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Sequential Equilibrium
Sequential equilibrium is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for extensive form games due to David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson. A sequential equilibrium specifies not only a strategy for each of the players but also a belief for each of the players. A belief gives, for each information set of the game belonging to the player, a probability distribution on the nodes in the information set. A profile of strategies and beliefs is called an assessment for the game. Informally speaking, an assessment is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if its strategies are sensible given its beliefs and its beliefs are confirmed on the outcome path given by its strategies. The definition of sequential equilibrium further requires that there be arbitrarily small perturbations of beliefs and associated strategies with the same property. Consistent assessments The formal definition of a strategy being sensible given a belief is straightforward; the strategy should simply maximize expected payoff ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
In game theory, a subgame perfect equilibrium (or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium used in dynamic games. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game. Informally, this means that at any point in the game, the players' behavior from that point onward should represent a Nash equilibrium of the continuation game (i.e. of the subgame), no matter what happened before. Every finite extensive game with perfect recall has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Perfect recall is a term introduced by Harold W. Kuhn in 1953 and ''"equivalent to the assertion that each player is allowed by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at previous moves and all of his choices at those moves"''. A common method for determining subgame perfect equilibria in the case of a finite game is backward induction. Here one first considers the last actions of the game and determ ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
In game theory, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is an equilibrium concept relevant for dynamic games with incomplete information (sequential Bayesian games). It is a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE). A perfect Bayesian equilibrium has two components -- ''strategies'' and ''beliefs'': * The strategy of a player in given information set specifies his choice of action in that information set, which may depend on the history (on actions taken previously in the game). This is similar to a sequential game. * The belief of a player in a given information set determines what node in that information set he believes the game has reached. The belief may be a probability distribution over the nodes in the information set, and is typically a probability distribution over the possible ''types'' of the other players. Formally, a belief system is an assignment of probabilities to every node in the game such that the sum of probabilities in any information set is 1. The strate ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Quasi-perfect Equilibrium
Quasi-perfect equilibrium is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for extensive form games due to Eric van Damme. Informally, a player playing by a strategy from a quasi-perfect equilibrium takes observed as well as potential future mistakes of his opponents into account but assumes that he himself will not make a mistake in the future, even if he observes that he has done so in the past. Quasi-perfect equilibrium is a further refinement of sequential equilibrium Sequential equilibrium is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for extensive form games due to David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson. A sequential equilibrium specifies not only a strategy for each of the players but also a belief for each of the player .... It is itself refined by normal form proper equilibrium. Mertens' voting game It has been argued by Jean-François MertensJean-François Mertens. "Two examples of strategic equilibrium." ''Games and Economic Behavior'', 8:378--388, 1995. that quasi-perfect equilibrium is ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Admissible Decision Rule
In statistical decision theory, an admissible decision rule is a rule for making a decision such that there is no other rule that is always "better" than it (or at least sometimes better and never worse), in the precise sense of "better" defined below. This concept is analogous to Pareto efficiency. Definition Define sets \Theta\,, \mathcal and \mathcal, where \Theta\, are the states of nature, \mathcal the possible observations, and \mathcal the actions that may be taken. An observation x \in \mathcal\,\! is distributed as F(x\mid\theta)\,\! and therefore provides evidence about the state of nature \theta\in\Theta\,\!. A decision rule is a function \delta:\rightarrow , where upon observing x\in \mathcal, we choose to take action \delta(x)\in \mathcal\,\!. Also define a loss function L: \Theta \times \mathcal \rightarrow \mathbb, which specifies the loss we would incur by taking action a \in \mathcal when the true state of nature is \theta \in \Theta. Usually we will take thi ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Proper Equilibrium
Proper equilibrium is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium due to Roger B. Myerson. Proper equilibrium further refines Reinhard Selten's notion of a trembling hand perfect equilibrium by assuming that more costly trembles are made with significantly smaller probability than less costly ones. Definition Given a normal form game and a parameter \epsilon > 0, a totally mixed strategy profile \sigma is defined to be \epsilon-proper if, whenever a player has two pure strategies s and s' such that the expected payoff of playing s is smaller than the expected payoff of playing s' (that is u(s,\sigma_) Example The game to the right is a var ...[...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium
A tremor is an involuntary, somewhat rhythmic, muscle contraction and relaxation involving oscillations or twitching movements of one or more body parts. It is the most common of all involuntary movements and can affect the hands, arms, eyes, face, head, vocal folds, trunk, and legs. Most tremors occur in the hands. In some people, a tremor is a symptom of another neurological disorder. A very common tremor is the teeth chattering, usually induced by cold temperatures or by fear. Types Tremor is most commonly classified by clinical features and cause or origin. Some of the better-known forms of tremor, with their symptoms, include the following: * Cerebellar tremor (also known as intention tremor) is a slow, broad tremor of the extremities that occurs at the end of a purposeful movement, such as trying to press a button or touching a finger to the tip of one's nose. Cerebellar tremor is caused by lesions in or damage to the cerebellum resulting from stroke, tumor, or disease such ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
