People's Liberation Army Rocket Force

The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, formerly the Second Artillery Corps, is the strategic and tactical missile force of the People's Republic of China. The PLARF is the 4th branch of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and controls China's arsenal of land-based ballistic, hypersonic, cruise missiles—both nuclear and conventional. The armed service branch was established on 1 July 1966 and made its first public appearance on 1 October 1984. The headquarters for operations is located at Qinghe, Beijing. The PLARF is under the direct command of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission (CMC).

The name was changed from the PLA Second Artillery Corps to the PLA Rocket Force on 1 January 2016. Despite claims by some, there appears to be no evidence to suggest that the new generation of Chinese ballistic-missile submarines will come under PLARF control.

The PLARF comprises more than 120,000 personnel and six ballistic missile "Bases" (units at roughly corps or army group grade), plus 3 support Bases in charge of storage, engineering, and training respectively. The six operational Bases are independently deployed in the five Theaters throughout China. and each controls a number of brigades.

China has the largest land-based missile arsenal in the world. According to United States Department of Defense estimates, this includes 400 ground-launched cruise missiles, 900 conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles, 1,300 conventional medium-range ballistic missiles, 500 conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Many of these are extremely accurate, which would allow them to destroy targets even without nuclear warheads. The '' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists'' and Federation of American Scientists estimated in 2023 that China has a stockpile of approximately 500 nuclear warheads, while a 2024 United States Department of Defense estimate put the number of nuclear warheads at 600. In 2025, FAS estimated the Chinese nuclear stockpile at around 600 warheads (the majority stored and not directly operationally), while the Pentagon estimates that the PRC will have around 1,000 warheads by 2030.

History

China established the Second Artillery as a branch of the PLA designed to operate its nuclear missiles. Top political leadership retained centralized control over the nuclear arsenal. In 1967, the CMC issued the ''Temporary Regulations on the Second Artillery's Basic Tasks and Command Relationships'', which established a direct line of command to the nuclear missile units and specified that "force development, deployments, maneuvers, and especially its combat perationsmust all be under the collective leadership of the CMC; extremely strictly ndextremely precisely, obeying and carrying out the orders of the CMC."

In 1980, the CMC stated that the Second Artillery should operate under the principles of "close defense" to ensure survivability of the nuclear force and "key point counterstrikes" to carry out retaliation. In 1984, the Second Artillery added a third principle, reflecting Deng Xiaoping's preferences, that the nuclear force be "lean and effective".

In the late 1980s, China was the world's third-largest nuclear power, possessing a small but credible nuclear deterrent force of approximately 100 to 400 nuclear weapons. Beginning in the late 1970s, China deployed a full range of nuclear weapons and acquired a nuclear second-strike capability. The nuclear forces were operated by the 100,000-person Strategic Missile Force, which was controlled directly by the General Staff.

China began developing nuclear weapons in the late 1950s with substantial Soviet assistance. With the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union withheld plans and data for an atomic bomb, abrogated the agreement on transferring defense and nuclear technology, and began the withdrawal of Soviet advisers in 1960. Despite the termination of Soviet assistance, China committed itself to continue nuclear weapons development to break "the superpowers' monopoly on nuclear weapons," to ensure Chinese security against the Soviet and American threats, and to increase Chinese prestige and power internationally.

China made rapid progress in the 1960s in developing nuclear weapons. In a 32-month period, China successfully tested its first atomic bomb on October 16, 1964, at Lop Nor, launched its first nuclear missile on October 27, 1966, and detonated its first hydrogen bomb on June 17, 1967. Deployment of the Dongfeng-1 conventionally armed short-range ballistic missile and the Dongfeng-2 (CSS-1) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) occurred in the 1960s. The Dongfeng-3 (CCS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) was successfully tested in 1969. Although the Cultural Revolution disrupted the strategic weapons program less than other scientific and educational sectors in China, there was a slowdown in succeeding years.

Gansu hosted a missile launching area. China destroyed 9 U-2 surveillance craft while two went missing when they attempted to spy on it.

In the 1970s, the nuclear weapons program saw the development of MRBM, IRBM and ICBMs and marked the beginning of a deterrent force. China continued MRBM deployment, began deploying the Dongfeng-3 IRBM and successfully tested and commenced deployment of the Dongfeng-4 (CSS-4) limited-range ICBM.

