Combinatorial Clock Auction
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Combinatorial Clock Auction
A combinatorial auction is a type of smart market in which participants can place bids on combinations of discrete heterogeneous items, or “packages”, rather than individual items or continuous quantities. These packages can be also called lots and the whole auction a multi-lot auction. Combinatorial auctions are applicable when bidders have non-additive valuations on bundles of items, that is, they value combinations of items more or less than the sum of the valuations of individual elements of the combination. Simple combinatorial auctions have been used for many years in estate auctions, where a common procedure is to accept bids for packages of items. They have been used recently for truckload transportation, bus routes, industrial procurement, and in the allocation of radio spectrum for wireless communications. In recent years, procurement teams have applied reverse combinatorial auctions in the procurement of goods and services. This application is often referred to as ...
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Smart Market
A smart market is a periodic auction which is cleared by the operations research technique of mathematical optimization, such as linear programming. The smart market is operated by a market manager. Trades are not bilateral, between pairs of people, but rather to or from a pool. A smart market can assist market operation when trades would otherwise have significant transaction costs or externalities. Most other types of auctions can be cleared by a simple process of sorting bids from lowest to highest. Goods may be divisible, as with milk or flour, or indivisible, as with paintings or houses. Finding a market-clearing allocation corresponds to solution of a simple knapsack problem, and does not require much computation. By contrast, a smart market allows market clearing with arbitrary constraints. During market design, constraints are selected to match the relevant physics and economics of the allocation problem. A good overview is given in McCabe et al. (1991). Combinatorial au ...
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Set Packing
Set packing is a classical NP-complete problem in computational complexity theory and combinatorics, and was one of Karp's 21 NP-complete problems. Suppose one has a finite set ''S'' and a list of subsets of ''S''. Then, the set packing problem asks if some ''k'' subsets in the list are pairwise disjoint (in other words, no two of them share an element). More formally, given a universe \mathcal and a family \mathcal of subsets of \mathcal, a ''packing'' is a subfamily \mathcal\subseteq\mathcal of sets such that all sets in \mathcal are pairwise disjoint. The size of the packing is , \mathcal, . In the set packing decision problem, the input is a pair (\mathcal,\mathcal) and an integer k; the question is whether there is a set packing of size k or more. In the set packing optimization problem, the input is a pair (\mathcal,\mathcal), and the task is to find a set packing that uses the most sets. The problem is clearly in NP since, given ''k'' subsets, we can easily verify that they ...
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MIT Press
The MIT Press is a university press affiliated with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States). It was established in 1962. History The MIT Press traces its origins back to 1926 when MIT published under its own name a lecture series entitled ''Problems of Atomic Dynamics'' given by the visiting German physicist and later Nobel Prize winner, Max Born. Six years later, MIT's publishing operations were first formally instituted by the creation of an imprint called Technology Press in 1932. This imprint was founded by James R. Killian, Jr., at the time editor of MIT's alumni magazine and later to become MIT president. Technology Press published eight titles independently, then in 1937 entered into an arrangement with John Wiley & Sons in which Wiley took over marketing and editorial responsibilities. In 1962 the association with Wiley came to an end after a further 125 titles had been published. The press acquired its modern name af ...
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First-price Auction
A first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSBA) is a common type of auction. It is also known as blind auction. In this type of auction, all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids so that no bidder knows the bid of any other participant. The highest bidder pays the price that was submitted. Strategic analysis In a FPSBA, each bidder is characterized by their monetary valuation of the item for sale. Suppose Alice is a bidder and her valuation is a. Then, if Alice is rational: *She will never bid more than a, because bidding more than a can only make her lose net value. *If she bids exactly a, then she will not lose but also not gain any positive value. *If she bids less than a, then she ''may'' have some positive gain, but the exact gain depends on the bids of the others. Alice would like to bid the smallest amount that can make her win the item, as long as this amount is less than a. For example, if there is another bidder Bob and he bids y and y, then Alice would like to ...
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Combinatorial Game Theory
Combinatorial game theory is a branch of mathematics and theoretical computer science that typically studies sequential games with perfect information. Study has been largely confined to two-player games that have a ''position'' that the players take turns changing in defined ways or ''moves'' to achieve a defined winning condition. Combinatorial game theory has not traditionally studied games of chance or those that use imperfect or incomplete information, favoring games that offer perfect information in which the state of the game and the set of available moves is always known by both players. However, as mathematical techniques advance, the types of game that can be mathematically analyzed expands, thus the boundaries of the field are ever changing. Scholars will generally define what they mean by a "game" at the beginning of a paper, and these definitions often vary as they are specific to the game being analyzed and are not meant to represent the entire scope of the field. C ...
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Optimization (mathematics)
Mathematical optimization (alternatively spelled ''optimisation'') or mathematical programming is the selection of a best element, with regard to some criterion, from some set of available alternatives. It is generally divided into two subfields: discrete optimization and continuous optimization. Optimization problems of sorts arise in all quantitative disciplines from computer science and engineering to operations research and economics, and the development of solution methods has been of interest in mathematics for centuries. In the more general approach, an optimization problem consists of maximizing or minimizing a real function by systematically choosing input values from within an allowed set and computing the value of the function. The generalization of optimization theory and techniques to other formulations constitutes a large area of applied mathematics. More generally, optimization includes finding "best available" values of some objective function given a define ...
