Battle Of Sharon (1918)

The Battle of Sharon fought between 19 and 25 September 1918, began the set piece Battle of Megiddo half a day before the Battle of Nablus, in which large formations engaged and responded to movements by the opposition, according to pre-existing plans, in the last months of the Sinai and Palestine Campaign of World War I. The fighting took place over a wide area from the Mediterranean Sea east to the Rafat salient in the Judean Hills. Here the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) XXI Corps with the French brigade sized '' Détachement Français de Palestine et de Syrie'' attacked the Yildirim Army Group Eighth Army's XXII Corps and German Asia Corps. The Battle of Sharon extended well behind the Ottoman front lines when the Desert Mounted Corps rode through a gap in the front line across the Plain of Sharon to occupy the Esdraelon Plain. Meanwhile, during the Battle of Nablus the XX Corps attacked Nablus while Chaytor's Force held the right flank in the Jordan Valley before advancing to secure bridges and fords across the Jordan River, to continue the encirclement the defenders in the Judean Hills. Subsequently, Chaytor's Force advanced against the Fourth Army to capture Es Salt and Amman after the Second Battle of Amman.

The Battle of Sharon began on 19 September with a Western Front style bombardment during which two-thirds of the mainly ground-based heavy artillery, supported by the firepower of two destroyers pounded Ottoman positions, while one third of the heavy artillery fired creeping barrages to cover the infantry assaults. The XXI Corps infantry attacked simultaneously along the front line from the Mediterranean coast where the 60th Division, launched an attack on the western coastal section of the front line defended by the Eighth Army's XXII Corps. During this Battle of Tulkarm the 60th Division breached the front and second line trenches to eventually capture Tulkarm, the site of the Eighth Army headquarters. On their right, the main Tabsor system of trenches held by the Ottoman XXII Corps was attacked and eventually captured during the Battle of Tabsor, by the 3rd (Lahore), 7th (Meerut), and the 75th Divisions. These three divisions subsequently advanced, despite the Ottoman XXII Corps being reinforced, to capture Et Tire and Masudiye Station. In the process of the battles for Tulkarm and Tabsor the 7th (Meerut) and 60th Divisions created a gap in the front line, for the Desert Mounted Corps to ride through. They rode north and eastwards to the rear to capture the defending Ottoman armies' lines of communication. The right flank of the attacking XXI Corps was protected from the Eighth Army's Asia Corps, by the 54th (East Anglian) Division and the French Colonial ''Détachement Français de Palestine et de Syrie'' holding and pivoting on the Rafat salient, during the Battle of Arara as the infantry battle progressed.

The cavalry phase of the Battle of Sharon began as soon as the gap was made during the infantry attacks. The 5th Cavalry Division led the way north up along the Plain of Sharon followed by the 4th Cavalry Division with the Australian Mounted Division in reserve. These divisions subsequently rode across the Mount Carmel Range through two passes, to occupy the Esdraelon Plain, on 20 September. Here they cut the main Ottoman lines of communication. Units of the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions converged to capture Afulah with the 4th Cavalry Division capturing Beisan in the afternoon. The Australian Mounted Division captured Jenin along with thousands of prisoners when they captured the main line of retreat from Nablus to Damascus. On 20 September Nazareth, the site of the Ottoman Army's Yildirim Army Group headquarters, was unsuccessfully attacked by the 5th Cavalry Division. During the Battle of Nazareth the Ottoman Commander in Chief, Otto Liman von Sanders, was forced to escape. The 5th Cavalry Division captured the town the following day and several days later this division also captured Haifa and Acre following the Battle of Haifa. On the last day of the Battle of Sharon, the Australian Mounted Division attacked a German reinforced rearguard garrison at Samakh, which had been put on the alert by Liman von Sanders during his escape from Nazareth. The Australian Light Horse victory at the Battle of Samakh and the subsequent Capture of Tiberias ended the Battle of Sharon and the Battle of Megiddo. As a result of the battles of Sharon and Nablus, known collectively as the Battle of Megiddo, much territory and many prisoners were captured. The Final Offensive of the Sinai and Palestine Campaign began the day after the Battle of Megiddo ended, with the pursuit to Damascus, which was captured on 1 October.

