Topic summary
Resolution 2758
Extracted from the Wikipedia article United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI).
References
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Unlike her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen has not recognized the existence of the "1992 Consensus." Yet, she has tried to reach a middle ground between Beijing's stance and that of her own party, the DPP. In her inaugural speech, she carefully worded her position, acknowledging the first meeting between SEF and ARATS in 1992 as "historical fact." She stated that the meeting had "arrived at various joint acknowledgments and understandings" and was conducted "in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences," a phrase often used by Beijing... In other words, while Tsai did not accept the "1992 Consensus," she acknowledged that the 1992 meeting took place in a positive spirit that should lay the groundwork for sustaining crossstrait peace.
...Under international law, the 1992 SEF-ARATS exchanges would not amount to a legally binding agreement on the meaning of "One China" and other sovereignty questions. While SEF and ARATS apparently possessed the capacity to represent their own governments in concluding agreements on cross-strait cooperation, the intention of each organization was to sign legal instruments recording their agreement on the specific matters under negotiation... The parties never evinced an intention to conclude an agreement on sovereignty matters involving the notion of "One China" precisely because they could not reach agreement on the thorny issues involved. Instead, they bypassed the "One China" issues and went on to conclude formal written agreements on technical matters. In other words, the element of intent to create legal obligations on sovereignty questions did not exist. This is evident from the caution of SEF—it carefully avoided committing itself to a written agreement with regard to the all-important political issue and suggested that each side orally state its differing position separately. This poses a contrast with the formal agreements later concluded by the two organizations on various economic and technical matters. None of these cross-strait agreements touched upon the "One China" issue, and all were concluded without regard to it. - ^ 2025.
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