July Ultimatum

The ultimatum of July 23, 1914, was a diplomatic note the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Belgrade delivered to the , the sole member of the royal government present in the capital that day. The text was drafted with great care by Baron Musulin von Gomirje, a Viennese diplomat. It constituted Austria-Hungary's response to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the thrones of Austria and Hungary, on June 28 of the same year in Sarajevo. This delayed response resulted from an agreement between Austria-Hungary and its principal ally, the German Empire,The German Imperial Constitution of 1871 gave the new German state the name ''Deutsches Reich''. reached as early as July 7.Historian Fritz Fischer describes the Reich's agreement as a " blank check."

Following a period of more than two weeks during which intense negotiations were conducted within the leadership of the dual monarchy, those in favor of initiating a conflict with the Kingdom of Serbia—deemed responsible for the assassination—secured the agreement of their colleagues, who had previously been reluctant to proceed. Subsequently, a subordinate diplomat, renowned for his proficiency in drafting, was assigned the task of formulating the ultimatum. The text was meticulously constructed to appear untenable, thereby ensuring its rejection by the Serbian government. Delivered to Serbian authorities on July 23, the Austro-Hungarian note compelled the Serbian royal government to issue a response, ultimately dismissed by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy.

General context

The Sarajevo assassination

On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the thrones of Austria and Hungary, was assassinated alongside his wife, Sophie Chotek, while attending Austro-Hungarian army maneuvers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The attack, carried out by Gavrilo Princip, a young Serbian activist, occurred during the couple's visit to Sarajevo, the provincial capital of annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Princip's actions were organized by Bosnian Serbs, who had been Austro-Hungarian subjects since 1909. The assassination marked the culmination of a decade of attacks against key Austro-Hungarian officials in the southern Slavic territories of the dual monarchy.

The repercussions of this event extended beyond the moral implications it held across Europe, prompting a comprehensive investigation by the Austro-Hungarian police force. The preliminary findings of this investigation swiftly identified the involvement of Serbs hailing from the Kingdom of Serbia.

Austro-Hungarian suspicions

Since there was no definitive proof,In 1919, after hostilities ended, the involvement of the Serbian secret society The Black Hand was unequivocally proven. the Austro-Hungarian authorities were inclined to implicate Serbian officials. The preliminary findings of the investigation, obtained through prompt inquiries, indicated the existence of a complex scheme with extensive connections in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Additionally, the investigation brought to light the involvement of a clandestine Serbian organization, the Black Hand, which was headed by Dragutin Dimitrijević, the chief of Serbian military intelligence. Austro-Hungarian police suspected that the terrorists had benefited from the complicity of Serbian military personnel and border guards during both the preparation of the attack and the subsequent exfiltration of accomplices who remained at large following the police investigation. In Serbia, Austrian diplomats also observed a discrepancy between official expressions of condolence and the public's reaction.Serbian citizens expressed enthusiasm at the news of the assassination.

Furthermore, as early as 1914, the political leaders of the Dual Monarchy, influenced by reports from their intelligence services, anticipated a significant crisis in the Balkan Peninsula. Austro-Hungarian intelligence sources indicated that not only had Tsar Nicholas II expressed support for initiating a conflict with the Dual Monarchy, but that the political and diplomatic crisis anticipated earlier in the year was expected to erupt before the year's end. This assessment was corroborated by numerous intelligence agents stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina during their investigation following the assassination of the imperial and royal crown prince.

Subsequently, Austria-Hungary had been progressively marginalized from the Balkans by Russia since the Balkan Wars. Bulgaria, which had been an ally of the Dual Monarchy, had suffered a decisive defeat during the Second Balkan War.

Serbia, the "Piedmont of the South Slavs"

Since its declaration of independence in 1878, the Kingdom of Serbia has constituted a primary concern of the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy.

