkamtib (, "Operational Command for Restoring Security and Order"). Subsequently, an Intelligence Task Force was formed in each region. On 22 August 1966, Suharto established the State Intelligence Command (KIN), headed by Brigadier General Yoga Sugomo and directly responsible to Suharto.

As a strategic intelligence agency, BPI was merged into KIN; KIN also had Special Operations Opsus under Lt. Col. Ali Moertopo and assistants Leonardus Benyamin (Benny) Moerdani and Aloysius Sugiyanto. On 22 May 1967, less than a year later, Suharto issued a Presidential Decre to redesign KIN as BAKIN (, "State Intelligence Coordinating Agency"). Major General Soedirgo was appointed as the first head of BAKIN.

Under Major General Sutopo Juwono, BAKIN had Deputy II, which was under Colonel Nicklany Soedardjo, a military police officer who graduated from Fort Gordon, US. In early 1965, Soedardjo created the PM's intelligence unit, or Den Pintel POM. Officially, Den Pintel POM was Special Intelligence Unit , then in 1976 it became Implementing Unit ' and in the 1980s it became the Implementing Unit 01.

Starting in 1970 there was a reorganization of BAKIN, Deputy III was added as an Opsus post under Brigadier General TNI Ali Moertopo, a Suharto insider. Opsus is considered the most prestigious posting in BAKIN, involved in events ranging from Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat of West Irian and the birth of the Golongan Karya (Golkar) to the Indochina issue. In 1983, as Deputy Head of BAKIN, L. B. Moerdani expanded intelligence activities and BAKIN became BAIS (, "Strategic Intelligence Agency"). Afterwards, BAKIN remained as a contra-subversion directorate of the New Order.

After removing Moerdani as Minister of Defense and Security, in 1993 Suharto reduced BAIS's mandate and changed its name to BAI (, "ABRI Intelligence Agency"). In 2000, President Abdurrahman Wahid changed BAKIN to BIN (, "State Intelligence Agency"), which it remains.

Thus, since 1945, the state intelligence organization has changed its name six times:
# BRANI (, "Indonesian State Secrets Agency")
# BKI (, "Intelligence Coordination Agency")
# BPI (, "Central Intelligence Agency")
# KIN (, "State Intelligence Command")
# BAKIN (, "State Intelligence Coordination Agency")
# BIN (, "State Intelligence Agency")

Organizational structure

Main organization

The organisational structure is mainly based on Presidential Regulation No. 90/2012 (State Intelligence Agency). The organizational structure was last amended by Presidential Regulation No. 79/2020 (Second Amendment of Presidential Regulation No. 90/2012 Re: State Intelligence Agency), signed on 20 July 2020. Under the Presidential Regulation, BIN's organisational structure consists of nine deputies, which was later expanded by Chief BIN Regulation No. 1/2022:

* Chief
* Deputy Chief
* Main Secretariat:
* Deputy of Foreign Affairs (Deputy I):
* Deputy of Home Affairs (Deputy II):
* Deputy of Counter Intelligence (Deputy III):
* Deputy of Economy (Deputy IV):
* Deputy for Technology Intelligence (Deputy V):
* Deputy for Cyber Intelligence (Deputy VI):
* Deputy Communication and Information (Deputy VII):
* Deputy Apparatuses Security Intelligence (Deputy VIII):
* Deputy Intelligence Analysis and Production (Deputy IX):
* Main Inspectorate:
* Expert Staffs:
**Political and Ideology
**Social and Culture
**Law and Human Rights
**Defense and Security
**Natural Resources and Environment
* Centers:
**Intelligence Professional Development Center
**Research and Development Center
**Education and Training Center
**Medical Intelligence Center
**Psychology Center
* Regional BIN Offices
* Extra-territorial BIN Representative Offices
* State Intelligence College
* State Intelligence Museum
* Task forces

Training facility

BIN possesses a primary education and training facility called STIN (, "State Intelligence College"). It has undergraduate, master, and doctoral level educational programs for intelligence in Indonesia. All STIN graduates will become part of BIN human resources after graduation. During the COVID-19 pandemic, in September 2020 Budi Gunawan announced that STIN would open a Medical Intelligence program. In April 2021, STIN opened their Medical Intelligence program, and expanded other programs under STIN.

