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Paraconsistent Logics
A paraconsistent logic is an attempt at a logical system to deal with contradictions in a discriminating way. Alternatively, paraconsistent logic is the subfield of logic that is concerned with studying and developing "inconsistency-tolerant" systems of logic which reject the principle of explosion. Inconsistency-tolerant logics have been discussed since at least 1910 (and arguably much earlier, for example in the writings of Aristotle); however, the term ''paraconsistent'' ("beside the consistent") was first coined in 1976, by the Peruvian philosopher Francisco Miró Quesada Cantuarias. The study of paraconsistent logic has been dubbed paraconsistency, which encompasses the school of dialetheism. Definition In classical logic (as well as intuitionistic logic and most other logics), contradictions entail everything. This feature, known as the principle of explosion or ''ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet'' (Latin, "from a contradiction, anything follows") can be expressed formall ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Logical System
A formal system is an abstract structure used for inferring theorems from axioms according to a set of rules. These rules, which are used for carrying out the inference of theorems from axioms, are the logical calculus of the formal system. A formal system is essentially an "axiomatic system". In 1921, David Hilbert proposed to use such a system as the foundation for the knowledge in mathematics. A formal system may represent a well-defined system of abstract thought. The term ''formalism'' is sometimes a rough synonym for ''formal system'', but it also refers to a given style of notation, for example, Paul Dirac's bra–ket notation. Background Each formal system is described by primitive symbols (which collectively form an alphabet) to finitely construct a formal language from a set of axioms through inferential rules of formation. The system thus consists of valid formulas built up through finite combinations of the primitive symbols—combinations that are formed from th ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Disjunctive Syllogism
In classical logic, disjunctive syllogism (historically known as ''modus tollendo ponens'' (MTP), Latin for "mode that affirms by denying") is a valid argument form which is a syllogism having a disjunctive statement for one of its premises. An example in English: # The breach is a safety violation, or it is not subject to fines. # The breach is not a safety violation. # Therefore, it is not subject to fines. Propositional logic In propositional logic, disjunctive syllogism (also known as disjunction elimination and or elimination, or abbreviated ∨E), is a valid rule of inference. If we are told that at least one of two statements is true; and also told that it is not the former that is true; we can infer that it has to be the latter that is true. If ''P'' is true or ''Q'' is true and ''P'' is false, then ''Q'' is true. The reason this is called "disjunctive syllogism" is that, first, it is a syllogism, a three-step argument, and second, it contains a logical disjunct ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Excluded Middle
In logic, the law of excluded middle (or the principle of excluded middle) states that for every proposition, either this proposition or its negation is true. It is one of the so-called three laws of thought, along with the law of noncontradiction, and the law of identity. However, no system of logic is built on just these laws, and none of these laws provides inference rules, such as modus ponens or De Morgan's laws. The law is also known as the law (or principle) of the excluded third, in Latin ''principium tertii exclusi''. Another Latin designation for this law is ''tertium non datur'': "no third ossibilityis given". It is a tautology. The principle should not be confused with the semantical principle of bivalence, which states that every proposition is either true or false. The principle of bivalence always implies the law of excluded middle, while the converse is not always true. A commonly cited counterexample uses statements unprovable now, but provable in the futu ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Disjunction Introduction
Disjunction introduction or addition (also called or introduction) is a rule of inference of propositional logic and almost every other deduction system. The rule makes it possible to introduce disjunctions to logical proofs. It is the inference that if ''P'' is true, then ''P or Q'' must be true. An example in English: :Socrates is a man. :Therefore, Socrates is a man or pigs are flying in formation over the English Channel. The rule can be expressed as: :\frac where the rule is that whenever instances of "P" appear on lines of a proof, "P \lor Q" can be placed on a subsequent line. More generally it's also a simple valid argument form, this means that if the premise is true, then the conclusion is also true as any rule of inference should be, and an immediate inference, as it has a single proposition in its premises. Disjunction introduction is not a rule in some paraconsistent logics because in combination with other rules of logic, it leads to explosion (i.e. everyth ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Natural Deduction
In logic and proof theory, natural deduction is a kind of proof calculus in which logical reasoning is expressed by inference rules closely related to the "natural" way of reasoning. This contrasts with Hilbert-style systems, which instead use axioms as much as possible to express the logical laws of deductive reasoning. Motivation Natural deduction grew out of a context of dissatisfaction with the axiomatizations of deductive reasoning common to the systems of Hilbert, Frege, and Russell (see, e.g., Hilbert system). Such axiomatizations were most famously used by Russell and Whitehead in their mathematical treatise ''Principia Mathematica''. Spurred on by a series of seminars in Poland in 1926 by Łukasiewicz that advocated a more natural treatment of logic, Jaśkowski made the earliest attempts at defining a more natural deduction, first in 1929 using a diagrammatic notation, and later updating his proposal in a sequence of papers in 1934 and 1935. His proposals led to diffe ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Bas Van Fraassen