Background

After the series of Central Powers defeats in Palestine at the end of 1917, at Beersheba, at Gaza, at Mughar Ridge, and with the loss of large areas of southern Palestine during the subsequent retreats of the Seventh and Eighth Armies back into the Judean Hills, and following the loss of Jerusalem, several of the German and Ottoman army commanders in the region were replaced. General Erich von Falkenhayn commanding the Yildirim Army Group was replaced by General Otto Liman von Sanders and Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, commander of the Eighth Army was replaced by Djevad Pasha. Cemal Pasha appointed Cemal Kucjuk Pasha to command the Fourth Army. The commander of the Seventh Army, Mustafa Kemal who had previously resigned his command, was reinstated early in September 1918.Falls 1930 Vol. 2 p. 674

The focus of the Ottoman Army's war effort in 1918 turned from Palestine to Anatolia, to the provinces and territories lost by their empire between 1877 and 1878 during the Russo-Turkish War. This change of direction was heavily influenced by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed in March 1918 which ended the war on the Eastern Front between Imperial Russia and the Central Powers. As a result, the Ottoman Army embarked on a series of territorial conquests in the Caucasus. Erzerum, which had been captured by the Russians during the Erzerum Offensive in 1916, was retaken on 24 March 1918, followed by Van on 5 April and later Batum, Kars and Tiflis. The reoccupation of these former Ottoman possessions, however, brought little strategic advantage, compared with the potential benefits of military success in Palestine.

Also in March 1918, major offensive operations in Palestine became a low priority for the British Army when the spectacular successes of Erich Ludendorff's German spring offensive in France seriously threatened the British Expeditionary Force. By July, it had become clear that this German offensive on the Western Front, had failed. In August, a brief return to the battle of attrition in the trenches ensued until the Hundred Days Offensive, coinciding with preparations for a renewal of the campaign in Palestine, began in August. General Edmund Allenby was "very anxious to make a move in September" when he expected to overrun the German and Ottoman front line, capture the headquarters of the Ottoman Seventh and Eighth Armies at Nablus and Tulkarm, advance to the Wadi el Fara road, and capture Jisr ed Damieh and Es Salt. In addition to defeating the enemy and capturing a large area of their territory, Allenby had an ulterior motive: "Another reason for moving to this line is that it will encourage both my own new Indian troops and my Arab Allies."

Before the Spring Offensive on the Western Front began, the War Office had decided to substitute British units in the EEF with British Indian Army units. The relieved British units were to be retained in Egypt as reinforcements. When the Spring Offensive was launched these British units were quickly redeployed to the Western Front.

Battlefield

By September 1918 the front line was being held by EEF infantry from close to sea level on the Mediterranean coast, about north of Jaffa and Arsuf. From this point, the line extended in the XXI Corps area about south-eastward across the Plain of Sharon, before rising up to a height of above sea level in the Judean Hills for about , into the XX Corps' battle of Nablus area. From this height the front line dropped precipitously down to below sea level, into the area patrolled by infantry and mounted infantry in Chaytor's Force. Here the line crossed the Jordan Valley in the Third Transjordan attack area, for approximately , ending east of the Dead Sea in the foothills of the Mountains of Gilead/Moab.Gullett 1919 pp. 25–6Wavell 1968 p. 205

