David Ray Griffin

David Ray Griffin (August 8, 1939 – November 26, 2022) was an American professor of philosophy of religion and theology and a 9/11 conspiracy theorist.Sources describing David Ray Griffin as a "conspiracy theorist", "conspiracist", "conspiracy nut", "truther" or otherwise associate him with 9/11 conspiracy theories and the "truther" movement include:
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* Along with John B. Cobb, Jr., he founded the Center for Process Studies in 1973, a research center of Claremont School of Theology that seeks to promote the common good by means of the relational approach found in process thought.

Griffin published numerous books about the September 11 attacks, claiming that elements of the Bush administration were involved. An advocate of the controlled demolition conspiracy theory, he was a founder member of Scholars for 9/11 Truth.

Life and professional career

Griffin was born on August 8, 1939. He was raised in a small town in Oregon, where he was an active participant in his Disciples of Christ church. After deciding to become a minister, Griffin entered Northwest Christian College but became disenchanted with the conservative-fundamentalist theology taught there. While pursuing his master's degree in counseling from the University of Oregon, Griffin attended a lecture series delivered by Paul Tillich at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, California. At that time, Griffin decided to focus on philosophical theology. He eventually attended the Claremont Graduate University, from which Griffin received his PhD in 1970.

As a student in Claremont, Griffin was initially interested in Eastern religions, particularly Vedanta. However, he started to become a process theologian while attending John B. Cobb's seminar on Whitehead's philosophy. According to Griffin, process theology, as presented by Cobb, "provided a way between the old supernaturalism, according to which God miraculously interrupted the normal causal processes now and then, and a view according to which God is something like a cosmic hydraulic jack, exerting the same pressure always and everywhere (which described rather aptly the position to which I had come)" (''Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology''). Griffin applied Alfred North Whitehead's thought to the traditional theological subjects of christology and theodicy and argued that process theology also provided a sound basis for addressing contemporary social and ecological issues. Griffin's process theology is founded on the process philosophy of Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.

After teaching theology and Eastern religions at the University of Dayton, Griffin came to appreciate the distinctively postmodern aspects of Whitehead's thought. In particular, Griffin found Whitehead's nonsensationist epistemology and panexperientialist ontology immensely helpful in addressing the major problems of modern philosophy, including the problems of mind-body interaction, the interaction between free and determined things, the emergence of experience from nonexperiencing matter, and the emergence of time in the evolutionary process. In 1973, Griffin returned to Claremont to establish, with Cobb, the Center for Process Studies at the Claremont School of Theology.

While on research leave in 1980–81 at Cambridge University and Berkeley, the contrast between modernity and postmodernity became central to Griffin's work. He has attempted to develop postmodern proposals for overcoming the conflicts between religion and modern science. Griffin came to believe that much of the tension between religion and science was not only the result of reactionary supernaturalism but also the mechanistic worldview associated with the rise of modern science in the seventeenth century. In 1983, Griffin established the Center for a Postmodern World in Santa Barbara and became editor of the SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Philosophy between 1987 and 2004.

Griffin was a full-time academic from 1973 until April 2004 and was a co-director of the Center for Process Studies. He was a longtime resident of Santa Barbara, California.

Statements and publications on the September 11 attacks

Following the September 11 attacks, David Ray Griffin shifted his focus from questions of philosophy and religion to ones of politics and history, specifically American expansionism and imperialism. He intended to write a book on the subject, presenting 9/11 in terms of "blowback" for aggressive United States foreign policies of the 20th century:

Until the spring of 2003, I had not looked at any of the evidence. I was vaguely aware there were people, at least on the internet, who were offering evidence against the official account of 9/11... I knew the US government had 'fabricated' evidence to go to war several times before. Nevertheless... I did not take this possibility seriously... I was so confident that they must be wrong.

After reading the work of Paul Thompson and Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, he became convinced that there was a ''prima facie'' case for the contention that there must have been complicity from individuals within the United States government. He has called for an extensive investigation from the United States media, Congress and the 9/11 Commission. It was then that he set about writing his first book on the topic, which he entitled '' The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions About the Bush Administration and 9/11'' (2004). The book has been described by Peter Barber of the ''Financial Times'' as "a touchstone in the 9/11 Truth movement". Griffin is a founder of Scholars for 9/11 Truth.