Bastiaan Cornelis van Fraassen (; born 1941) is a Dutch-American philosopher noted for his contributions to philosophy of science, epistemology and formal logic. He is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at San Francisco State University and the McCosh Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Princeton University. Biography and career Van Fraassen was born in the German-occupied Netherlands on 5 April 1941. His father, a steam fitter, was forced by the Nazis to work in a factory in Hamburg. After the war, the family reunited and, in 1956, emigrated to Edmonton, in western Canada. Van Fraassen earned his B.A. (1963) from the University of Alberta and his M.A. (1964) and Ph.D. (1966, under the direction of Adolf Grünbaum) from the University of Pittsburgh. He previously taught at Yale University, the University of Southern California, the University of Toronto and, from 1982 to 2008, at Princeton University, where he is now emeritus. Since 2008, van Fraassen has taught at San ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Empirical Adequacy
In philosophy of science, constructive empiricism is a form of empiricism. While it is sometimes referred to as an empiricist form of structuralism, its main proponent, Bas van Fraassen, has consistently distinguished between the two views. Overview Bas van Fraassen is nearly solely responsible for the initial development of constructive empiricism; its historically most important presentation appears in his ''The Scientific Image'' (1980). Constructive empiricism states that scientific theories are semantically literal, that they aim to be empirically adequate, and that their acceptance involves, as belief, only that they are empirically adequate. A theory is empirically adequate if and only if everything that it says about observable entities is true (regardless of what it says about unobservable entities). A theory is semantically literal if and only if the language of the theory is interpreted in such a way that the claims of the theory are either true or false (as opposed to an ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Graham Priest
Graham Priest (born 1948) is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the CUNY Graduate Center, as well as a regular visitor at the University of Melbourne, where he was Boyce Gibson Professor of Philosophy and also at the University of St Andrews. Education Priest was educated at St John's College, Cambridge and the London School of Economics. His thesis advisor was John Lane Bell. He also holds a DLitt from the University of Melbourne. Philosophical work He is known for his defence of , his in-depth analyses of t ...[...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Information
Information is an abstract concept that refers to that which has the power to inform. At the most fundamental level information pertains to the interpretation of that which may be sensed. Any natural process that is not completely random, and any observable pattern in any medium can be said to convey some amount of information. Whereas digital signals and other data use discrete signs to convey information, other phenomena and artifacts such as analog signals, poems, pictures, music or other sounds, and currents convey information in a more continuous form. Information is not knowledge itself, but the meaning that may be derived from a representation through interpretation. Information is often processed iteratively: Data available at one step are processed into information to be interpreted and processed at the next step. For example, in written text each symbol or letter conveys information relevant to the word it is part of, each word conveys information rele ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Solomon Feferman
Solomon Feferman (December 13, 1928 – July 26, 2016) was an American philosopher and mathematician who worked in mathematical logic. Life Solomon Feferman was born in The Bronx in New York City to working-class parents who had immigrated to the United States after World War I and had met and married in New York. Neither parent had any advanced education. The family moved to Los Angeles, where Feferman graduated from high school at age 16. He received his B.S. from the California Institute of Technology in 1948, and in 1957 his Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of California, Berkeley, under Alfred Tarski, after having been drafted and having served in the U.S. Army from 1953 to 1955. In 1956 he was appointed to the Departments of Mathematics and Philosophy at Stanford University, where he later became the Patrick Suppes Professor of Humanities and Sciences. Feferman died on 26 July 2016 at his home in Stanford, following an illness that lasted three months and a stroke ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Alfred Tarski
Alfred Tarski (, born Alfred Teitelbaum;School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of St Andrews ''School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of St Andrews''. January 14, 1901 – October 26, 1983) was a Polish-American logician and mathematician. A prolific author best known for his work on model theory, metamathematics, and algebraic logic, he also contributed to abstract algebra, topology, geometry, measure theory, mathematical logic, set theory, and analytic philosophy. Educated in Poland at the University of Warsaw, and a member of the Lwów–Warsaw school of logic and the Warsaw school of mathematics, he immigrated to the United States in 1939 where he became a naturalized citizen in 1945. Tarski taught and carried out research in mathematics at the University of California, Berkeley, from 1942 until his death in 1983. Feferman A. His biographers Anita Burdman Feferman and Solomon Feferman state that, "Along with his contemporary, Kurt Gödel, he cha ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Metalanguage
In logic and linguistics, a metalanguage is a language used to describe another language, often called the ''object language''. Expressions in a metalanguage are often distinguished from those in the object language by the use of italics, quotation marks, or writing on a separate line. The structure of sentences and phrases in a metalanguage can be described by a metasyntax. Types There are a variety of recognized metalanguages, including ''embedded'', ''ordered'', and ''nested'' (or ''hierarchical'') metalanguages. Embedded An embedded metalanguage is a language formally, naturally and firmly fixed in an object language. This idea is found in Douglas Hofstadter's book, '' Gödel, Escher, Bach'', in a discussion of the relationship between formal languages and number theory: "... it is in the nature of any formalization of number theory that its metalanguage is embedded within it." It occurs in natural, or informal, languages, as well—such as in English, where words ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
