Dignāga (a.k.a. ''Diṅnāga'', c. 480 – c. 540 CE) was an Indian Buddhist scholar and one of the

Buddhist Buddhism ( , ), also known as Buddha Dharma and Dharmavinaya (), is an Indian religion or philosophical tradition based on teachings attributed to the Buddha. It originated in northern India as a -movement in the 5th century BCE, and ...

founders of

Indian logic The development of Indian logic dates back to the ''anviksiki'' of Medhatithi Gautama (c. 6th century BCE); the Sanskrit grammar rules of Pāṇini (c. 5th century BCE); the Vaisheshika school's analysis of atomism (c. 6th century BCE to 2nd centu ...

(''hetu vidyā''). Dignāga's work laid the groundwork for the development of

deductive logic Deductive reasoning is the mental process of drawing deductive inferences. An inference is deductively valid if its conclusion follows logically from its premises, i.e. if it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be fals ...

in India and created the first system of

Buddhist logic Buddhist logico-epistemology is a term used in Western scholarship for ''pramāṇa-vāda'' (doctrine of proof) and ''Hetu-vidya'' (science of causes). Pramāṇa-vāda is an epistemological study of the nature of knowledge; Hetu-vidya is a syste ...

and

epistemology Epistemology (; ), or the theory of knowledge, is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. Epistemology is considered a major subfield of philosophy, along with other major subfields such as ethics, logic, and metaphysics. Epis ...

(

Pramana ''Pramana'' (Sanskrit: प्रमाण, ) literally means "proof" and "means of knowledge".Georges B. Dreyfus, his philosophical school brought about an Indian "epistemological turn" and became the "standard formulation of Buddhist logic and epistemology in India and Tibet." Dignāga's thought influenced later Buddhist philosophers like

Dharmakirti Dharmakīrti (fl. c. 6th or 7th century; Tibetan: ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པ་; Wylie: ''chos kyi grags pa''), was an influential Indian Buddhist philosopher who worked at Nālandā.Tom Tillemans (2011)Dharmakirti Stanford ...

and also Hindu thinkers of the Nyaya school. Dignāga's

accepted only "perception" ( ''pratyaksa'') and "inference" ('' anumāṇa'') as valid instruments of knowledge and introduced the widely influential theory of "exclusion" (''apoha'') to explain linguistic meaning. His work on

language Language is a structured system of communication. The structure of a language is its grammar and the free components are its vocabulary. Languages are the primary means by which humans communicate, and may be conveyed through a variety of ...

, inferential reasoning and

perception Perception () is the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory information in order to represent and understand the presented information or environment. All perception involves signals that go through the nervous system ...

were also widely influential among later Indian philosophers. According to Richard P. Hayes "some familiarity with Dinnaga's arguments and conclusions is indispensable for anyone who wishes to understand the historical development of Indian thought." Dignāga was born in Simhavakta near Kanchipuram and very little is known of his early years, except that he took Nagadatta of the

Pudgalavada The Pudgalavāda (Sanskrit; English: "Personalism"; Pali: Puggalavāda; ) was a Buddhist philosophical view and also refers to a group of Nikaya Buddhist schools (mainly known as Vātsīputrīyas) that arose from the Sthavira nikāya.Williams, P ...

school as his spiritual preceptor, before being expelled and becoming a student of

Vasubandhu Vasubandhu (; Tibetan: དབྱིག་གཉེན་ ; fl. 4th to 5th century CE) was an influential Buddhist monk and scholar from ''Puruṣapura'' in ancient India, modern day Peshawar, Pakistan. He was a philosopher who wrote commentary ...

Philosophy

Dignāga mature philosophy is expounded in his ''magnum opus'', the '' Pramāṇa-samuccaya''. In chapter one, Dignāga explains his

which holds that there are only two 'instruments of knowledge' or 'valid cognitions' (''pramāṇa''); "perception" or "sensation" ( ''pratyakṣa'') and "inference" or "reasoning" ('' anumāṇa''). In chapter one, Dignāga writes:

Sensation and reasoning are the only two means of acquiring knowledge, because two attributes are knowable; there is no knowable object other than the peculiar and the general attribute. I shall show that sensation has the peculiar attribute as its subject matter, while reasoning has the general attribute as its subject matter.