The Seventh and Eighth Armies Ottoman defenders were supplied by two railways which crisscrossed the battlefield. A railway ran from Haifa on the Mediterranean coast to join the main railway from Istanbul to Deraa, which crossed the Jordan River before passing Beisan to enter the Judean Hills at Jenin. There were also good roads from Haifa and Damascus, via Nazareth and Jenin.Keogh 1955 p. 250 From Deraa the extensive railway network, branched into two lines. The southern line known as the Hejaz railway continued east of the Jordan River to supply the Ottoman Fourth Army headquarters at Amman, the garrisons at Shunet Nimrin and Es Salt and the forces scattered along several hundred miles of the southern Hejaz railway. The western line known as the Palestine Railways crossed the Jordan River at Jisr Majami to become the Jezreel Valley railway, as it ran southwards down the west bank of the Jordan River to Beisan, on the western edge of the Esdraelon Plain. From there it turned westward to run parallel to the front line in the Judean Hills, to Afulah. Here the railway branched again into two lines, one line running north–westerly to Haifa on the Mediterranean coast, while the main line turned south across the Esdraelon Plan to Jenin. From Jenin the railway wound through a narrow pass in the foothills to climb to Messudieh Junction in the Judean Hills where it again branched. One line continued south–eastward to Nablus the Seventh Army headquarters, located on the main road to Jenin, Nazareth and Damascus, while the second line ran westward to Tulkarm and the Eighth Army headquarters before turning south to reach railhead behind the Eighth Army' front line on the coastal plain.

The advance by the Desert Mounted Corps' cavalry would take them north on the coastal Plain of Sharon and across the Mount Carmel Range. This rugged mountain range, approximately wide, stretching northward from the Judean Hills to end just to the south of Haifa, could be crossed by the mounted force through two passes. The northern pass linked the Plain of Sharon via Abu Shuheh to arrive on the Esdraelon Plain south–east of Nazareth, while the southern pass linked the coast via Musmus to arrive at Megiddo on the plain.Keogh 1955 pp. 243–4Abu Shushe should not be confused with Abu Shushe located between Junction Station and the Jerusalem to Jaffa Road. See Battle of Mughar Ridge However, the mountainous terrain made the passes easily defended by a relatively small force which would be hard to capture. If the cavalry encountered such defences in these passes, a protracted campaign would require another large infantry attack.

The quick occupation of the Esdraelon Plain, behind the Ottoman front line, would place Desert Mounted Corps in the rear of the two Ottoman armies fighting in the Judean Hills and in control of their lines of communication. The EEF cavalry would then be in a position to quickly control three lowland areas forming a semicircle around the Ottoman Seventh and Eighth Armies in the Judean Hills, from the Plain of Sharon, across the Esdraelon Plain to the Jordan Valley. They would then control the important Ottoman communications hubs at Afulah and Beisan.

Prelude

Attacking force

The XXI Corps commanded by the British Lieutenant General Edward S. Bulfin consisted of the 3rd (Lahore), 7th (Meerut), 54th (East Anglian), 60th and 75th Divisions with the ''Détachement Français de Palestine et de Syrie.'' These units were supported by Corps Troops' Composite Regiment (one squadron Duke of Lancashire Yeomanry and two squadrons of 1/1st Herts. Yeomanry) and the artillery of the XCV, XCVI, 100th, and 102nd Brigades RGA, and the VIII and IX Mountain Brigades RGA.

The Desert Mounted Corps commanded by the Australian Lieutenant General Henry Chauvel, consisted of the 4th and 5th Cavalry and the Australian Mounted Divisions.Desert Mounted Corps's Anzac Mounted Division had been detached to Chaytor's Force. alls 1930 Vol. 2 p. 667/ref> Armoured car support was provided by Nos. 11 and 12 Light Armoured Motor Batteries and Nos. 1 and 7 Light Car Patrols from the Machine Gun Corps.DiMarco 2008 p. 328The Australian Mounted Division's 5th Light Horse Brigade was detached to the 60th Division during the first few days of battle. arver 2003 p. 232/ref>

A total of 54,800 beds were set aside in Palestine and Egypt, including convalescence and clearing hospitals. There were 22,524 hospital beds available in Egypt. A hospital centre in the Deir el Belah and Gaza area along with stationary hospitals between Kantara and Ludd, could accommodate another 15,000 casualties.Downes 1941 p. 764 By August, casualty clearing stations or clearing hospitals were located at Ludd, Jaffa and Jerusalem, supported by medical stores depots at Ludd and Jerusalem. However, the Australian Stationary Hospital at Moascar only had a few beds available. No. 14 Australian General Hospital on the Suez Canal was full of malaria cases from the Jordan Valley with the overflow being treated in the No. 31 British General Hospital at Abbassia, Cairo.