Aside from STIN, BIN possesses another education and training facility called Education and Training Center, under the Main Secretariat office. Unlike training provided by STIN, training at the Education and Training Center is more specialised.

Para-commando unit

BIN also possesses at least one para-commando force unit. A unit codenamed "Rajawali" (Eagle) was disclosed by Bambang Soesatyo, Speaker of People's Consultative Assembly. The existence of the unit surprised many Indonesians. The unit is signified by black full-body clad military attire, similar to Koopsus combat attire. In the press release, BIN acknowledged that Rajawali Force is a BIN force specially trained in "special threats handling and deterrence". BIN also said that the unit does not has specific name, as it changes annually. Most other details of the unit remain undisclosed.

Activities

* In the late 1960s to 1970s when BIN was still called BAKIN, Colonel Nicklany who at that time served as head of deputy II of BAKIN, asked for help from the CIA, MI6, and MOSSAD to train a new BAKIN unit called Satsus Intel (satuan khusus intelijen/special intelligence unit) which was tasked with handling foreign counterintelligence, namely catching foreign spies operating in Indonesia especially from communist countries, even though Indonesia does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, Nicklany did not care about this and said: "We will bring in these Israeli instructors because they are the best in world".
* In September 1973, intelligence task force drew up plans to permanently station a team at Jakarta's Kemayoran Airport. The team soon began archiving color photographs of Arab passports from over a dozen nations and comparing the names to a terrorist watchlist compiled by foreign intelligence services. Especially suspicious of Yemen, BIN conducted surveillance on the Yemeni consulate for almost a decade but never found important information and, despite fears, communism was not spread to Indonesia.
* In 1982, BIN and Kopkamtib captured Alexander Pavlovich Vinenko, a GRU agent posing as an Aeroflot manager in Jakarta, and Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Egorov, the Soviet assistant military attaché. Lieutenant Colonel Susdaryanto, an Indonesian navy officer, assisted in their capture after previously being arrested by BIN for selling information about Indonesian seas and the navy to the Soviets. However, political pressure from the Soviets led to their release with '' persona non grata'' status. Susdaryanto continued working with BIN to uncover other Soviet spies.
* In 1998, José Ramos-Horta said that Indonesian intelligence was spying on East Timorese exiles around the world.