Part One of the book looks at the events of 9/11, discussing each flight in turn and also the behaviour of President George W. Bush and his Secret Service protection. Part Two examines 9/11 in a wider context, in the form of four "disturbing questions." David Ray Griffin discussed this book and the claims within it in an interview with Nick Welsh, reported under the headline ''Thinking Unthinkable Thoughts: Theologian Charges White House Complicity in 9/11 Attack''.

Critics, such as the activist Chip Berlet, have identified claims in the book that have been refuted by independent experts. Griffin debated Berlet on Democracy Now! defending his claims.

Griffin's second book on the subject was a critique of the 9/11 Commission Report, called ''The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions And Distortions'' (2005). Griffin's article "The 9/11 Commission Report: A 571-page Lie" summarizes this book, presenting 115 allegations of what Griffin claims are either omissions or distortions of evidence, stating that "the entire Report is constructed in support of one big lie: that the official story about 9/11 is true."

In his next book, ''Christian Faith and the Truth Behind 9/11: A Call to Reflection and Action'' (2006), he summarizes some of what he believes is evidence for government complicity and reflects on its implications for Christians. The Presbyterian Publishing Corporation, publishers of the book, described Griffin as being a distinguished theologian and praised the book's religious content, but said, "The board believes the conspiracy theory is spurious and based on questionable research."

In 2006, Griffin, along with Peter Dale Scott, edited ''9/11 and the American Empire: Intellectuals Speak Out'', a collection of essays including Steven Jones' paper ''Why Indeed Did The World Trade Center Towers Collapse?''. ''Debunking 9/11 Debunking'' (2007) disputes at the rhetorical level the debunking of 9/11 conspiracy theories in such venues such as ''Popular Mechanics''. In ''9/11 Contradictions: An Open Letter to Congress and the Press'' (2008), he presents chapters on 25 alleged contradictions involving elements of the "accepted story" of 9/11 and calls for Congress and the press to investigate and resolve them.

Griffin delivered several lectures and was interviewed by Alex Jones on his radio show featuring 9/11 conspiracy theories. A lecture entitled ''9/11 and American Empire: How should religious people respond?'', delivered on April 18, 2005, at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, was aired by C-SPAN. At the end of one of his lectures entitled ''9/11: The Myth and the Reality'' Griffin was asked why a theologian would take such an interest in 9/11, to which he replied: "If 9/11 is not a religious issue, then I don't know what is."

In a review published in ''The Nation'', former Central Intelligence Agency agent Robert Baer dismissed the gist of Griffin's writings as one in a long line of conspiracy theories about national tragedies but stated that the Bush administration had created a climate of secrecy and mistrust that helped generate such explanations."Dangerous Liaisons," September 27, 2004
/ref> In the review, Baer said:

As more facts emerge about September 11, many of Griffin's questions should be answered, but his suspicions will never be put to rest as long as the Bush Administration refuses to explain why it dragged this country into the most senseless war in its history. Until then, otherwise reasonable Americans will believe the Bush Administration benefited from 9/11, and there will always be a question about what really happened on that day.

David Aaronovitch, in the London ''Times'' in 2008, wrote: "Griffin believes that no plane hit the Pentagon (despite hundreds of people seeing it) and that the World Trade Centre was brought down by a controlled demolition. There isn't a single point of alleged fact upon which Griffin's barking theory hasn't itself been demolished".

Philosophical and theological work

The theologian Gary Dorrien has said about Griffin:

No one better represents the intellectual ambition of process theology than David Griffin. He has surpassed everyone in challenging the materialistic, atheistic modernism of the academy, and his work is prolific and wide-ranging to the point of being impossible to summarize.

''Unsnarling the World-Knot''

In his 1998 book, ''Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem'', Griffin confronts what he says "has arguably been the central problem in modern philosophy since its inception in the seventeenth century," namely, the mind-body problem. Citing philosophers like Nicholas Humphry, William Lycan, Paul Churchland, Alastair Hannay, Colin McGinn, Willian Seager, Daniel Dennett, and Owen Flanagan, Griffin further argues that, "consciousness has widely come to be seen as lying at the heart of the mind-body problem". Concerning the current state of the mind-body problem, Griffin comments:

This book is based on the conviction that a development that has occurred in the intense and current discussion provides an opportunity for a breakthrough with regard to the central metaphysical assumption that has led to the intractability of the mind-body problem, an intractability that has taken the form of a standoff between duelists and materialists.