While the Obrenović dynasty, which ruled until 1903, was dependent on Austria-Hungary for its continued existence, the violent dynastic change in 1903 resulted in the dissolution of this dependency. The Obrenović dynasty had relied on Austria-Hungary for political and economic support, aligning the small kingdom with its northern neighbor. The new monarch, Peter I, with the support of Serbian radicals, initiated a shift in alliances toward France. The victories of Serbia in the First and Second Balkan Wars of 1913 served to heighten nationalist pride in Belgrade and to demonstrate the consequences of Romania, a traditional ally of the Dual Monarchy, repositioning itself against Bulgaria. To counter Serbia, a mid-sized but rapidly growing power that was closely tied to Russia, the Austro-Hungarians and Germans sought to force it back into strict dependency on the Central Powers.

Internal tensions within the Austro-Hungarian Empire also intensified. Beginning in 1905, representatives of South Slavic peoples in the Empire's legislative assemblies formed joint parliamentary groups in Dalmatia and Croatia, thereby securing a majority in the Sabor of Zagreb by 1908.

In the early months of 1914, Serbia was beset by a significant political crisis. Crown Prince Alexander, who had been appointed regent due to his father's weakened state, engaged in a series of disputes with certain military factions, while Prime Minister Nikola Pašić effectively held executive power. The election campaign for the parliamentary elections of August 14, 1914, in which Pašić was deeply involved, served to further exacerbate these internal divisions.

The position of the central powers in 1914

By 1914, the German Empire was no longer in a position to retain smaller Balkan states like Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece within its alliance. The Balkan Wars had exacted a significant toll on these kingdoms, and their governments were seeking financial support to reinforce their claims to territories that had been annexed. However, neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary demonstrated the capacity to provide more than token commitments.The King of Greece received the marshal's baton in Berlin but secured the funding his kingdom needed for economic development in London and Paris.

German influence in the Ottoman Empire also faced threats, acknowledged by Kaiser Wilhelm II and his close advisors. By the autumn of 1913, the Ottoman government, despite its pro-German stance, could no longer secure funding from German banks, which were themselves struggling. It turned instead to markets in London and Paris. On May 29, 1914, Karl Helfferich, a representative of Deutsche Bank, sent an alarming memorandum to Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, highlighting the Reich's weakening position in the Ottoman Empire. Although short-term financial assistance was arranged in June, German bankers deemed this insufficient to address future demands from their allies.

By the advent of spring in 1914, the Dual Monarchy remained Germany's sole reliable ally, in stark contrast to the Balkan states, which were increasingly estranged from their erstwhile allies. Leopold Berchtold, the foreign minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, assigned a trusted aide, Franz Matscheko, the task of preparing a report on the developments in the Balkans since the Balkan Wars. The preliminary report, delivered on June 23, 1914, assessed the consequences of these developments, advised against the proposed alliance with Romania, advocated for a more aggressive stance against Serbia, and proposed focusing diplomatic efforts on Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire to ally against Belgrade.

July 7 – July 23, 1914: Intense preparations

In the wake of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Austro-Hungarian leaders devised a meticulously orchestrated response in collaboration with the German Reich, aimed at Serbia.In 1914, the Dual Monarchy could not risk a European war alone without the Reich's support.

The German "blank check"

Despite differing perspectives among Austrians and Hungarians, the leaders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire concurred on the importance of seeking counsel from Germany.

Austro-Hungarian diplomats were promptly apprised of Kaiser Wilhelm II's stance. On July 2, Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold convened with the German ambassador in Vienna, who counseled prudence and cautioned against hastily ascribing culpability to the Serbian government.

On July 5, Count Hoyos, in possession of a memorandum that was highly critical of Serbia and a handwritten letter from Franz Joseph to Wilhelm II, undertook an official journey to Berlin to secure the support of the German government for the measures that the Austro-Hungarian Empire planned to take against Serbia. On the preceding day, Viennese diplomats had been given an informal briefing on Germany's position. On July 4, Kaiser Wilhelm II conveyed his personal support for his ally in a statement that reiterated positions he had taken the previous autumn.In October 1913, an forced Serbia to withdraw its troops from occupied territories in Albania. These included his willingness to provide backing to the Dual Monarchy should it take decisive action against Serbia. This support was formally confirmed to the Austro-Hungarian envoy on July 6, 1914.

