Jihadism (also known as jihadist movement, jihadi movement, and variants) is a 21st-century neologism found in Western languages to describe militant Islamic movements perceived as "existentially threatening" to the West and "rooted in political Islam".Compare: It has been described as a "difficult term to define precisely", because it remains a recent neologism with no single, generally accepted meaning. The term "jihadism" first appeared in South Asian media; Western journalists adopted it in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks of 2001. It has since been applied to various insurgent and terrorist movements whose ideology is based on the Islamic notion of jihad. Contemporary jihadism ultimately has its roots in the late 19th- and early 20th-century ideological developments of Islamic revivalism, which developed into Qutbism and related ideologies during the mid-20th century. The terrorist organisations partaking in the Soviet–Afghan War of 1979 to 1989 reinforced the rise of jihadism, which has been propagated in various armed conflicts throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Gilles Kepel has diagnosed a specifically Salafi jihadism within the Salafi movement of the 1990s. Jihadism with an international, Pan-Islamist scope is also known as global jihadism. Studies show that with the rise of ISIS, many European Muslims, from countries like the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, France, and Switzerland, traveled to Syria to join the global Jihad.


The term "jihadism" has been in use since the 1990s, more widely in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. It was first used by the Indian and Pakistani mass media, and by French academics who used the more exact term "jihadist-Salafist". "French academics have put the term into academic circulation as 'jihadist-Salafism.' The qualifier of Salafism—an historical reference to the precursor of these movements—will inevitably be stripped away in popular usage. "Jihadist-Salafism" is defined by Gilles Kepel, ''Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam'' (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 219-22; and Guilain Deneoux, "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam," ''Middle East Policy'', June 2002, pp. 69-71." According to Martin Kramer as of 2003, "jihadism is used to refer to the most violent persons and movements in contemporary Islam, including al-Qaeda." David Romano has defined his use of the term as referring to "an individual or political movement that primarily focuses its attention, discourse, and activities on the conduct of a violent, uncompromising campaign that they term a ''jihad''". Following Daniel Kimmage, he distinguishes the jihadist discourse of jihad as a global project to remake the world from the resistance discourse of groups like Hezbollah, which is framed as a regional project against a specific enemy. Most Muslims do not use the term, disliking the association of illegitimate violence with a noble religious concept, and instead prefer the use of delegitimising terms like "deviants". The term "jihadist globalism" is also often used in relation to jihadism. Academic Manfred Steger proposes an extension of the term "jihadist globalism" to apply to all extremely violent strains of religiously influenced ideologies that articulate the global imaginary into concrete political agendas and terrorist strategies (these include al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, Hamas, and Hezbollah, which he finds "today's most spectacular manifestation of religious globalism"). "Jihad Cool" is a term used by Western security experts concerning the re-branding of militant jihadism into something fashionable, or "cool", to younger people through consumer culture, social media, magazines, rap videos, toys, propaganda videos, and other means. It is a sub-culture mainly applied to individuals in developed nations who are recruited to travel to conflict zones on jihad. For example, jihadi rap videos make participants look "more MTV than Mosque", according to NPR, which was the first to report on the phenomenon in 2010. Maajid Nawaz, founder and chairman of the anti-extremism think tank Quilliam, defines Jihadism as a violent subset of Islamism: ''"Islamism sthe desire to impose any version of Islam over any society. Jihadism is the attempt to do so by force."''


Islamic revivalism and Salafism (1990s to present)

