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Egocentric Presentism
Egocentric presentism is a form of solipsism introduced by Caspar Hare in which other persons can be conscious, but their experiences are simply not . Similarly, in related work, Hare argues for a theory of perspectival realism in which other perspectives do exist, but the present perspective has a defining intrinsic property. In one example that Hare uses to illustrate his theory (starting on page 354 of the official version of his paper), you learn that you are one of two people, named A and B, who have just been in a train crash; and that A is about to have incredibly painful surgery. You cannot remember your name. Naturally, you hope to be B! The point of the example is that you know everything relevant that there is to know about the objective world; all that is missing is position in it, that is, whose experiences are , A's or B's. This example is easily handled by egocentric presentism because under this theory, the case where the present experiences are A's is fundamentall ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Solipsism
Solipsism (; ) is the philosophical idea that only one's mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind. Varieties There are varying degrees of solipsism that parallel the varying degrees of skepticism: Metaphysical Metaphysical solipsism is a variety of solipsism. Based on a philosophy of subjective idealism, metaphysical solipsists maintain that the self is the only existing reality and that all other realities, including the external world and other persons, are representations of that self, and have no independent existence. There are several versions of metaphysical solipsism, such as Caspar Hare's egocentric presentism (or perspectival realism), in which other people are conscious, but their experiences are simply not ''present''. Epistemological Epistemological solipsism is the variety of ideali ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Caspar John Hare
Caspar is a masculine given name. It may refer to: People * Caspar (magus), a name traditionally given to one of the Three Magi in the Bible who brought the baby Jesus gifts *Caspar Austa (born 1982), Estonian cyclist *Caspar Badrutt (1848–1904), Swiss businessman and pioneer of alpine resorts * Caspar Barlaeus (1584–1648), Dutch polymath, Renaissance humanist, theologian, poet and historian *Caspar Bartholin the Elder (1585–1629), Danish theologian and medical professor * Caspar Bartholin the Younger (1655–1738), Danish anatomist *Caspar Buberl (1834–1899), American sculptor * Caspar del Bufalo (1786–1837), Italian priest and saint * Caspar Commelijn (1668–1731), Dutch botanist * Caspar de Crayer (1582–1669), Flemish painter *Caspar Cruciger the Younger (1525–1597), German theologian, son of Caspar Creuziger *Caspar Creuziger or Caspar Cruciger the Elder (1504–1548), German humanist, professor of theology and preacher * Caspar Einem (born 1948), Austrian politi ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Perspectival Realism
In Caspar Hare's theory of perspectival realism, there is a defining ''intrinsic'' property that the things that are in perceptual awareness have. Consider seeing object A but not object B. Of course, we can say that the visual experience of A is present ''to you'', and no visual experience of B is present ''to you''. But, it can be argued, this misses the fact that the visual experience of A is ''simply'' present, not relative to anything. This is what Hare's perspectival realism attempts to capture, resulting in a weak version of metaphysical solipsism. As Hare points out, the same type of argument is often used in the philosophy of time to support theories such as presentism. Of course, we can say that A is happening on nsert today's date But, it can be argued, this misses the fact that A is ''simply'' happening (right now), not relative to anything. Hare's theory of perspectival realism is closely related to his theory of egocentric presentism. Several other philosophe ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Presentism (philosophy Of Time)
Philosophical presentism is the view that only present entities exist (or, equivalently, that everything is present). According to presentism, then, there are no wholly past or merely future entities whatsoever. In a sense, the past and the future do not exist for presentists—past events have happened (have existed) and future events will happen (will exist), but neither exist at all since they do not exist now. Presentism is a view about temporal ontology that contrasts with eternalism—the view that past, present, and future entities exist (that is, the ontological thesis of the block universe theory)—and with no-futurism—the view that only past and present entities exist (that is, the ontological thesis of the growing block theory). Historical antecedents Augustine of Hippo proposed that the present is analogous to a knife edge placed exactly between the perceived past and the imaginary future and does not include the concept of time. Proponents claim this should be s ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Subjectivism
Subjectivism is the doctrine that "our own mental activity is the only unquestionable fact of our experience", instead of shared or communal, and that there is no external or objective truth. The success of this position is historically attributed to Descartes and his methodic doubt, although he used it as an epistemological tool to prove the opposite (an objective world of facts independent of one's own knowledge, ergo the "Father of Modern Philosophy" inasmuch as his views underlie a scientific worldview). Subjectivism accords primacy to subjective experience as fundamental of all measure and law. In extreme forms like Solipsism, it may hold that the nature and existence of every object depends solely on someone's subjective awareness of it. One may consider the qualified empiricism of George Berkeley in this context, given his reliance on God as the prime mover of human perception. Metaphysical subjectivism Subjectivism is a label used to denote the philosophical tenet that ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Christian List