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Maarten Janssen
Maarten Christiaan Wilhelmus Janssen (born September 19, 1962 in Breda) is a Dutch economist and university professor of microeconomics at the University of Vienna. He is particularly known for his work on consumer search behavior and auction theory. Education Janssen studied econometrics and philosophy of economics at the University of Groningen, where he received his PhD in 1990. From 1997 to 2008, he was professor of microeconomics at Erasmus University Rotterdam and director of the Tinbergen Institute from 2004 to 2009. Since 2008, Janssen has been professor of microeconomics at the Department of Economics, University of Vienna. Scientific contribution Janssen's research focus is theoretical industrial economics. In particular, he conducts research on consumer search behavior and auctions, and has made several methodological contributions in the area of consumer search theory. In addition, Janssen has launched a new subfield that studies the effects of consumer search ...
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Vickrey Auction
A Vickrey auction or sealed-bid second-price auction (SBSPA) is a type of sealed-bid auction. Bidders submit written bids without knowing the bid of the other people in the auction. The highest bidder wins but the price paid is the second-highest bid. This type of auction is strategically similar to an English auction and gives bidders an incentive to bid their true value. The auction was first described academically by Columbia University professor William Vickrey in 1961 though it had been used by stamp collectors since 1893. In 1797 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe sold a manuscript using a sealed-bid, second-price auction. Vickrey's original paper mainly considered auctions where only a single, indivisible good is being sold. The terms ''Vickrey auction'' and ''second-price sealed-bid auction'' are, in this case only, equivalent and used interchangeably. In the case of multiple identical goods, the bidders submit inverse demand curves and pay the opportunity cost. Vickrey auctions ...
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Incentive Compatibility
A mechanism is called incentive-compatible (IC) if every participant can achieve the best outcome to themselves just by acting according to their true preferences. There are several different degrees of incentive-compatibility: * The stronger degree is dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility (DSIC). It means that truth-telling is a weakly-dominant strategy, i.e. you fare best or at least not worse by being truthful, regardless of what the others do. In a DSIC mechanism, strategic considerations cannot help any agent achieve better outcomes than the truth; hence, such mechanisms are also called strategyproof or truthful. (See Strategyproofness) * A weaker degree is Bayesian-Nash incentive-compatibility (BNIC). It means that there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which all participants reveal their true preferences. I.e, ''if'' all the others act truthfully, ''then'' it is also best or at least not worse for you to be truthful. Every DSIC mechanism is also BNIC, but a BNIC me ...
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Landing Slot
__NOTOC__ A landing slot, takeoff slot, or airport slot is a permission granted by the owner of an airport designated as Level 3 (Coordinated Airport), which allows the grantee to schedule a landing or departure at that airport during a specific time period. Slots may be administered by the operator of the airport or by a government aviation regulator such as the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. Landing slots are allocated in accordance with guidelines set down by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Worldwide Airport Slots Group. All airports worldwide are categorized as either Level 1 (Non-Coordinated Airport), Level 2 (Schedules Facilitated Airport), or Level 3 (Coordinated Airport). At Level 2 airports, the principles governing slot allocation are less stringent; airlines periodically submit proposed schedules to the administrating authority, rather than historic performance. Participation is not mandatory, but reduces congestion and non-participants are pen ...
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Auction
An auction is usually a process of buying and selling goods or services by offering them up for bids, taking bids, and then selling the item to the highest bidder or buying the item from the lowest bidder. Some exceptions to this definition exist and are described in the section about different types. The branch of economic theory dealing with auction types and participants' behavior in auctions is called auction theory. The open ascending price auction is arguably the most common form of auction and has been used throughout history. Participants bid openly against one another, with each subsequent bid being higher than the previous bid. An auctioneer may announce prices, while bidders submit bids vocally or electronically. Auctions are applied for trade in diverse contexts. These contexts include antiques, paintings, rare collectibles, expensive wines, commodities, livestock, radio spectrum, used cars, real estate, online advertising, vacation packages, emission trading, a ...
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Lagrangian Relaxation
In the field of mathematical optimization, Lagrangian relaxation is a relaxation method which approximates a difficult problem of constrained optimization by a simpler problem. A solution to the relaxed problem is an approximate solution to the original problem, and provides useful information. The method penalizes violations of inequality constraints using a Lagrange multiplier, which imposes a cost on violations. These added costs are used instead of the strict inequality constraints in the optimization. In practice, this relaxed problem can often be solved more easily than the original problem. The problem of maximizing the Lagrangian function of the dual variables (the Lagrangian multipliers) is the Lagrangian dual problem. Mathematical description Suppose we are given a linear programming problem, with x\in \mathbb^n and A\in \mathbb^, of the following form: : If we split the constraints in A such that A_1\in \mathbb^, A_2\in \mathbb^ and m_1+m_2=m we may write the syste ...
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