metaphysics Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that examines the basic structure of reality. It is traditionally seen as the study of mind-independent features of the world, but some theorists view it as an inquiry into the conceptual framework of ...

, a universal is what particular things have in common, namely characteristics or qualities. In other words, universals are repeatable or recurrent entities that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things. For example, suppose there are two chairs in a room, each of which is green. These two chairs share the quality of " chairness", as well as "greenness" or the quality of being green; in other words, they share two "universals". There are three major kinds of qualities or characteristics: types or kinds (e.g. mammal),

properties Property is the ownership of land, resources, improvements or other tangible objects, or intellectual property. Property may also refer to: Philosophy and science * Property (philosophy), in philosophy and logic, an abstraction characterizing an ...

(e.g. short, strong), and relations (e.g. father of, next to). These are all different types of universals. Paradigmatically, universals are '' abstract'' (e.g. humanity), whereas particulars are ''

concrete Concrete is a composite material composed of aggregate bound together with a fluid cement that cures to a solid over time. It is the second-most-used substance (after water), the most–widely used building material, and the most-manufactur ...

'' (e.g. the personhood of Socrates). However, universals are not necessarily abstract and particulars are not necessarily concrete. For example, one might hold that numbers are particular yet abstract objects. Likewise, some philosophers, such as D. M. Armstrong, consider universals to be concrete. Most do not consider classes to be universals, although some prominent philosophers do, such as John Bigelow.

Problem of universals

The problem of universals is an ancient problem in metaphysics on the existence of universals. The problem arises from attempts to account for the phenomenon of similarity or attribute agreement among things. For example,

grass Poaceae ( ), also called Gramineae ( ), is a large and nearly ubiquitous family (biology), family of monocotyledonous flowering plants commonly known as grasses. It includes the cereal grasses, bamboos, the grasses of natural grassland and spe ...

and Granny Smith apples are similar or agree in attribute, namely in having the attribute of greenness. The issue is how to account for this sort of agreement in attribute among things. There are many philosophical positions regarding universals. Taking "

beauty Beauty is commonly described as a feature of objects that makes them pleasure, pleasurable to perceive. Such objects include landscapes, sunsets, humans and works of art. Beauty, art and taste are the main subjects of aesthetics, one of the fie ...

" as an example, four positions are: *

Idealism Idealism in philosophy, also known as philosophical realism or metaphysical idealism, is the set of metaphysics, metaphysical perspectives asserting that, most fundamentally, reality is equivalent to mind, Spirit (vital essence), spirit, or ...

: beauty is a property constructed in the mind, so it exists only in descriptions of things. * Platonic extreme realism: beauty is a property that exists in an ideal form independently of any mind or thing. * Aristotelian moderate realism or conceptualism: beauty is a property of things (''fundamentum in re'') that the mind abstracts from these beautiful things. *

Nominalism In metaphysics, nominalism is the view that universals and abstract objects do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels. There are two main versions of nominalism. One denies the existence of universals—that which can be inst ...

: there are no universals, only individuals. Taking a broader view, the main positions are generally considered classifiable as: extreme realism,

nominalism In metaphysics, nominalism is the view that universals and abstract objects do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels. There are two main versions of nominalism. One denies the existence of universals—that which can be inst ...

(sometimes simply named "anti-realism" with regard to universals), moderate realism, and

idealism Idealism in philosophy, also known as philosophical realism or metaphysical idealism, is the set of metaphysics, metaphysical perspectives asserting that, most fundamentally, reality is equivalent to mind, Spirit (vital essence), spirit, or ...

. Extreme Realists posit the existence of independent, abstract universals to account for attribute agreement. Nominalists deny that universals exist, claiming that they are not necessary to explain attribute agreement. Conceptualists posit that universals exist only in the

mind The mind is that which thinks, feels, perceives, imagines, remembers, and wills. It covers the totality of mental phenomena, including both conscious processes, through which an individual is aware of external and internal circumstances ...

