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Security Parameter
In cryptography, a security parameter is a way of measuring of how "hard" it is for an adversary to break a cryptographic scheme. There are two main types of security parameter: ''computational'' and ''statistical'', often denoted by \kappa and \lambda, respectively. Roughly speaking, the computational security parameter is a measure for the input size of the computational problem on which the cryptographic scheme is based, which determines its computational complexity, whereas the statistical security parameter is a measure of the probability with which an adversary can break the scheme (whatever that means for the protocol). Security parameters are usually expressed in unary representation - i.e. \kappa is expressed as a string of \kappa 1s, \kappa=1\cdots 1, conventionally written as 1^\kappa - so that the time complexity of the cryptographic algorithm is polynomial in the size of the input. Computational security The security of cryptographic primitives relies on the hard ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Cryptography
Cryptography, or cryptology (from "hidden, secret"; and ''graphein'', "to write", or ''-logy, -logia'', "study", respectively), is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of Adversary (cryptography), adversarial behavior. More generally, cryptography is about constructing and analyzing Communication protocol, protocols that prevent third parties or the public from reading private messages. Modern cryptography exists at the intersection of the disciplines of mathematics, computer science, information security, electrical engineering, digital signal processing, physics, and others. Core concepts related to information security (confidentiality, data confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation) are also central to cryptography. Practical applications of cryptography include electronic commerce, Smart card#EMV, chip-based payment cards, digital currencies, password, computer passwords, and military communications. ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Total Variation Distance
In probability theory, the total variation distance is a statistical distance between probability distributions, and is sometimes called the statistical distance, statistical difference or variational distance. Definition Consider a measurable space (\Omega, \mathcal) and probability measures P and Q defined on (\Omega, \mathcal). The total variation distance between P and Q is defined as :\delta(P,Q)=\sup_\left, P(A)-Q(A)\. This is the largest absolute difference between the probabilities that the two probability distributions assign to the same event. Properties The total variation distance is an F-divergence, ''f''-divergence and an integral probability metric. Relation to other distances The total variation distance is related to the Kullback–Leibler divergence by Pinsker's inequality, Pinsker’s inequality: :\delta(P,Q) \le \sqrt. One also has the following inequality, due to Bretagnolle–Huber inequality, Bretagnolle and Huber (see also ), which has the advantage ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Key Size
In cryptography, key size or key length refers to the number of bits in a key used by a cryptographic algorithm (such as a cipher). Key length defines the upper-bound on an algorithm's security (i.e. a logarithmic measure of the fastest known attack against an algorithm), because the security of all algorithms can be violated by brute-force attacks. Ideally, the lower-bound on an algorithm's security is by design equal to the key length (that is, the algorithm's design does not detract from the degree of security inherent in the key length). Most symmetric-key algorithms are designed to have security equal to their key length. However, after design, a new attack might be discovered. For instance, Triple DES was designed to have a 168-bit key, but an attack of complexity 2112 is now known (i.e. Triple DES now only has 112 bits of security, and of the 168 bits in the key the attack has rendered 56 'ineffective' towards security). Nevertheless, as long as the security (understood ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Computationally Bounded Adversary
In information theory, the computationally bounded adversary problem is a different way of looking at the problem of sending data over a noisy channel. In previous models the best that could be done was ensuring correct decoding for up to ''d''/2 errors, where d was the Hamming distance of the code. The problem with doing it this way is that it does not take into consideration the actual amount of computing power available to the adversary. Rather, it only concerns itself with how many bits of a given code word can change and still have the message decode properly. In the computationally bounded adversary model the channel – the adversary – is restricted to only being able to perform a reasonable amount of computation to decide which bits of the code word need to change. In other words, this model does not need to consider how many errors can possibly be handled, but only how many errors could possibly be introduced given a reasonable amount of computing power on the part of the ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Universal Composability
The framework of universal composability (UC) is a general-purpose model for the analysis of cryptographic protocols. It guarantees very strong security properties. Protocols remain secure even if arbitrarily composed with other instances of the same or other protocols. Security is defined in the sense of protocol emulation. Intuitively, a protocol is said to emulate another one, if no environment (observer) can distinguish the executions. Literally, the protocol may simulate the other protocol (without having access to the code). The notion of security is derived by implication. Assume a protocol P_1 is secure per definition. If another protocol P_2 emulates protocol P_1 such that no environment tells apart the emulation from the execution of the protocol, then the emulated protocol P_2 is as secure as protocol P_1. Ideal functionality An ideal functionality is a protocol in which a trusted party that can communicate over perfectly secure channels with all protocol participants ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Zero Knowledge Proof