By 1980, China had overcome the slowdown in nuclear development caused by the Cultural Revolution and had successes in its strategic weapons program. In May 1980, China successfully test launched its full-range ICBM, the Dongfeng-5 (CCS-4); the missile flew from central China to the Western Pacific, where it was recovered by a naval task force. The Dongfeng-5 possessed the capability to hit targets in the Soviet Union and the western United States.

In 1981, China launched three satellites into space orbit from a single launch vehicle, indicating that China might possess the technology to develop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). China also launched the Type 092 submarine SSBN (Xia-class) in 1981, and the next year it conducted its first successful test launch of the Julang-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (CSS-NX-4).

In addition to the development of a sea-based nuclear force, China began considering the development of tactical nuclear weapons. PLA exercises featured the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in offensive and defensive situations beginning in 1982. Reports of Chinese possession of tactical nuclear weapons had remained unconfirmed in 1987.

In 1986, China possessed a credible deterrent force with land, sea and air elements. Land-based forces included ICBMs, IRBMs, and MRBMs. The sea-based strategic force consisted of SSBNs. The Air Force's bombers were capable of delivering nuclear bombs but would be unlikely to penetrate the sophisticated air defenses of modern military powers.

During the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the United States bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Believing that the bombing was intentional, Chinese leadership worried that China was significantly lacking in leverage against the United States. Among the measures China took to close its lack in leverage were efforts to develop precision missiles and accelerating plans to expand conventional missile forces.

China's nuclear forces, in combination with the PLA's conventional forces, served to deter both nuclear and conventional attacks on the Chinese lands. Chinese leaders pledged to not use nuclear weapons first (''no first use''), but pledged to absolutely counter-attack with nuclear weapons if nuclear weapons are used against China. China envisioned retaliation against strategic and tactical attacks and would probably strike countervalue rather than counterforce targets.

The combination of China's few nuclear weapons and technological factors such as range, accuracy, and response time limited the effectiveness of nuclear strikes against counterforce targets. China has been seeking to increase the credibility of its nuclear retaliatory capability by dispersing and concealing its nuclear forces in difficult terrain, improving their mobility, and hardening its missile silos.

The CJ-10 long-range cruise missile made its first public appearance during the military parade on the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China; the CJ-10 represents the next generation in rocket weapons technology in the PLA.

In late 2009, it was reported that the Corps was constructing a long underground launch and storage facility for nuclear missiles in the Hebei province. ''47 News'' reported that the facility was likely located in the Taihang Mountains.

The DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) made its first flight test on 9 January 2014; it likely entered service by October 2019. It is believed to have atop speed of Mach 10, or .

Two Chinese technical papers from December 2012 and April 2013 show that China has concluded that hypersonic weapons pose "a new aerospace threat" and that they are developing satellite directed precision guidance systems. China is the third country to enter the "hypersonic arms race" after Russia and the United States. The U.S. Air Force has flown the X-51A Waverider technology demonstrator and the U.S. Army has flight tested the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon. China later confirmed the successful test flight of a "hypersonic missile delivery vehicle," but claimed it was part of a scientific experiment and not aimed at a target.

US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimated that as of 2023 the number of Chinese nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States has expanded well over 200.

In June 2021, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies has found out that China is constructing new missile silo field in Gansu in western China. According to the satellite picture, 119 missile silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles are under construction near Yumen City. In July, Federation Of American Scientists found out there are another 110 silos being built in Hami, Xinjiang. The two significant expansion projects include silos more than ten times the number of ICBM silos in operation of PLARF today.

In July 2021, China tested globe-circling hypersonic missile including the unprecedented launch of a separate 2nd missile from the ultra-high-speed vehicle according to the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal. The test showed China's development of its strategic, nuclear-capable weapons as more advanced than any had thought, surprising Pentagon officials, the two newspapers said. Neither the United States nor Russia has demonstrated the same ability, which requires launching a missile from a parent vehicle traveling five times the speed of sound. According to reporting by the Financial Times, this weapons system consists of two parts: a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) and a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).

In July 2023, ''South China Morning Post'' reported that PLARF commander Li Yuchao and deputy commander Liu Guangbin were under the investigation by the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection. Later that month, both Li Yuchao and Liu Guangbin were officially removed from their posts, while Wang Houbin was appointed as the commander of the PLARF. Additionally, Xu Xisheng was appointed as the political commissar. Li Yuchao and Liu Guangbin's expulsion has not been formally explained. There are rumors that they are being investigated for corruption or disclosing military secrets. Furthermore, it was thought to be an odd decision to replace the Rocket Force commander with military personnel from outside the branch, and this led to concerns about the security, credibility, and integrity of the PLA as well as its participation in China's military tactics during the Taiwan Strait conflict.

