William Henry Baumer Jr.

William Henry Baumer Jr. (November 27, 1909 – February 13, 1989) was an Army Major General, military strategist, and author. He was a key member of the team that created and implemented Operation Bodyguard, the deception warfare operation aimed at misleading the Nazis about the actual timing and location of the D-Day landings. A 1933 graduate of the United States Military Academy, he served on the staff of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower in the War Plans Division during World War II. He authored many books, including the co-authored ''Darby's Rangers, We Led the Way'' with Col. William O. Darby, founder of the U.S. Army Rangers.

Early life

William H. Baumer Jr. was born in Omaha, Nebraska, to William Henry Baumer Sr., who was an insurance salesman, and Winifred Madeline Mitchell. He attended Creighton Military High School before going to the United States Military Academy at West Point, where he was a member of "C" Company. His roommate and fellow "C" Company cadet was Richard Mattern Montgomery, who later became a lieutenant general in the U.S. Air Force and chief of staff of the Strategic Air Command. At West Point, Baumer was recognized for his writing ability, and he worked with the Academy's director of public relations covering athletics for newspapers nationwide. He also gained experience in radio broadcasting, working army football games alongside legendary sports commentators such as Floyd Gibbons, Ted Husing, and Bill Stern.

Following graduation form USMA class of 1933 he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the infantry and stationed at posts near New York City, which allowed him to take on work as a stringer for ''The New York Times''.

Early military career

Early in his military career, Baumer was stationed with the 18th Infantry Regiment at Fort Wadsworth, New York, before being assigned to Camp Dix, New Jersey, where he worked with the Civilian Conservation Corps. In 1936, he graduated from the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and was then posted to the 3rd Infantry Regiment at Fort Snelling, Minnesota.

In 1938, he was selected to return to West Point as a history instructor. Under Colonel Herman Beukema, head of the social sciences department, Baumer was encouraged to pursue graduate education in anticipation of the coming global conflict. Beukema famously told his instructors, "Gentlemen, there is a war coming. Every one of you will be on the General Staff, and I want every one of you to go to graduate school and get a degree." Following this advice, Baumer commuted to New York City to earn a Master of Science degree in political science from Columbia University.

During his tenure as an instructor at West Point from 1938 to 1942, Baumer maintained a demanding schedule. He taught history six days a week, actively managed sports publicity in the afternoons, and attended Columbia University twice a week for three years. He also authored six books and numerous articles on West Point and military life, several of which gained widespread popularity and went through multiple editions. Despite this rigorous workload, he and his wife Alice Brough (1912–1970), whom he had married in 1936 after meeting on a blind date at West Point, had two daughters, born in 1939 and 1941.

World War II

In early 1942, as the United States entered World War II, Baumer now a major, was assigned to the War Department Operations Division (OPD) previously called the War Plans Division. There he served on the staff of General Dwight D. Eisenhower where he was involved in high-level strategic planning for North Africa, including Operation Barrister (a proposed seizure of Dakar) and Operation Gymnast, which evolved into Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of French North Africa. At one point he was tasked with informing General George S. Patton of his role in leading the amphibious assault in Morocco. Baumer recorded Patton's initial shock at the assignment—expecting to be sent to Egypt to confront Rommel—but noted that the General quickly recovered and demanded, "Get me every son of a bitch who knows anything about North Africa." Baumer worked closely with Patton until the latter's departure for the front on October 23, 1942. Patton frequently invited him for drinks and offered him a position on his staff, but Baumer declined. They later worked together to plan the invasion of Sicily.

While serving in the OPD, Baumer worked closely with Albert C. Wedemeyer, a fellow Omaha native and Creighton Academy alumnus, as well as Colonel Harold D. Kehm, a 1923 West Point graduate and instructor who had served in Col. Beukema's West Point department from 1932 to 1938. He was eventually joined by two others of his Class-of-1933 West Point classmates who played key roles in the Allied deception campaigns: Lt. William Allen Harris and Lt. Col. Arthur Alfred McCrary.

Deception warfare

In early 1943, Baumer and his colleagues in the OPD were assigned to a new frontier of strategic military warfare—deception operations. The British had been engaged in the development of psychological warfare techniques for over a year under the leadership of Colonel John Bevan at the highly secretive London Controlling Section (LCS). As the prospect of a full-scale Allied invasion of mainland Europe loomed, it became increasingly clear that the British would need American involvement in their deception planning. A coordinated effort between the two nations was necessary to execute large-scale strategic misdirection campaigns. Baumer was directly involved in establishing the deception framework within OPD, working alongside Col. Kehm.

Although the various branches of the U.S. military initially remained skeptical about the value of deception operations, and progress was slow, momentum gradually built with the establishment of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC). This committee was tasked with developing and overseeing psychological operations in alignment with strategic directives approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the need for more structured and coordinated deception efforts became apparent, Baumer was selected to work directly with the British deception apparatus.