Aircraft

On 18 September, the Royal Air Force's 5th (Corps) Wing, and the 40th (Army) Wing, both headquartered at Ramle, were deployed to the area. They were responsible for cooperation with artillery and contact patrols, tactical and strategic reconnaissance, photography, escorts, offensive patrols and bombing operations. No. 1 Squadron Australian Flying Corps (AFC), No. 111 Squadron RAF and a flight of No. 145 Squadron RAF, were based at Ramle, and No. 144 Squadron RAF was based at Junction Station.

Tactical reconnaissance up to in advance of the XXI Corps was provided by corps squadrons. No. 113 Squadron RAF along with No. 21 Balloon Company were also assigned to XXI Corps, operating out of Sarona. No. 142 Squadron RAF (less one flight) assigned to the Desert Mounted Corps was also based at Sarona.See Battle of Nablus (1918) for operations of XX Corps and Chaytor's Force.

The Bristol F.2 Fighters in No. 1 Squadron (AFC) were to carry out bombing and strategic reconnaissance, as well as providing general oversight of the battlefield and reporting developments. Nos. 111 and 145 Squadrons of S.E.5.a aircraft were to conduct day-long patrols over the main Jenin aerodrome, bombing and machine gunning all targets in the area to prevent any aircraft leaving the aerodrome. No. 144 Squadron, consisting of Airco DH.9 biplane bombers, were to bomb the Afulah telephone exchange and railway station, and the Messudieh Junction railway lines as well as the Ottoman Seventh Army headquarters and telephone exchange at Nablus. The newly arrived Handley–Page O-400 heavy bomber (armed with 16 bombs) and piloted by Australian Ross Smith was to support No. 144 Squadron's bombing of Afulah.Ross Smith was apparently no relation to Charles Kingsford Smith, with whom he and his brother Keith, flew after the war

EEF deployment

On the first quarter of the front line, stretching from the Mediterranean some inland, 35,000 infantry, 9,000 cavalry and 383 guns were preparing for the attack. The remaining three-quarters of the front line across the Judean Hills to the Dead Sea, was covered by 22,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 157 artillery guns.Wavell 1968 p. 203

The XXI Corps was deployed without a corps reserve. The 60th Division was positioned on the coast with the 7th (Meerut) Division on their right, then the 75th Division with the longest frontage, was followed by the 3rd (Lahore) Division. On their right, at the eastern end of the XXI Corps and the Battle of Sharon's front line in the Judean Hills, the 54th (East Anglian) Division with the ''Détachement Français de Palestine et de Syrie,'' held the Rafat salient.Falls 1930 Vol. 2 p. 470Mention is made of four British infantry brigades in reserve. rickson 2007 pp. 146, 148/ref>

The final deployment by XXI Corps was made during 35 minutes of darkness, between the moon setting and dawn on 19 September, when each division took up a position at right angles to the direction of their frontal attack. They were deployed across a distance of about , leaving stretches of the front line which did not favour a frontal attack, uncovered. Altogether, these stretches amounted to about . The sections of the front line which were not part of the initial attack, were to be captured as the attack developed. This would occur during a planned right flanking movement, which aimed to bring all the divisions together and any enemy caught behind would be cut off.

Desert Mounted Corps' 5th Cavalry Division which was to lead the corps advance, was concentrated north-west of Sarona, from the front, with the 4th Cavalry Division waiting in orange groves east of Sarona, from the front. The Australian Mounted Division was located near Ramle and Ludd (Lydda) from the front line.Falls 1930 Vol. 2 p. 463 These divisions and their horses were camouflaged from aircraft, in olive and orange groves, where the irrigation channels were used to water the horses. James Calderwood Jones with the Lowland Brigade, Royal Field Artillery Ammunition Column, described the scene at 21:00 on 18 September 1918 in his diary: "What a mass of horses & transport. Stand–to all night, lie down with our equipment on ... horses being hooked–up to the wagons."

