|
Generalized Expected Utility
Generalized expected utility is a decision-making metric based on any of a variety of theories that attempt to resolve some discrepancies between expected utility theory and empirical observations, concerning choice under risky (probabilistic) circumstances. Given its motivations and approach, generalized expected utility theory may properly be regarded as a subfield of behavioral economics, but it is more frequently located within mainstream economic theory. The expected utility model developed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern dominated decision theory from its formulation in 1944 until the late 1970s, not only as a prescriptive, but also as a descriptive model, despite powerful criticism from Maurice Allais and Daniel Ellsberg who showed that, in certain choice problems, decisions were usually inconsistent with the axioms of expected utility theory. These problems are usually referred to as the Allais paradox and Ellsberg paradox. Beginning in 1979 with the publicati ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Decision Theory
Decision theory (or the theory of choice; not to be confused with choice theory) is a branch of applied probability theory concerned with the theory of making decisions based on assigning probabilities to various factors and assigning numerical consequences to the outcome. There are three branches of decision theory: # Normative decision theory: Concerned with the identification of optimal decisions, where optimality is often determined by considering an ideal decision-maker who is able to calculate with perfect accuracy and is in some sense fully rational. # Prescriptive decision theory: Concerned with describing observed behaviors through the use of conceptual models, under the assumption that those making the decisions are behaving under some consistent rules. # Descriptive decision theory: Analyzes how individuals actually make the decisions that they do. Decision theory is closely related to the field of game theory and is an interdisciplinary topic, studied by econom ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Allais Paradox
The Allais paradox is a choice problem designed by to show an inconsistency of actual observed choices with the predictions of expected utility theory. Statement of the problem The Allais paradox arises when comparing participants' choices in two different experiments, each of which consists of a choice between two gambles, A and B. The payoffs for each gamble in each experiment are as follows: Several studies involving hypothetical and small monetary payoffs, and recently involving health outcomes, have supported the assertion that when presented with a choice between 1A and 1B, most people would choose 1A. Likewise, when presented with a choice between 2A and 2B, most people would choose 2B. Allais further asserted that it was reasonable to choose 1A alone or 2B alone. However, that the same person (who chose 1A alone or 2B alone) would choose both 1A and 2B together is inconsistent with expected utility theory. According to expected utility theory, the person should choose e ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Expected Utility
The expected utility hypothesis is a popular concept in economics that serves as a reference guide for decisions when the payoff is uncertain. The theory recommends which option rational individuals should choose in a complex situation, based on their risk appetite and preferences. The expected utility hypothesis states an agent chooses between risky prospects by comparing expected utility values (i.e. the weighted sum of adding the respective utility values of payoffs multiplied by their probabilities). The summarised formula for expected utility is U(p)=\sum u(x_k)p_k where p_k is the probability that outcome indexed by k with payoff x_k is realized, and function ''u'' expresses the utility of each respective payoff. On a graph, the curvature of u will explain the agent's risk attitude. For example, if an agent derives 0 utils from 0 apples, 2 utils from one apple, and 3 utils from two apples, their expected utility for a 50–50 gamble between zero apples and two is 0.5''u''(0 ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Cumulative Prospect Theory
Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) is a model for descriptive decisions under risk and uncertainty which was introduced by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in 1992 (Tversky, Kahneman, 1992). It is a further development and variant of prospect theory. The difference between this version and the original version of prospect theory is that weighting is applied to the cumulative probability distribution function, as in rank-dependent expected utility theory but not applied to the probabilities of individual outcomes. In 2002, Daniel Kahneman received the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for his contributions to behavioral economics, in particular the development of Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). Outline of the model The main observation of CPT (and its predecessor prospect theory) is that people tend to think of possible outcomes usually relative to a certain reference point (often the status quo) rather than to the final status, a phenomenon whi ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Econometrica
''Econometrica'' is a peer-reviewed academic journal of economics, publishing articles in many areas of economics, especially econometrics. It is published by Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of the Econometric Society. The current editor-in-chief is Guido Imbens. History ''Econometrica'' was established in 1933. Its first editor was Ragnar Frisch, recipient of the first Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1969, who served as an editor from 1933 to 1954. Although ''Econometrica'' is currently published entirely in English, the first few issues also contained scientific articles written in French. Indexing and abstracting ''Econometrica'' is abstracted and indexed in: * Scopus * EconLit * Social Science Citation Index According to the ''Journal Citation Reports'', the journal has a 2020 impact factor of 5.844, ranking it 22/557 in the category "Economics". Awards issued The Econometric Society aims to attract high-quality applied work in economics for publication in ''Eco ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Mark J