Perception is a non-conceptual knowing of particulars which is bound by causality, while inference is reasonable, linguistic and conceptual.Tom Tillemans (2011)
Dharmakirti
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy This conservative epistemic theory was in contrast to the Nyaya school who accepted other means of knowledge such as ''upamāṇa'' (comparison and analogy).

Pratyakṣa

Pratyakṣa is a kind of awareness that acquires information about particulars, and is immediately present to one of the senses. This is the topic of the first chapter of the ''Pramāṇa-samuccaya.'' For Dignāga, perception is pre-verbal, pre-conceptual and unstructured sense data. In chapter two of the ''Pramāṇa-samuccaya'' he writes:

Sensation is devoid of structure. That cognition in which there is no structure is sensation. What kind of thing is this so-called structure? Attaching a name, a universal and so forth.

According to Dignāga our mind always takes raw sense data or particulars and interprets them or groups them together in more complex ways, compares them to past experiences, gives them names to classify them based on general attributes (''samanyalaksana'') and so forth. This process he terms ''kalpana'' (arranging, structuring). This cognitive process is already different from sensation, which is a simple cognition based only on the immediately present. Thus pratyakṣa is only awareness of particular sense data such as a patch of green color and the sensation of hardness, never awareness of a macroscopic object such an apple which is always a higher level synthesis. For Dignāga, sensation is also inerrant, it cannot "stray" because it is the most basic and simple phenomenon of experience or as he puts it:

"it is impossible too for the object of awareness itself to be errant, for errancy is only the content of misinterpretation by the mind."

Also, for Dignaga, ''pratyakṣa'' is mostly phenomenalist and is not dependent on the existence of an external world. It is also inexpressible and private.

Anumāṇa

''Anumāṇa'' (inference or reasoning) for Dignāga is a type of cognition which is only aware of general attributes, and is constructed out of simpler sensations. Inference can also be communicated through linguistic conventions. A central issue which concerned Dignāga was the interpretation of signs (''linga'') or the evidence (''hetu'') which led one to an inference about states of affairs; such as how smoke can lead one to infer that there is a fire. This topic of ''svārthānumāna'' (reasoning, literally "inference for oneself") is the subject of chapter two of the ''Pramāṇa-samuccaya'' while the topic of the third chapter is about demonstration (''parārthānumāna'', literally "inference for others"), that is, how one communicates one's inferences through proper argument. According to Richard Hayes, in Dignāga's system, to obtain knowledge that a property (the "inferable property", ''sadhya'') is inherent in a "subject of inference" (''paksa'') it must be derived through an inferential sign (''linga''). For this to occur, the following must be true: #The inferential sign must be a property of the subject of the inference. That is, there exists in the subject of inference a property, which is different from the inferable property and which is furthermore evident to the person drawing the inference; this second property may serve as an inferential sign in case it has two further characteristics. #The inferential sign must be known to occur in at least one locus, other than the subject of inference, in which the inferable property occurs. #The inferential sign must not be known to occur in ''any'' other loci in which the inferable property is absent. Richard Hayes interprets these criteria as overly strict and this is because he sees Dignāga's system as one of rational

skepticism Skepticism, also spelled scepticism, is a questioning attitude or doubt toward knowledge claims that are seen as mere belief or dogma. For example, if a person is skeptical about claims made by their government about an ongoing war then the p ...