He was deployed to London, where he joined Col. Bevan's team at the LCS. There, he was introduced to key planners at the British War Cabinet Annex who had been pioneering deception techniques for over a year. His work placed him in close collaboration with notable figures such as the acclaimed novelist and intelligence officer Dennis Wheatley, Harold Petevel, Ronald Wingateas, and other leading members of Britain's deception hierarchy. During this period, Baumer became heavily involved in designing and executing the large-scale deception campaigns that would become known as Operation Bodyguard. The objective was to construct a deception campaign so elaborate and multi-faceted that it would compel the Nazis to misallocate their forces across multiple theaters of operation.

Operation Bodyguard

A major component of Operation Bodyguard was Operation Fortitude, which was divided into ''Fortitude North'' and ''Fortitude South''. ''Fortitude North'' sought to convince the Germans that the Allies were preparing to invade Norway, thereby tying down significant Wehrmacht divisions in Scandinavia. ''Fortitude South'', the more critical aspect, aimed to persuade the German high command that the main Allied landing would occur at Pas-de-Calais rather than Normandy.

Baumer played a key role in the coordination and implementation of several tactics:
* Controlled leaks and double agents: The Allies relied heavily on their network of double agents, many of whom were part of the British Double-Cross System. These agents included figures such as Juan Pujol García (codenamed "Garbo"), who fed the Germans false intelligence about the location of the invasion.
* Phantom armies and fake radio traffic: The creation of the fictitious First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG), under the command of Gen. George S. Patton, was a centerpiece of ''Fortitude South''. This phantom army was "stationed" in southeastern England and "prepared" for an assault on Pas-de-Calais. Baumer worked with British and American radio teams to generate fake radio traffic between non-existent divisions, reinforcing the illusion of a large invasion force assembling in Kent and Sussex.
* Visual deception and dummy equipment: Inflatable dummy tanks, wooden aircraft, and dummy landing craft were placed in visible areas near supposed embarkation points for the invasion. Baumer contributed to the procurement and placement of these deception elements, expecting that German reconnaissance aircraft would detect them and report back that a massive force was positioned in southeastern England.
* Political and diplomatic misdirection: In addition to military deception, Operation Bodyguard involved diplomatic maneuvers meant to support the illusion of multiple potential invasion sites. This included misleading statements by Allied leaders, feigned interest in Balkan operations, and fabricated intelligence meant to be intercepted by German spies in neutral countries such as Spain and Sweden.
* Deceptive military movements and false timetables: To further confuse German intelligence, actual troop movements were carefully manipulated. Units assigned to the real Normandy invasion were deliberately moved in ways that suggested they were destined for the Pas-de-Calais. Simulated amphibious exercises took place along the British coastline, drawing German attention away from the true invasion site.

Trip to Moscow – from Baumer's diary

By early 1944, it was clear that the Soviets would need to join Operation Bodyguard for the deception to succeed. Baumer was chosen to accompany Colonel John Bevan and represent the British and American Chiefs of Staff in securing Soviet cooperation for the deception campaign.

The two men departed for Moscow on January 29, 1944. The flight, which took them "over the top" through bitterly cold and turbulent conditions, was described by Baumer as "the worst air travel I have ever been through". Their aircraft was a British C-87 bomber not yet converted for passenger transport, which required them to lie on the floor of the bomb bay, strapped in with blankets and plugged into heated flight suits for survival.

Upon arrival in Moscow, Baumer reported to General John R. Deane, who was in charge of the U.S. Military Mission, and Ambassador W. Averell Harriman. Moscow was harsh and still scarred from Nazi attacks. There was strict Soviet security, and Baumer noted that any foreigner's movements were tightly monitored.

The first meeting with the Soviet delegation took place at Karl Marx Place. The Soviet representatives included Vladimir Dekanozov of the Foreign Office, Lieutenant General Fyodor Kuznetsov, and Major General Slavin; they were accompanied by an interpreter who, while competent in English grammar, struggled with the technical military language of deception planning. Talks with the Soviets began poorly, with Bevan's speech lost in translation. General Deane salvaged it with a concise summary and some humor, easing tensions. Negotiations spanned weeks, broken up with trips to the ballet, the Moscow Circus, diplomatic dinners, and vodka-fueled banquets. At one of these, Russian officers pushed endless toasts, leaving Bevan quite ill.

The final breakthrough in the negotiations occurred in a 1:30 am meeting at the Kremlin (the Soviet hierarchies' work day started at 5 pm and ended at 5 am). Baumer and Bevan were caught off guard when the Soviets suddenly announced that they accepted the deception plan "lock, stock, and barrel" and would work to execute it in coordination with the Allies.

In the ensuing days, the final protocol agreement was drafted by Allied interpreters and needed to be signed. However, the Allied interpreters initially botched the formatting and failed to place each signatory nation's copy in the correct order. Baumer had to step in and personally type out the revised versions on an old English typewriter, while simultaneously attending a strategy meeting and listening to a conversation about using the press for deception. The Soviets were keen to use their press to influence German intelligence; while the British and Americans had no objections to the Soviets doing so, they insisted that they would not purposely deceive their own people in this way. Importantly, all parties agreed that each should notify the others before releasing any strategic misinformation.