According to Joseph Grange, a strength of ''Unsnarling the World-Knot'' is that Griffin:

comprehensively reviews the major positions taken over the years by such important philosophers as Searle, Kim, Lycan, McGinn, Eccles, Strawson, and Flanagan. He rightly finds huge inconsistencies, logical errors, and implausible conclusions in this list of thinkers (he also includes others).

During his comprehensive review of modern positions on the mind-body problem, Griffin makes his central argument against both dualism and materialism: "the problems of dualism and materialism are both rooted in the same source: the Cartesian intuition about matter." Griffin levels criticisms against dualism that don't apply to materialism, for example the criticism that by positing two absolutely different substances dualism's explanation of interaction between the two is incoherent; griffin also levels criticisms against materialism that do not apply to dualism, for example against the reduction of experience to the purely physical, a position whose very meaning Griffin finds problematic. Ultimately though, Griffin believes that it is their shared understanding of matter as devoid of an "inside", of any kind of experience at all, that makes it impossible for either dualists or materialists to unsnarl the world-knot. As the philosopher Leemon McHenry points out:

Most importantly, materialism and dualism cannot explain without an explicit or at least implicit supernaturalism how experience arose out of nonexperiencing actualities."

Griffin's solution to the mind-body problem, following the philosophers Alfred N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, is to re-conceive matter by fully naturalizing mind. As McHenry puts it:

The view that mind is subjective, temporal, and unextended while matter is objective, spatial and extended is collapsed into one ontological category of entities conceived as spatio-temporal units of rudimentary sentience, which are first subjective, then objective. Such units are understood to be ''events r''ather than mental and physical substances.

Griffin's preferred term for his position is "panexprientialism". He argues that:

To affirm panexperientialism would be to carry through the regulative principle that mind should be naturalized, because it would involve attributing the two basic features that we associate with mind -- experience and spontaneity -- to all units of nature.

The phrase "units of nature" is important. Griffin comments in a footnote:

The "pan" in the panexperientialism to be advocated here refers not simply to all ''things'' but only to all genuine ''units'' or ''individuals''. This means that experience is ''not'' attributed to aggregational things, such as rocks and chairs, as such.

Because panexperientialism argues that all true individuals in nature have some measure of an "inside", some rudimentary experience, it resolves the issue of how more complex forms of experience like consciousness and self-consciousness could emerge in a fully natural way from far simpler units of nature.

According to Griffin, the most important reason for adopting panexperientialism is that it "provides hope of actually solving the mind-body problem". As summarized by Gary Dorrien:

... only panexperientialism reconciles the element of truth in dualist theory (that mind and brain are distinct and interact) with the element of truth in materialist theory (that all actual things are physical).

Common sense beliefs

In the Introduction to his 1993 book ''Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy'', as part of his effort to clarify the meaning of "constructive postmodernism" and its position with respect to truth, Griffin articulated a sophisticated understanding of a class of "privileged" common sense beliefs, "partly with Charles Pierce's 'critical common-sensism' in view". It is important to understand what Griffin means by the word "privileged" here. Specifically, Griffin does ''not'' argue for a version of what is commonly called ''foundationalism''. Griffin is ''not'' arguing that there is an underlying set of "basic beliefs" whose truth is certain in a "context-independent" way. Such foundationalism in effect gives priority to epistemology over metaphysics, claiming that "at least in its basic propositions, pistemologycan be presuppositionless" and that accordingly, all consequent metaphysics should be founded on this epistemology. Griffin explicitly rejects this foundationalist approach to philosophy:

We began philosophizing, as Peirce says, with a mind already chock full of beliefs of every type, and these cannot be laid aside when one becomes philosophical.

Griffin instead approvingly cites Alfred North Whitehead's approach:

Whitehead's contrasting view is that constructive philosophy should employ the method of the "working hypothesis," and in doing so must reject the "dogmatic method" with which philosophy has been afflicted...

