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Trigger Strategy
In game theory, a trigger strategy is any of a class of strategies employed in a repeated non-cooperative game. A player using a trigger strategy initially cooperates but punishes the opponent if a certain level of defection (i.e., the trigger) is observed. The level of ''punishment'' and the sensitivity of the trigger vary with different trigger strategies. Trigger strategies *Grim trigger (the punishment continues indefinitely after the other player defects just once) *Tit for tat (the punishment continues as long as the other player defects) * Tit for two tats (a more forgiving variant of tit for tat) References ;Textbooks and general reference texts * Vives, X. (1999) ''Oligopoly pricing'', MIT Press, Cambridge MA (readable; suitable for advanced undergraduates.) * Tirole, J. (1988) ''The Theory of Industrial Organization'', MIT Press, Cambridge MA (An organized introduction to industrial organization) ;Classical paper on this subject * Friedman, J. (1971). A non-coope ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Game Theory
Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interactions among rational agents. Myerson, Roger B. (1991). ''Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict,'' Harvard University Press, p.&nbs1 Chapter-preview links, ppvii–xi It has applications in all fields of social science, as well as in logic, systems science and computer science. Originally, it addressed two-person zero-sum games, in which each participant's gains or losses are exactly balanced by those of other participants. In the 21st century, game theory applies to a wide range of behavioral relations; it is now an umbrella term for the science of logical decision making in humans, animals, as well as computers. Modern game theory began with the idea of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person zero-sum game and its proof by John von Neumann. Von Neumann's original proof used the Brouwer fixed-point theorem on continuous mappings into compact convex sets, which became a standard method in game theory and mathema ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Game Theory
Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interactions among rational agents. Myerson, Roger B. (1991). ''Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict,'' Harvard University Press, p.&nbs1 Chapter-preview links, ppvii–xi It has applications in all fields of social science, as well as in logic, systems science and computer science. Originally, it addressed two-person zero-sum games, in which each participant's gains or losses are exactly balanced by those of other participants. In the 21st century, game theory applies to a wide range of behavioral relations; it is now an umbrella term for the science of logical decision making in humans, animals, as well as computers. Modern game theory began with the idea of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person zero-sum game and its proof by John von Neumann. Von Neumann's original proof used the Brouwer fixed-point theorem on continuous mappings into compact convex sets, which became a standard method in game theory and mathema ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Grim Trigger
In game theory, grim trigger (also called the grim strategy or just grim) is a trigger strategy for a repeated game. Initially, a player using grim trigger will cooperate, but as soon as the opponent defects (thus satisfying the trigger condition), the player using grim trigger will defect for the remainder of the iterated game. Since a single defect by the opponent triggers defection forever, grim trigger is the most strictly unforgiving of strategies in an iterated game. In Robert Axelrod's book ''The Evolution of Cooperation'', grim trigger is called "Friedman", for a 1971 paper by James Friedman, which uses the concept. The infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma The infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma is a well-known example for the grim trigger strategy. The normal game for two prisoners is as follows: In the prisoners' dilemma, each player has two choices in each stage: # Cooperate # Defect for an immediate gain If a player defects, he will be punished for the rema ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Tit For Tat
Tit for tat is an English saying meaning "equivalent retaliation". It developed from "tip for tap", first recorded in 1558. It is also a highly effective strategy in game theory. An agent using this strategy will first cooperate, then subsequently replicate an opponent's previous action. If the opponent previously was cooperative, the agent is cooperative. If not, the agent is not. Game theory Tit-for-tat has been very successfully used as a strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. The strategy was first introduced by Anatol Rapoport in Robert Axelrod's two tournaments, held around 1980. Notably, it was (on both occasions) both the simplest strategy and the most successful in direct competition. An agent using this strategy will first cooperate, then subsequently replicate an opponent's previous action. If the opponent previously was cooperative, the agent is cooperative. If not, the agent is not. This is similar to reciprocal altruism in biology. History The term develo ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Folk Theorem (game Theory)
In game theory, folk theorems are a class of theorems describing an abundance of Nash equilibrium payoff profiles in repeated games . The original Folk Theorem concerned the payoffs of all the Nash equilibria of an infinitely repeated game. This result was called the Folk Theorem because it was widely known among game theorists in the 1950s, even though no one had published it. Friedman's (1971) Theorem concerns the payoffs of certain subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPE) of an infinitely repeated game, and so strengthens the original Folk Theorem by using a stronger equilibrium concept: subgame-perfect Nash equilibria rather than Nash equilibria. The Folk Theorem suggests that if the players are patient enough and far-sighted (i.e. if the discount factor \delta \to 1 ), then repeated interaction can result in virtually any average payoff in an SPE equilibrium. "Virtually any" is here technically defined as "feasible" and "individually rational". For example, in the one-shot Pr ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