. Dignāga's epistemology, argues Hayes, is a way to express and practice the traditional Buddhist injunction to not become attached to views and opinions. According to Hayes, for Dignāga, the role of logic is:

to counter dogmatism and prejudice. As a weapon in the battle against prejudice that rages in every mind that seeks wisdom--in minds of the vast majority of people who do not seek wisdom, prejudice simply takes full control without a contest-there is nothing as powerful as the kind of reason that lies at the heart of Dignaga's system of logic. For it should be clear that very few of our judgments in ordinary life pass the standards set by the three characteristics of legitimate' evidence. Taken in its strictest interpretation, none of the judgments of any but a fully omniscient being passes. And, since there is no evidence that there exist any fully omniscient beings, the best available working hypothesis is that no one's thinking is immune from errors that require revision in the face of newly discovered realities.

''Apohavada'' and language

Dignāga considered the interpretation of conventional and symbolic signs such as the words and sentences of human language to be no more than special or conventional instances of the general principles of inference or anumana. He takes up several issues relating to language and its relationship to inference in the fifth chapter of his ''Pramāṇa-samuccaya''. During Dignāga's time, the orthodox Indian Nyaya school and also Hindu Sanskrit grammarians (such as

Bhartṛhari Bhartṛhari (Devanagari: ; also romanised as Bhartrihari; fl. c. 5th century CE) was a Hindu linguistic philosopher to whom are normally ascribed two influential Sanskrit texts: * the ''Vākyapadīya'', on Sanskrit grammar and linguistic philo ...

) had discussed issues of epistemology and language respectively, but their theories generally accepted the concept of

universals In metaphysics, a universal is what particular things have in common, namely characteristics or qualities. In other words, universals are repeatable or recurrent entities that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things. For exa ...

which was rejected by most Buddhist philosophers. Influenced by the work of these thinkers as well as by Buddhist philosophers of the Sautrantika school who rejected Hindu theories of universals in favor of nominalism (''prajñapti''), Dignāga developed his own Buddhist theory of language and meaning based on the concept of "apoha" (exclusion). Hattori Masaaki explains the doctrine thus:

a word indicates an object merely through the exclusion of other objects (''anyapoha'', ''-vyavrtti''). For example, the word "cow" simply means that the object is not a non-cow. As such, a word cannot denote anything real, whether it be an individual (vyakti), a universal (jati), or any other thing. The apprehension of an object by means of the exclusion of other objects is nothing but an inference.

Works

As noted by Hayes, the difficulty in studying the highly terse works of Dignāga is considerable, because none of them have survived in the original

Sanskrit Sanskrit (; attributively , ; nominally , , ) is a classical language belonging to the Indo-Aryan branch of the Indo-European languages. It arose in South Asia after its predecessor languages had diffused there from the northwest in the late ...

and the Tibetan and Chinese translations which do survive show signs of having been done by translators who were not completely certain of the meaning of the work. This difficulty has also led scholars to read Dignaga through the lens of later authors such as

and their Indian and Tibetan interpreters as well as their Hindu Nyaya opponents. Because of this tendency in scholarship, ideas which are actually innovations of Dharmakirti and later authors have often been associated with Dignaga by scholars such as

Fyodor Shcherbatskoy Fyodor Ippolitovich Shcherbatskoy or Stcherbatsky (Фёдор Ипполи́тович Щербатско́й) (11 September (N.S.) 1866 – 18 March 1942), often referred to in the literature as F. Th. Stcherbatsky, was a Russian Indologist who, ...

and S. Mookerjee, even though these thinkers often differ. Dignāga's ''magnum opus'', the '' Pramāṇa-samuccaya'' (''Compendium of Valid Cognition''), examined perception, language and inferential reasoning. It presents perception as a bare cognition, devoid of conceptualization and sees language as useful fictions created through a process of exclusion (

Apoha Buddhist logico-epistemology is a term used in Western scholarship for '' pramāṇa-vāda'' (doctrine of proof) and ''Hetu-vidya'' (science of causes). Pramāṇa-vāda is an epistemological study of the nature of knowledge; Hetu-vidya is a syst ...

