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Resource Monotonicity
Resource monotonicity (RM; aka aggregate monotonicity) is a principle of fair division. It says that, if there are more resources to share, then all agents should be weakly better off; no agent should lose from the increase in resources. The RM principle has been studied in various division problems. Allocating divisible resources Single homogeneous resource, general utilities Suppose society has m units of some homogeneous divisible resource, such as water or flour. The resource should be divided among n agents with different utilities. The utility of agent i is represented by a function u_i; when agent i receives y_i units of resource, he derives from it a utility of u_i(y_i). Society has to decide how to divide the resource among the agents, i.e, to find a vector y_1,\dots,y_n such that: y_1+\cdots+y_n = m. Two classic allocation rules are the egalitarian rule - aiming to equalize the utilities of all agents (equivalently: maximize the minimum utility), and the utilitari ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Fair Division
Fair division is the problem in game theory of dividing a set of resources among several people who have an entitlement to them so that each person receives their due share. That problem arises in various real-world settings such as division of inheritance, partnership dissolutions, divorce settlements, electronic frequency allocation, airport traffic management, and exploitation of Earth Observation Satellite, Earth observation satellites. It is an active research area in mathematics, economics (especially social choice theory), dispute resolution, etc. The central tenet of fair division is that such a division should be performed by the players themselves, maybe using a mediation, mediator but certainly not an arbitration, arbiter as only the players really know how they value the goods. The archetypal fair division algorithm is divide and choose. It demonstrates that two agents with different tastes can divide a cake such that each of them believes that he got the best piece. The ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Leximin Order
In mathematics, leximin order is a total preorder on finite-dimensional vectors. A more accurate, but less common term is leximin preorder. The leximin order is particularly important in social choice theory and fair division. Definition A vector x = (''x''1, ..., ''x''''n'') is ''leximin-larger'' than a vector y = (''y''1, ..., ''y''''n'') if one of the following holds: * The smallest element of x is larger than the smallest element of y; * The smallest elements of both vectors are equal, and the second-smallest element of x is larger than the second-smallest element of y; * ... * The ''k'' smallest elements of both vectors are equal, and the (''k''+1)-smallest element of x is larger than the (''k''+1)-smallest element of y. Examples The vector (3,5,3) is leximin-larger than (4,2,4), since the smallest element in the former is 3 and in the latter is 2. The vector (4,2,4) is leximin-larger than (5,3,2), since the smallest elements in both are 2, but the second-smallest elem ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Econometrica
''Econometrica'' is a peer-reviewed academic journal of economics, publishing articles in many areas of economics, especially econometrics. It is published by Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of the Econometric Society. The current editor-in-chief is Guido Imbens. History ''Econometrica'' was established in 1933. Its first editor was Ragnar Frisch, recipient of the first Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1969, who served as an editor from 1933 to 1954. Although ''Econometrica'' is currently published entirely in English, the first few issues also contained scientific articles written in French. Indexing and abstracting ''Econometrica'' is abstracted and indexed in: * Scopus * EconLit * Social Science Citation Index According to the '' Journal Citation Reports'', the journal has a 2020 impact factor The impact factor (IF) or journal impact factor (JIF) of an academic journal is a scientometric index calculated by Clarivate that reflects the yearly mean number o ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives
The independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), also known as binary independence or the independence axiom, is an axiom of decision theory and various social sciences. The term is used in different connotation in several contexts. Although it always attempts to provide an account of rational individual behavior or aggregation of individual preferences, the exact formulation differs widely in both language and exact content. Perhaps the easiest way to understand the axiom is how it pertains to casting a ballot. There the axiom says that if Charlie (the irrelevant alternative) enters a race between Alice and Bob, with Alice (leader) liked better than Bob (runner-up), then the individual voter who likes Charlie less than Alice will not switch his vote from Alice to Bob. Because of this, a violation of IIA is commonly referred to as the "spoiler effect": support for Charlie "spoils" the election for Alice, while it "logically" should not have. After all, Alice ''was'' liked better ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Pareto Optimality
Pareto efficiency or Pareto optimality is a situation where no action or allocation is available that makes one individual better off without making another worse off. The concept is named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), Italian civil engineer and economist, who used the concept in his studies of economic efficiency and income distribution. The following three concepts are closely related: * Given an initial situation, a Pareto improvement is a new situation where some agents will gain, and no agents will lose. * A situation is called Pareto-dominated if there exists a possible Pareto improvement. * A situation is called Pareto-optimal or Pareto-efficient if no change could lead to improved satisfaction for some agent without some other agent losing or, equivalently, if there is no scope for further Pareto improvement. The Pareto front (also called Pareto frontier or Pareto set) is the set of all Pareto-efficient situations. Pareto originally used the word "optimal" for th ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Kalai–Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution
