Episteme

In philosophy, episteme (; french: épistémè) is a term that refers to a principle system of understanding (i.e., knowledge), such as scientific knowledge or practical knowledge. The term comes from the Ancient Greek verb grc, ἐπῐ́στᾰμαι, epístamai, label=none, meaning 'to know, to understand, to be acquainted with'. The term ''epistemology'' (the branch of philosophy concerning knowledge) is derived from ''episteme''.

Plato contrasts ''episteme'' with ''doxa'': common belief or opinion. The term ''episteme'' is also distinguished from ''techne'': a craft or applied practice. Socrates noted that nous and episteme is requisite for prudence (phronesis).

Western philosophy

Aristotle

Aristotle distinguished between five virtues of thought: ''technê'', ''epistêmê'', ''phronêsis'', ''sophia'', and ''nous'', with techne translating as "craft" or "art" and episteme as "knowledge". A full account of ''epistêmê'' is given in ''Posterior Analytics'', where Aristotle argues that knowledge of necessary, rather than contingent truths regarding causation is foundational for episteme. To emphasize the necessity, he uses geometry. Notably, Aristotle uses the notion of cause (''aitia'') in a broader sense than contemporary thought. For example, understanding how geometrical axioms lead to a theorem about properties of triangles counts as understanding the ''cause'' of the proven property of the right triangle. As a result, episteme is a virtue of thought that deals with what cannot be otherwise, while techne and phronesis deal with what is contingent.

Michel Foucault

For Foucault, an episteme is the guiding unconsciousness of subjectivity within a given epoch – subjective parameters which form an historical a priori. He uses the term ''épistémè'' in his ''The Order of Things'', in a specialized sense to mean the historical, non-temporal, ''a priori'' knowledge that grounds truth and discourses, thus representing the condition of their possibility within a particular epoch.

In the book, Foucault describes ''épistémè'':

In any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one ''episteme'' that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice.

In subsequent writings, he makes it clear that several ''épistémè'' may co-exist and interact at the same time, being parts of various power-knowledge systems. However, he does not discard the concept

Relation to Thomas Kuhn's paradigm

Foucault's use of ''épistémè'' has been asserted as being similar to Thomas Kuhn's notion of a paradigm, as for example by Jean Piaget. However, there are key differences. Whereas Kuhn's ''paradigm'' is an all-encompassing collection of beliefs and assumptions that result in the organization of scientific worldviews and practices, Foucault's ''episteme'' is not confined to scienceit provides the grounding for a broad range of discourses (all of science itself would fall under the ''episteme'' of the epoch). One might say that a paradigm is subsumed within an episteme.

Kuhn's paradigm shifts are a consequence of a series of conscious decisions made by scientists to pursue a neglected set of questions. Foucault's ''episteme'' is something like the 'epistemological unconscious' of an era; the resultant configuration of knowledge of a particular ''episteme'' is, to Foucault, based on a set of primordial, fundamental assumptions that are so basic to the ''episteme'' that they're experientially "invisible" to the constituents (such as people, organizations, or systems) operating within the ''episteme.''

Moreover, Kuhn's concept corresponds to what Foucault calls ''theme'' or theory of a science, though Foucault analyzed how ''opposing'' theories and themes could ''co-exist'' within a science. Kuhn does not search for the conditions of possibility of opposing discourses within a science, but simply for the invariant dominant paradigm governing scientific research (supposing that ''one'' paradigm always ''is'' pervading, except under paradigmatic transition).

Foucault attempts to demonstrate the constitutive limits of discourse, and in particular, the rules enabling their productivity; however, Foucault maintains that, though ideology may infiltrate and form science, it need not do so: it must be demonstrated how ideology actually forms the science in question; contradictions and lack of objectivity is not an indicator of ideology.

Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. Rabinow, Paul, ed. 1991. ''The Foucault Reader: An introduction to Foucault’s thought''. London: Penguin. .

Kuhn's and Foucault's notions are possibly influenced by the French philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard's notion of an "epistemological rupture" as indeed was Louis Althusser.

Judith Butler

In 1997, Judith Butler used the concept of episteme in their book '' Excitable Speech'', examining the use of speech-act theory for political purposes.

See also

* Epistemology
* ''Phronesis''
* ''Zeitgeist''

Notes

References

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{{Michel Foucault

Concepts in ancient Greek epistemology
Discourse analysis
Knowledge
Michel Foucault
Philosophy of science
Theories in ancient Greek philosophy