Wilhelm II had carefully prepared his stance in advance. In the days following the assassination, he held extensive consultations with his ministers and advisors to shape Germany's policy on the Austro-Serbian crisis. Reassured by their ally's backing,Hoyos returned to Vienna on July 7. Austro-Hungarian leaders began implementing measures in response to the crown prince's assassination. German officials also emphasized the importance of acting swiftly to capitalize on the outrage sparked by the attack.

Ultimately, as part of the Reich's policy realignment, Wilhelm II assured Romania regarding its neutrality in the context of an Austro-Serbian conflict. Bulgaria, the Central Powers' newly-forged ally, had previously threatened intervention on Romania's southern flank, thereby further ensuring that Romania would maintain its neutral stance.

However, as Fritz Fischer has demonstrated in his historical analysis, the Reich did not limit itself to mere declarations of support or a diplomatic balancing act. To limit the Austro-Serbian conflict, German initiatives sought to engage with Serbia's potential allies through diplomatic and political means. In a statement made on July 21 and 22, before the issuance of the ultimatum, Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg expressed his view that the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia was "fair and moderate." On July 24, a circular from the German Foreign Ministry instructed Reich ambassadors to underscore the bilateral nature of the Austro-Serbian dispute. Moreover, Germany's ambassador in Vienna, Heinrich Leonard von Tschirschky und Bögendorff, exerted considerable influence over the Austro-Hungarian monarchy through his daily interactions and frequent meetings with key policymakers. He advocated for a robust response as a means of restoring the monarchy's waning prestige. It was assumed by officials from both the Reich and Austria-Hungary that a rapid offensive, limited to the capture of Belgrade and its surroundings, would present the Triple Entente with a fait accompli.Forcing the Triple Entente powers into a fait accompli after a quick victory over Serbia seemed doomed from the start.

The different centers of power in Austria-Hungary (July 7–23)

During the crisis, various institutions within the Dual Monarchy exerted, at times, contradictory pressures on Austro-Hungarian foreign policy. The common Minister of War, Alexander von Krobatin; Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold; and Chief of the General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf advocated for prompt military action. However, they encountered resistance from Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza, who was disinclined to portray the monarchy as the aggressor.

Emperor Franz Joseph promptly endorsed a resolute policy towards Serbia. Despite his disinclination towards his nephew, Franz Ferdinand, the Emperor was resolved to safeguard the interests of his dynasty and the integrity of his dominions from any external encroachment. The emperor was supported in this endeavor by several individuals, including Alexander Hoyos, Janos Forgach, Alexander von Musulin, and Franz von Matscheko, as well as the Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf and the Foreign Minister Berchtold. Collectively, these figures exerted considerable influence, enabling the emperor to pursue a confrontational policy towards Serbia. Nevertheless, he sought to demonstrate the involvement of Serbian intelligence in the assassination, to gain Berlin's support before any Austro-Hungarian initiative, and to persuade Tisza to approve military action against the Kingdom of Belgrade.

Tisza was concerned about the potential response of the minority and marginalized Slavic populations in Hungary and was opposed to military action against Serbia. This stance placed him at odds with other decision-makers in the Dual Monarchy. From the outset of the crisis, he encountered resistance from the military, particularly from Conrad, who advocated a swift assault on Belgrade without an ultimatum or declaration of war. Tisza persisted in his opposition to military action against Serbia throughout the Austro-Hungarian Council of Ministers on July 7 and the subsequent days, until July 14. In a move to reinforce his stance, Tisza invoked the memorandum he had drafted on June 30, outlining his position on the matter. On July 7, he put forth an alternative diplomatic solution, aiming to bolster alliances with Bulgaria and Romania. This strategy sought to isolate Belgrade and compel Serbian leaders to concede to Austro-Hungarian demands. After protracted deliberations, his consent was ultimately obtained. On July 14, Germany's ambassador in Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirschky, conveyed to Berlin that Tisza had acquiesced to the proposal of conveying a missive to the Serbian government.

On July 19, during a joint council of ministers in Vienna, Tisza's remaining objections were overcome after consulting with his close associate, Stephan Burián von Rajecz. Furthermore, Conrad guaranteed him—contrary to Berchtold's concerns—that the monarchy would not emerge from the conflict without territorial gains and that Hungarian Transylvania would be safeguarded against potential Romanian offensives. To address Tisza's concerns, a compromise was reached. This involved Bulgaria, an ally of the Dual Monarchy, annexing Serbian territories. However, other issues that Tisza had raised, including Romania's likely demands for compensation, Bulgaria's future policies as an expanded state, replacing the Karageorgevic dynasty, the possibility of Russian intervention, and its military consequences, remained unresolved.

