Maskin Monotonicity
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Maskin Monotonicity
Maskin monotonicity is a desired property of voting systems suggested by Eric Maskin. Each voter reports his entire preference relation over the set of alternatives. The set of reports is called a ''preference profile''. A ''social choice rule'' maps the preference profile to the selected alternative. For a preference profile P_1 with a chosen alternative A_1, there is another preference profile P_2 such that the position of A_1 relative to each of the other alternatives either improves or stays the same as in P_1. With Maskin monotonicity, A_1 should still be chosen at P_2. Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for implementability in Nash equilibrium. Moreover, any social choice rule that satisfies Maskin monotonicity and another property called "no veto power" can be implemented in Nash equilibrium form if there are three or more voters. See also * Monotonicity (mechanism design) In mechanism design, monotonicity is a property of a social choice function. It is a nec ...
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Voting System
An electoral system or voting system is a set of rules that determine how elections and referendums are conducted and how their results are determined. Electoral systems are used in politics to elect governments, while non-political elections may take place in business, non-profit organisations and informal organisations. These rules govern all aspects of the voting process: when elections occur, who is allowed to vote, who can stand as a candidate, how ballots are marked and cast, how the ballots are counted, how votes translate into the election outcome, limits on campaign spending, and other factors that can affect the result. Political electoral systems are defined by constitutions and electoral laws, are typically conducted by election commissions, and can use multiple types of elections for different offices. Some electoral systems elect a single winner to a unique position, such as prime minister, president or governor, while others elect multiple winners, such as memb ...
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Eric Maskin
Eric Stark Maskin (born December 12, 1950) is an American economist and mathematician. He was jointly awarded the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Leonid Hurwicz and Roger Myerson "for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory". He is the Adams University Professor and Professor of Economics and Mathematics at Harvard University. Until 2011, he was the Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, and a visiting lecturer with the rank of professor at Princeton University.Economics professor wins Nobel – The Daily Princetonian


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Preference (economics)
In economics and other social sciences, preference is the order that an agent gives to alternatives based on their relative utility. A process which results in an "optimal choice" (whether real or theoretical). Preferences are evaluations and concern matters of value, typically in relation to practical reasoning. The character of the preferences is determined purely by a person's tastes instead of the good's prices, personal income, and the availability of goods. However, people are still expected to act in their best (rational) interest. Rationality, in this context, means that when individuals are faced with a choice, they would select the option that maximizes self-interest. Moreover, in every set of alternatives, preferences arise. The belief of preference plays a key role in many disciplines, including moral philosophy and decision theory. The logical properties that preferences possess have major effects also on rational choice theory, which has a carryover effect on all mode ...
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Nash Equilibrium
In game theory, the Nash equilibrium, named after the mathematician John Nash, is the most common way to define the solution of a non-cooperative game involving two or more players. In a Nash equilibrium, each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no one has anything to gain by changing only one's own strategy. The principle of Nash equilibrium dates back to the time of Cournot, who in 1838 applied it to competing firms choosing outputs. If each player has chosen a strategy an action plan based on what has happened so far in the game and no one can increase one's own expected payoff by changing one's strategy while the other players keep their's unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices constitutes a Nash equilibrium. If two players Alice and Bob choose strategies A and B, (A, B) is a Nash equilibrium if Alice has no other strategy available that does better than A at maximizing her payoff in response to Bob choosing B, and Bob ...
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Monotonicity (mechanism Design)
In mechanism design, monotonicity is a property of a social choice function. It is a necessary condition for being able to implement the function using a strategyproof mechanism. Its verbal description is: In other words: Notation There is a set X of possible outcomes. There are n agents which have different valuations for each outcome. The valuation of agent i is represented as a function: v_i : X \longrightarrow R_+ which expresses the value it assigns to each alternative. The vector of all value-functions is denoted by v. For every agent i, the vector of all value-functions of the ''other'' agents is denoted by v_. So v \equiv (v_i,v_). A social choice function is a function that takes as input the value-vector v and returns an outcome x\in X. It is denoted by \text(v) or \text(v_i,v_). In mechanisms without money A social choice function satisfies the strong monotonicity property (SMON) if for every agent i and every v_i,v_i',v_, if: x = \text(v_i, v_) x' = \text ...
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Monotonicity Criterion
The monotonicity criterion is a voting system criterion used to evaluate both single and multiple winner ranked voting systems. A ranked voting system is monotonic if it is neither possible to prevent the election of a candidate by ranking them higher on some of the ballots, nor possible to elect an otherwise unelected candidate by ranking them lower on some of the ballots (while nothing else is altered on any ballot).D R Woodall"Monotonicity and Single-Seat Election Rules" ''Voting matters'', Issue 6, 1996 That is to say, in single winner elections no winner is harmed by up-ranking and no loser is helped by down-ranking. Douglas Woodall called the criterion mono-raise. Raising a candidate on some ballots ''while changing'' the orders of other candidates does ''not'' constitute a failure of monotonicity. E.g., harming candidate by changing some ballots from to would violate the monotonicity criterion, while harming candidate by changing some ballots from to would not. The ...
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Mechanism Design
Mechanism design is a field in economics and game theory that takes an objectives-first approach to designing economic mechanisms or incentives, toward desired objectives, in strategic settings, where players act rationally. Because it starts at the end of the game, then goes backwards, it is also called reverse game theory. It has broad applications, from economics and politics in such fields as market design, auction theory and social choice theory to networked-systems (internet interdomain routing, sponsored search auctions). Mechanism design studies solution concepts for a class of private-information games. Leonid Hurwicz explains that 'in a design problem, the goal function is the main "given", while the mechanism is the unknown. Therefore, the design problem is the "inverse" of traditional economic theory, which is typically devoted to the analysis of the performance of a given mechanism.' So, two distinguishing features of these games are: * that a game "designer" choos ...
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