Flag of ISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh According to Rudolph Peters, scholar of Islamic studies and history of Islam, contemporary traditionalist Muslims "copy phrases of the classical works on fiqh" in their writings on jihad; Islamic Modernists "emphasize the defensive aspect of jihad, regarding it as tantamount to ''bellum justum'' in modern international law; and the contemporary fundamentalists (Abul Ala Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, etc.) view it as a struggle for the expansion of Islam and the realization of Islamic ideals." Jihad has been propagated in modern fundamentalism beginning in the late 19th century, an ideology that arose in the context of struggles against colonial powers in North Africa in the late 19th century, as in the Mahdist War in Sudan, and notably in the mid-20th century by Islamic revivalist authors such as Sayyid Qutb and Abul Ala Maududi. The term ''jihadism'' (earlier ''Salafi jihadism'') has arisen in the 2000s to refer to the contemporary jihadi movements, the development of which was in retrospect traced to developments of Salafism paired with the origins of al-Qaeda in the Soviet–Afghan War during the 1990s. Jihadism has been called an "offshoot" of Islamic revivalism of the 1960s and 1970s. The writings of Sayyid Qutb and Mohammed Abdul-Salam Farag provide inspiration. The Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989) is said to have "amplified the jihadist tendency from a fringe phenomenon to a major force in the Muslim world." It served to produce foot soldiers, leadership and organization. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam provided propaganda for the Afghan cause. After the war veteran jihadists returned to their home countries and dispersed to other sites of conflicts involving Muslim populations such as Algeria, Bosnia, and Chechnya creating a "transnational jihadist stream." * Kashmir conflict (Lashkar-e-Taiba, 1990–present) * Somali Civil War (1991–present) * Algerian Civil War (1991-2002) * Bosnian war (Bosnian mujahideen, 1992–1995) * Afghan civil war (Taliban 1994–present) * East Turkestan irredentism (East Turkestan Islamic Movement, 1997–present) * Chechen war and Insurgency in the North Caucasus (Arab Mujahideen in Chechnya, 1994–2017) * Nigerian Sharia conflict (Boko Haram 2001–present) * Iraqi insurgency (Islamic State of Iraq, 2003–present) * Al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen (Abyan Governorate, 2010–present) * Syrian Civil War (Al-Nusra Front to Protect the Levant 2011–present) * Syrian Civil War (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 2013–present) An explanation for jihadist willingness to kill civilians and self-professed Muslims on the grounds that they were actually apostates (''takfir'') is the vastly reduced influence of the traditional diverse class of ''ulama'', often highly educated Islamic jurists. In "the vast majority" of Muslim countries during the post-colonial world of the 1950s and 1960s, the private religious endowments (''awqaf'') that had supported the independence of Islamic scholars and jurists for centuries were taken over by the state. The jurists were made salaried employees and the nationalist rulers naturally encouraged their employees (and their employees interpretations of Islam) to serve the rulers' interests. Inevitably the jurists came to be seen by the Muslim public as doing so. Into this vacuum of religious authority came aggressive proselytizing funded by tens of billions of dollars of petroleum-export money from Saudi Arabia. The version of Islam being propagated (Saudi doctrine of Wahhabism) billed itself as a return to pristine, simple, straightforward Islam, not one school among many, and not interpreting Islamic law historically or contextually, but the one, orthodox "straight path" of Islam. Unlike the traditional teachings of the jurists who tolerated and even celebrated divergent opinions and schools of thought and kept extremism marginalized, Wahhabism had "extreme hostility" to "any sectarian divisions within Islam".

Shia jihad

The term ''jihadist'' is almost exclusively used to describe Sunni extremists. In Syria, where there are thousands of foreign Muslim fighters engaged in the civil war, for example, non-Syrian Shia are often referred to as "militia", and Sunni foreigners as "jihadists" (or "would-be jihadists"). One who does use the term "Shia jihad" is Danny Postel, who complains that "this Shia jihad is largely left out of the dominant narrative."see also: Other authors see the ideology of "resistance" (Arabic: ''muqawama'') as more dominant even among extremist Shia groups. Therefore, and for the disambiguation, they suggest to use the term "''muqawamist"'' instead.


According to Shadi Hamid and Rashid Dar, jihadism is driven by the idea that jihad is an "individual obligation" (''fard ‘ayn'') incumbent upon all Muslims. This is in contrast with the belief of Muslims up until now (and by contemporary non-jihadists) that jihad is a "collective obligation" (''fard al-kifaya'') carried out according to orders of legitimate representatives of the Muslim community. Jihadist insist all Muslims should participate because (they believe) today's Muslim leaders are illegitimate and do not command the authority to ordain justified violence.