On 25 September 2024 at 00:44 UTC, the PLARF performed its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test over the Pacific Ocean since the early 1980s. The specific ICBM that was launched was not stated.

Missile ranges

File:PRC Conventional Strike Ranges 2022.png, Chinese Conventional Strike Ranges as of 2022
File:China Nuclear Ballistic Missile Ranges.png, Chinese Nuclear Ballistic Missile Strike Ranges as of 2022

Ranks

Officers

Enlisted

Equipment

Firearms

The Special Operations Regiment has been seen using with QBZ-95 rifles and QBU-88 sniper rifles.

The QBZ-03 has also been used by the PLARF.

Active missiles

As of at least 2024, China has the largest land-based missile arsenal in the world.

Retired missiles

* DF-3A, CSS-2 (IRBM) – In service from 1971 to 2014

Transporter erector launchers

* TA580/TAS5380
* TA5450/TAS5450
* HTF5680A1
* WS2300
* WS2400
* WS2500
* WS2600

Tractor trucks

* Hanyang HY4260
* Hanyang HY4330

Structure

The PLARF is directly subordinated to the CMC. and headquartered in Beijing. It is organized into six operational bases and three support bases; these are corps leader or corps deputy grade units.

The operational bases cover geographical areas, and their ordnance mix reflects their location and mission. They are similarly structured with six to eight missile brigrades, support regiments, and at least one hospital. Base equipment inspection regiments are responsible for storing nuclear warheads.

Bases have peacetime administrative control of nuclear forces. In wartime, the CMC has direct control over nuclear forces. Control over conventional forces is unclear; in 2022, there was evidence of continuing integration with theater commands.

The Military Unit Cover Designators (MUCD) from the April 2017 system for PLARF units are 5-digit numbers starting with "96" with the remaining digits organization details. MCUD's starting with "961" or "965" are from the pre-2017 MUCD system.

Headquarters

PLARF headquarters has four administrative departments: Staff Department, Political Work Department, Equipment Department, and Logistics Department.

Wang Houbin became PLARF commander in July 2023, Xu Xisheng was the political commissar in 2022.

Base 61

(第六十一基地) is an operational base covering eastern and some of southeastern China with headquarters in Huangshan, Anhui. It was created in 1965.

Base 61 includes a brigade for testing its large short-ranged conventional missile inventory and an unmanned aerial vehicle regiment for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

Base 62

(第六十二基地) is an operational base covering most of southeastern China with headquarters in Kunming, Yunnan. It was created in 1966.

Base 63

(第六十三基地) is an operational base covering southern inland China with headquarters in Huaihua, Hunan.

Base 63 includes a regiment responsible for fueling liquid-fuelled missiles.

Base 64

(第六十四基地) is an operational base covering northwest and north-central China with headquarters in Lanzhou, Gansu.

Base 64 has an equipment inspection brigade instead of a regiment.

Base 65

(第六十五基地) is an operational base covering eastern and northeastern China with headquarters in Shenyang, Liaoning. It was formerly Base 51.

Base 66

(第六十六基地) is an operational base covering central China with headquarters in Luoyang, Henan. It was established in 1966.

Base 67

(第六十七基地) is a support base headquartered in Baoji, Shaanxi, responsible for the storage, maintenance and distribution of China's nuclear weapons. Base 67 was created in 1958 as Unit 0674 in Haiyan County, Qinghai. It was transferred to the Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense in 1969 and moved to Shaanxi, and then to the Second Artillery Corps in 1980. It was known as Base 22 until 2017.

Base 67 includes the subterranean nuclear weapons storage complex in Taibai County in the Qin Mountains. Preparations to move the nuclear weapons storage facility to Taibai began in 1969. In 2010, relatively few warheads were maintained at operational base-level for extended durations. The distribution of warheads is reliant on the country's transportation network. The construction of the Baoji–Chengdu railway by the PLA in the 1960s may have been to support warhead distribution. A derailment inside a tunnel during the 2008 Sichuan earthquake shutdown the Baoji–Chengdu railway for 12 days. In another incident, a Second Artillery Corps crane was used to clear a multiple-vehicle collision caused by icy roads in the Qin Mountains.

