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Participatory Budgeting Algorithm
A participatory budgeting (PB) algorithm is an algorithm for implementing participatory budgeting. The inputs to a PB algorithm are: a list of possible ''projects'' that require funding, the total available ''budget'' for funding the projects, and the ''preferences of voters'' over the project. The output of a PB algorithm is a partition of budget among the projects - determining how much money to allocate to each project. A PB algorithm can treat the projects as either ''divisible'' or ''indivisible'': * A ''divisible'' PB algorithm may allocate any amount of money to any project, as long as the sum of allocations equals the budget. It is suited for projects in which each additional dollar can be used effectively, such as charity donations. * An ''indivisible'' PB algorithm takes, as additional inputs, the costs of the projects. It returns a subset of the projects, such that the total cost of the selected projects does not exceed the budget. Each selected project is allocated its ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Participatory Budgeting
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a type of citizen sourcing in which ordinary people decide how to allocate part of a municipal or public budget through a process of democratic deliberation and decision-making. Participatory budgeting allows citizens or residents of a locality to identify, discuss, and prioritize public spending projects, and gives them the power to make real decisions about how money is spent. Participatory budgeting processes are typically designed to involve those left out of traditional methods of public engagement, such as low-income residents, non-citizens, and youth. A comprehensive case study of eight municipalities in Brazil analyzing the successes and failures of participatory budgeting has suggested that it often results in more equitable public spending, greater government transparency and accountability, increased levels of public participation (especially by marginalized or poorer residents), and democratic and citizenship learning. Participatory ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Electoral Systems
An electoral system or voting system is a set of rules that determine how elections and referendums are conducted and how their results are determined. Electoral systems are used in politics to elect governments, while non-political elections may take place in business, non-profit organisations and informal organisations. These rules govern all aspects of the voting process: when elections occur, who is allowed to vote, who can stand as a candidate, how ballots are marked and cast, how the ballots are counted, how votes translate into the election outcome, limits on campaign spending, and other factors that can affect the result. Political electoral systems are defined by constitutions and electoral laws, are typically conducted by election commissions, and can use multiple types of elections for different offices. Some electoral systems elect a single winner to a unique position, such as prime minister, president or governor, while others elect multiple winners, such as memb ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Multiwinner Voting
Multiwinner voting, also called multiple-winner elections or committee voting or committee elections, is an electoral system in which multiple candidates are elected. The number of elected candidates is usually fixed in advance. For example, it can be the number of seats in a country's parliament, or the required number of members in a committee. There are many scenarios in which multiwinner voting is useful. They can be broadly classified into three classes, based on the main objective in electing the committee: # Excellence. Here, each voter is an expert, and each vote expresses his/her opinion about which candidate/s is "better" for a certain task. The goal is to find the "best" candidates. An example application is shortlisting: selecting, from a list of candidate employees, a small set of finalists, who will proceed to the final stage of evaluation (e.g. using an interview). Here, each candidate is evaluated independently of the other candidates. If two candidates are simila ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Resource Monotonicity
Resource monotonicity (RM; aka aggregate monotonicity) is a principle of fair division. It says that, if there are more resources to share, then all agents should be weakly better off; no agent should lose from the increase in resources. The RM principle has been studied in various division problems. Allocating divisible resources Single homogeneous resource, general utilities Suppose society has m units of some homogeneous divisible resource, such as water or flour. The resource should be divided among n agents with different utilities. The utility of agent i is represented by a function u_i; when agent i receives y_i units of resource, he derives from it a utility of u_i(y_i). Society has to decide how to divide the resource among the agents, i.e, to find a vector y_1,\dots,y_n such that: y_1+\cdots+y_n = m. Two classic allocation rules are the egalitarian rule - aiming to equalize the utilities of all agents (equivalently: maximize the minimum utility), and the utilitari ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Strategyproofness
In game theory, an asymmetric game where players have private information is said to be strategy-proof or strategyproof (SP) if it is a weakly-dominant strategy for every player to reveal his/her private information, i.e. given no information about what the others do, you fare best or at least not worse by being truthful. SP is also called truthful or dominant-strategy-incentive-compatible (DSIC), to distinguish it from other kinds of incentive compatibility. An SP game is not always immune to collusion, but its robust variants are; with group strategyproofness no group of people can collude to misreport their preferences in a way that makes every member better off, and with strong group strategyproofness no group of people can collude to misreport their preferences in a way that makes at least one member of the group better off without making any of the remaining members worse off. Examples Typical examples of SP mechanisms are majority voting between two alternatives, second- ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Pareto Optimal