Moreover, in response to the assertive actions of German diplomats and the disclosure of confidential information by the German Secretary of State, Austro-Hungarian officials ceased sharing their intentions and planned measures with German leaders until July 22, the day before the ultimatum was delivered to Serbia.

During this period, Austro-Hungarian military officials undertook preparations for the impending conflict, effecting a transition in the role of the intelligence services. The network of Austro-Hungarian agents was transformed from a passive information-gathering apparatus to one engaged in active espionage, censorship of postal, telephone, and telegraph communications, and counterintelligence operations directed against adversarial intelligence services.

The kingdom of Serbia in the aftermath of the assassination

In the hours following the assassination, officials of the Dual Monarchy, with the support of information provided by the imperial and royal ambassador in Belgrade, directed their attention to the Serbian capital. The preliminary interrogations of suspects appeared to substantiate the Austro-Hungarian suspicions. On July 1, Danilo Ilić, an arrested conspirator during police raids on Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbian nationalist circles, revealed the plot's extensive connections. However, establishing connections to the Kingdom of Serbia proved challenging, partly due to the behavior of prisoners implicated by Ilić.

This conclusion is further supported by the observations of Austro-Hungarian diplomats regarding the attitudes of the population within the kingdom. Despite the government in Belgrade's declaration of an official mourning period of eight weeks, which was subsequently reduced to eight days, the population expressed its vehement discontent, and the nationalist press launched impassioned attacks against Austria-Hungary. This occurred despite the appeals of Serbian diplomats stationed in other European countries and the disapproval of the Dual Monarchy. In response, the Serbian government invoked its constitution, which prohibited restrictions on press freedom, as justification for its inaction. Moreover, Austro-Hungarian diplomatic requests for an investigation into the connections of the conspiracy within Serbia yielded no tangible results, largely due to the lack of cooperation from Serbian investigators.

Furthermore, the electoral context in SerbiaElections were scheduled for August 14. did not motivate the government to challenge the most radical nationalists. Nevertheless, as early as June 29, Prime Minister Nikola Pašić articulated in a public address that the Kingdom of Belgrade would possess the capacity to defend itself in the event of an Austro-Hungarian assault.

As outlined by Pašić, the Serbian response unfolded in three distinct phases. These phases reflect a cautious balancing act on the part of the government, which demonstrated a consistent willingness to cooperate with the Dual Monarchy's police throughout the crisis. The initial phase, spanning from June 28 to July 15, was characterized by a cautious and measured approach. The second phase commenced on July 15, following Hungary's decision to adopt a policy of retaliation against Serbia, which persisted until the issuance of the ultimatum. The third phase commenced with the ultimatum's delivery, influencing Serbia's response to the evolving crisis.

A deliberate Austro-Hungarian response

As early as July 6, Austria-Hungary commenced preparations for its response to the assassination of the Habsburg heir apparent. This response was conveyed to the Serbian government in a note delivered on the afternoon of July 23. The drafting process involved consultations among key Austro-Hungarian actors, with particular attention paid to the timing of its delivery.

Planning the note

On July 8, Baron Musulin von Gomirje, a proficient Austro-Hungarian diplomat renowned for his literary proficiency and advocacy for crisis resolution through decisive action, was entrusted with the drafting process. The Vienna ministry exercised meticulous supervision over the drafting process, aiming for a text that Serbia might accept, except Point 6, which encroached upon Serbian sovereignty.

Upon completion on July 19, the draft was presented to Emperor Franz Joseph on July 20 and received his approval the following morning.

Structure of the ultimatum

The "July 23 Ultimatum" comprised three elements: a diplomatic note, a ten-point ultimatum, and a commentary on the circumstances and conditions of the document's delivery.

The introductory note delineated the grievances of the Dual Monarchy against Serbia, citing commitments Serbia had made in 1909 to maintain amicable relations with its neighbors. The Austro-Hungarian government explicitly accused Belgrade not of directly supporting the assassination of the heir but of "tolerating" the activities of the conspirators.