). Other works include: *'' Hetucakra'' (''The wheel of reason''), considered his first work on formal logic. It may be regarded as a bridge between the older doctrine of '' trairūpya'' and Dignāga's own later theory of ''

vyapti a Sanskrit expression, in Hindu philosophy refers to the state of pervasion. It is considered as the logical ground of inference which is one of the means to knowledge. No conclusion can be inferred without the knowledge of vyapti. Vyapti guarant ...

'' which is a concept related to the Western notion of implication. *'' Alambana-parīkṣā'', (''The Treatise on the Objects of Cognition'') and its auto commentary (''vrtti''). *''Abhidharmakośa-marma-pradīpa'' – a condensed summary of

's seminal work the Abhidharmakosha *A summary of the Mahayana '' Aṣṭasāhasrika-prajñāpāramitā sūtra'' *''Trikāla-parikṣa'', (''Treatise on the tri-temporality'') *''Nyāya-mukha'' (''Introduction to logic'').

Tradition and influence

Dignāga founded a tradition of Buddhist epistemology and reasoning, and this school is sometimes called the "School of Dignāga" or "The school of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti" (due to the strong influence of Dharmakīrti as well).Westerhoff, Jan (2018). ''The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy,'' p. 217. Oxford University Press. In Tibetan it is often called “those who follow reasoning” (Tibetan: ''rigs pa rjes su ‘brang ba''); in modern literature it is sometimes known by the

'pramāṇavāda', often translated as "the Epistemological School." Many of the figures in these were commentators on the works of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti, but some of them also wrote original works and developed the tradition in new directions. The work of this tradition also went on to influence the Buddhist

Madhyamaka Mādhyamaka ("middle way" or "centrism"; ; Tibetan: དབུ་མ་པ ; ''dbu ma pa''), otherwise known as Śūnyavāda ("the emptiness doctrine") and Niḥsvabhāvavāda ("the no ''svabhāva'' doctrine"), refers to a tradition of Buddhi ...

school, through the work of figures like Bhāvaviveka (c. 500 - c. 578), Jñanagarbha (700-760), and

Śāntarakṣita (Sanskrit; , 725–788),stanford.eduŚāntarakṣita (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)/ref> whose name translates into English as "protected by the One who is at peace" was an important and influential Indian Buddhist philosopher, particul ...

(725–788). These thinkers attempted to adopt the logical and epistemological insights of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti to defend the tenets of the Madhyamaka school. Dignāga's tradition of logic and epistemology continued in

Tibet Tibet (; ''Böd''; ) is a region in East Asia, covering much of the Tibetan Plateau and spanning about . It is the traditional homeland of the Tibetan people. Also resident on the plateau are some other ethnic groups such as Monpa, Taman ...

, where it was expanded by thinkers such as Cha-ba (1182–1251) and

Sakya Pandita Sakya Pandita Kunga Gyeltsen (Tibetan: ས་སྐྱ་པཎ་ཌི་ཏ་ཀུན་དགའ་རྒྱལ་མཚན, ) (1182 – 28 November 1251) was a Tibetan spiritual leader and Buddhist scholar and the fourth of the Five S ...

(1182–1251). Dignāga also influenced non-Buddhist Sanskrit thinkers. According to Lawrence J. McCrea, and Parimal G. Patil, Dignāga set in motion an "epistemic turn" in Indian philosophy. After Dignāga, most Indian philosophers were now expected to defend their views by using a fully developed epistemological theory (which they also had to defend).Lawrence J. McCrea, and Parimal G. Patil. Buddhist Philosophy of Language in India: Jnanasrimitra on Exclusion. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. p 5.

References

External links

Dignaga's Logic of Invention, by Volker PeckhausVidhabhusana, Satis Chandra (1907). History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic. Calcutta University.
{{DEFAULTSORT:Dignaga Atomists 6th-century Indian philosophers Buddhism amongst Tamils Buddhist logic Buddhist writers Idealists Indian Buddhist monks Indian logicians Indian scholars of Buddhism Yogacara Year of birth uncertain 5th-century Indian philosophers 6th-century Indian mathematicians 5th-century Indian mathematicians 6th-century Indian writers