Christian List (born 1973) is a German philosopher and political scientist who serves as professor of philosophy and decision theory at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich and co-director of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. He was previously professor of political science and philosophy at the London School of Economics. List's research interests relate to social choice theory, formal epistemology, political philosophy, and the philosophy of social science.Professor Christian List. London School of Economics. Retrieved 23 June 2015. Born in , Germany, on 7 November 1973, List earned his |
Consciousness
Consciousness, at its simplest, is sentience and awareness of internal and external existence. However, the lack of definitions has led to millennia of analyses, explanations and debates by philosophers, theologians, linguisticians, and scientists. Opinions differ about what exactly needs to be studied or even considered consciousness. In some explanations, it is synonymous with the mind, and at other times, an aspect of mind. In the past, it was one's "inner life", the world of introspection, of private thought, imagination and volition. Today, it often includes any kind of cognition, experience, feeling or perception. It may be awareness, awareness of awareness, or self-awareness either continuously changing or not. The disparate range of research, notions and speculations raises a curiosity about whether the right questions are being asked. Examples of the range of descriptions, definitions or explanations are: simple wakefulness, one's sense of selfhood or sou ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Centered World
A centered world, according to David Kellogg Lewis, consists of (1) a possible world, (2) an agent in that world, and (3) a time in that world. The concept of centered worlds has epistemic as well as metaphysical uses; for the latter, the three components of a centered world have connections to theories such as actualism, solipsism (especially egocentric presentism and perspectival realism In Caspar Hare's theory of perspectival realism, there is a defining ''intrinsic'' property that the things that are in perceptual awareness have. Consider seeing object A but not object B. Of course, we can say that the visual experience of A i ...), and presentism, respectively. References Concepts in epistemology Concepts in metaphysics Metaphysics of mind Philosophy of time Possible worlds Theory of mind {{metaphysics-stub ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Vertiginous Question
Benj Hellie's vertiginous question is as follows: of all the subjects of experience out there, why is ''this'' one—the one corresponding to the human being referred to as Benj Hellie—the one whose experiences are ''live''? (The reader is supposed to substitute their own case for Hellie's.) A simple response to this question is that it reduces to "Why are Hellie's experiences live from Hellie's perspective," which is trivial to answer. However, Hellie argues, through a parable, that this response leaves something out. The parable describes two situations, one reflecting a broad global ''constellation'' view of the world and everyone's phenomenal features, and one describing an ''embedded'' view from the perspective of a single subject. The former seems to align better with the simple response above, but the latter seems a better description of consciousness. David Chalmers has written a response to Hellie, but he did not address the question itself. Hellie's argument is also clos ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Personal Horizon
In his book ''Dream, Death and the Self'', J. J. Valberg develops the concept of the personal horizon. He attempts to bring out his subject-matter by considering the dream hypothesis – what if ''this'' were a dream? In Valberg's view, an undetermined horizon would necessarily be internalised (a.k.a. subconscious) if ''this'' were all a dream. This leads to "horizonal" conceptions of consciousness, mind, experience, life, the self, etc. Valberg subsequently considers death, and argues that when the meaning of death strikes us in the right way, it presents us with the prospect of nothingness – not there being nothing ''for me'', but nothing ''period''. This corresponds to one's personal horizon being the ''pre-eminent'' one, corresponding to a weak version of solipsism (arguably closely related to Hare's egocentric presentism). Valberg points out the difficulty of reconciling this with his commitment to the view that he shares the world with metaphysical equals; he continues by re ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Further Facts
In philosophy, further facts are facts that do not follow logically from the physical facts of the world. Reductionists who argue that at bottom there is nothing more than the physical facts thus argue against the existence of further facts. The concept of further facts plays a key role in some of the major works in analytic philosophy of the late 20th century, including in Derek Parfit's ''Reasons and Persons'', and David Chalmers's ''The Conscious Mind''. One context in which the existence of further facts is debated is that of personal identity across time: in what sense is Alice today really the ''same'' person as Alice yesterday, given that across the two days the state of her brain is different and the atoms that constitute her are different? One may believe that at bottom, there is nothing more than the atoms and their arrangement at different points in time; while we may for practical purposes come up with some notion of sameness of a person, this notion does not reflec ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Indexicality
In semiotics, linguistics, anthropology, and philosophy of language, indexicality is the phenomenon of a ''sign'' pointing to (or ''indexing'') some object in the context in which it occurs. A sign that signifies indexically is called an index or, in philosophy, an indexical. The modern concept originates in the semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce, in which indexicality is one of the three fundamental sign modalities by which a sign relates to its referent (the others being iconicity and symbolism). Peirce, C.S., "Division of Signs" in ''Collected Papers'', 1932 897 Peirce's concept has been adopted and extended by several twentieth-century academic traditions, including those of linguistic pragmatics, linguistic anthropology, and Anglo-American philosophy of language. Words and expressions in language often derive some part of their referential meaning from indexicality. For example, ''I'' indexically refers to the entity that is speaking; ''now'' indexically refers to a ti ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
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