Subsequently, the ultimatum was presented, comprising ten points. The text then proceeded to address the issue of anti-Austrian propaganda. Three points demanded the cessation of anti-Austrian propaganda within Serbian territory, including the prohibition of nationalist press and Yugoslav propaganda. About the matter of judicial actions, Four additional points called for the initiation of legal proceedings against those responsible for the assassination and the apprehension of any Serbian officials who may have been complicit in the plot. Police Cooperation: Points 5 and 6 underscored the importance of Serbian police collaboration with Austro-Hungarian authorities in identifying the perpetrators and permitted Austro-Hungarian officials to operate within Serbian territory.

From the text, it becomes evident that Austro-Hungarian diplomats, at the behest of military leaders and key officials of the Dual Monarchy, sought to assert increasing control over their smaller neighbor. Their objective was to revert to the situation before 1903, effectively transforming the Kingdom of Serbia into a satellite of Austria-Hungary.

Ultimately, the note was accompanied by a commentary intended for the Serbian government, the purpose of which was to elucidate the context in which the Austro-Hungarians had prepared the ultimatum.

Full Text

The following is the Austro-Hungarian note of July 23, 1914, translated by diplomat and writer Gabriel Hanotaux in his Histoire illustrée de la guerre de 1914, Volume 2:

Note

Ultimatum

Commentary

The note concludes stating The Imperial and Royal Government invites Your Excellency to convey this note to the appropriate government, along with a detailed commentary:

Despite this declaration, Serbia pursued actions that directly undermined Austro-Hungarian stability:

In the aftermath of the revolution, a wide range of organizations were established, overtly and covertly, to incite unrest within Austria-Hungary. These groups included influential figures from various sectors, such as “generals, diplomats, state officials, and judges,” reflecting a cross-section of Serbian society.

The Serbian press played a pivotal role in promoting anti-Austrian sentiment:

Serbia also deployed agents to spread propaganda and influence the youth in Austro-Hungarian territories, while its politicians, some with violent histories in Macedonia, shifted their focus to supporting anti-Austrian terrorism:

Despite years of provocation, Austria-Hungary exercised restraint. However, Serbia failed to act against these activities, violating its commitments under the 1909 declaration:

Austria-Hungary had hoped that its lack of territorial ambitions and support for Serbia’s expansion in 1912 would foster cooperation:

However, Serbia continued to tolerate propaganda and actions against Austria-Hungary, leading to the assassination on June 28 of the heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne—a crime “orchestrated in Belgrade.”

Faced with this reality, Austria-Hungary felt compelled to act decisively to protect its security and territorial integrity:

To substantiate its claims, Austria-Hungary has shared a comprehensive dossier with the French government, detailing Serbia’s role in the assassination. Copies of this communication have also been sent to other signatory powers:

Delivery of the ultimatum

The Austro-Hungarian government's selected course of action was the result of a meticulous planning process. The Austro-Hungarian note was delivered on Thursday, July 23, at precisely 6 p.m. This was the moment when key French officials were expected to be aboard a ship returning from a visit to Russia. Consequently, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador delivered the note to the Serbian Minister of Finance, who was acting instead of the Prime Minister, at his location in Niš. The timing of this action effectively prevented the French and Russians from consulting with each other until the French delegation returned to Dunkirk, temporarily immobilizing two members of the Entente.

The timeframe for Serbia's response was also contingent upon the demands of the Austro-Hungarian military. Chief of General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf took into account the time required for and successfully requested that the response deadline be set for 5 p.m. on Saturday, allowing mobilization orders to be issued overnight.

The note delivered to the Serbian government included the text of the ultimatum and an appendix. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador presented the document to the Serbian minister, who objected to the short deadline, citing the ongoing Serbian electoral campaign. This objection was summarily dismissed.

From the moment the Austro-Hungarian note was delivered, the Serbian government was obliged to accept its terms within a period of 48 hours.

