Succinct Game
In algorithmic game theory, a succinct game or a succinctly representable game is a game which may be represented in a size much smaller than its normal form representation. Without placing constraints on player utilities, describing a game of n players, each facing s strategies, requires listing ns^n utility values. Even trivial algorithms are capable of finding a Nash equilibrium in a time polynomial in the length of such a large input. A succinct game is of ''polynomial type'' if in a game represented by a string of length ''n'' the number of players, as well as the number of strategies of each player, is bounded by a polynomial in ''n'' (a formal definition, describing succinct games as a computational problem, is given by Papadimitriou & Roughgarden 2008). Types of succinct games Graphical games Graphical games are games in which the utilities of each player depends on the actions of very few other players. If d is the greatest number of players by whose actions any si ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Algorithmic Game Theory
Algorithmic game theory (AGT) is an interdisciplinary field at the intersection of game theory and computer science, focused on understanding and designing algorithms for environments where multiple strategic agents interact. This research area combines computational thinking with economic principles to address challenges that emerge when algorithmic inputs come from self-interested participants. In traditional algorithm design, inputs are assumed to be fixed and reliable. However, in many real-world applications—such as online auctions, internet routing, digital advertising, and resource allocation systems—inputs are provided by multiple independent agents who may strategically misreport information to manipulate outcomes in their favor. AGT provides frameworks to analyze and design systems that remain effective despite such strategic behavior. The field can be approached from two complementary perspectives: * ''Analysis'': Evaluating existing algorithms and systems throu ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Symmetric Equilibrium
In game theory, a symmetric equilibrium is an equilibrium where all players use the same strategy (possibly mixed) in the equilibrium. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game pictured to the right, the only Nash equilibrium is (''D'', ''D''). Since both players use the same strategy, the equilibrium is symmetric. Symmetric equilibria have important properties. Only symmetric equilibria can be evolutionarily stable states in single population models. See also *Symmetric game In game theory, a symmetric game is a game where the payoffs for playing a particular strategy depend only on the other strategies employed, not on who is playing them. If one can change the identities of the players without changing the payoff t ... References {{DEFAULTSORT:Symmetric Equilibrium Game theory equilibrium concepts ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Boolean Circuit
In computational complexity theory and circuit complexity, a Boolean circuit is a mathematical model for combinational digital logic circuits. A formal language can be decided by a family of Boolean circuits, one circuit for each possible input length. Boolean circuits are defined in terms of the logic gates they contain. For example, a circuit might contain binary AND and OR gates and unary NOT gates, or be entirely described by binary NAND gates. Each gate corresponds to some Boolean function that takes a fixed number of bits as input and outputs a single bit. Boolean circuits provide a model for many digital components used in computer engineering, including multiplexers, adders, and arithmetic logic units, but they exclude sequential logic. They are an abstraction that omits many aspects relevant to designing real digital logic circuits, such as metastability, fanout, glitches, power consumption, and propagation delay variability. Formal definition In givi ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Turing Machine
A Turing machine is a mathematical model of computation describing an abstract machine that manipulates symbols on a strip of tape according to a table of rules. Despite the model's simplicity, it is capable of implementing any computer algorithm. The machine operates on an infinite memory tape divided into discrete mathematics, discrete cells, each of which can hold a single symbol drawn from a finite set of symbols called the Alphabet (formal languages), alphabet of the machine. It has a "head" that, at any point in the machine's operation, is positioned over one of these cells, and a "state" selected from a finite set of states. At each step of its operation, the head reads the symbol in its cell. Then, based on the symbol and the machine's own present state, the machine writes a symbol into the same cell, and moves the head one step to the left or the right, or halts the computation. The choice of which replacement symbol to write, which direction to move the head, and whet ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Potential Game
In game theory, a game is said to be a potential game if the incentive of all players to change their strategy can be expressed using a single global function called the potential function. The concept originated in a 1996 paper by Dov Monderer and Lloyd Shapley. The properties of several types of potential games have since been studied. Games can be either ''ordinal'' or ''cardinal'' potential games. In cardinal games, the difference in individual payoffs for each player from individually changing one's strategy, other things equal, has to have the same value as the difference in values for the potential function. In ordinal games, only the signs of the differences have to be the same. The potential function is a useful tool to analyze equilibrium properties of games, since the incentives of all players are mapped into one function, and the set of pure Nash equilibria can be found by locating the local optima of the potential function. Convergence and finite-time convergence of ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Game Without A Value
In the mathematical theory of games, in particular the study of zero-sum continuous games, not every game has a minimax value. This is the expected value to one of the players when both play a perfect strategy (which is to choose from a particular PDF). This article gives an example of a zero-sum game that has no value. It is due to Sion and Wolfe. Zero-sum games with a finite number of pure strategies are known to have a minimax value (originally proved by John von Neumann) but this is not necessarily the case if the game has an infinite set of strategies. There follows a simple example of a game with no minimax value. The existence of such zero-sum games is interesting because many of the results of game theory become inapplicable if there is no minimax value. The game Players I and II choose numbers x and y respectively, between 0 and 1. The payoff to player I is K(x,y)= \begin -1 & \text x [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Correlated Equilibrium