The Missile Technical Service Brigade is the main unit overseeing the Taibai facility. Its main focus seems to be warhead storage and maintenance. It is complemented by the brigade-sized Unit 96038 which seems focused on inspection and testing of certain warhead components. Unit 96038 includes a security battalion with the 38-member "Sharp Blade" Special Operations Team for site defense and the "Guardian Spirits of the Restricted Zone" Security Company. According to '' Ta Kung Pao'' in 2019, "Sharp Blade" also performed nuclear missile escort, warhead security and offensive tasks.

Base 68

(第六十八基地) is an engineering support base responsible for constructing physical infrastructure headquartered in Luoyang, Henan.

Base 68 was created as the PLARF Engineering Base in 2012 from the Engineering Technical Zongdui (ETZ); ETZ was created in 1962 to handle installation of test platforms for nuclear
weapon and satellite tests. It was combined with 308th Engineering Command in 2017 to create Base 68.

Base 68 contains six engineering brigades plus support regiments.

Base 69

(第六十九基地) is a training support base created in 2017 headquartered in Yinchuan. It has four Test and Training Districts and various independent test and training regiments.

The 1st Test and Training District provides training in desert environments, and provides measurement and control support for missile tests. The 2nd Test and Training District hosts a opposing force (OPFOR) regiment for PLARF training. The 3rd Test and Training District provides training in plateau operations, hosts the PLARF's electronic warfare OPFOR unit, and supports the Gobi Desert test range. The 4th Test and Training District provides cruise missile and rail transport training.

Command, control, and communications

The PLARF has operated a separate command and control structure from the rest of the PLA since 1967. The goal of the system is to ensure tight control of nuclear warheads at the highest levels of government. This is done by the Central Military Commission having direct control of the PLARF, outside of the structure of military regions.

For nuclear weapons, the command structure is believed to run from the CMC, to the headquarters of the PLARF in Beijing, from there to each Rocket Base, and from each Rocket Base down to the individual Brigade. From there, the Brigade transmits firing orders to the launch companies under its control. In the case of conventional ballistic missiles, it is reasonable to assume that more autonomy will be provided in wartime, with command likely being issued from the Bases, which are believed to coordinate with their respective Military Regions on targeting and conventional missile use.

Chinese nuclear C3 capabilities are centered around fiber-optic and satellite-based communication networks, replacing older radio command networks that made up the-then Second Artillery's C3 infrastructure before the 1990s. While historically Chinese nuclear missile forces had to launch from pre-prepared sites, the newest generation of nuclear-capable missiles (the DF-26 and DF-31AG) have been seen deploying to, and launching from, unprepared sites in exercises.

This would corroborate reports that PLARF communications regiments are being trained in the ability to set up telephone and command networks "on-the-fly". The reason for these changes likely has to do with concerns about PLARF survivability; China's commitment to a no-first-use policy means that its nuclear forces have to be capable of both surviving a first-strike, and receiving the orders required to fire back.

Operations in Saudi Arabia

The PLARF Golden Wheel Project (Chinese Wikipedia: 金轮工程) co-operates the DF-3 and DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles in Saudi Arabia since the establishment of Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force in 1984.

See also

* Dongfeng (missile)
* Nuclear triad
* List of states with nuclear weapons
* Qian Xuesen (also known as Tsien Hsue-shen)

Notes

References

Citations

Sources

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External links

Official homepage

Further reading

* Everleth, Decker
"People's Liberation Army Rocket Force Order of Battle 2023
" Middlebury Institute of International Stuides at Monterey. "At time of publication, it is estimated that the PLARF has 162 to 216 SRBM launchers, 87 to 96 MRBM launchers, 78 to 96 GLCM launchers, 216 IRBM launchers, and 110 ICBM launchers within its active force. By 2028 this force will grow to at least 108 to 144 SRBM launchers, at least 156 to 192 MRBM launchers, at least 78 to 96 or more GLCM launchers, at least 252 IRBM launchers, and 507 or more ICBM launchers. It is worth emphasizing that everything in the current estimate is counting something that the PRC has already built or is in the process of building." (p38)
* Federation of American Scientists et al. (2006)
Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning

China Nuclear Forces Guide
Federation of American Scientists
* Enrico Fels (February 2008)
Will the Eagle strangle the Dragon? An Assessment of the U.S. Challenges towards China's Nuclear Deterrence
Trends East Asia Analysis No. 20.

{{Strategic forces

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Strategic forces
Theater Command grade units of the Armed Forces of China