Griffin rejects foundationalism then, but he also rejects what he calls extreme forms of antifoundationalism (e.g., relativistic postmodernism, what Griffin calls "deconstructive postmodernism"):

Extreme antifoundationalism rejects not only foundationalism ... but also three other notions: a "given" element in perception, truth as correspondence of idea to referent, and any class of privileged, universal (to all cultures) beliefs that can serve as a criterion for evaluating less privileged beliefs.

With regard to the first of these three notions, that there is no given element in perception, Griffin writes:

The premises in question here are that our only possible source of information about the world beyond our experience is sensory perception, and that sensory perception gives us nothing but sense-data. Given these premises, it is hard to see how we could escape solipsism, the doctrine that we have no knowledge that a world beyond our own experience exists.

With regard to the second of these three notions, that truth is not correspondence of idea to referent, Griffin writes:

The idea of truth as correspondence is so embattled partly because its detractors take it to involve things that its defenders do not. For example, detractors often point to the impossibility of getting out of one's perspective to ''show'' that one's perspectival idea of something does indeed correspond to the thing; but the correspondence notion of truth is a notion about what "truth" ''means'', not a theory about how our ideas as to what is true are to be verified.

Griffin adds:

The detractors rightly point out that there is an indefinite number of finite perspectives from which a thing can be viewed ... and that none of these perspectives is privileged.

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But to believe that a certain assertion about something is true does not entail that it is ''the'' truth (in the sense of the whole truth), or even the most important truth, about it. Every true assertion about something abstracts tremendously from the full truth about it. The full truth about something would consist of all true propositions that apply to it; this full truth, even about something as simple as a molecule or an ant -- let alone something as complex as a human being or historical event -- is only knowable to omniscience. Finite minds are capable of only remote approximation to this complete truth.

Finally, it is the third and last of these notions held by extreme forms of antifoundationalism that brings us back to the central topic of this section, that is, the notion of whether there is a privileged class of common sense beliefs. Against the rejection of this class of beliefs, Griffin writes:

Constructive postmodern philosophers hold that some beliefs are privileged in the sense that, once we become conscious of them (through whatever method), we should have more confidence in their truth than the truth of any other beliefs from which their falsity could be deduced. The beliefs in question are t''hose that we inevitably presuppose in practice, even if we deny them verbally''.

The issue, ultimately, is whether there is any common layer to our experience which informs our thought. Extreme forms of antifoundationalism, such as postmodernism as illustrated by Richard Rorty, deny that there is such a layer; Griffin, Alfred North Whitehead, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, Henri Bergson and Charles Hartshorne all accept such a layer in that "they hold that we have a presensory, prelinguistic, preconscious apprehension of reality." Of course, says Griffin, such apprehensions or intuitions are not what we usually mean by beliefs - they are vague, hard to formulate verbally, and not always consciously held. But, Griffin argues, "they are, nevertheless, beliefs, because we are prepared to act upon them -- in fact, we do act upon them all the time." But of course to be useful by philosophers, such intuitions must be given a verbal formulation. All such verbal formulations are in this sense subject to the same limitations as any verbal formulation about anything, that is:

This formulation will always be fallible. It will be dependent upon a range of factors, such as the available linguistic tools, the insight and linguistic ability of the formulators, and the other beliefs of which they are strongly convinced. The words and phrases that attempt to express the intuition in question will always remain fallible symbols for the more-or-less vaguely grasped meaning.

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But they nevertheless, do have a privileged status, in a secondary sense, within the system precisely because they are inevitably presupposed in practice. Accordingly, although they are not privileged in the sense of being infallible and thus beyond the possible need for reformulation, they are privileged within the entire set of fallible beliefs in the sense that they cannot be simply rejected.

As Gary Dorrien points out, by the late 1990s the notion of a privileged class of beliefs, now called "hard-core commonsense" beliefs, had become central to Griffin's philosophy. By the late 1990s Griffin had also clarified the distinction between "common sense" in the weak sense ("soft-core commonsense") and "common sense" in the strong sense ("hard-core commonsense"), partly in response to philosophers of science that regard defiance of common sense as "a point in the theory's favor." According to Griffin, soft-core commonsense "does ''not'' refer to truly common or universal notions but merely to parochial notions that ''can'' be denied without pain of implicit inconsistency" and science is right to disregard such beliefs but not to disregard hard-core commonsense. To distinguish hard-core common sense notions from soft-core, however, one needs a criterion, a metaphysical rule of evidence. Clarifying Whitehead, Griffin claims that this criterion can be stated in this way:

... the ultimate criteria for theoretical thought are those notions that all human beings inevitably presuppose in practice, even if and when they deny them verbally.