In game theory, a subgame perfect equilibrium (or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium used in dynamic games. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game. Informally, this means that at any point in the game, the players' behavior from that point onward should represent a Nash equilibrium of the continuation game (i.e. of the subgame), no matter what happened before. Every finite extensive game with perfect recall has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Perfect recall is a term introduced by Harold W. Kuhn in 1953 and ''"equivalent to the assertion that each player is allowed by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at previous moves and all of his choices at those moves"''. A common method for determining subgame perfect equilibria in the case of a finite game is backward induction. Here one first considers the last actions of the game and determ ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Mixed Strategy
In game theory, a player's strategy is any of the options which they choose in a setting where the outcome depends ''not only'' on their own actions ''but'' on the actions of others. The discipline mainly concerns the action of a player in a game affecting the behavior or actions of other players. Some examples of "games" include chess, bridge, poker, monopoly, diplomacy or battleship. A player's strategy will determine the action which the player will take at any stage of the game. In studying game theory, economists enlist a more rational lens in analyzing decisions rather than the psychological or sociological perspectives taken when analyzing relationships between decisions of two or more parties in different disciplines. The strategy concept is sometimes (wrongly) confused with that of a move. A move is an action taken by a player at some point during the play of a game (e.g., in chess, moving white's Bishop a2 to b3). A strategy on the other hand is a complete algorithm for p ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Limit Point
In mathematics, a limit point, accumulation point, or cluster point of a set S in a topological space X is a point x that can be "approximated" by points of S in the sense that every neighbourhood of x with respect to the topology on X also contains a point of S other than x itself. A limit point of a set S does not itself have to be an element of S. There is also a closely related concept for sequences. A cluster point or accumulation point of a sequence (x_n)_ in a topological space X is a point x such that, for every neighbourhood V of x, there are infinitely many natural numbers n such that x_n \in V. This definition of a cluster or accumulation point of a sequence generalizes to nets and filters. The similarly named notion of a (respectively, a limit point of a filter, a limit point of a net) by definition refers to a point that the sequence converges to (respectively, the filter converges to, the net converges to). Importantly, although "limit point of a set" is synon ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Information Set (game Theory)
In game theory, an information set is a set that, for a particular player, given what that player has observed shows the decision vertices available to the player which are undistinguishable to them at the current point in the game. For a better idea on decision vertices, refer to Figure 1. If the game has perfect information, every information set contains only one member, namely the point actually reached at that stage of the game, since each player knows the exact mix of chance moves and player strategies up to the current point in the game. Otherwise, it is the case that some players cannot be sure exactly what has taken place so far in the game and what their position is. Information sets are used in extensive form games and are often depicted in game trees. Game trees show the path from the start of a game and the subsequent paths that can be made depending on each player's next move. Information sets can be easily depicted in game trees to display each player's possible move ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Bayesian Game
In game theory, a Bayesian game is a game that models the outcome of player interactions using aspects of Bayesian probability. Bayesian games are notable because they allowed, for the first time in game theory, for the specification of the solutions to games with incomplete information. Hungarian economist John C. Harsanyi introduced the concept of Bayesian games in three papers from 1967 and 1968: He was awarded the Nobel Prize for these and other contributions to game theory in 1994. Roughly speaking, Harsanyi defined Bayesian games in the following way: players are assigned by nature at the start of the game a set of characteristics. By mapping probability distributions to these characteristics and by calculating the outcome of the game using Bayesian probability, the result is a game whose solution is, for technical reasons, far easier to calculate than a similar game in a non-Bayesian context. For those technical reasons, see the Specification of games section in this article ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Extensive Form Game
An extensive-form game is a specification of a game in game theory, allowing (as the name suggests) for the explicit representation of a number of key aspects, like the sequencing of players' possible moves, their choices at every decision point, the (possibly imperfect) information each player has about the other player's moves when they make a decision, and their payoffs for all possible game outcomes. Extensive-form games also allow for the representation of incomplete information in the form of chance events modeled as " moves by nature". Finite extensive-form games Some authors, particularly in introductory textbooks, initially define the extensive-form game as being just a game tree with payoffs (no imperfect or incomplete information), and add the other elements in subsequent chapters as refinements. Whereas the rest of this article follows this gentle approach with motivating examples, we present upfront the finite extensive-form games as (ultimately) constructed here. This ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