Mark may refer to: Currency * Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible mark, the currency of Bosnia and Herzegovina * East German mark, the currency of the German Democratic Republic * Estonian mark, the currency of Estonia between 1918 and 1927 * Finnish markka ( sv, finsk mark, links=no), the currency of Finland from 1860 until 28 February 2002 * Mark (currency), a currency or unit of account in many nations * Polish mark ( pl, marka polska, links=no), the currency of the Kingdom of Poland and of the Republic of Poland between 1917 and 1924 German * Deutsche Mark, the official currency of West Germany from 1948 until 1990 and later the unified Germany from 1990 until 2002 * German gold mark, the currency used in the German Empire from 1873 to 1914 * German Papiermark, the German currency from 4 August 1914 * German rentenmark, a currency issued on 15 November 1923 to stop the hyperinflation of 1922 and 1923 in Weimar Germany * Lodz Ghetto mark, a special currency for Lodz Ghetto. * ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Rank-dependent Expected Utility
The rank-dependent expected utility model (originally called anticipated utility) is a generalized expected utility model of choice under uncertainty, designed to explain the behaviour observed in the Allais paradox, as well as for the observation that many people both purchase lottery tickets (implying risk-loving preferences) and insure against losses (implying risk aversion). A natural explanation of these observations is that individuals overweight low-probability events such as winning the lottery, or suffering a disastrous insurable loss. In the Allais paradox, individuals appear to forgo the chance of a very large gain to avoid a one per cent chance of missing out on an otherwise certain large gain, but are less risk averse when offered the chance of reducing an 11 per cent chance of loss to 10 per cent. A number of attempts were made to model preferences incorporating probability theory, most notably the original version of prospect theory, presented by Daniel Kahneman and ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Amos Tversky
Amos Nathan Tversky ( he, עמוס טברסקי; March 16, 1937 – June 2, 1996) was an Israeli cognitive and mathematical psychologist and a key figure in the discovery of systematic human cognitive bias and handling of risk. Much of his early work concerned the foundations of measurement. He was co-author of a three-volume treatise, ''Foundations of Measurement''. His early work with Daniel Kahneman focused on the psychology of prediction and probability judgment; later they worked together to develop prospect theory, which aims to explain irrational human economic choices and is considered one of the seminal works of behavioral economics. Six years after Tversky's death, Kahneman received the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for the work he did in collaboration with Amos Tversky. (The prize is not awarded posthumously.) Kahneman told ''The New York Times'' in an interview soon after receiving the honor: "I feel it is a joint prize. We were twinned for ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Daniel Kahneman
Daniel Kahneman (; he, דניאל כהנמן; born March 5, 1934) is an Israeli-American psychologist and economist notable for his work on the psychology of judgment and decision-making, as well as behavioral economics, for which he was awarded the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (shared with Vernon L. Smith). His empirical findings challenge the assumption of human rationality prevailing in modern economic theory. With Amos Tversky and others, Kahneman established a cognitive basis for common human errors that arise from heuristics and biases, and developed prospect theory. In 2011 he was named by '' Foreign Policy'' magazine in its list of top global thinkers. In the same year his book ''Thinking, Fast and Slow'', which summarizes much of his research, was published and became a best seller. In 2015, ''The Economist'' listed him as the seventh most influential economist in the world. He is professor emeritus of psychology and public affairs at Princeton U ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Prospect Theory
Prospect theory is a theory of behavioral economics and behavioral finance that was developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 1979. The theory was cited in the decision to award Kahneman the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. Based on results from controlled studies, it describes how individuals assess their loss and gain perspectives in an asymmetric manner (see loss aversion). For example, for some individuals, the pain from losing $1,000 could only be compensated by the pleasure of earning $2,000. Thus, contrary to the expected utility theory (which models the decision that perfectly rational agents would make), prospect theory aims to describe the actual behavior of people. In the original formulation of the theory, the term ''prospect'' referred to the predictable results of a lottery. However, prospect theory can also be applied to the prediction of other forms of behaviors and decisions. Overview Prospect theory stems from Loss aversion, where the observ ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Ellsberg Paradox
In decision theory, the Ellsberg paradox (or Ellsberg's paradox) is a paradox in which people's decisions are inconsistent with subjective expected utility theory. Daniel Ellsberg popularized the paradox in his 1961 paper, “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms”. John Maynard Keynes published a version of the paradox in 1921. It is generally taken to be evidence of ambiguity aversion, in which a person tends to prefer choices with quantifiable risks over those with unknown, incalculable risks. Ellsberg's findings indicate that choices with an underlying level of risk are favored in instances where the likelihood of risk is clear, rather than instances in which the likelihood of risk is unknown. A decision-maker will overwhelmingly favor a choice with a transparent likelihood of risk, even in instances where the unknown alternative will likely produce greater utility. When offered choices with varying risk, people prefer choices with calculable risk, even when they have less ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Daniel Ellsberg
Daniel Ellsberg (born April 7, 1931) is an American political activist, and former United States military analyst. While employed by the RAND Corporation, Ellsberg precipitated a national political controversy in 1971 when he released the ''Pentagon Papers'', a top-secret Pentagon study of the U.S. government decision-making in relation to the Vietnam War, to ''The New York Times'', ''The Washington Post'' and other newspapers. On January 3, 1973, Ellsberg was charged under the Espionage Act of 1917 along with other charges of theft and conspiracy, carrying a total maximum sentence of 115 years. Because of governmental misconduct and illegal evidence-gathering, and the defense by Leonard Boudin and Harvard Law School professor Charles Nesson, Judge William Matthew Byrne Jr. dismissed all charges against Ellsberg on May 11, 1973. Ellsberg was awarded the Right Livelihood Award in 2006. He is also known for having formulated an important example in decision theory, the Ellsber ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
_(cropped).jpg "Click for more on -> Cumulative Prospect Theory")
.jpg "Click for more on -> Daniel Ellsberg")