All movement had been restricted to nighttime, culminating in a general move forward on the night of 18/19 September. "The night ... was fine and still."Baly 2003 p. 243 The 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions were close behind the infantry, while the Australian Mounted Division moved up to Sarona. Desert Mounted Corps concentrated, with their supplies being carried in massed horse–drawn transport and on endless strings of camels, clogging every road.Wavell 1968 p. 208 The light horsemen "loaded their horses with three days' food, rations an extra water bottle slung on the saddle, and extra bandolier around the horse's neck ... the 4 kilograms weight of .303 rifle ... nits bucket close behind the right hand." "All surplus equipment had been discarded in huge dumps".Jones 1987 p. 148

Plan of attack

The Ottoman front line was to be breached quickly by massed infantry in overwhelming strength, supported by the greatest possible weight of artillery at the point in the line where the gap was to be made, while other sections of the front line would be lightly held. After the successful infantry breakthrough, the mass of cavalry would quickly move northwards, avoiding contact so as to reach the rear with as strong a force as possible. The cavalry was to enter the Esdraelon Plain, to the north, behind the Judean Hills, where reconnaissance had reported an absence of major defensive works.Wavell 1968 pp. 197–8Powles 1922 p. 233

"Concentration, surprise, and speed were key elements in the ''blitzkrieg'' warfare planned by Allenby."The issue of whether or not it was Allenby's plan has been raised in the literature. rickson 2007 pp. 141–2According to Chauvel, Allenby had already decided on his plan before the Second Transjordan attack in April/May which had confirmed the Ottoman determination to defend the Deraa railway junction and the difficulties for mounted operations in the area. ill 1978 p. 161/ref> Success depended on
* Making the infantry attack in terrain which favoured the attack and the movement of large mounted formations around the battlefieldErickson 2001 p. 200
* Sufficiently intense and creeping artillery barrages to cover the concentrated infantry attacks,
* Destroying or dominating German aircraft to stop reconnaissances revealing the weak sections of the front line and alerting Liman von Sanders to the approaching cavalry,
* Holding the territory captured by the infantry and cavalry corps which would be dependent on rations more than from their supply bases,
* Deception in the Jordan Valley disguised the move of Desert Mounted Corps from the valley to the coast. Rumours included a race meeting planned for the first day of battle.The success of Allenby's "deception operations has never been seriously questioned and the assumption that it was a major contribution to his victory detracts from the tactical accomplishments of Allenby's XXI Corps." rickson 2007 pp. 144–5/ref>
* Tactical improvements in the British artillery and infantry attack.

On a tactical level, Allenby's battle plans were similar except for the use of horses instead of tanks, to the British Fourth Army's attack on the Western Front during the Battle of Amiens six weeks before the Battle of Megiddo. The similarities include
* Before both battles, the uneven deployments were kept secret by controlling aerial reconnaissance through British air superiority.Erickson 2007 p. 150
* The initial attacks at Megiddo and Amiens were by infantry divisions deployed two brigades abreast, with a third in reserve.
* Both battles began within ten minutes of each other at 04:20 and 04:30, when two-thirds of the heavy artillery engaged in counter-battery work. At the same time a carefully coordinated short artillery barrage by the remaining one third of the available heavy artillery, "lifted and shifted," to the enemy's rear to accommodate the forward movement of the assaulting infantry.
* At both battles, as the infantry attacks developed they bypassed and isolated strong points.