Evolution of jihad

Some observers have noted the evolution in the rules of jihad—from the original "classical" doctrine to that of 21st century Salafi jihadism. According to the legal historian Sadarat Kadri, during the last couple of centuries, incremental changes in Islamic legal doctrine (developed by Islamists who otherwise condemn any ''bid‘ah'' (innovation) in religion), have "normalized" what was once "unthinkable". "The very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield." The first or the "classical" doctrine of jihad which was developed towards the end of the 8th century, emphasized the jihad of the sword (''jihad bil-saif'') rather than the "jihad of the heart", but it contained many legal restrictions which were developed from interpretations of both the Quran and the Hadith, such as detailed rules involving "the initiation, the conduct, the termination" of jihad, the treatment of prisoners, the distribution of booty, etc. Unless there was a sudden attack on the Muslim community, jihad was not a "personal obligation" (''fard ‘ayn''); instead it was a "collective one" (''fard al-kifaya''), which had to be discharged "in the way of God" (''fi sabil Allah''), and it could only be directed by the caliph, "whose discretion over its conduct was all but absolute." (This was designed in part to avoid incidents like the Kharijia's jihad against and killing of Caliph Ali, since they deemed that he was no longer a Muslim). Martyrdom resulting from an attack on the enemy with no concern for your own safety was praiseworthy, but dying by your own hand (as opposed to the enemy's) merited a special place in Hell. The category of jihad which is considered to be a collective obligation is sometimes simplified as "offensive jihad" in Western texts. Based on the 20th-century interpretations of Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, Ruhollah Khomeini, al-Qaeda and others, many if not all of those self-proclaimed jihad fighters believe that defensive global jihad is a personal obligation, which means that no caliph or Muslim head of state needs to declare it. Killing yourself in the process of killing the enemy is an act of martyrdom and it brings you a special place in Heaven, not a special place in Hell; and the killing of Muslim bystanders (never mind Non-Muslims), should not impede acts of jihad. Military and intelligent analyst Sebastian Gorka described the new interpretation of jihad as the "willful targeting of civilians by a non-state actor through unconventional means." Islamic theologian Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir has been identified as the key theorist and ideologue behind modern jihadist violence. His theological and legal justifications influenced Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of al-Qaeda as well as several jihadi terrorist groups, including ISIS. Zarqawi used a manuscript of al-Muhajir's ideas at AQI training camps that were later deployed by ISIS, referred to as ''The Jurisprudence of Jihad'' or ''The Jurisprudence of Blood''. The book has been described as rationalising "the murder of non-combatants" by ''The Guardian''s Mark Towsend, citing Salah al-Ansari of Quilliam, who notes: "There is a startling lack of study and concern regarding this abhorrent and dangerous text 'The Jurisprudence of Blood''in almost all Western and Arab scholarship". Charlie Winter of ''The Atlantic'' describes it as a "theological playbook used to justify the group's abhorrent acts". He states: Psychologist Chris E. Stout also discusses the al Muhajir-inspired text in his book, ''Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism''. He assesses that jihadists regard their actions as being "for the greater good"; that they are in a "weakened in the earth" situation that renders terrorism a valid means of solution.


Against Shia

The Syrian Civil War became a focus for Sunni fighters waging jihad on Shia. The al-Nusra Front is the largest jihadist group in Syria. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has called for jihad against the Syrian government and against that government's Shi'ite allies. Saudi Arabia backs the jihad against the Shia in Syria using proxies. Sunni jihadi converge in Syria from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Yemen, Kuwait, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, as well as other Arab states with Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Western countries.

Against atheists

During the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s, many Muslims received calls for a jihad against atheists. Mujahideen were recruited from various countries including Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The conflict gradually turned from one against occupation to one seen as a jihad.

See also

*Jihadist flag *Caucasus Emirate,Darion Rhodes
Salafist-Takfiri Jihadism: the Ideology of the Caucasus Emirate
, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, March 2014
a self-declared proto-state in Russia's North Caucasus *Counter-jihad *Defensive jihad *Dominion theology *International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism *Islam and war **Holy war in Islam *Islamic fundamentalism *Islamic terrorism *Kahanism *List of Islamist terrorist attacks *Mujahideen




* * * * *Gilles Kepel, ''Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam'' (2000, 2002, 2006). ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

External links

* {{Islamism Category:Islamic fundamentalism Category:Mujahideen Category:Anti-Christian sentiment Category:Anti-Judaism Category:Political neologisms Category:Islam-related controversies