The term "practice" here is crucial and is used in reference to David Hume who denied any experience of a reality beyond sense perceptions or any legitimate reference to an external world, "while adding that we must, nonetheless, presuppose them .e, direct experience of reality and an external worldin practice." According to Griffin, Whitehead considered this formulation by Hume a kind of antirationalism. Griffin quotes Whitehead:

Whatever is found in 'practice' must lie within the scope of the metaphysical description. When the description fails to include the 'practice,' the metaphysics is inadequate and requires revision. There can be no appeal to practice to supplement metaphysics. (PR, 13)

In his 2007 book, ''Whitehead's Radically Different Postmodern Philosophy'', Griffin explains further the kind of contradiction he ascribes to verbal rejections of hard-core commonsense beliefs:

The reason it is antirational to deny in theory ideas that one necessarily presupposes in practice is that one thereby violates the first rule of reason, the law of noncontradiction. It is irrational simultaneously to affirm and deny one and the same proposition. And this is what happens when one denies a hard-core commonsense idea. That is, one is denying the idea explicitly while affirming it implicitly. This point has been made by Karl-Ottto Apel and Jurgen Habermas in their critique of "performative contradiction," in which the very act of performing a speech act contradicts its semantic content, its meaning.

Griffin then goes on to illustrate the point with an example:

Let us assume then that Hume told an audience that he was a solipsist -- that, as far as he knew, he was the only actual being, with everything and everyone else being mere elements in his imagination, like characters and things in a dream. In saying that to other people, Hume would have shown by the very fact of addressing them that he did not doubt their existence. The meaning of his statement would have been contradicted by the very act of making it. Such a self-contradiction is "absolutely self-refuting" ...

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It is impossible, accordingly, for one to deny the existence of a real world beyond oneself without being guilty of this kind of self-refuting inconsistency, The same is true of all our other hard-core commonsense ideas.

Parapsychology

Griffin wrote two books dealing with parapsychology: ''Parapsychology, Philosophy and Spirituality: A Postmodern Exploration'' and ''James and Whitehead on Life After Death''. As he states in the first book:

The title and contents of this book reflect my conviction that parapsychology is of utmost Importance for both philosophy and the spiritual life, especially in the present, as we are being pushed into a postmodern age.

In taking parapsychology seriously, Griffin is at odds with the majority of other writers about science who have taken up this topic. Paul R. Gross, Norman Levitt, and Martin W. Lewis assert that ,"The overwhelming majority of scientists consider parapsychology, by whatever name, to be pseudoscience."

Personal life and death

On November 26, 2022, it was announced that Griffin had died at the age of 83.