The Kalai–Smorodinsky (KS) bargaining solution is a solution to the Bargaining problem. It was suggested by Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky, as an alternative to Nash's bargaining solution suggested 25 years earlier. The main difference between the two solutions is that the Nash solution satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives while the KS solution satisfies monotonicity. Setting A two-person bargain problem consists of a pair (F,d): * A feasible agreements set F. This is a closed convex subset of \mathbb^2. Each element of F represents a possible agreement between the players. The coordinates of an agreement are the utilities of the players if this agreement is implemented. The assumption that F is convex makes sense, for example, when it is possible to combine agreements by randomization. * A disagreement point d=(d_1, d_2), where d_1 and d_2 are the respective payoffs to player 1 and player 2 when the bargaining terminates without an agreement. It is assumed that ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Bargaining Problem
Cooperative bargaining is a process in which two people decide how to share a surplus that they can jointly generate. In many cases, the surplus created by the two players can be shared in many ways, forcing the players to negotiate which division of payoffs to choose. Such surplus-sharing problems (also called bargaining problem) are faced by management and labor in the division of a firm's profit, by trade partners in the specification of the terms of trade, and more. The present article focuses on the ''normative'' approach to bargaining. It studies how the surplus ''should'' be shared, by formulating appealing axioms that the solution to a bargaining problem should satisfy. It is useful when both parties are willing to cooperate in implementing the fair solution. The five axioms, any Nash Bargaining Solution should satisfy are Pareto Optimality (PAR), Individual Rationality (IR), Independent of Expected Utility Representations (INV), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
House Monotonicity
House monotonicity (also called house-size monotonicity) is a property of apportionment methods and multiwinner voting systems. These are methods for allocating seats in a parliament among federal states (or among political party). The property says that, if the number of seats in the "house" (the parliament) increases, and the method is re-activated, then no state should have less seats than it previously had. A method that fails to satisfy house-monotonicity is said to have the Alabama paradox. House monotonicity is the special case of ''resource monotonicity'' for the setting in which the resource consists of identical discrete items (the seats). Methods violating house-monotonicity An example of a method violating house-monotonicity is the largest remainder method (= Hamilton's method). Consider the following instance with three states: When one seat is added to the house, the share of state C decreases from 2 to 1. This occurs because increasing the number of seats incre ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Mathematics Of Apportionment
Mathematics of apportionment describes mathematical principles and algorithms for fair allocation of identical items among parties with different entitlements. Such principles are used to apportion seats in parliaments among federal states or political parties. See apportionment (politics) for the more concrete principles and issues related to apportionment, and apportionment by country for practical methods used around the world. Mathematically, an apportionment method is just a method of rounding fractions to integers. As simple as it may sound, each and every method for rounding suffers from one or more paradoxes. The mathematical theory of apportionment aims to decide what paradoxes can be avoided, or in other words, what properties can be expected from an apportionment method. The mathematical theory of apportionment was studied as early as 1907 by the mathematician Agner Krarup Erlang. It was later developed to a great detail by the mathematician Michel Balinsky and the ec ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Picking Sequence
A picking sequence is a protocol for fair item assignment. Suppose ''m'' items have to be divided among ''n'' agents. One way to allocate the items is to let one agent select a single item, then let another agent select a single item, and so on. A picking-sequence is a sequence of ''m'' agent-names, where each name determines what agent is the next to pick an item. As an example, suppose 4 items have to be divided between Alice and Bob. Some possible picking sequences are: * AABB - Alice picks two items, then Bob picks the two remaining items. * ABAB - Alice picks one item, then Bob picks one item, then Alice again, then Bob again. This is more "fair" than AABB since it lets Bob more chance to get a better item. * ABBA - Alice picks one item, then Bob picks two items, then Alice receives the remaining item. This is intuitively even more "fair" than ABAB, since, in ABAB, Bob is always behind of Alice, while ABBA is more balanced. Advantages A picking-sequence has several merits as ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Round-robin Item Allocation
Round robin is a procedure for fair item allocation. It can be used to allocate several indivisible items among several people, such that the allocation is "almost" envy-free: each agent believes that the bundle he received is at least as good as the bundle of any other agent, when at most one item is removed from the other bundle. In sports, the round-robin procedure is called a draft. Setting There are ''m'' objects to allocate, and ''n'' people ("agents") with equal rights to these objects. Each person has different preferences over the objects. The preferences of an agent are given by a vector of values - a value for each object. It is assumed that the value of a bundle for an agent is the sum of the values of the objects in the bundle (in other words, the agents' valuations are an additive set function on the set of objects). Description The protocol proceeds as follows: # Number the people arbitrarily from 1 to n; # While there are unassigned objects: #* Let each per ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Envy-graph Procedure
The envy-graph procedure (also called the envy-cycles procedure) is a procedure for fair item allocation. It can be used by several people who want to divide among them several discrete items, such as heirlooms, sweets, or seats in a class. Ideally, we would like the allocation to be envy-free (EF). i.e., to give each agent a bundle that he/she prefers over the bundles of all other agents. However, the items are discrete and cannot be cut, so an envy-free assignment might be impossible (for example, consider a single item and two agents). The envy-graph procedure aims to achieve the "next-best" option -- ''envy-freeness up to at most a single good'' (EF1): it finds an allocation in which the envy of every person towards every other person is bounded by the maximum marginal utility it derives from a single item. In other words, for every two people ''i'' and ''j'', there exists an item such that, if that item is removed, ''i'' does not envy ''j''. The procedure was presented by Lip ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
