In
game theory, and particularly
mechanism design
Mechanism design is a field in economics and game theory that takes an objectives-first approach to designing economic mechanisms or incentives, toward desired objectives, in strategic settings, where players act rationally. Because it starts a ...
, participation constraints or individual rationality constraints are said to be satisfied if a mechanism leaves all participants at least as well-off as they would have been if they hadn't participated.
Unfortunately, it can frequently be shown that participation constraints are incompatible with other desirable properties of mechanisms for many purposes.
One kind of participation constraint is the
participation criterion
The participation criterion is a voting system criterion. Voting systems that fail the participation criterion are said to exhibit the no show paradox and allow a particularly unusual strategy of tactical voting: abstaining from an election can he ...
for
voting systems
An electoral system or voting system is a set of rules that determine how elections and referendums are conducted and how their results are determined. Electoral systems are used in politics to elect governments, while non-political elections m ...
. It requires that by voting, a voter should not decrease the odds of their preferred candidates winning.
See also
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Individual rationality
Rational choice theory refers to a set of guidelines that help understand economic and social behaviour. The theory originated in the eighteenth century and can be traced back to political economist and philosopher, Adam Smith. The theory postul ...
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Compensating variation In economics, compensating variation (CV) is a measure of utility change introduced by John Hicks (1939). 'Compensating variation' refers to the amount of additional money an agent would need to reach their initial utility after a change in prices, ...
Mechanism design
Electoral system criteria
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