Al-Shabaab (militant Group)

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM; ar, حركة الشباب المجاهدين, translit=Ḥarakat ash-Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn, so, Xarakada Mujaahidiinta Alshabaab, ), more commonly known as al-Shabaab, is an Islamic fundamentalist Salafi jihadist group which is based in Somalia and active elsewhere in East Africa. It is actively involved in the ongoing Somali Civil War. Even though its membership incorporates Somali nationalist elements, al-Shabaab's central aims are Salafi jihadist. Allegiant to the militant pan-Islamist organization al-Qaeda since 2012, it has also been suspected of forging ties with Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Formed in the mid-2000s as part of the Islamic Courts Union, al-Shabaab came to prominence during the 2006–2009 Somalia War, during which it presented itself as a vehicle for the waging of armed resistance against the Ethiopian occupation. In subsequent years, it became a dominant force in south and central Somalia, defending large swathes of territory by fighting against the African Union Mission to Somalia and the Federal Government of Somalia, as well as the latter's transitional predecessor. The group has also frequently clashed with the Somali Sufi militia Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a as well as with the Islamic State in Somalia. Al-Shabaab gained international prominence due to its recruitment of foreign fighters, including fighters who are from Western countries. Countries which include the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates, have all designated it as a terrorist organization, and the United States has militarily intervened in order to fight against the group.

Between 2011 and 2013, a coalition which mostly consisted of East African forces, led by the Somali government, wrested a significant amount of territory from al-Shabaab, including the capital city, Mogadishu. During the same period, the group was plagued by internal conflicts over its leadership and ideological direction, which intensified when, in February 2012, al-Shabaab's leadership pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. It suffered further military losses in 2014, as a result of Operation Indian Ocean, and the killing of its emir, Ahmed Abdi Godane, in an American drone strike, as well as the killing of other leaders. For several years thereafter, al-Shabaab retreated from the major cities, but it remained influential in many rural areas, and it prioritized guerrilla and terror attacks over territorial acquisitions. It is responsible for many high-fatality attacks, including the 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya, the October 2017 Mogadishu bombings, the December 2019 Mogadishu bombing, and the October 2022 Mogadishu bombings. In addition to being active in Somalia, it is also active in other East African countries, especially in Kenya, and occasionally, it is also active in Ethiopia. Attendant to its recent resurgence, it was estimated to have increased its combat strength to between 7,000 and 12,000 fighters in February 2022.

Name

Al-Shabaab is also known as Ash-Shabaab, Hizb al-Shabaab ("Party of the Youth") and as the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRM) ( ar, حركة المقاومة الشعبية في بلاد الهجرتين). The term ''al-Shabaab'' means "the youth" in Arabic.

Organisation and structure

Origins

Although it is unclear when al-Shabaab was formed, it is understood to have originated as a wing of the Islamic Courts Union, an umbrella group which provided ''de facto'' governance in much of Somalia until the country was invaded by Ethiopia in December 2006. In 2007–8, al-Shabaab established itself as an independent actor, gaining prominence as a vehicle of armed resistance to Ethiopian occupation in the War in Somalia. Many of its early leaders and members previously belonged not only to the Islamic Courts Union but also to the older al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, a group founded on the tenets of Salafism and opposition to clannism. Many early al-Shabaab leaders had also been trained as muhajideen in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Ideology

According to the International Crisis Group, Salafism has been the core unifying principle of al-Shabaab, although this principle is not interpreted uniformly by the group's members and leaders. In particular, al-Shabaab officially and generally advocates a form of Salafi jihadism with transnational aims, linking Somali nationalist and local grievances to the plight of Muslims worldwide. Through this lens, incursions into Somalia by Ethiopia – and later by Kenya, the United States, and others – are viewed as continuous with non-Muslim acts of aggression in other Muslim-majority countries. However, this globalist framework is not universal within the group,Senate Hearing 111–678: Violent Islamic Extremism—2009
Hearing of the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. U.S. Government Printing Office. 2009. an ideological fault-line which has sometimes fostered factionalism and internal conflict. Much of al-Shabaab's Somali support base is fiercely nationalist, and sees as its primary goal the establishment of a stable Islamic state inside Somalia, or, more ambitiously, inside so-called Greater Somalia, uniting the ethnic Somali populations of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. Other domestic supporters are concerned primarily with clan-related and local objectives, and are therefore prone to infighting and shifting alliances.