After all relevant papers were signed, Baumer and Bevan departed Moscow in a properly converted Russian C-47 aircraft.

Post Operation Bodyguard

In the months following the successful execution of Operation Bodyguard, Baumer remained involved in deception strategy but faced increasing bureaucratic challenges. While his work had played a crucial role in misleading German forces before Operation Overlord, shifting priorities and leadership changes meant that deception planning lost some of its earlier momentum.

He was assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and worked at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) at Versailles. As part of SHAEF, Baumer was sent again to Moscow to coordinate the planning and execution of the Shuttle Bombing Project, in which American aircraft launched bombing raids from Soviet airfields to target Axis forces. In addition, he continued to contribute to the Allied psychological warfare program where he worked closely with the Office of War Information (OWI), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) to develop propaganda intended to weaken enemy morale and influence occupied populations.

During his time at SHAEF, Baumer also monitored Nazi reactions to Allied deception efforts and provided analysis on their effectiveness. His reports indicated that while the Nazis had suspected misinformation about the Allied invasion of France, they ultimately still kept significant forces in Pas-de-Calais, believing it to be the primary D-Day invasion site.

Following the Allied victory in Europe, Baumer attended the Potsdam Conference in Berlin as part of the U.S. military delegation and served as a military adviser at the Paris Peace Conference. He also attended the Big Four Conference, which met in Paris in June 1946. In November he was named deputy chief of staff of the U.S. Constabulary in West Germany. After returning to Washington his post-war assignments included Chief of Information for the Armed Forces Information and Education Division and heading the Armed Forces Radio Network. He resigned his commission in 1950 but remained active in the U.S. Army Reserve for another 19 years, ultimately reaching the rank of Major General in 1966.

''Baumer'' war papers and diary

Throughout the war, Baumer maintained detailed records of strategic discussions, military deception tactics, and intelligence-sharing efforts between Allied nations in his diary and personal papers. These papers have all been collected at The Hoover Institute and give firsthand accounts of wartime decision-making, the inner workings of high-level military conferences, the challenges of interservice rivalries, and the diplomatic maneuvering that shaped Allied strategy. He provides candid assessments of key figures, such as General Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill and the logistical and strategic challenges faced in both the European and Pacific theaters.

In one of his many observations Baumer details attending the high-level Casablanca Conference held at Anfa Camp in early 1943, where he observed tensions between U.S. and British leadership regarding the strategic direction of the war. He recorded that American planners, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lacked a unified approach and were often outmaneuvered by the more prepared British delegation, which had clear objectives. He noted disagreements over the prioritization of the Mediterranean campaign versus the cross-Channel invasion, as well as concerns over Churchill's insistence on operations in the Balkans. His diary also reflects the interservice rivalries between the U.S. Army and Navy, particularly regarding Pacific operations. He described meetings in Washington where Army officers, including General MacArthur staff, clashed with Navy leadership over the allocation of resources and command authority in the South Pacific. He was critical of the Navy's logistical planning and its reluctance to integrate fully with Army-led operations.

Included in the collection is his diary, memoirs, correspondences, orders, memoranda, and reports. There is also a translation of Adolf Hitler's last will and political testament, with some related documents.

Author

In addition to his military duties, Baumer was an accomplished author. He wrote multiple books, including ''Sports as Taught and Played at West Point'' (1939), ''How to Be an Army Officer'' (1940, co-authored with S.F. Giffin), ''The Draft and You'' (1940), ''He's in the Army Now'' (1941), ''Not All Warriors'' (1941), and ''West Point: Moulder of Men'' (1942). He also co-authored ''Darby's Rangers, We Led the Way'' with his class of 1933 West Point classmate, Col. William O. Darby, the founder of the U.S. Army Rangers. For this he was made an honorary member of The Ranger Battalion Association of World War II.

Post military career

After transitioning to the private sector, Baumer became a prominent business executive. In the 1950s he was special assistant to Robert Wood Johnson, chairman of the board of Johnson & Johnson pharmaceutical company, focusing on corporate strategy and employee motivation. During the 1960s until his retirement in 1972, he was associated with International General Industries (IGI) as an executive vice president and president. He was also vice president of the International Bank, which at the time owned 47% of IGI. He was a director of Kliklok Corporation, Foster Wheeler Corporation, The Pierce Governor Company, The Woodman Company, Globe Industries, Inc. and Avis Industrial Corporation, all associated companies of IGI and was a senior partner with Centurian Capital, Inc. From 1971 until his death, Baumer was also a director of the Philadelphia Fund, America's oldest mutual fund.

Death

Baumer died of heart failure at age 79 on February 13, 1989. He is buried at Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia.

References

Further reading

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External links

William Henry Baumer papers
– Hoover Institution Library & Archives at Stanford University

W. H. Baumer diary from service in War Department General Staff, Operations Division

{{DEFAULTSORT:Baumer, William Henry Jr.

Military deception during World War II
United States Military Academy alumni
Recipients of the Legion of Merit
American recipients of the Croix de guerre (Belgium)
1909 births
1989 deaths
United States Army generals