Conversational implicature
Grice was primarily concerned with conversational implicatures. Like all implicatures, these are part of what is communicated. In other words, conclusions the addressee draws from an utterance although they were not actively conveyed by the communicator are never implicatures. According to Grice, conversational implicatures arise because communicating people are expected by their addressees to obey theStandard implicatures
The simplest situation is where the addressee can draw conclusions from the assumption that the communicator obeys the maxims, as in the following examples. The symbol "+>" means "implicates". ; Quality : It is raining. +> I believe, and have adequate evidence, that it is raining. Moore's paradox, the observation that the sentence "It is raining, but I don't believe that it is raining" sounds contradictory although it isn't from a strictly logical point of view, has been explained as a contradiction to this type of implicature. However, as implicatures can be cancelled (seeClashes of maxims
Sometimes it is impossible to obey all maxims at once. Suppose that A and B are planning a holiday in France and A suggests they visit their old acquaintance Gérard: : A: Where does Gérard live? : B: Somewhere in the South of France. +> B does not know where exactly Gérard lives. B's answer violates the first maxim of quantity as it does not contain sufficient information to plan their route. But if B does not know the exact location, she cannot obey this maxim ''and also'' the maxim of quality; hence the implicature.Floutings
The maxims can also be blatantly disobeyed or ''flouted'', giving rise to another kind of conversational implicature. This is possible because addressees will go to great lengths in saving their assumption that the communicator did in fact – perhaps on a deeper level – obey the maxims and the cooperative principle. Many figures of speech can be explained by this mechanism. ;Quality (i) Saying something that is obviously false can produceParticularized versus generalized implicatures
Conversational implicatures that arise only in specific contexts are called ''particularized'', while those that are not or only slightly context dependent are ''generalized''. Many of the examples above rely on some context, making them particularized implicatures: thus, "War is war" can refer to different properties of war, or things expected to happen during war, depending on the situation in which it is uttered. Prototypical examples of generalized implicatures are the scalar implicatures. Particularized implicatures are by far the more common kind.Properties
Grice attributed a number of properties to conversational implicatures: They are ''defeasible'' (cancellable), meaning that the implicature may be cancelled by further information or context. Take the examples from above: : That cake looks delicious. +> I would like a piece of that cake. : versus: That cake looks delicious, but it looks too rich for me. (implicature defeated) : A: Did John eat some of the cookies? : B: He certainly did eat some of the cookies. In fact he ate them all. They are usually ''non-detachable'' in the sense that they cannot be "detached" by rephrasing the utterance, as they are consequences of the meaning and not the wording. The obvious exception are implicatures following from the maxim of manner, which explicitly relies on the phrasing. Thus, the following utterances have the same implicature as above: : That fruit cake there looks appetizing. : The dessert you brought is really mouthwatering. Conversational implicatures are ''calculable'': they are supposed to be formally derivable from the literal meaning of the utterance in combination with the cooperative principle and the maxims, as well as contextual information and background knowledge. They are ''non-conventional'', that is, they are not part of the "conventional" (lexical and logical) meaning of a sentence. Lastly, they can be ''context dependent'', as mentioned above.Opting out of the cooperative principle
The cooperative principle and the maxims of conversation are not mandatory. A communicator can choose not to be cooperative; she can ''opt out'' of the cooperative principle by giving appropriate clues such as saying "My lips are sealed", or for example during a cross-examination at court. In such situations, no conversational implicatures arise.Modifications to Grice's maxims
;Laurence Horn Various modifications to Grice's maxims have been proposed by other linguists, the so-called neo-Griceans. Laurence Horn's approach keeps the maxims of quality and replaces the other maxims with just two principles: * The Q-principle: Make your contribution sufficient; say as much as you can (given the quality maxims and the R-principle). * The R-principle: Make your contribution necessary; say no more than you must (given the Q-principle). The Q-principle replaces the first quantity maxim ("make your contribution as informative as is required") and the first and second manner maxims ("avoid obscurity and ambiguity"), and is taken to serve the interests of the hearer, who wants as much information as possible. It thus gives rise to the classical scalar implicatures. The R-principle subsumes the second quantity maxim ("do not make your contribution more informative than is required"), the maxim of relation, and the remaining manner maxims ("be brief and orderly"), and serves the interests of the speaker, who wants to communicate with as little effort as possible. These two principles have opposite effects analogous to Grice's two maxims of quantity. To determine which of the two principles is