However, these ideological differences can accommodate broad opposition within the group to common adversaries – notably opposition to external intervention in Somalia, often publicly expressed in quasi- Qutbist terms; and opposition to the internationally recognised Somali government, which, lacking a basis in religious (Sharia) law, is seen to lack legitimacy. Al-Shabaab hardliners broadly adhere to a Takfiri interpretation of the principle of '' al-wala' wal-bara''' (), insofar as it prescribes dissociation from non-Muslims and those perceived as apostates. The group has persecuted Somalia's small Christian minority; and, having desecrated a Sufi mosque and graves on the basis that Sufism is incompatible with Sharia, has clashed with the Sufi militias of Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a. In addition, its statements have expressed anti-Zionist sentiment, and the group claimed that its 2019 DusitD2 complex attack was retaliation against the declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Size and structure

In 2017, observers estimated that al-Shabaab comprised between 7,000 and 9,000 fighters. In 2018, the Council of Foreign Relations and United States military revised this figure downwards, estimating 3,000 to 6,000 and 4,000 to 6,000 respectively. Reflecting an apparent al-Shabaab resurgence, the United States Africa Command estimated 5,000 to 10,000 fighters two years later, in 2020. Most recently, an expert report submitted to the United Nations (UN) Security Council in early February 2022 estimated that al-Shabaab's fighting force had grown to between 7,000 and 12,000 fighters. The group is led by a shura council of senior leaders, appointed and assigned portfolios by the emir, and operates several internal security organs, including an intelligence agency, Amniyat, and a police force, Jeysh Al-Hisbah.

Membership

Especially in its early years, al-Shabaab was sometimes characterised by Somali opponents as dominated by the Hawiye clan, which is one of the largest clans in Somalia. Hawiye remain influential in the group, and, according to a 2018 analysis by the Somali Hiraal Institute, five of the ten members of the executive shura council were Hawiye, as were about 94 of the top 220 officials. However, al-Shabaab is attached to an ethos of anti-clannism, and has therefore tried to appeal to minority groups and to ensure ethnic and clan diversity among its leadership. It incorporates a relatively large contingent of foreign fighters . Rank-and-file members, though sometimes recruited by force, are also attracted by the regular pay that al-Shabaab offers and by its political propaganda. In the past, many young al-Shabaab recruits were drawn from marginalised southern clans, such as the Jareer. Many are children.

In February 2012, Fu'ad Qalaf Shongole, an al-Shabaab officer with responsibility for "awareness raising", encouraged a Somali gathering to send their unmarried daughters to fight jihad with al-Shabaab, which until then had used only male fighters. However, according to International Crisis Group, women rarely participate directly in military decision-making or operations, though they do play important roles in recruitment, intelligence, and explosives smuggling.

History

2006–09: Ethiopian incursion

Al-Shabaab rose to prominence as a relatively well-organised militia, garnering popular support from Somalis sympathetic to their opposition to the Ethiopian invasion: though the invasion had fractured the Islamic Courts Union, it galvanised nationalism on which al-Shabaab capitalised, especially for recruitment purposes. In the military arena, al-Shabaab suffered key losses during offensives by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), which was established in 2007, but during this phase "put down the roots of an enduring insurgency", establishing networks and territorial bases concentrated in rural south-central Somalia.

2009–10: Dominance in the south

Having made important territorial gains from mid-2008, al-Shabaab increasingly focused its attention on opposition to the Somali Transitional Federal Government, as the Ethiopian-led war segued into the next phase of the protracted Somali Civil War. By 2009–10, al-Shabaab controlled most of central and southern Somalia (south of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland), and it had formed administrative structures to govern territories under its control. It had particular success building relationships with local leaders in order to build cross-clan coalitions, combining its principled anti-clannism with a "pragmatic clannism": a willingness to manipulate clan networks and exploit inter-clan politics.