Books

About philosophy, theology, and religion

* ''A process Christology'', Westminster Press, 1973,
* ''Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition'', with John B. Cobb, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976,
* ''John Cobb's Theology in Process'', Westminster John Knox Press, 1977,
* ''Process and Reality'', Free Press; 2nd edition, 1979,
* ''Physics and the Ultimate Significance of Time: Bohm, Prigogine and Process Philosophy'', State University of New York Press, 1986,
* ''The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals (Suny Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought)'', State Univ of New York Press, 1988,
* ''Spirituality and Society: Postmodern Visions (Suny Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought)'', State University of New York Press, 1988,
* ''Varieties of Postmodern Theology (Suny Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought)'', State University of New York Press, 1989,
* ''God and Religion in the Postmodern World: Essays in Postmodern Theology (Constructive Postmodern Thought)'', State University of New York Press, 1989,
* ''Archetypal Process: Self and Divine in Whitehead, Jung, and Hillman'', Northwestern University Press, 1990,
* ''Sacred Interconnections: Postmodern Spirituality, Political Economy and Art (SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought)'', State University of New York Press, 1990,
* ''Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology (Suny Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought)'', State University of New York Press, 1990,
* ''God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy'', University Press of America, 1991,
* ''Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations'', State University of New York Press, 1991,
* ''Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy: Peirce, James, Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne (SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought)'', State University of New York Press, 1993,
* ''Postmodern Politics for a Planet in Crisis: Policy, Process, and Presidential Vision (SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought)'', State University of New York Press, 1993,
* ''Jewish Theology and Process Thought (Suny Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought)'', State University of New York Press, 1996,
* ''Parapsychology, Philosophy, and Spirituality: A Postmodern Exploration (SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought)'', State University of New York Press, 1997,
* ''Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion (Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion)'', Cornell University Press, 2000,
* ''Religion and Scientific Naturalism: Overcoming the Conflicts (SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought)'', State University of New York Press, 2000,
* ''Process Theology and the Christian Good News: A Response to Classical Free Will Theism'' in 'Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue between Process and Free Will Theists', Cobb and Pinnock (editors), Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2000,
* ''Two Great Truths: A New Synthesis of Scientific Naturalism and Christian Faith'', Westminster John Knox Press, 2004,
* ''Deep Religious Pluralism'', Westminster John Knox Press, 2005,
* ''Whitehead's Radically Different Postmodern Philosophy: An Argument for Its Contemporary Relevance (SUNY Series in Philosophy)'', State University of New York Press, 2007,
* ''Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem'', Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2007, ISBN 978-1-55635-755-8
* ''Panentheism and Scientific Naturalism: Rethinking Evil, Morality, Religious Experience, Religious Pluralism, and the Academic Study of Religion'', Claremont, Process Century Press, 2014,
* ''The Christian Gospel for Americans: A Systematic Theology'', Anoka (Minnesota): Process Century Press, 2019,

About the September 11 attacks

* '' The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions About the Bush Administration and 9-11'', Olive Branch Press, 2004,
* ''The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions'', Olive Branch Press, 2004,
* ''Christian Faith and the Truth Behind 9/11: A Call to Reflection and Action'', Westminster John Knox Press, 2006,
* ''The American Empire and the Commonwealth of God: A Political, Economic, Religious Statement'', with John B. Cobb, Richard A. Falk and Catherine Keller, Westminster John Knox Press, 2006,
* ''9/11 and American Empire: Intellectuals Speak Out, Vol. 1'', editor, with Peter Dale Scott, Olive Branch Press, 2006,
* ''Debunking 9/11 Debunking: An Answer to Popular Mechanics and Other Defenders of the Official Conspiracy Theory (Revised & Updated Edition)'', Olive Branch Press, Paperback: 392 pages, March 2007,
* ''9/11 Contradictions: An Open Letter to Congress and the Press'', Interlink Publishing Group, March 2008,
* ''New Pearl Harbor Revisited: 9/11, the Cover-up and the Exposé'', Olive Branch Press, September 2008,
* ''Osama Bin Laden: Dead or Alive?'', Olive Branch Press, May 2009, ; Arris Books UK, July 2009,
* ''The Mysterious Collapse of World Trade Center 7: Why the Final Official Report About 9/11 Is Unscientific and False'', Interlink Publishing, September 2009, ; Arris Books UK, September 2009,
* ''Cognitive Infiltration: An Obama Appointee's Plan to Undermine the 9/11 Conspiracy Theory'', Olive Branch Press, September 2010
* ''9/11 Ten Years Later: When State Crimes Against Democracy Succeed'', Olive Branch Press, September 6, 2011,
* ''Bush and Cheney: How They Ruined America and the World'', Olive Branch Press/Interlink, 2017,
* ''The American Trajectory: Divine or Demonic?'', Clarity Press, 2018,

About the work of David Ray Griffin

* ''Reason and Reenchantment: The Philosophical, Religious and Political Thought of David Ray Griffin'', John B. Cobb - Richard Falk - Catherine Keller (eds.), Process Century Press, 2013,

References

External links

Affiliations

Center for Process Studies
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Interviews

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{{DEFAULTSORT:Griffin, David Ray
1939 births
2022 deaths
20th-century American philosophers
American political writers
American male non-fiction writers
American religious writers
Process theologians
University of Oregon alumni
American Disciples of Christ
Bushnell University alumni
Claremont Graduate University alumni
American conspiracy theorists
9/11 conspiracy theorists
Panpsychism