At Amiens, about 400 tanks supported the Fourth Army's advance of about when they broke three German trench lines, killing or wounding 9,000 Germans and capturing over 15,000 prisoners and 374 guns.Hill 1978 p. 161Erickson 2007 pp. 150–1 At Megiddo between 19 and 22 September, Chauvel's Desert Mounted Corps cavalry exploited the infantry's success, advancing . Both the infantry and cavalry corps captured "at least 25,000 prisoners and 260 guns." The Desert Mounted Corps advance, "without the presence of a single tank was to bear a closer relationship to the ''Blitzkrieg'' than either Amiens or Cambrai".

Aircraft were also an integral part of the battle plan laid out in Force Order No. 68 when instructions were issued separately.

Defending force

By August 1918, the Yildirim Army Group's 40,598 front line infantrymen were organised into twelve divisions. They were deployed on a long front line armed with 19,819 rifles, 273 light and 696 heavy machine guns. The high number of machine guns reflected the Ottoman Army's new tables of organization, and the high machine gun component of the German Asia Corps.The only available German and Ottoman sources to the British official historian were Liman von Sanders' memoir and the Asia Corps' war diary. Ottoman army and corps records seem to have disappeared during their retreat. alls 1930 Vol. 2 pp. 494–5

The Eighth Army's 10,000 soldiers were commanded by Cevat Çobanlı. With headquarters at Tulkarm, this force was organised into two corps. The XXII Corps commanded by Colonel Refet Bey consisted of the 7th, 20th and 46th Infantry Divisions. The Asia Corps, also known as the "Left Wing Group" commanded by German Colonel Gustav von Oppen, consisted of the 16th and 19th Infantry Divisions and three German battalion groups from the German Pasha II Brigade. The Eighth Army, supported by 157 artillery guns held a line from the Mediterranean coast just north of Arsuf to Furkhah in the Judean Hills.Carver 2003 p. 231Erickson 2001 p. 196Keogh 1955 pp. 241–2Wavell 1968 p. 195 The 2nd Caucasian Cavalry Division was available for reserve duty at the operational level in the Eighth Army area.

Ottoman deployment

Two infantry divisions in the XXII Corps held the shortest frontages of the entire Yildirim Army Group. The 7th Division covered the first of trenches from the Mediterranean coast. On their left, the 20th Infantry Division covered of trenches which was the doctrinal template laid down by contemporary Ottoman tactics. The 19th Infantry Division (Asia Corps) on their left, covered , of trenches further inland. In Eighth Army reserve, the 46th Division (XXII Corps) was located behind the front line.Bou 2009 p. 192Erickson 2007 pp. 142–3

These divisions facing the EEF's XXI Corps, were highly regarded veteran Ottoman Army formations. The 7th and 19th Infantry Divisions, had fought with distinction during the Gallipoli Campaign as part of Esat Pasa's III Corps.Erickson 2007 p. 146 The 20th Infantry Division was also a highly regarded regular army division raised and stationed in Palestine. Sometimes referred to as an 'Arab' division, it had fought in the latter phases of the Gallipoli Campaign and had served for a year in Galicia on the Eastern Front fighting Imperial Russia.

The adjacent Seventh Army of 7,000 soldiers commanded by General Mustafa Kemal Pasa, was headquartered at Nablus. It was made up of the III Corps' 1st and 11th Infantry Divisions and the XXIII Corps' 26th and 53rd Infantry Divisions, supported by 111 guns. The Seventh Army held the line in the Judean Hills from Furkhah eastwards towards the Jordan Valley in the Battle of Nablus sector, against the XX Corps' two divisions commanded by Lieutenant General Philip Chetwode.

Other views of this force

The Ottoman armies were under strength, overstretched, "haemorrhaging" deserters, suffering greatly from strained lines of communication, and were overwhelmingly outnumbered by a factor of two to one, by the EEF. Their supply system was so bad in February 1918, that the normal daily ration for the Yildirim Army Group in Palestine consisted of of bread and boiled beans three times a day, without oil or any other condiment.