2011–13: Internal and external challenges

In subsequent years, however, al-Shabaab's strong position was significantly weakened, as – in the context of a famine in the region and, simultaneously, a military offensive against the group – the group experienced territorial and strategic setbacks in the military arena; an internal struggle over the group's direction and leadership; and, in response to both, a wave of high-profile defections.

Territorial losses

The group's military fortunes turned with the failure of the August 2010 Ramadan offensive – the inauguration of the Battle of Mogadishu – which resulted in heavy al-Shabaab losses. By August 2011, al-Shabaab had announced a "strategic withdrawal" from Mogadishu, although, from outlying districts, it continued to exert influence in the city and to launch deadly guerrilla attacks against AMISOM and the TFG. In October and November 2011, Kenya and Ethiopia – partnering with local militias – launched offensives against al-Shabaab strongholds: Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi on the southern front, while Ethiopia approached from the west. The group lost territory to both armies, notably losing Baidoa to Ethiopia in February 2012 and losing the port city (and revenue hub) of Kismayo to Kenya in October 2012. Military pressures on the group were sustained into 2013.

Drought, al-Qaeda, and internal struggle

Some al-Shabaab members viewed the 2010 Ramadan offensive as disastrously ill-conceived, and subsequent territorial losses galvanised internal opposition to the leadership of Ahmed Abdi Godane, who was publicly named the group's emir in December 2007. As a severe drought afflicted the region, critics, generally associated with the leadership of Hassan Dahir Aweys and Mukhtar Robow, opposed al-Shabaab's response to the resulting famine, particularly its obstruction of foreign humanitarian aid to populations in its territories . More broadly, they argued that the group's authoritarian style of governance, and use of violence, were causing the group to lose public support. Some suggested that these leadership missteps were the result of Godane's lack of clan roots, which they said led him to undervalue the lives both of civilians and of al-Shabaab fighters.

These criticisms became intertwined with a broader and pre-existing dispute over the increasingly globalist flavour of al-Shabaab's ideology – Godane was among the faction which viewed Somalia as only one battleground of global jihad. Godane's announcement in February 2012 of a merger with al-Qaeda thus also met opposition. Other senior al-Shabaab members met at a conference in Baidabo, and outlined a policy programme which diverged from Godane's: they rejected Godane's proposal to change the group's name to al-Qaeda in East Africa, and resolved to focus on domestic issues rather than global jihad. They also resolved to establish a national shura of Islamic clerics, independent of al-Qaeda control. Godane's rival Aweys declared publicly that, "Al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda are merely a small part of the larger Islamic group and al-Qaeda's ideology should not be viewed as the sole, righteous path for Islam."

In 2013, these internal rifts led to internecine violence as Godane effected what was virtually a purge of his critics. Among those killed were Ibrahim al-Afghani and three other senior commanders, executed in June; and Omar Shafik Hammami, killed in September. Journalist Simon Tisdall viewed the September 2013 Westgate shopping mall shooting in Nairobi, Kenya as a reflection of the internal power struggle, with Godane's hardline globalist faction seeking to exert its authority.

Defections

From mid-to-late 2011, and into 2012, al-Shabaab faced an increasing number of defections. It was not the first such wave of defections: in particular, in late 2009, after the Ethiopian departure from Somalia, several leaders had defected to the Somali government, citing complaints about al-Shabaab's use of suicide attacks and executions; its "false interpretations of Islam"; and its use of extortion and attitude towards foreign humanitarian aid. Such defections were viewed as strategically important to al-Shabaab's adversaries, not only for their propaganda use but because former militants could provide intelligence about al-Shabaab's combat strategy. However, according to AMISOM and the Somali government, the volume of defections in the period around 2012 was unprecedented, and indicated that al-Shabaab's cohesion and authority were deteriorating: in June 2012, the government said that around 500 al-Shabaab militants had already defected to it, and that more were doing so every day. Al-Shabaab brutalities, which alienated local populations, were again cited as central in motivating defections. On September 5 and September 22, 2012, two large contingents of al-Shabaab fighters – around 200 each time – surrendered to the government coalition in Afmadow and Garsale respectively. Another wave of defections and desertions followed Godane's 2013 purges – Aweys, for example, fled the group in mid-2013.