, or when conceptualized, denying the independent existence of universals, but accepting they have a ''fundamentum in re''. Complications which arise include the implications of language use and the complexity of relating language to

ontology Ontology is the philosophical study of existence, being. It is traditionally understood as the subdiscipline of metaphysics focused on the most general features of reality. As one of the most fundamental concepts, being encompasses all of realit ...

Particular

A universal may have instances, known as its ''particulars''. For example, the type ''dog'' (or ''doghood'') is a universal, as are the property ''red'' (or ''redness'') and the relation ''betweenness'' (or ''being between''). Any particular dog, red thing, or object that is between other things is not a universal, however, but is an ''instance'' of a universal. That is, a universal type (''doghood''), property (''redness''), or relation (''betweenness'') '' inheres'' in a particular object (a specific dog, red thing, or object between other things).

Platonic realism

Platonic realism holds universals to be the

referent A referent ( ) is a person or thing to which a name – a linguistic expression or other symbol – refers. For example, in the sentence ''Mary saw me'', the referent of the word ''Mary'' is the particular person called Mary who is being spoken o ...

s of general terms, such as the '' abstract'', nonphysical, non-mental entities to which words such as "sameness", "circularity", and "beauty" refer. Particulars are the referents of proper names, such as "Phaedo," or of definite descriptions that identify single objects, such as the phrase, "that person over there". Other metaphysical theories may use the terminology of universals to describe physical entities. Plato's examples of what we might today call universals included mathematical and geometrical ideas such as a circle and natural numbers as universals. Plato's views on universals did, however, vary across several different discussions. In some cases, Plato spoke as if the perfect circle functioned as the form or blueprint for all copies and for the word definition of ''circle''. In other discussions, Plato describes particulars as "participating" in the associated universal. Contemporary realists agree with the thesis that universals are multiply-exemplifiable entities. Examples include by D. M. Armstrong, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reinhardt Grossmann, Michael Loux.

Nominalism

Nominalists hold that universals are not real mind-independent entities but either merely concepts (sometimes called "conceptualism") or merely names. Nominalists typically argue that properties are abstract particulars (like tropes) rather than universals.

JP Moreland James Porter Moreland (born March 9, 1948), better known as J. P. Moreland, is an American philosopher, theologian, and Christian apologetics, Christian apologist. He is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Talbot School of Theology at Biol ...

distinguishes between "extreme" and "moderate" nominalism. Examples of nominalists include Buddhist logicians and apoha theorists, the medieval philosophers Roscelin of Compiègne and William of Ockham and contemporary philosophers W. V. O. Quine, Wilfrid Sellars, D. C. Williams, and Keith Campbell.

Ness-ity-hood principle

The ness-ity-hood principle is used mainly by English-speaking philosophers to generate convenient, concise names for universals or

.Feldman (2005), p. 25. According to the Ness-Ity-Hood Principle, a name for any universal may be formed by taking the name of the predicate and adding the suffix "ness", "ity", or "hood". For example, the universal that is distinctive of left-handers may be formed by taking the predicate "left-handed" and adding "ness", which yields the name "left-handedness". The principle is most helpful in cases where there is not an established or standard name of the universal in ordinary English usage: What is the name of the universal distinctive of chairs? "Chair" in English is used not only as a subject (as in "The chair is broken"), but also as a predicate (as in "That is a chair"). So to generate a name for the universal distinctive of chairs, take the predicate "chair" and add "ness", which yields "chairness".

Notes

References

* Feldman, Fred (2005). "The Open Question Argument: What It Isn't; and What It Is", ''Philosophical Issues'' 15, ''Normativity''. * Loux, Michael J. (1998). ''Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction'', N.Y.: Routledge. * Loux, Michael J. (2001). "The Problem of Universals" in ''Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings'', Michael J. Loux (ed.), N.Y.: Routledge, pp. 3–13. * MacLeod, M. & Rubenstein, E. (2006). "Universals", ''The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', J. Fieser & B. Dowden (eds.).
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* Moreland, J. P. (2001). ''Universals'', McGill-Queen's University Press/Acumen. * Price, H. H. (1953). "Universals and Resemblance", Ch. 1 of ''Thinking and Experience'', Hutchinson's University Library. * Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo (2008). "Nominalism in Metaphysics", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
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