International reactions

The response of the Serbian government was contingent upon the actions of Prime Minister Pašić on July 23 and the position adopted by Russia during the crisis. Initially unavailable due to his engagement in the electoral campaign and subsequent journey to Thessaloniki, the Prime Minister was directed by Regent Alexander to return to Belgrade without delay. In his absence, the Serbian cabinet convened to adopt measures to equip diplomats with arguments to defend the royal government's position.The cabinet decided to send a circular to all representatives of the kingdom abroad to justify its policies.

However, the little kingdom's response came as no surprise, as the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note had been designed from the outset by the BallhausplatzThe Ballhausplatz, named after the square where it was located in Vienna, referred to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry. designers to be unacceptable to the Belgrade government.

Partial text of the Serbian response of July 25, 1914

The following is a partial translation of the Serbian response of July 25, 1914, as recorded by the diplomat and writer Gabriel Hanotaux in ''Histoire illustrée de la guerre de 1914'' (Illustrated history of the 1914 war), Volume 2:

The Serbian government’s response to Austro-Hungarian demands sought to address each point comprehensively, blending firm commitments with an adherence to constitutional principles. Serbia began by pledging to introduce legal reforms targeting anti-Austrian sentiments. Specifically, the government agreed:

Additionally, it committed to amending Article 22 of the Constitution to allow for the confiscation of such publications, a measure currently prohibited by constitutional constraints.

Regarding the dissolution of subversive organizations, Serbia remarked that it had no evidence of wrongdoing by these groups but nonetheless declared:

The Serbian government further committed to purging anti-Austrian materials from its public education system. However, it noted that:

On the matter of dismissing military personnel implicated in anti-Austro-Hungarian activities, Serbia promised compliance contingent on evidence from Vienna. It stated:

Serbia expressed a willingness to collaborate with Austria-Hungary on investigations but noted its reservations about the scope of the demand. It acknowledged its duty to investigate individuals involved in the June 28 assassination plot and stated:

However, it resisted allowing foreign agents to participate in the process, citing constitutional and legal barriers.

Immediate actions were highlighted, including the arrest of Commander Vojislav Tankosić. Regarding Milan Ciganović, Serbia explained that he had not yet been located and requested Vienna to “provide evidence of guilt collected in the Sarajevo investigation to facilitate further inquiries.”

Additionally, Serbia committed to “reinforce and expand measures to prevent the illegal trafficking of arms and explosives across the border” and promised to investigate and punish any border officials who neglected their duties, enabling the perpetrators to cross into Austria-Hungary.

Addressing Austro-Hungary’s concerns over hostile rhetoric, Serbia offered to provide clarifications for statements attributed to its officials, stating:

Finally, Serbia emphasized its preference for a peaceful resolution of any outstanding issues, expressing readiness to refer the matter to international arbitration. It concluded:

Through its response, Serbia sought to balance addressing Austro-Hungarian grievances with safeguarding its sovereignty and legal integrity.

Serbian response: Partial compliance with Austro-Hungarian demands

Influences exerted by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov resulted in the Serbian response addressing the majority of Austria-Hungary's demands,The Serbian government accepted eight of the ten conditions in the note. particularly those that Belgrade could reasonably accept. Concurrently, the Serbian government sought clarification on the arguments presented by Vienna.

The Serbian note was meticulously calculated, underscoring the alteration in diplomatic strategy towards Austria-Hungary after the resolution of the Bosnian crisis. Its creators underscored the absence of involvement by the Serbian government in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, expressed remorse over the involvement of Bosnian Serbs in the crime, and pledged action against Serbian nationals engaged in anti-Austrian propaganda.

Nevertheless, Serbia declined to permit Austrian law enforcement officials to operate within its borders. This decision was made following consultations with the Russian chargé d'affaires in Belgrade and subsequent explicit support from the Russian foreign minister. As a result of this refusal, diplomatic relations between the two countries were effectively terminated.

In practice, Serbia's apparent capitulation was rendered meaningless by the skillful wording of its response, which effectively rejected Austrian demands. This, however, deceived Kaiser Wilhelm II, who declared the day after Serbia's reply that "all grounds for war have disappeared."

The Serbian response, described by the Austrian note's author, Baron Musulin, as "the most brilliant exercise in diplomatic virtuosity," prompted Austro-Hungarian ambassador Wladimir Giesl von Gieslingen to sever diplomatic ties with Serbia just minutes after receiving the note.