used, Horn introduces the concept of ''division of pragmatic labor'': unmarked (shorter, standard, more lexicalized) phrasings tend to R-implicate a standard meaning, and marked (more wordy, unusual, less lexicalized) phrasings tend to Q-implicate a nonstandard meaning: : She stopped the machine. +> She stopped the machine ''in the usual way''. (R-implicature: a stronger, more specific claim is implicated) : She got the machine to stop. +> She did not stop the machine in the usual way. (Q-implicature: the stronger claim is negated, as with scalar implicatures) Horn's account has been criticised for misrepresenting the speaker's and hearer's interests: realistically, the hearer does not want a lot of information but just the relevant information; and the speaker is more interested in being understood than in having little work to do. Furthermore, as in Grice's theory, there is often no explanation for when which of the two principles is used, i.e. why "I lost a book yesterday" has the Q-implicature, or scalar implicature, that the book was the speaker's, while "I slept on a boat yesterday" R-implicates that the boat wasn't the speaker's. ;Stephen Levinson Stephen Levinson's approach is similar to Horn's. His Q-principle is basically the same, but its antagonist, the I-principle, only takes the place of the second quantity maxim. There is a separate M-principle more or less corresponding to the third and fourth manner maxims, as well as to Horn's division of pragmatic labor; but there is no replacement for the maxim of relation. * The M-principle: Indicate abnormal, nonstereotypical situations by using marked expressions that contrast with those you would use to describe the corresponding normal, stereotypical situations. Levinson subsequently developed a theory of generalized conversational implicature (GCI) based on the Q-principle. He argues that GCIs are distinct from particularized conversational implicatures in that they are inferred via a specialized set of principles and rules that are always in force, independent of the context. If a GCI does not arise in some specific situations, this is because it is blocked under certain circumstances according to Levinson.Criticism
Apart from the mentioned problem with the two opposing quantity maxims, several issues with Grice's conversational implicatures have been raised: ;Do implicatures contrast with entailments? While Grice described conversational implicatures as contrasting with entailments, there has since been dissent. : A: Did you drive somewhere yesterday? : B: I drove to London. Here, B implicates via the maxim of relation that he drove somewhere (as this is the fitting answer to A's question), but this information is also entailed by his answer. ;Are quantity implicatures actually implicatures? At least some scalar and other quantity "implicatures" seem not to be implicatures at all but semantic enrichments of the utterance, what is variously described as an explicature or impliciture in the literature. For example, Kent Bach argues that a sentence like "John ate some of the cookies" does not implicate "John didn't eat all of the cookies" because the latter isn't a claim separate from the first; rather, the speaker just has a single meaning in mind, namely "John ate some '' ut not all' of the cookies". Likewise,Implicature in relevance theory
In the framework known as relevance theory, implicature is defined as a counterpart to explicature. The explicatures of an utterance are the communicated assumptions that are developed from its logical form (intuitively, the literal meaning) by supplying additional information from context: by disambiguating ambiguous expressions, assigning referents to pronouns and other variables, and so on. All communicated assumptions that cannot be obtained in this way are implicatures. For example, if Peter says : Susan told me that her kiwis were too sour. in the context that Susan participated in a fruit grower's contest, the hearer might arrive at the explicature : Susan told Peter that the kiwifruit she, Susan, grew were too sour for the judges at the fruit grower's contest. Now assume that Peter and the hearer both have access to the contextual information that : Susan is ambitious. If she loses at something, she's pretty downcast. and that Peter intended the hearer to activate this knowledge. Then this is an ''implicated premise''. The hearer can now draw the ''contextual implications'' that : +> Susan needs to be cheered up. : +> Peter wants me to ring Susan and cheer her up. If Peter intended the hearer to come to these implications, they are ''implicated conclusions''. Implicated premises and conclusions are the two types of implicatures in the relevance theoretical sense. There is no sharp cutoff between implicatures, which are part of the intentional meaning of an utterance, and unintended implications the addressee may draw. For example, there may be no consensus whether : ?+> Peter wants me to buy Susan some chocolate to cheer her up. is an implicature of the above utterance. We say this assumption is only ''weakly implicated'', while "Susan needs to be cheered up" is essential for the utterance to achieve relevance for the addressee and is therefore ''strongly implicated''.The principle of relevance
Both explicatures and implicatures follow from the communicative principle of relevance, which unlike Grice's cooperative principle is not optional, but is always in force whenever someone communicates – it isDistinction from explicatures