2013–17: Regrouping

Following its territorial losses, al-Shabaab reverted to the tactics of asymmetric warfare, launching guerrilla attacks on AMISOM and government positions and territories. Southern commander Aweys had announced this new strategy in a media interview shortly after the withdrawal from Mogadishu in August 2011. Al-Shabaab increasingly avoided direct military combat and large battles, in favour of "dictat ngthe conflict's pace by undertaking smaller ambushes at locations of its own choosing". It also developed a strategy of maintaining a "semi-territorial presence" in key regions and parts of key cities: while it no longer had exclusive and military authority over substantial territory, it retained a sporadic presence, and therefore significant influence, in many places.Nonetheless, by 2016, al-Shabaab was viewed as significantly weakened by the military campaign against it, with earlier losses compounded in 2014–15 by Operation Indian Ocean, a joint endeavour by AMISOM, the Somali government, and the United States. The Somali government claimed in October 2014 that over 700 al-Shabaab militants had surrendered since September, when it had extended an amnesty offer to them. Reports of further senior defections continued into 2015. Moreover, an American drone strike killed Godane on September 1, 2014; he was succeeded as al-Shabaab leader by Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah, who took office the same week. Other senior members were killed in armed clashes or by American drone strikes in 2014 and 2015. According to some reports, since Godane's death, the group has placed less weight on global jihad than on local grievances.

2018–2022: Resurgence

In October 2017, more than 500 people were killed by a suicide truck bombing in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab did not claim responsibility for the attack but was suspected of involvement. In December 2019, another suicide truck bomb marked the beginning of a series of al-Shabaab attacks on the capital city, which continued into 2022. Al-Shabaab also targeted American military personnel in an attack on a Kenyan base in January 2020, and in July 2022 launched an unusually bold, though short-lived, incursion into Ethiopian territory. By 2020, the group's strategy of semi-territorialism allowed it operate freely in much of rural Somalia, with its primary base in the Jubba River Valley, although air strikes against its leaders continued; and it has recently won military successes against the government. It had also expanded its operations in Puntland, prompting a military offensive by Puntland forces in 2021. As of July 2022, al-Shabaab is generally considered to be "resurgent", a situation partly enabled by a reduction in the number of American air strikes, and possibly motivated by competition with Islamic State in Somalia, which has been conducting its own expansionary campaign.

2022–present: Retaliation

In August 2022, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared "total war" against Al Shabaab during a televised address after the group carried out a deadly hotel attack in Mogadishu and also announced that the Somalia military had regained territory from al Shabaab in the central Galmudug state and Southwest state. Al By September 2022 Somali and ATMIS offensive operations against al-Shabaab, with U.S. support, would escalate to the highest point in five years. The operation, which is considered a combined Somali-ATMIS offensive, began in August 2022 and, with assistance from U.S. airstrikes, has been focused on disrupting al-Shabaab activity in Somalia's central Hiraan region. Other Al Shabaab-controlled areas in southern Somalia have been targeted by the Somalia military as well. On 20 September 2022, as the military operation progressed, a statement was released by the Somali Ministry of Information which revealed that President Sheikh would not offer any other option than surrender for al-Shabaab members.

Propaganda strategy

Although al-Shabaab has disseminated its propaganda by various media, the bulk of its engagement with Somalis in rural areas is either face-to-face or by radio broadcast. Face-to-face, the group holds seminars on Islamic jurisprudence and community meetings on such matters such as grain and livestock distribution. It operates its own radio station, Radio Andalus, mainly operated using relay stations and other equipment seized from private radio stations, including the BBC
...