Chikunda origins
The prazos
Since the 16th century, the Portuguese Crown, which claimed ownership of the land inThe early chikunda
In the 17th and early 18th centuries, the term “chikunda” was not in general use for the armed retainers of a ''prazeiro'', who could include chattel slaves. However, although many chattel slaves were acquired by capture or purchase to undertake agricultural work, mining or as house-servants or craftsmen on the prazos, it was normal from the mid-18th century for the retainers who became soldiers or administrators to offer themselves as voluntary unfree dependents in return for protection and a prospect of advancement and enrichment. By the mid-18th century, the term chikunda, which probably derives from the bantu word kunda means “to conquer”, was reserved for the armed clients of the prazo owners, and other designations were used for personal or household slaves. The chikunda of each prazo came from diverse backgrounds, because ''prazeiros'' preferred recruits without local ties, but they developed a loyalty to the group to which they belonged. They were often recruited from areas of conflict or famine, offering themselves voluntarily or, in some cases, coming as captives. At their height in the 17th century, individual ''prazeiros'' such as António Lobo da Silva could have upwards of 5000 chikunda, some reputedly owning as many as 15000. In the mid-eighteenth century, the total chikunda population in Zambezia was estimated at 50000. In a survey of 1766, the two largest prazos were said to have around 700 and 500 chikunda. In early times, the chikunda were usually armed with bows and spears but, by the mid-18th century, some were armed with muskets. The chikunda usually lived in small fortified villages, often near the margins of the larger prazos. Each chikunda village was headed by the owner's deputy called a capitão, or headman. These villages generally produced food to support the chikunda and also made a contribution in cash or goods to their master. If the prazo owner was strong, the chikunda acted as a defence and police force, keeping order and collecting tribute, but under a weak owner or in times of famine, they could become little more than bandits, preying on local communities and disregarding their nominal patron. Individuals were incorporated into the ranks of the chikunda through a ritual under which they swore lifelong loyalty to the ''prazeiro''. However prosperous or anarchic they might become, the chikunda could only rarely become completely free of their patron, who guaranteed their status as warriors and their security. Some chikunda did manage to break away from their masters, leave their prazo and hunt for ivory in the Shire valley, where they competed with Yao traders in the mid-18th centuryDecline of the prazos
The great Mozambique drought of 1794 to 1802 and subsequent droughts and smallpox epidemics lasting into the 1830s destroyed the agricultural economy of the Zambezia prazos, as the cultivators could not feed themselves, let alone produce surpluses to maintain the chikunda and ''prazeiros''. Many chikunda deserted their prazos and some formed armed bands seeking any means to survive, so worsening the situation created by drought. Other former chikunda returned, or attempted to return, to their homelands and resume their old lives, or merged into the local peoples as peasants. A few used their military skills to become elephant hunters and, in the time of Ndebele incursions, they used their guns against the invaders. Some bands of chikunda became elephant hunters, and travelled as far north as the area around Nkhotakota and the Luangwa valley in search of new herds to exploit. They married women from the local Chewa and Tumbuka peoples and their offspring soon lost their identity as chikunda.The 19th century chikunda
The Afro-Goan statelets
By the 1840s, many of the former prazo owners that had survived the droughts and epidemics had left Zambezia and were replaced by five powerful families along the middle Zambezi, the da Cruz, Caetano Pereira, Vas dos Anjos, Ferrão and Alves da Silva, who were joined in the 1860s by a sixth family, the de Sousa. There were also several less prominent Afro-Portuguese families in this area and on the fringes of Portuguese influence. Most of these families were of Indian, or specifically Goanese, origin although the original Alves da Silva were from Portugal, and all of the families based their economy on the slave trade, despite its legal abolition in 1830, or hunting for ivory, rather than agriculture. Through intermarriage with the families of leading African chiefs, they were recognised as the legitimate holders of several chieftaincies by their African subjects and they adopted African titles and the indigenous symbols of kingship and patronised local religious cults, yet also received Portuguese offices or military ranks that gave them an official status. The areas controlled by the main families far exceeded those of earlier prazos, and they maintained large numbers of armed chikunda, said to number several thousand, although estimates vary. Their military strength was based on a combination of strong defensive fortifications and European firearms, including breech-loading rifles later in the 19th century. Their centres were fortified towns, called , which were a development of the traditional stockaded village. Each consisted of a wooden stockade, supported by earthworks in the form of a ditch and bank, often with inner walls protecting the more important sections of the town. One large , Massangano, had fortifications 1,300 metres long and 150 to 180 metres wide. These mainly Afro-Goan families formed what were in effect small independent states, giving at best token allegiance to the Portuguese crown. From the 1840s, their leaders attempted to extend their influence, either by forcing neighbouring African chiefs to acknowledge their sovereignty or driving out those that resisted. Several of the less prominent families included the Rosário Andrade, whose head was known as Kanyembe and who operated along the Upper Zambezi west of Zumbo, now the westernmost town in Mozambique, and the Arujo Lobo, whose head was called Matakenya and who operated in the Luangwa and LowerThe chikunda revived