In cryptography, a zero-knowledge proof (also known as a ZK proof or ZKP) is a protocol in which one party (the prover) can convince another party (the verifier) that some given statement is true, without conveying to the verifier any information ''beyond'' the mere fact of that statement's truth. The intuition underlying zero-knowledge proofs is that it is trivial to prove possession of the relevant information simply by revealing it; the hard part is to prove this possession without revealing this information (or any aspect of it whatsoever). In light of the fact that one should be able to generate a proof of some statement ''only'' when in possession of certain secret information connected to the statement, the verifier, even after having become convinced of the statement's truth, should nonetheless remain unable to prove the statement to further third parties. Zero-knowledge proofs can be interactive, meaning that the prover and verifier exchange messages according to some pro ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Ciphertext
In cryptography, ciphertext or cyphertext is the result of encryption performed on plaintext using an algorithm, called a cipher. Ciphertext is also known as encrypted or encoded information because it contains a form of the original plaintext that is unreadable by a human or computer without the proper cipher to decrypt it. This process prevents the loss of sensitive information via hacking. Decryption, the inverse of encryption, is the process of turning ciphertext into readable plaintext. Ciphertext is not to be confused with codetext because the latter is a result of a code, not a cipher. Conceptual underpinnings Let m\! be the plaintext message that Alice wants to secretly transmit to Bob and let E_k\! be the encryption cipher, where _k\! is a secret key, cryptographic key. Alice must first transform the plaintext into ciphertext, c\!, in order to securely send the message to Bob, as follows: : c = E_k(m). \! In a symmetric-key system, Bob knows Alice's encryption key. ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Encryption
In Cryptography law, cryptography, encryption (more specifically, Code, encoding) is the process of transforming information in a way that, ideally, only authorized parties can decode. This process converts the original representation of the information, known as plaintext, into an alternative form known as ciphertext. Despite its goal, encryption does not itself prevent interference but denies the intelligible content to a would-be interceptor. For technical reasons, an encryption scheme usually uses a pseudo-random encryption Key (cryptography), key generated by an algorithm. It is possible to decrypt the message without possessing the key but, for a well-designed encryption scheme, considerable computational resources and skills are required. An authorized recipient can easily decrypt the message with the key provided by the originator to recipients but not to unauthorized users. Historically, various forms of encryption have been used to aid in cryptography. Early encryption ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Public-key Encryption
Public-key cryptography, or asymmetric cryptography, is the field of cryptographic systems that use pairs of related keys. Each key pair consists of a public key and a corresponding private key. Key pairs are generated with cryptographic algorithms based on mathematical problems termed one-way functions. Security of public-key cryptography depends on keeping the private key secret; the public key can be openly distributed without compromising security. There are many kinds of public-key cryptosystems, with different security goals, including digital signature, Diffie–Hellman key exchange, public-key key encapsulation, and public-key encryption. Public key algorithms are fundamental security primitives in modern cryptosystems, including applications and protocols that offer assurance of the confidentiality and authenticity of electronic communications and data storage. They underpin numerous Internet standards, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS), SSH, S/MIME, and P ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Negligible Function
In mathematics, a negligible function is a function \mu:\mathbb\to\mathbb such that for every positive integer ''c'' there exists an integer ''N''''c'' such that for all ''x'' > ''N''''c'', :, \mu(x), 0 such that for all ''x'' > ''N''poly : , \mu(x), 0, there exists a positive number \delta>0 such that , x-x_0, N_\varepsilon ::, \mu(x), 0 by the functions 1/x^c where c>0 or by 1/\operatorname(x) where \operatorname(x) is a positive polynomial. This leads to the definitions of negligible functions given at the top of this article. Since the constants \varepsilon>0 can be expressed as 1/\operatorname(x) with a constant polynomial, this shows that infinitesimal functions are a superset of negligible functions. Use in cryptography In complexity-based modern cryptography, a security scheme is ''provably secure'' if the probability of security failure (e.g., inverting a one-way function, distinguishing cryptographically strong pseudorandom bits from truly ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
RSA (cryptosystem)
The RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman) cryptosystem is a public-key cryptosystem, one of the oldest widely used for secure data transmission. The initialism "RSA" comes from the surnames of Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman, who publicly described the algorithm in 1977. An equivalent system was developed secretly in 1973 at Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the British signals intelligence agency, by the English mathematician Clifford Cocks. That system was declassified in 1997. In a public-key cryptosystem, the encryption key is public and distinct from the decryption key, which is kept secret (private). An RSA user creates and publishes a public key based on two large prime numbers, along with an auxiliary value. The prime numbers are kept secret. Messages can be encrypted by anyone via the public key, but can only be decrypted by someone who knows the private key. The security of RSA relies on the practical difficulty of factoring the product o ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Adversary (cryptography)
In cryptography, an adversary (rarely opponent, enemy) is an entity whose aim is to prevent the users of the cryptosystem from achieving their goal (primarily privacy, integrity, and availability of data), often with malicious intent. An adversary's efforts might take the form of attempting to discover secret data, corrupting some of the data in the system, spoofing the identity of a message sender or receiver, or forcing system downtime. Actual adversaries, as opposed to idealized ones, are referred to as ''attackers''. The former term predominates in the cryptographic and the latter in the computer security literature. Eavesdropper Eve, malicious attacker Mallory, opponent Oscar, and intruder Trudy are all adversarial characters widely used in both types of texts. This notion of an adversary helps both intuitive and formal reasoning about cryptosystems by casting security analysis of cryptosystems as a 'game' between the users and a ''centrally co-ordinated'' enemy. The notion ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
