Deniable encryption

Encryption techniques where an adversary cannot prove that the plaintext data exists In cryptography and steganography, plausibly deniable encryption describes encryption techniques in which the existence of an encrypted file or message is deniable in the sense that an adversary cannot prove that the plaintext data exists. The users may convincingly deny that a given piece of data is encrypted, or that they are able to decrypt a given piece of encrypted data, or that some specific encrypted data exists. Such denials may or may not be genuine. For example, it may be impossible to prove that the data is encrypted without the cooperation of the users. If the data is encrypted, the users genuinely may not be able to decrypt it. Deniable encryption serves to undermine an attacker's confidence either that data is encrypted, or that the person in possession of it can decrypt it and provide the associated plaintext. Ran Canetti, Cynthia Dwork, Moni Naor, and Rafail Ostrovsky introduced the concept of deniable encryption in a paper in 1996. The notion of deniable encryption was used by Julian Assange and Ralf Weinmann in the Rubberhose file system. Function Deniable encryption makes it impo