All pragmatically derived information, including parts of explicatures that are supplied from context, is calculable and defeasible. Therefore, different criteria are needed in relevance theory to identify implicatures. Sperber and Wilson originally assumed that implicatures can be sufficiently defined as the communicated assumptions that are not developed from an utterance's logical form, as noted above. On this account, loose language use (saying "This steak is raw" to express that it is really undercooked) is a case of implicature, as are hyperbole and metaphor. Carston has argued for a more formal approach, namely that an utterance's implicatures cannot entail any of its explicatures. If they did, the resulting redundancies would cause unnecessary effort on part of the addressee, which would run against the principle of relevance. An example of pragmatically derived information that has traditionally been seen as an implicature, but must be an explicature according to Carston's reasoning, has already been mentioned above: "He drank a bottle of vodka and fell into a stupor" → "He drank a bottle of vodka and ''consequently'' fell into a stupor". However, there has since been found at least one example of an implicature that does entail an explicature, showing that this test is not infallible: : A: Did Jim go to the party? : B: I don't know, but I can tell you that if ''anybody'' was there, Jim was there. : A: ''Somebody'' was there – this I know for sure. (I saw John going there.) +> Jim was there. (entails: Somebody was there.) Another possible criterion is that explicatures, but not implicatures, can be embedded in negations, if clauses and other grammatical constructions. Thus, the sentences : Susan did not tell Peter that her kiwis were too sour. : If Susan has told Peter that her kiwis were too sour, she was just fishing for compliments. are equivalent to : Susan did not tell Peter that the kiwifruit she, Susan, grew were too sour for the judges. : If Susan told Peter that the kiwifruit she, Susan, grew were too sour for the judges, she was just fishing for compliments. respectively, showing the embedded clause to be an explicature. On the other hand, they are not equivalent to embeddings of the mentioned implicature: : *Susan does not need to be cheered up. : *If Susan needs to be cheered up, she is just fishing for compliments. These embedding tests also show the vodka bottle example to be an explicature. However, there is still no generally accepted criterion to reliably distinguish explicatures and implicatures.Poetic effects
Metaphors can be an efficient means to communicate a wide range of weak implicatures. For example, : Jane is my anchor in the storm. can weakly implicate that Jane is reliable and stable in difficult circumstances, helpful in calming the speaker, and so on. Even if the speaker had no specific set of assumptions in mind, this information can give the addressee an idea of Jane's significance to the speaker's life. Speaking generally, utterances conveyCriticism
Levinson sees relevance theory as tooConventional implicature
Conventional implicatures, briefly introduced but never elaborated on by Grice, are independent of the cooperative principle and the four maxims. They are instead tied to the conventional meaning of certain particles and phrases such as "but, although, however, nevertheless, moreover, anyway, whereas, after all, even, yet, still, besides", verbs such as "deprive, spare", and possibly also to grammatical structures. (Such words and phrases are also said to ''trigger'' conventional implicatures.) In addition, they are not defeasible, but have the force of entailments. An example: : Donovan is poor ''but'' happy. This sentence is logically equivalent to – that is, it has the same truth conditions as – "Donovan is poor ''and'' happy". In addition, the word "but" implicates a sense of contrast. Taken together, the sentence means approximately "Surprisingly, Donovan is happy in spite of being poor". The verbs "deprive" and "spare" also have the same truth conditions but different conventional implicatures. Compare: : I have deprived you of my lecture. +> Attending my lecture would have been desirable (for you). :I have spared you my lecture. +> Attending my lecture would not have been desirable (for you). Non-restrictive supplements such as the following adjective phrase have been argued to be grammatical structures that produce conventional implicatures: : Yewberry jelly, ''toxic in the extreme'', will give you an awful stomachache. The implicature here is that yewberry jelly is toxic in the extreme. Other such constructions are non-restrictiveCriticism
Because of the mentioned differences to conversational (and relevance theoretical) implicatures, it has been argued that "conventional implicatures" are not implicatures at all but rather secondary propositions or entailments of an utterance. Under this view, the sentence about Donovan would have the primary proposition "Donovan is poor and happy" and the secondary proposition "There is a contrast between poverty and happiness". The sentence about yewberry jelly contains the two propositions "Yewberry jelly will give you an awful stomachache" and "Yewberry jelly is toxic in the extreme". Other analyses of "but" and similar words have been proposed. Rieber takes above sentence to mean "Donovan is poor and (I suggest this contrasts) happy" and calls it a ''tacit (i.e. silent, implied)See also
* Entailment, or '' implication'', in logic *Citations
General and cited references
* * * * * * * * * * * * * . . Reprinted in . Page numbers refer to the reprint. * * * * * * * * * * * * *Further reading
* * * *External links
* {{Cite SEP , url-id=implicature , title=Implicature , last=Davis , first=Wayne Inference Pragmatics