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First-price Auction
A first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSBA) is a common type of auction. It is also known as blind auction. In this type of auction, all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids so that no bidder knows the bid of any other participant. The highest bidder pays the price that was submitted. Strategic analysis In a FPSBA, each bidder is characterized by their monetary valuation of the item for sale. Suppose Alice is a bidder and her valuation is a. Then, if Alice is rational: *She will never bid more than a, because bidding more than a can only make her lose net value. *If she bids exactly a, then she will not lose but also not gain any positive value. *If she bids less than a, then she ''may'' have some positive gain, but the exact gain depends on the bids of the others. Alice would like to bid the smallest amount that can make her win the item, as long as this amount is less than a. For example, if there is another bidder Bob and he bids y and y [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Auction
An auction is usually a process of Trade, buying and selling Good (economics), goods or Service (economics), services by offering them up for Bidding, bids, taking bids, and then selling the item to the highest bidder or buying the item from the lowest bidder. Some exceptions to this definition exist and are described in the section about different #Types, types. The branch of economic theory dealing with auction types and participants' behavior in auctions is called auction theory. The open ascending price auction is arguably the most common form of auction and has been used throughout history. Participants bid openly against one another, with each subsequent bid being higher than the previous bid. An auctioneer may announce prices, while bidders submit bids vocally or electronically. Auctions are applied for trade in diverse #Contexts, contexts. These contexts include antiques, Art auction, paintings, rare collectibles, expensive wine auction, wines, commodity, commodities, l ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Truthful Mechanism
In mechanism design, a strategyproof (SP) mechanism is a game form in which each player has a weakly- dominant strategy, so that no player can gain by "spying" over the other players to know what they are going to play. When the players have private information (e.g. their type or their value to some item), and the strategy space of each player consists of the possible information values (e.g. possible types or values), a truthful mechanism is a game in which revealing the true information is a weakly-dominant strategy for each player. An SP mechanism is also called dominant-strategy-incentive-compatible (DSIC), to distinguish it from other kinds of incentive compatibility. A SP mechanism is immune to manipulations by individual players (but not by coalitions). In contrast, in a group strategyproof mechanism, no group of people can collude to misreport their preferences in a way that makes every member better off. In a strong group strategyproof mechanism, no group of people can c ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Procurement
Procurement is the process of locating and agreeing to terms and purchasing goods, services, or other works from an external source, often with the use of a tendering or competitive bidding process. The term may also refer to a contractual obligation to "procure", i.e. to "ensure" that something is done. When a government agency buys goods or services through this practice, it is referred to as '' government procurement'' or public procurement. Procurement as an organizational process is intended to ensure that the buyer receives goods, services, or works at the best possible price when aspects such as quality, quantity, time, and location are compared. Corporations and public bodies often define processes intended to promote fair and open competition for their business while minimizing risks such as exposure to fraud and collusion. Almost all purchasing decisions include factors such as delivery and handling, marginal benefit, and fluctuations in the prices of goods. Org ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Tendering
An invitation to tender (ITT, also known as a call for bids or a request for tenders) is a formal, structured procedure for generating competing offers from different potential suppliers or contractors looking to obtain an award of business activity in works, supply, or service contracts, often from companies who have been previously assessed for suitability by means of a supplier questionnaire (SQ) or pre-qualification questionnaire (PQQ). Unlike a request for proposal (RFP), which is used when a company sources for business proposals, ITTs are used when a government or company does not require the submission of an original business proposal and is looking solely to award a contract based on the best tender submitted. As a result, whereas ITTs are often decided based on the best price offered, decisions on RFPs may also involve other considerations such as technology and innovation. Both are forms of reverse auction. At the same time, variants may be requested in an ITT, whic ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Dutch Auction
A Dutch auction is one of several similar types of auctions for buying or selling goods. Most commonly, it means an auction in which the auctioneer begins with a high offer price in the case of selling, and lowers it until some participant accepts the price, or it reaches a predetermined reserve price. This type of price auction is most commonly used for goods that are required to be sold quickly such as flowers, fresh produce, or tobacco. A Dutch auction has also been called a ''clock auction'' or ''open-outcry descending-price auction''. This type of auction shows the advantage of speed since a sale never requires more than one bid. It is strategically similar to a first-price sealed-bid auction. History Herodotus relates an account of a descending price auction in Babylon, suggesting that market mechanisms similar to Dutch auctions were used in ancient times. Descending-price auctions were used in 17th-century Holland for estate sales and paintings. The Dutch manner of au ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
English Auction