The Austro-Serbian breakup

On the morning of Saturday, July 25, the Serbian cabinet convened to draft the government's response to the Austro-Hungarian note, which had been delivered the previous day and was set to expire that evening. That evening, shortly before 6 p.m., just minutes before the deadline, Serbian Prime Minister Nikola PašićNo other member of the Serbian cabinet agreed to deliver the note to the Imperial and Royal ambassadors. delivered the response to Wladimir Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Belgrade. Upon receiving the Serbian note, the ambassador promptly reviewed it and informed the Serbian Prime Minister of the severance of diplomatic relations between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Kingdom of Serbia.

In anticipation of the impending conflict,Austro-Hungarian interests in Serbia were taken over by the Reich, which remained officially neutral at this stage of the Austro-Serbian confrontation. the Austro-Hungarian ambassador departed Belgrade at 6 p.m. On July 28, Emperor Franz Joseph formally declared war on the Kingdom of Serbia on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

European reactions: July 23–28

Immediately following the distribution of the Austro-Hungarian note to Belgrade, European powers initiated discussions despite the constrained timeframe available to Serbia for coordinating with its allies. These consultations, coupled with the inflexible timeline established by the Central Powers, further reinforced French and Russian suspicions of Austro-German collusion in devising a response to the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian heir.

Russia was the inaugural major power to offer a response. Despite an initially indignant reaction from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov, the Russian Council of Ministers, soon joined by their French and British counterparts, proposed requesting an extension of the deadline for Serbia's reply. Concurrently, Russia initiated a partial mobilization of its armed forces, a decision that was publicly disclosed on July 28. In addition, economic countermeasures were implemented, including the repatriation of Russian assets from Germany and Austria-Hungary. These actions provoked the German Empire, whose diplomats were adamant in their assertion to their European counterparts that the Austro-Serbian conflict was a matter confined to the local and bilateral levels. Russia's response, though robust, was hindered by Austro-Hungarian diplomatic maneuvering. The timing of the note's delivery to Belgrade temporarily obstructed effective coordination between Russia and its French allies, as French leaders were en route back to France following a state visit to Russia. Nevertheless, French President Raymond Poincaré, a key figure in French diplomacy, conveyed that France would advise Russia to exercise moderation—on the condition that Germany exert similar restraint on its ally.

In the United Kingdom, the response was characterized by a certain degree of restraint and measured diplomacy. The British government put forth a proposal for mediation by the four major powers (Germany, Italy, France, and Britain) to facilitate conciliation between Serbia and Austria-Hungary following Belgrade's occupation by Austro-Hungarian forces. Prime Minister Edward Grey asserted that Britain should play an active role in addressing the crisis, particularly in the event of a renewed Balkan war involving Austria-Hungary directly. However, by July 27, the Austro-Hungarian leadership underestimated the extent of Russian support for Serbia and misinterpreted Britain's position.

The responses from Russia and Britain were perceived as deceptive by Austro-Hungarian officials, who misjudged both the extent of Russian backing for Serbia and the implications of the British declaration.

Ultimately, the German government was made aware of the precise content of the Serbian note, albeit somewhat belatedly. The German government received a copy of the Serbian reply to the ultimatum at approximately midday on July 27.The Imperial Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Gottlieb von Jagow, had to insist that Vienna send the Serbian reply. Subsequently, Gottlieb von Jagow, influenced by Wilhelm II's admiration for the quality of the Serbian reply, proposed that the Dual Monarchy restrict its military operations to a coup de main, with the objective of occupying Belgrade and defending this conquest. Additionally, the German Emperor advised the Dual Monarchy's military not to pursue Serbian troops following the occupation of Belgrade.Wilhelm II, Franz Joseph, and their advisors underestimated Serbia's potential for resistance, misjudging the quality of Serbian troops, who were battle-hardened from the Balkan Wars. The Germans viewed the capture of the Serbian capital as a means of exerting influence over the course of peace negotiations between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia. German ministers endorsed this strategy, aiming to contain the crisis through diplomatic exchanges between Wilhelm II and Nicholas II.