The fighting strength of the three Ottoman Armies' (including the Fourth Army deployed east to the Jordan River in the Third Transjordan attack area) has been estimated at 26,000 infantry, 2,000 mounted troops and 372 artillery guns. The nine infantry battalions in Asia Corps' 16th Infantry Division, had effective strengths equal to a British infantry company of between 100 and 250 men. While 150 to 200 men were "assigned" to the Asia Corps' 19th Infantry Division battalions, which had had between 500 and 600 men at Beersheba.Erickson 2007 p. 132These low numbers of soldiers in Asia Corps units, reflect the high number of machine guns in that corps. rickson 2007 p. 132/ref>

On the line stretching inland from the Mediterranean Sea where Allenby deployed 35,000 infantry, 9,000 cavalry and 383 guns they faced "only 8,000 infantry with 130 guns". The defenders were deployed in a rectangle in length and in depth, with Afulah and Beisan respectively, from Allenby's front line.The front has also been described as and long, probably included the Jordan Valley. ruce 2002 p. 208 rickson 2007 p. 142/ref>

A single trench system was relied on for defence. This inflexible defence meant that "every inch of ground had to be fought for when a more flexible system would have better suited the situation." " the point where Allenby struck the Turks themselves achieved a fair degree of concentration of their scant resources ... utthere was no secondary lines of defence nor were there any fall–back positions in the event of a retreat. The Yildirim army intended to fight it out or die."Erickson 2007 p. 143

Deception issue

Despite the lack of aerial reconnaissance, Liman von Sanders had fairly accurate knowledge on 17 September 1918, regarding the forces deployed against his Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Armies. He understood there to be five infantry divisions and a French detachment facing the Eighth Army with another two divisions facing the Seventh Army and two mounted divisions facing the Fourth Army.Erickson 2007 p. 145 Liman von Sanders was not surprised by the strength and location of the attack. He shifted all his available reserves and reinforcements to the west, not to the east. The strategically vital coastal plain was the most strongly defended sector of the front line. Here Liman von Sanders deployed his most experienced infantry divisions supported by heavy artillery.

The position of the Yildirim Army Group's heavy artillery, which should have moved eastwards if Allenby's deception plan had worked, did not change. They remained primarily in the Eighth Army sector. " ree of five Ottoman Army heavy artillery batteries (the 72nd, 73rd and 75th) available in Palestine were deployed in the Eighth Army sector. The remaining two heavy artillery ... atterieswere assigned to the adjacent Seventh Army. Significantly, no Ottoman heavy artillery ... atterieswere positioned on the Jordan River front, although an Austrian heavy artillery battery served there."

If Allenby's deception plan had been effective "Ottoman reserves should have been drawn to the Jordan River front; in fact, exactly the reverse happened," when Liman von Sander sent his only reinforcement, the 2nd Caucasian Cavalry Division to support the Eight Army. This division began arriving near Tulkarm on 16 September and the 46th Infantry Division, in reserve near the Eighth Army's headquarters at Tulkarm moved to the south–west on 17 September to a new reserve position at Et Tire, to reinforce the XXII Corps holding the coastal sector. Further, "regiments on the front line were alerted that a major attack was imminent."

It was not surprise as a result of a successful deception which caused the front line to break during the infantry attacks, but a failure to have sufficient reserves available to mount effective counterattacks.Erickson 2007 p. 153 The loss of "situational awareness caused by the breakdown in communications," was complicated by a change in the "organisational architecture" of the infantry divisions, when assault battalions were added.Erickson 2007 pp. 152–3The 3rd and 46th Assault Companies trained in German-style stormtrooper tactics had helped defeat the EEF at the First Battle of Amman during the First Transjordan attack on Amman. The 24th Division's 24th Assault Company (Seventh Army) had helped push the EEF back from Es Salt during the Second Transjordan attack on Shunet Nimrin and Es Salt. rickson 2007 pp. 133–5/ref>

Battle

Preliminary attacks

Deraa was attacked on 16 and 17 September by RAF aircraft when sections of the railway to the north and west of the Deraa junction were bombed. The railway south of Deraa was attacked on 17 September by a Sherifial Arab Column supported by British armoured cars and a French mountain battery. They left Qasr el 'Azraq