In this period, the term chikunda (or achikunda with the collective prefix) was applied exclusively to the professional soldiers of the Afro-Goan or Afro-Portuguese families. These families maintained large numbers of chikunda, each having several thousand armed men at their disposal. The chikunda had ceased to be clients of the prazeros when the Zambezia agricultural system had collapsed, and they were now recruited through gifts of modern weapons, land or wives, and retained by being allowed to share of the profits of slave raiding. Some physically fit slaves were also selected, mostly from those areas north of the Zambezi that were the focus of raiding for slaves. Each of the Zambezia states had a significant force of chikunda divided into regiments, usually based near the borders of its territory to facilitate slave raiding and as protection against external threats. The 19th century chikunda set themselves apart from the populations among which they were quartered by living in separate villages and using aThe Zambezi wars
Portuguese attempts to co-opt the rulers of these minor Afro-Goan and Afro-Portuguese states into the colonial system by granting them full legal title to the land they occupied, tax exemptions and even sums of cash generally failed. Although these statelets extended the area of nominal Portuguese influence westward and fought off invading Ngoni incursions, their forces were used not only against indigenous African rulers but, from 1849, in fighting among themselves and even against any government forces sent against them. Until 1868, the governors of Mozambique and Tete had few troops of their own and preferred to use the chikunda of any ''prazeiros'' loyal to the Portuguese government or from any minor state opposed to whatever ruler they targeted, rather than using soldiers from metropolitan Portugal or Goa. These nominally loyal chikunda had been used with some success in the 1850s against slave trading by the Sultan of Angoche and the Pereira family, but two families continued to give the Portuguese governors trouble: the Vas dos Anjos in the Lower Shire and the da Cruz, who ruled a section of the middle Zambezi in Manica and Tete provinces, centred on the of Massangano. The Vas dos Anjos were forced out of their at Shamo, near the junction of the Shire and Zambezi in 1858, but were allowed to regroup further north up the Shire, near its confluence with the Ruo River; the da Cruz posed much more of a problem. After successes against Angoche and the Pereira and Vas dos Anjos families, the governor of Tete, Miguel Gouveia, assembled a force of chikunda from the prazos around Tete in July 1867 to attack Massangano, which was only a few days march away. However, Gouveia's force was ambushed by da Cruz chikunda while on route to Massangano: most of the government chikunda were massacred and Gouveia himself was executed by the da Cruz forces. Between November 1867 and May 1869, three more expeditions were sent against Massangano, with increasing numbers of troops from Portugal and Goa, artillery and assistance from the chikunda of the de Sousa state of Gorongosa. Each failed because of poor organisation, the effects of malaria on European soldiers and the desertion of local forces. The expedition of November 1867, mounted in the rainy season, managed to blockade the Massangano , but it ran out of supplies and ammunition, managing, however, to withdraw in good order. The next expedition of May 1868 managed to besiege Massangano and caused significant casualties among its defenders. However, the da Cruz chikunda counterattacked and routed the government forces, causing them heavy casualties. The last and largest expedition of May 1869 was partly defeated by its own size as there was insufficient river transport for the troops or their supplies. Da Cruz chikunda harassed those Portuguese forces that had to march overland to Massangano and their supply lines to such an extent that they could not invest the . Once the Portuguese began to retreat, the chikunda made night attacks that caused the Portuguese forces to scatter with heavy losses. Although the da Cruz were subsequently left in peace for about 20 years, and recognised as effectively autonomous, they made little use of their military successes and never became more than a bandit state, based on the slave trade and the tolls it could impose on river traffic, as they occupied a sparsely populated and infertile area. The formal abolition of the institution of slavery in Mozambique 1875 and of the prazo system in 1878 had little immediate effect on the Afro-Goan and Afro-Portuguese families. Just as the formal abolition of the slave trade in 1830 had simply promoted a clandestine trade that lasted into the 20th century, so the abolition of slavery made no immediate change to the unfree status and situation of the peasants in the minor states.Chikunda states
As economical and environmental degradation coupled with upheaval and migration of peoples took its toll on the ''prazos'', certain ex-chikunda took the initiative of fleeing north and northwest and establish their own states, modelled on the prazos. The most successful of these may have been José Rosário de Andrade, known as ''Kanyemba'' ("the ferocious"), who began assembling a private army in the 1870s and settled in the region of Bawa, two hundred kilometers west of Tete, from which he either traded with or raided the surrounding countryside. In the 1880s, this warlord was said to have 10000 chikunda at arms. Andrade died in the late nineteenth century, and by 1903 the Portuguese would defeat his state along with the rest of runaway chikunda forces.The end of the chikunda
The Scramble for Africa
In the second half of the 19th century, several European powers had increasing interests in Africa that could challenge Portugal's territorial claims, as it had no effective presence in the area betweenColonialism established
De Sousa's failure to secure more of northern Mashonaland in 1887 allowed Rhodes to contest Portuguese claims in that area. Rhodes' troops arrested de Sousa in 1890 and drove his chikunda out of parts of Barue and Rupire before the definitive Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1891 assigned virtually all the contested areas to Portugal. However, after being released, de Sousa was unable to re-establish his control of Barue before being killed in his 1892 attempt to do so. Barue reverted to being an African kingdom, and much of de Sousa's original Gorongosa domain fell under the control of his former lieutenants. The 1891 treaty prevented the chikunda of the Rosário Andrade and Arujo Lobo families from raiding in the areas of the Luangwa and Kafue valleys that were now British territory or selling slaves to the Ndebele kingdom after it was conquered by theReferences
Sources
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