In game theory, a correlated equilibrium is a solution concept that is more general than the well known Nash equilibrium. It was first discussed by mathematician Robert Aumann in 1974. The idea is that each player chooses their action according to their private observation of the value of the same public signal. A strategy assigns an action to every possible observation a player can make. If no player would want to deviate from their strategy (assuming the others also don't deviate), the distribution from which the signals are drawn is called a correlated equilibrium. Formal definition An N-player strategic game \displaystyle (N,\,\) is characterized by an action set A_i and utility function u_i for each player When player i chooses strategy a_i \in A_i and the remaining players choose a strategy profile described by the a_, then player i's utility is \displaystyle u_i(a_i,a_). A ''strategy modification'' for player i is a function \phi_i\colon A_i \to A_i. That is, \phi_i te ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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John Von Neumann
John von Neumann ( ; ; December 28, 1903 – February 8, 1957) was a Hungarian and American mathematician, physicist, computer scientist and engineer. Von Neumann had perhaps the widest coverage of any mathematician of his time, integrating Basic research, pure and Applied science#Applied research, applied sciences and making major contributions to many fields, including mathematics, physics, economics, computing, and statistics. He was a pioneer in building the mathematical framework of quantum physics, in the development of functional analysis, and in game theory, introducing or codifying concepts including Cellular automaton, cellular automata, the Von Neumann universal constructor, universal constructor and the Computer, digital computer. His analysis of the structure of self-replication preceded the discovery of the structure of DNA. During World War II, von Neumann worked on the Manhattan Project. He developed the mathematical models behind the explosive lense ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Minimax Theorem
In the mathematical area of game theory and of convex optimization, a minimax theorem is a theorem that claims that : \max_ \min_ f(x,y) = \min_ \max_f(x,y) under certain conditions on the sets X and Y and on the function f. It is always true that the left-hand side is at most the right-hand side ( max–min inequality) but equality only holds under certain conditions identified by minimax theorems. The first theorem in this sense is von Neumann's minimax theorem about two-player zero-sum games published in 1928, which is considered the starting point of game theory. Von Neumann is quoted as saying "''As far as I can see, there could be no theory of games ... without that theorem ... I thought there was nothing worth publishing until the Minimax Theorem was proved''". Since then, several generalizations and alternative versions of von Neumann's original theorem have appeared in the literature. Bilinear functions and zero-sum games Von Neumann's original theorem was motivated by ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Zero-sum Game
Zero-sum game is a Mathematical model, mathematical representation in game theory and economic theory of a situation that involves two competition, competing entities, where the result is an advantage for one side and an equivalent loss for the other. In other words, player one's gain is equivalent to player two's loss, with the result that the net improvement in benefit of the game is zero. If the total gains of the participants are added up, and the total losses are subtracted, they will sum to zero. Thus, Fair cake-cutting, cutting a cake, where taking a more significant piece reduces the amount of cake available for others as much as it increases the amount available for that taker, is a zero-sum game if marginal utility, all participants value each unit of cake equally. Other examples of zero-sum games in daily life include games like poker, chess, sport and Contract bridge, bridge where one person gains and another person loses, which results in a zero-net benefit for every ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Strong NP-completeness
In computational complexity, strong NP-completeness is a property of computational problems that is a special case of NP-completeness. A general computational problem may have numerical parameters. For example, the input to the bin packing problem is a list of objects of specific sizes and a size for the bins that must contain the objects—these object sizes and bin size are numerical parameters. A problem is said to be strongly NP-complete (NP-complete in the strong sense), if it remains NP-complete even when all of its numerical parameters are bounded by a polynomial in the length of the input. A problem is said to be strongly NP-hard if a strongly NP-complete problem has a pseudo-polynomial reduction to it. This pseudo-polynomial reduction is more restrictive than the usual poly-time reduction used for NP-hardness proofs. In special, the pseudo-polynomial reduction cannot output a numerical parameter that is not polinomially bounded by the size and value of numbers in the input ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |
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Polymatrix Game
In algorithmic game theory, a succinct game or a succinctly representable game is a game which may be represented in a size much smaller than its normal form representation. Without placing constraints on player utilities, describing a game of n players, each facing s strategies, requires listing ns^n utility values. Even trivial algorithms are capable of finding a Nash equilibrium in a time polynomial in the length of such a large input. A succinct game is of ''polynomial type'' if in a game represented by a string of length ''n'' the number of players, as well as the number of strategies of each player, is bounded by a polynomial in ''n'' (a formal definition, describing succinct games as a computational problem, is given by Papadimitriou & Roughgarden 2008). Types of succinct games Graphical games Graphical games are games in which the utilities of each player depends on the actions of very few other players. If d is the greatest number of players by whose actions any sin ... [...More Info...]       [...Related Items...]     OR:     [Wikipedia]   [Google]   [Baidu]   |