* Australian intelligence agencies have several times suspected that Indonesian intelligence agencies had succeeded in infiltrating the Australian government to recruit high-level Australian officials, Captain Andrew Plunkett, an intelligence officer with the 3rd Royal Australian Regiment parachute regiment in Sydney was one of two Australian spies who tried to destroy Kim Beazley's chances of winning the 2001 election and asked to investigate him, Capt Plunkett It alleged Mr Beazley, a former defense minister, had been compromised by Indonesian intelligence because of his friendship with an unnamed prominent Indonesian and was therefore a risk to Australia's national security. His allegations were investigated by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) before the 2001 election but the spy agency found no substance to them.In June 2004, Kim BeazleyToohey, Brian (7 July 200
Security proves a complicated affair.
Sydney Morning Herald. was accused of having a "special relationship" with Ratih HardjonoSim, Susan (19 February 2000). All the President's whisperers, Straits Times (Singapore). when he was defence minister. Hardjono was allegedly accused of "inappropriately" photographing a secure Australian Defence facility, working with the embassy ID, and having a close working relationship with her uncle, a senior officer in BAKIN now BIN. In July, journalist Greg Sheridan contacted the then head of ASIO, Dennis Richardson, and discussed a classified operational investigation. Later in July members of the Attorney General's department were still investigating the original allegation, making Richardson's comments premature and inaccurate. The whole episode was a salient reminder to politicians in Canberra of the British experience of 'agents of influence' and honeypots. Ratih Hardjono was married to Bruce Grant in the 1990s, Until now the results of these investigations are unknown.
* In 2002, BIN, in coordination with Kopassus's Anti-Terror unit Sat-81, successfully captured Islamist militant Omar al-Faruq. He was later handed over to US authorities.
* In early 2002, BIN was derided by ministers and senior politicians when it emerged that it had written separate, and contradictory, reports on the economy for cabinet ministers and for a parliamentary committee. BIN also prepared an error-filled briefing for parliament's Foreign Affairs and Security Commission prior to John Howard's visit to Indonesia in February 2002. The briefing alleged that Australia's Lieutenant general Peter Cosgrove had written an autobiography denigrating Indonesia's role in East Timor. The briefing also asserted that the Howard government had formed a secret twelve-person committee to engineer Papua's secession from Indonesia.
* In 2004, retiring chief of BIN, General Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriyono, admitted that Indonesia had wiretapped the Australian embassy in Jakarta during the 1999 East Timorese crisis and has tried to recruit Australian spies, and former intelligence service officer David Reed suspects that Indonesian intelligence has succeeded in infiltrating ASIS.
* In 2005, BIN was found to have used the charitable foundation of former Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid to hire a Washington lobbying firm to pressure the US government for a full restart of military training programs in Indonesia.
* A United States diplomatic cables leak suggested that BIN was involved in the poisoning of Indonesian human rights activist Munir Said Thalib on board a Garuda Indonesia flight from Jakarta to Amsterdam. Top level BIN officials were implicated in his murder, and a BIN deputy chairman, Muchdi Purwopranjono, was tried for the assassination attempt and acquitted; his trial was internationally condemned as a "sham trial". In 2014, former BIN chief A.M Hendropriyono admitted that he bore "command responsibility" for the assassination, and he was prepared to be tried.
* In 2018, there are reports that BIN purchased spyware from Israeli-founded companies, including Pegasus. Activists fear its potential use for political purposes, and even the supervising House of Representatives was unaware of this.
* In September 2021, not long after the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, Deputy VII of BIN, Wawan Hari Purwanto, said that they continued to communicate with the Taliban to prevent terrorism from reaching Indonesia. BIN also continued monitoring groups with ties to the Taliban, and was communicating with former Indonesian fighters who had joined the Mujahideen in the Soviet–Afghan War to prevent acts of terrorism in Indonesia.
* In October 2021, the Dutch news media de Volkskrant interviewed a Dutchman nicknamed Eduard who had been a spy for the Dutch intelligence agency AIVD and the American intelligence agency CIA in Indonesia since 2002 Bali Bombing, he was tasked with infiltrating into the Islamist terrorist network in Indonesia and joined AIVD intelligence network in Indonesia, thanks to his information three high-ranking Indonesian terrorists were killed, they are Azahari Husin, Amrozi and Bahrun Naim, and after quitting his job in 2019 he started receiving death threats for him and his family from someone he didn't know from the phone he used to communicate with radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, he said that no one on the phone contact admitted responsibility for sending the message and even though he had thrown away the phone and cut off contact, the threat kept coming until several people came to his business company and asked about him and a member of his family also received threatening messages on social media, afraid for his family's safety he moved with his family to the Netherlands to seek protection and was forced to shut down his business and may not be able to return to Indonesia, he asked for help from the AIVD and CIA to protect him and his family but the AIVD and CIA refused to provide assistance to him and even though AIVD had promised protection for him, AIVD and CIA each renounced their responsibility, from his incident and the response of AIVD and CIA there was a big possibility if BIN already knows about Eduard and AIVD intelligence network, and if this is true and BIN has found out about the AIVD intelligence network in Indonesia, then AIVD and the CIA have suffered a huge blow because it could reveal the intelligence network and identities of AIVD and CIA spies in Asia and throughout the world because Eduard has met with many intelligence agents outside Indonesia including those with high rank.https://www.destentor.nl/binnenland/bedreigd-en-ondergedoken-veiligheidsdiensten-lieten-nederlandse-infiltrant-aan-zijn-lot-over~a87e47c8/

References

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Government agencies of Indonesia
Indonesian intelligence agencies