Declaration of war on Serbia: July 27–28

On July 27, Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold transmitted a missive to Emperor Franz Joseph containing erroneous information. This information suggested that the Serbian army had launched an offensive against Imperial forces, resulting in casualties. Berchtold leveraged this claim to justify the preparation of a war declaration telegram against Serbia, which he planned to transmit the following day unless the emperor objected. He expressed concern that the Triple Entente might broker a peaceful resolution if war were not declared immediately.

''"Your Majesty,''

''I have the honor to submit to Your Majesty, attached herewith, a draft telegram addressed to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs containing a declaration of war against Serbia. I very humbly suggest that Your Majesty authorize me to dispatch this telegram tomorrow morning and to simultaneously arrange for the official publication of the war declaration in Vienna and Budapest.''

''Considering the Serbian government's response note, which was very cleverly drafted and handed over on March 28 by Mr. Pašić to the Imperial and Royal envoy, Baron Giesl, I find it lacking in substance though conciliatory in tone. I believe it is not impossible for the powers of the Triple Entente to still attempt a peaceful resolution of the conflict unless a decisive situation is created through the war declaration. According to a report from the 4th Army Corps Command, Serbian troops fired yesterday on our forces from boats on the Danube near Temes-Kubin, resulting in casualties.''

''The response to the gunfire led to a larger skirmish. Hostilities are thus effectively underway, making it all the more necessary to ensure that our army, from the perspective of international law, has the freedom of movement that only becomes available when a state of war is declared.''

''The notification of the state of war to neutral powers would be sent, with Your Majesty's supreme approval, concurrently with the declaration to their local representatives. I must note that His Imperial and Royal Highness, Archduke Friedrich, Commander-in-Chief of the Balkan Armed Forces, as well as the Chief of the General Staff, have opposed the issuance of the war declaration. Nonetheless, we have decided not to oppose the declaration being made tomorrow morning. With the utmost reverence,''

''Vienna, July 27, 1914.'' igned''Berchtold."''

The text of the telegram and the dispatches sent to embassies on July 28, 1914, is as follows:

''"The Royal Government of Serbia, not having responded satisfactorily to the note that was delivered to it by the Minister of Austria-Hungary in Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government finds itself compelled to ensure the safeguarding of its rights and interests by its means and to resort to the force of arms for this purpose, particularly since Serbian troops have already attacked an Imperial and Royal Army detachment near Temes-Kubin.'' ''Austria-Hungary therefore considers itself, from this moment, to be in a state of war with Serbia.''

''The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary.'' igned''Count Berchtold."''

The purported assault at Temes-Kubin by the Serbian military, which was presented as a rationale for initiating hostilities and securing the Emperor's approval, was ultimately revealed to be a mere Austro-Hungarian operation aimed at capturing two Serbian steamboats. This operation resulted in no deaths or injuries. This event was no longer mentioned in the text published in the official gazette on July 28, 1914, at 4:25 a.m., which was subsequently picked up by press agencies.

''"Vienna, July 28.''

The Austro-Hungarian government has officially notified Serbia of the declaration of war.

''The Official Gazette,'' in a special edition, publishes the text of the declaration as follows:

''The Royal Government of Serbia, not having responded satisfactorily to the note that was delivered to it by the Minister of Austria-Hungary in Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government finds itself compelled to ensure the safeguarding of its rights and interests by its means and to resort to the force of arms for this purpose.''

''Austria-Hungary therefore considers itself, from this moment, to be in a state of war with Serbia.''

''The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary.'' igned''Count Berchtold."''

See also

* Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand
* July Crisis
* Causes of World War I
* Austria-Hungary
* Kingdom of Serbia
* History of Austria-Hungary during World War I
* Franz Joseph I of Austria
* Peter I of Serbia
* Wilhelm II
* Leopold Berchtold
* Stephan Burián von Rajecz
* Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf
* István Tisza
* Nikola Pašić

Notes

Sources

References

Bibliography

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External links

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{{Portal, Serbia

July Crisis
Serbia in World War I
Austria-Hungary in World War I
1914 in Serbia
1914 in Austria-Hungary
July 1914 in Europe
July 23 1914