Pareto efficiency or Pareto optimality is a situation where no action or allocation is available that makes one individual better off without making another worse off. The concept is named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), Italian civil engineer and economist, who used the concept in his studies of economic efficiency and income distribution. The following three concepts are closely related: * Given an initial situation, a Pareto improvement is a new situation where some agents will gain, and no agents will lose. * A situation is called Pareto-dominated if there exists a possible Pareto improvement. * A situation is called Pareto-optimal or Pareto-efficient if no change could lead to improved satisfaction for some agent without some other agent losing or, equivalently, if there is no scope for further Pareto improvement. The Pareto front (also called Pareto frontier or Pareto set) is the set of all Pareto-efficient situations. Pareto originally used the word "optimal" for th ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Core (game Theory)
In cooperative game theory, the core is the set of feasible allocations that cannot be improved upon by a subset (a ''coalition'') of the economy's agents. A coalition is said to ''improve upon'' or ''block'' a feasible allocation if the members of that coalition are better off under another feasible allocation that is identical to the first except that every member of the coalition has a different consumption bundle that is part of an aggregate consumption bundle that can be constructed from publicly available technology and the initial endowments of each consumer in the coalition. An allocation is said to have the ''core property'' if there is no coalition that can improve upon it. The core is the set of all feasible allocations with the core property. Origin The idea of the core already appeared in the writings of , at the time referred to as the ''contract curve''. Even though von Neumann and Morgenstern considered it an interesting concept, they only worked with zero-sum ga ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Method Of Equal Shares
The Method of Equal Shares (in early papers the method has been also referred to as Rule X, but since 2022 the authors started using the name "method of equal shares") is a proportional method of counting ballots that applies to participatory budgeting to committee elections and to simultaneous public decisions. It can be used, when the voters vote via approval ballots, ranked ballots or cardinal ballots. If each voter has equal entitlement and each voter submits approval preferences, the Method of Equal Shares is a specific rule in a more general class of rules called PB-EAR that was designed earlier in 2019 by Aziz and Lee for ordinal preferences (that include approval ballots). Motivation The method is an alternative to the knapsack algorithm which is used by most cities even though it is a disproportional method. For example, if 51% of the population support 10 red projects and 49% support 10 blue projects, and the money suffices only for 10 projects, the knapsack budge ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Lars Edvard Phragmén
Lars Edvard Phragmén (2 September 1863 Örebro – 13 March 1937) was a Swedish mathematician. The son of a college professor, he studied at Uppsala then Stockholm, graduating from Uppsala in 1889. He became professor at Stockholm in 1892, after Sofia Kovalevskaia. He left Uppsala less than a year after, becoming professor Mittag-Leffler's assistant at Stockholm. In 1884, he provided a new proof of the Cantor-Bendixson theorem. His work focused on elliptic functions and complex analysis. His most famous result is the extension of Liouville's theorem to analytic functions on a sector. A first version was proposed by Phragmén, then improved by the Finnish mathematician Ernst Lindelöf. They jointly published this last version,« ''Sur une extension d'un principe classique de l'analyse et sur quelques propriétés des fonctions monogènes dans le voisinage d'un point singulier'' », Acta Math. 31, 1908 known as the Phragmén–Lindelöf principle. He left the university in ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Greedy Algorithm
A greedy algorithm is any algorithm that follows the problem-solving heuristic of making the locally optimal choice at each stage. In many problems, a greedy strategy does not produce an optimal solution, but a greedy heuristic can yield locally optimal solutions that approximate a globally optimal solution in a reasonable amount of time. For example, a greedy strategy for the travelling salesman problem (which is of high computational complexity) is the following heuristic: "At each step of the journey, visit the nearest unvisited city." This heuristic does not intend to find the best solution, but it terminates in a reasonable number of steps; finding an optimal solution to such a complex problem typically requires unreasonably many steps. In mathematical optimization, greedy algorithms optimally solve combinatorial problems having the properties of matroids and give constant-factor approximations to optimization problems with the submodular structure. Specifics Greedy algorith ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Justified Representation
Justified representation (JR) is a criterion for evaluating the fairness of electoral systems in multiwinner voting, particularly in multiwinner approval voting. It can be seen as an adaptation of the proportional representation criterion to approval voting. Definitions One definition for "proportional representation" is that the candidates are partitioned into disjoint parties, and each voter approves all candidates in a single party. For example, suppose we need to elect a committee of size 10. Suppose that exactly 50% of the voters approve all candidates in party A, exactly 30% approve all candidates in party B, and exactly 20% approve all candidates in party C. Then, proportional representation requires that the committee contains exactly 5 candidates from party A, exactly 3 candidates from party B, and exactly 2 candidates from party C. If the fractions are not exact, then some rounding method should be used, and this can be done by various Apportionment (politics), appor ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