An English auction is an open-outcry ascending dynamic auction. It proceeds as follows. * The auctioneer opens the auction by announcing a suggested opening bid, a starting price, or a reserve for the item on sale. * Then the auctioneer accepts increasingly higher bids from the floor and sometimes from other sources, for example online or telephone bids. The auctioneer usually determines the minimum increment of bids, often making them larger as bidding reaches higher levels. * The highest bidder at any given moment is considered to have the standing bid, which can only be displaced by a higher bid from a competing buyer. * If no competing bidder challenges the standing bid within the time allowed by the auctioneer, the standing bid becomes the winner, and the item is sold to the highest bidder at a price equal to their bid. *If no bidder accepts the starting price, the auctioneer either begins to lower the starting price in increments, or bidders are allowed to bid prices lowe ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Common Value Auction
In common value auctions the value of the item for sale is identical amongst bidders, but bidders have different information about the item's value. This stands in contrast to a private value auction where each bidder's private valuation of the item is different and independent of peers' valuations. A classic example of a pure common values auction is when a jar full of quarters is auctioned off. The jar will be worth the same amount to anyone. However, each bidder has a different guess about how many quarters are in the jar. Other, real-life examples include Treasury bill auctions, initial public offerings, spectrum auctions, very prized paintings, art pieces, antiques etc. One important phenomenon occurring in common value auctions is the winner's curse. Bidders have only estimates of the value of the good. If, on average, bidders are estimating correctly, the highest bid will tend to have been placed by someone who overestimated the good's value. This is an example of adverse s ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Statistically Independent
Independence is a fundamental notion in probability theory, as in statistics and the theory of stochastic processes. Two event (probability theory), events are independent, statistically independent, or stochastically independent if, informally speaking, the occurrence of one does not affect the probability of occurrence of the other or, equivalently, does not affect the odds. Similarly, two random variables are independent if the realization of one does not affect the probability distribution of the other. When dealing with collections of more than two events, two notions of independence need to be distinguished. The events are called Pairwise independence, pairwise independent if any two events in the collection are independent of each other, while mutual independence (or collective independence) of events means, informally speaking, that each event is independent of any combination of other events in the collection. A similar notion exists for collections of random variables. M ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Revenue Equivalence
Revenue equivalence is a concept in auction theory that states that given certain conditions, any mechanism that results in the same outcomes (i.e. allocates items to the same bidders) also has the same expected revenue. Notation There is a set X of possible outcomes. There are n agents which have different valuations for each outcome. The valuation of agent i (also called its "type") is represented as a function: : v_i : X \longrightarrow R_ which expresses the value it has for each alternative, in monetary terms. The agents have quasilinear utility functions; this means that, if the outcome is x and in addition the agent receives a payment p_i (positive or negative), then the total utility of agent i is: : u_i := v_i(x) + p_i The vector of all value-functions is denoted by v. For every agent i, the vector of all value-functions of the ''other'' agents is denoted by v_. So v \equiv (v_i,v_). A ''mechanism'' is a pair of functions: * An Outcome function, that takes as inpu ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Dominant Strategy
In game theory, a strategy ''A'' dominates another strategy ''B'' if ''A'' will always produce a better result than ''B'', regardless of how any other player plays. Some very simple games (called straightforward games) can be solved using dominance. Terminology A player can compare two strategies, A and B, to determine which one is better. The result of the comparison is one of: * B strictly dominates (>) A: choosing B always gives a better outcome than choosing A, no matter what the other players do. * B weakly dominates (≥) A: choosing B always gives at least as good an outcome as choosing A, no matter what the other players do, and there is at least one set of opponents' actions for which B gives a better outcome than A. (Notice that if B strictly dominates A, then B weakly dominates A. Therefore, we can say "B dominates A" to mean "B weakly dominates A".) * B is weakly dominated by A: there is at least one set of opponents' actions for which B gives a worse outcome than A, ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Bayesian Game
In game theory, a Bayesian game is a strategic decision-making model which assumes players have incomplete information. Players may hold private information relevant to the game, meaning that the payoffs are not common knowledge. Bayesian games model the outcome of player interactions using aspects of Bayesian probability. They are notable because they allowed the specification of the solutions to games with incomplete information for the first time in game theory. Hungarian economist John C. Harsanyi introduced the concept of Bayesian games in three papers from 1967 and 1968: He was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for these and other contributions to game theory in 1994. Roughly speaking, Harsanyi defined Bayesian games in the following way: players are assigned a set of characteristics by nature at the start of the game. By mapping probability distributions to these characteristics and by calculating the outcome of the game using Bayesian probability, the r ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Second-price Auction
A Vickrey auction or sealed-bid second-price auction (SBSPA) is a type of sealed-bid auction. Bidders submit written bids without knowing the bid of the other people in the auction. The highest bidder wins but the price paid is the second-highest bid. This type of auction is strategically similar to an English auction and gives bidders an incentive to bid their true value. The auction was first described academically by Columbia University professor William Vickrey in 1961 though it had been used by stamp collectors since 1893. In 1797 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe sold a manuscript using a sealed-bid, second-price auction. Vickrey's original paper mainly considered auctions where only a single, indivisible good is being sold. The terms ''Vickrey auction'' and ''second-price sealed-bid auction'' are, in this case only, equivalent and used interchangeably. In the case of multiple identical goods, the bidders submit inverse demand curves and pay the opportunity cost. Vickrey auctions ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
